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Dear Reader,

The Internal Security Service will have celebrated its 95th anniversary by the time this annual review is published. Looking back at 2014, I have to admit that it was quite a complicated period in the history of the Service and our country.

In November 2013, Ukrainians refused to be diverted from their path towards Europe. In February 2014, brutal murders were committed to try and muffle their pursuit of complete independence. As we know, the Russian Federation responded to Ukraine’s independent-mindedness by the annexation of Crimea and the creation and leadership of armed separatism. For the second time since WWII, the territorial integrity of a sovereign state has been changed by armed assault. It happened first in Georgia in 2008, and then too it was Russia that attacked its neighbour.

These events have crucially changed the way Estonia and all of Europe understand Russia. Russia has attempted to split NATO and EU partners by a policy of divide and rule, while the West is actually showing greater unity following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A common security area among allies often implies common concerns. One of these is the penetration of Islamism into Europe. Events in Syria seem relatively distant from an Estonian perspective. At the beginning of 2015, the Estonian public became aware of people participating in military activity in Syria, both on the side of the jihadists and against them. Although we can count the foreign fighters on the fingers of one hand, there is cause for concern because, as events in France at the beginning of 2015 showed, terrorists returning from Syria present a serious security risk.

September 2014 posed a challenge for our Service. One of our staff has not been with us for over seven months now. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) kidnapped Eston Kohver and is still holding him...
in custody. By this act, Russia violated international law – both written international agreements and international practice. It is appropriate to remind Russia, which often portrays itself as the spokesperson of international law, of the clause in the 1899 Hague Convention formulated by the international law jurist Friedrich Fromhold Martens, who originated from Estonia and represented Russia at the time: “Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued … populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.” This principle should apply universally.

Since 1999 we have shared our security analyses and conclusions with the Estonian and international public through our annual reviews. By providing information on security threats, our annual review has helped prevent various threats. To that end, we use all the means, material and legal, entrusted to us by the people and our democratic government. These include the right to collect information covertly and to share information and conclusions with the public. It is the duty of this Service to use these legitimate means as required to counter security threats. However, permission for or denial of legal means is the competence and responsibility of the legislature and, in certain cases, the judicial authorities, rather than the Internal Security Service itself.

The menace of Russia’s actions is no longer underestimated. But it is equally important not to go to the other extreme. Our decisions must not be guided by fear. It is important to recognise threats and act wisely in order to avoid fatal decisions.

The Internal Security Service has its role in guaranteeing cyber security. We share our observations and advice, so that the Estonian people can themselves contribute to this.

Corruption as a threat to security in certain situations features once again a topic in this report. Greater emphasis is this time placed on preventive information. There is room for improvement in this area. We have noticed that sometimes messages are not received, nor the necessary decisions taken.

We feel the responsibility to share the valuable experience of Estonia. Based on international support received in the 1990s, we consider it important to assist those partners who have asked for help in implementing the operations of a security service of a democratic state, thus creating the preconditions for ensuring the long-term stability of the region.

Arnold Sinisalu
DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The Internal Security Service has the duty to defend Estonia’s constitutional order, i.e. prevent and control security threats that may lead to the overthrow of democratic state authority. Security threats can be basically divided into three categories: direct, indirect, and threats opposing general safety. In 2014, constitutional order was not directly threatened in Estonia and the general security of the country was ensured, while indirect threats arising from the foreign policy decisions of Russia continue to require the attention of security authorities.

Events in Ukraine and intensification of the international situation

The Russian aggression in Ukraine is a serious concern for the whole world. After the events of 2008 in Georgia, Europe once again had reason to be concerned about military threats. The actions of Russia and the East Ukrainian separatists it leads show no intention of ending the conflict, and its escalation cannot be ruled out. The planning and implementation of Estonia’s military defence is, naturally, the duty of the Ministry of Defence and the Estonian Defence Forces rather than the Internal Security Service. We can say, though, that, as a response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, both military cooperation within NATO and our cooperation with allies and partner services have intensified, and we are experiencing greater consensus in the preparation of threat assessments and planning of countermeasures.

Looking back at last year, we can see that, in parallel with attacking Ukraine, Russia’s formerly somnolent influence operations became overtly threatening towards the entire Western world. There was a lot of talk in 2014 about hybrid war in the world – the use of non-military influence as a “tool” of warfare. It is therefore...
important to recognise Russia’s influence operations and to be able to counter the threats arising from them.

One of the strategic goals of the Russian Federation is to prevent countries on the former territory of the Russian Empire from integrating with NATO or the European Union. Putin’s regime regards democracy and other Western values that impede its imperialist endeavours, and also NATO, as a security threat and has set out to prevent integration. In order to prepare the ground in target societies to achieve this aim, the Kremlin uses information as the tool of influence operations. To achieve influential power, Russia disseminates messages designed to change thinking in the target societies. Rather than a Western mentality, it advocates integration of the east. Russia has had some success in this area, as the EU’s Eastern Partnership countries, Belarus and Armenia, have preferred to join a partnership with Russia and Kazakhstan in the form of a common customs union. When influence operations or political measures are no longer effective, Russia does not refrain from direct military aggression, as we saw in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014.

There were no serious ethnic conflicts in Ukraine before the aggression of the Putin regime in 2014, but what the international public sees there now is “separatists” supplied with modern military equipment requiring specialist knowledge and lengthy training. The occupation and annexation of Crimea with the help of Russian armed forces showed how Putin’s regime actually uses its segregation policy known as “compatriot policy” to set ethnic groups apart. The occupation of Crimea was accompanied in Russian-controlled media by anti-Western hysteria and long worn-out accusations of Nazism, which also became an important element in the influence operations targeted at the Russian diaspora. Russia’s government-controlled media have repeatedly accused the US and EU member states of artificially creating the Ukraine crisis and of a desire to break down Putin’s regime and fragment Russia’s territory by sanctions.

**Extreme left- and right-wingers gain popularity by contrasting each other, while demonstrating sympathy for the Kremlin for various reasons.**

**Putin’s regime and extremism in Europe**

2014 was a successful year for those on the European extreme right and left. The number of extremists and right- and left-wing populists in the European Parliament multiplied as a result of the European elections. These parties won elections in the UK, Denmark and Greece; furthermore, representatives were sent to the European Parliament by parties such as the National Democratic Party of Germany, Hungary’s Jobbik and Golden Dawn in Greece. At the same time, opponents of the EU were unable to establish their own faction in Strasbourg and they remain either as individual members or belong to other factions.

It is a concern that extreme left- and right-wingers gain popularity by contrasting each other, while demonstrating sympathy for the Kremlin for various reasons. Left-wing populists groundlessly consider Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, a bearer of leftist values, while right-wingers see support for their Christian-conservative values in Russia’s face as they view it in a distorting mirror. In 2014, representatives of various European extremist parties, both left- and right-wing, participated as observers in the “elections” held in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and supported Crimea’s annexation. In return, Russia extended grants and loans to them and held negotiations on further cooperation. This union, which seems impossible at first sight, between a country preparing to celebrate “70 years since its victory over fascism”, on one hand, and right-wing populist European
Extremists, who hide behind the slogan of antifascism, are henchmen of the Kremlin whose business is to effectively instigate hostility.

**Extremism without a broad base in Estonia**

Russia’s wish to weaken the West without choosing its means implies, in the Estonian context, that this country’s extremists are logically an object of interest for Russia. Estonia’s extreme right- and left-wingers have become less active in recent years and, when looking back at 2014, there is no reason to mention any extremism presenting a threat to national security. Extremist activities were limited to a few minor concerts or demonstrations. Extremists are continuing to attempt to achieve political success, but this will depend on the protest votes of people disappointed in other parties, as extremists have so far not been able to win the voters’ support for their own ideas.

Great Russian chauvinists are also marginal in Estonia. In connection with events in Ukraine, certain people related to the extremist group Nochnoy (Night Watch) became more active in spring 2014, but their attempts to involve Estonia’s Russian-speaking community in actions supporting Russia’s activities in Ukraine failed. These extremists, who hide behind the slogan of antifascism, are henchmen of the Kremlin whose business is to effectively instigate hostility. Board members of the Russian GONGO¹ Mir Bez Natsizma (World Without Nazism) participated in the Crimean referendum of 16 March 2014 as “international observers from Estonia”, although they had been permanently residing in Russia for some time. On 28 September 2014, one of them visited the Donbass as a member of the “international group of observers” put together by the Russian Federation (the Russian media called them “OSCE observers”). The same extremists were regularly used as spokespersons and “experts” in the dissemination of messages against the Baltic countries.

**The Russian understanding of “soft power”**

At the end of October 2014, the Political Analysis Centre (PAC) in Moscow published the analysis “Russian Soft Power” (Russkaya Soft Power). Even though this is not a state-level document and the PAC is only a think tank of the state-owned information agency TASS, it gives an idea of what is understood as soft power in Russia and what its aim is in the Western world.

According to the document, Russia’s soft power is primarily understood as its foreign policy propaganda aiming to influence public opinion and organisations, as well as the political and economic elite, in the Western world in line with Russia’s foreign-policy interests. Surprisingly, the document concludes that Russia’s soft power (i.e. propaganda) should be used not only in foreign countries, but also within Russia itself, where “negative myths about Russia” are spreading. The document concludes that cooperation is needed with everyone who shows sympathy for Russia: opinion leaders, business figures, representatives of the academic world, public organisations, political parties and politicians, regardless of their political views, i.e. not excluding left- and right-wing extremists or even various conspiracy theorists.

There is essentially nothing new in this approach and we have discussed it before. The objective of Russia’s influence operations, including the segregation policy labelled as “compatriot policy”, is to disturb the integrity of the target country’s society, to deepen and amplify existing ethnic, social, economic, regional and other differences, and often also to artificially create and instigate such distinctions. It also aims to label and derogate the target countries or their social and political forces in the eyes of the international public and allies, and to destroy the unity of the Western world. All this is also evident in Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine and its information operations against the West.

The anti-Estonian messages delivered by Russia’s influence operations have largely remained the same over the past year. Estonia is still accused of discriminating against its Russian-speaking population and of favouring Nazism; it is presented as a failed country with no prospects, and attempts are made to undermine the unity of the European Union and NATO.

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¹ GONGO = government-organised non-governmental organisation.
Despite years of Russian influence operations in Russia itself and garish lies in the Russian government-controlled media, the vast majority of Estonia’s Russian-speaking population can easily distinguish the hostile propaganda from Estonia’s reality. We do not have the manifestations of separatism that many foreign journalists came to look for in Estonia at the time of events in Ukraine. Now and then, websites appear in support of the idea of autonomy for Ida-Virumaa, predominantly the Russian-speaking county in north-eastern Estonia, but they lack any real content or support.

**Exploitation of Russian expatriates**

Allegedly defending the rights of the Russian-speaking population was and is one of the pretexts for the intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, just as Georgia was attacked in August 2008 under the pretence of protecting Russian citizens. This is why this narrative of the Russian Federation should be taken with all seriousness.

It is worth mentioning the statement by Anatoly Makarov, director of a department in the Russian foreign ministry and executive secretary of a government commission, that anti-Russian sentiment and discrimination against Russian-speaking populations intensified in 2014, particularly in the Baltic countries.

In order for Russia’s accusations to be heard, adherents of the Kremlin’s narrative are published in the Russian-language media, they are invited at the organisers’ expense to events in Russia, and their participation in events held by international organisations such as the OSCE and UN is funded. They are also used as the spokespersons of Russian influence operations and their reliability as “experts” in the field is boosted, even though some of them earned their fame through theft or corruption.

To achieve these goals, the Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad was established in 2012 to fund, train and support the people who purport to protect Russian expatriates. They are paid to write reports on the difficult situation of Russians in the countries where they live, so that Russia can later justify its actions by reference.
to these reports. The fund also supports the organisation of conferences to present Russia’s point of view in countries of domicile and abroad.

One of the organisations thus funded is the Tallinn-based non-profit organisation Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR), which also conducts its mission for Russia. Supported by the fund, the LICHR held events in Tallinn and Moscow to mark its 20th anniversary. On 28–29 November 2014 it organised a conference in Tallinn entitled “Human Rights in Contemporary Estonia: The Practical Experience of LICHR”, the organisers’ reports and presentations of which fully supported the views of the event’s funder – the Russian Federation – on the violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. The Russian compilation “Russian-Speaking Population of Estonia and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities” was presented at the conference, which was also commissioned and funded by the compatriot fund. An abridged English version of the compilation was also published.

**Media projects of Russia’s influence operations**

The analysis “Russian Soft Power” finds that Russia has the instruments necessary to implement its foreign-policy propaganda (or “soft power”, as Russia calls it), but these should clearly be improved and integrated, and their coordination strengthened. The main instruments are new propaganda channels targeted at foreign countries. An example is the establishment of the Russian state information agency Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today) in 2013. This was preceded by the launch of the English-language TV channel Russia Today (which also broadcasts news in Arabic, Spanish and German), now known as RT, part of the information agency Rossiya Segodnya. A new project of Rossiya Segodnya, the multimedia channel Sputnik, has the ambition of broadcasting multimedia content through radio stations, websites and press centres in 34 languages, including Estonian. By the time this annual review is published, Sputnik will have begun a search for journalists in Estonia. Sputnik’s Baltic operations are led by Andrey Bagodyrenko.
The Baltnews project

Another example is the launch of the Baltnews media brand in the Baltic countries, funded by Rossiya Segodnya. This media project was launched in October 2014 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the form of the Russian-language web portals baltnews.ee, baltnews.lv and baltnews.lt. Plans include adding multimedia content and (web) TV and radio capabilities to these channels. The operations of the website baltnews.ee are led in Estonia by Aleksandr Kornilov, a member of the local Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots and head of the propaganda portal baltija.eu. The project is funded via Media Capital Holding BV, a company registered in the Netherlands and controlled by people related to Rossiya Segodnya. One of the founders of the Baltnews project was Vladimir Lepekhin, director of the Eurasian Economic Community Institute, who actively participates in Russia’s influence operations in neighbouring countries and visited Estonia in spring 2014. Lepekhin is the member of Club Zynoveev, founded by Rossiya Segodnya and Intsitute of Alexander Zynovev’s Biography. Co-chairman of this Kremlin propaganda think-tank is director general of Club Zynoveev Dmitry Kiselev. Lepekhin discussed the launch and funding of the Baltnews project at meetings with Kornilov and other compatriots.

Historical propaganda plays a key role in justifying the actions and conquests of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy.

Impressum media project

Impressum was created in 2008 by Igor Teterin, publisher of Komsomolskaya Pravda v Severnoi Evrope (i.e. Northern Europe edition) and Galina Sapozhnikova, a journalist at Komsomolskaya Pravda, in order to organise directed discussion on topics relevant to Russian influence operations. Impressum has organised regular anti-Estonian propaganda events since the autumn of 2008.

This propaganda club in Estonia is known to be the first on the territory of countries of the former Soviet Union, which Russia considers to be in its sphere of influence. The same group has expanded its activities in Russia’s neighbouring countries year by year. In July 2009, Galina Sapozhnikova led the establishment of the club Format-A3 in Moldova and Crimea, Ukraine, which uses an identical format and the same presenters as Impressum. The next expansion took place in September 2010 when the Skovoroda Club was founded in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital. In April 2011 Format-A3 began to organise evening meetings in Latvia, and in the autumn of 2012 in Lithuania. All these clubs – Impressum, Format-A3 and the Skovoroda Club – have the same content. The events organised by Impressum are characterised by the absence of any free exchange of ideas and, rather, the dissemination of the core messages of Russia’s influence operations. Guests must pre-register and submit their questions in writing, after which the organisers select the questions which are deemed suitable for discussion.

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2 http://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/
3 http://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20150224/1049552949.html
Historical propaganda

Russia’s rhetoric in the interpretation of events in Ukraine has shown very clearly how history can be used as an effective propaganda weapon and a means of influence. We have regularly discussed Russia’s so-called “fight against the falsification of history”, the actual content of which is to create a narrative favourable to Russia and to legitimise its geopolitical policies.

For years, Russia has vocally accused the Baltic countries and Ukraine of heroising Nazism and of collaboration during WWII. These groundless and worn-out accusations consistently disseminated by Russia are not accidental opinions, but almost a cornerstone in Russia’s sphere-of-influence policy. It is true that, for the people of Russia, the victory in WWII (“The Great Patriotic War”) has become mythologised and a slogan that can still be used to mobilise the masses. This is why the Kremlin is currently making huge efforts to present the aggression against Ukraine as a newly erupted fight against Nazism. It also wishes to make the world believe that Russia has an inalienable historical and moral right to fight that battle, a right that outweighs international law4 – or rather, precludes any concern for international or any other law.

Historical propaganda plays a key role in justifying the actions and conquests of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy. By hushing up the collaboration between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany from 23 August 1939 to 22 June 1941, and instead of recognising the annexations that started with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and the crimes of communism, Russia employs the tactics of attack, accusing its neighbours of Nazism. Attempts have been made to incriminate both Ukraine and the Baltic countries of collaboration with Nazi Germany. In parallel with labeling the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fascist, Russia has continuously tried to disparage the armed struggle for freedom of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after WWII and their resistance to Soviet occupation.

It has become a tradition in Russian propaganda to criticise and relate to Nazism the commemorative events at the site of the WWII Battle of Narva in Ida-Virumaa. 2014 was no exception. The Estonian media, however, paid more attention to the failed attempt by the journalists Maxim Gritsenko and Vyacheslav Amelyutin of the Zvezda TV channel, which belongs to the Russian defence ministry, to cover the event in a manner suitable for Russia. On 25 July 2014, the journalists presented false press passes of a Ukrainian TV channel to Estonian Police and Border Guard officials at Tallinn airport, as a result of which the journalists’ visas were cancelled and they were returned to Moscow the next day.

In the context of the military action in Ukraine, Russia’s accusations

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4 Russian Investigative Committee called for an end to the precedence of international law over Russia’s domestic law, calling it a “sabotage” of the Russian Constitution. [https://pressmas.com/Interpreter_Mag/press/7141](https://pressmas.com/Interpreter_Mag/press/7141)
of Nazism take on a more serious meaning because they can be used, as we saw, to justify an armed conflict. It is no accident that old, fabricated news stories according to which NATO and Estonia were training Ukrainian nationalists here were once again disseminated by Russian TV channels in spring 2014. It is important to recognise and prevent such information operations and manipulation of the facts in future.

2015 will see the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, on which occasion Russia is planning grandiose celebrations. Given the current political situation at home and abroad, Russia is interested in wide dissemination and popularisation of the historical approach on which its conquests are based. At the end of 2014, a draft plan for a new government-financed fund, Istoria Otechestva (History of the Fatherland), was published. This fund will be given the task of introducing the history of Russia at home and abroad, and to support history education programmes. The initiative for the fund came from the Russian Historical Society, which was revived in 2012 and is led by Sergey Naryshkin, chairman of the State Duma and head of the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attemps to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests. The media has opined that the new fund’s activity will be similar to that of another Russian government fund, Russkii Mir, which supports the segregation of Russian expatriates.

History is an important propaganda weapon for Russia, which is why special services have always been involved in this area. On 17 December 2014 it was decided at a session of the FSB’s public committee in Moscow that “a decisive counterblow must be delivered in 2015 against falsifiers of history and attempts to heroise Nazi criminals”. In connection with the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, special attention is paid to justifying the wartime activities of the Soviet security services. The application of a similar mechanism of government control to research and the creation of an atmosphere of fear will not contribute to the development of an objective and research-based approach to history, but will, rather, further isolate Russia from the international community.

An insight into what Russia understands as a “counterblow to the falsification of history” is offered by a statement by the Bryansk branch of the Izborsk Club, which speaks of “defiling the Great Victory of 1945 by defiling the role of the supreme commander”. The statement glorifies Stalin as an ingenious army commander, a promoter of culture and the economy, and the creator of the Soviet Union’s power, while justifying the political repression committed under his leadership. The document also links the approach to history with the Ukrainian war: “We can see the results of this historical diversion in Ukraine. It began with the idea of a ‘Stalinist Holodomor’ [famine] and the erection of monuments to this ‘crime’ on Ukrainian territory, and ended with the country’s renunciation of its heroic history, with the bloody Maidan and civil war.” Finally, the Izborsk Club demands that defiling the name of Stalin be recognised as a betrayal of the “heroic deed of our great forefathers”.

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5 For more about the Izborsk Club, see our 2013 Annual Review [link]
Intelligence operations are bound to be rather conservative in essence, even despite certain changes in tactics and the development of technology in the form of cyber intelligence. There is still a need for the recruitment of human sources as well, and this is exactly what is happening. The main targets are still politicians, servicemen, diplomats, opinion leaders (including journalists), specialists in computing and communication, and employees of the special services.

The aggressive intelligence operations of Russia’s secret services in Europe continued throughout 2014. This is confirmed by the fact that, during the year, several European countries expelled Russian intelligence officers who had been operating under diplomatic cover. Estonia was no exception.

The main events in Estonia in 2015 – the parliamentary elections and the formation of a new government, the presence of the military contingent of our allies and the steps taken by Estonia and our partners in the EU and NATO – are of special interest to the secret services of hostile countries. Increasing interest means severe intelligence activities against Estonia and its people. As formal relations with Russian Federation keep turning colder, more intense espionage is to be expected under non traditional covers. The influence operations directed at Estonia, that were a subject in the previous chapter, are also expected to intensify.

The Gerasimov Doctrine

In January 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, gave a lecture at the Academy of Military Science in Moscow about new developments in the forms and methods of using the armed forces (hereafter referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine), which contained several important statements. A little over a year later, the focal points of the Russian general’s lecture acquired a whole new meaning. According to Gerasimov, the “rules of war” have changed fundamentally in the world we live in today and the role of non-military means in achieving political and strategic goals has increased significantly.

In certain situations, non-military methods can be even more effective than guns. According to the Gerasimov Doctrine, non-military means include: formation of coalitions and alliances, finding ways to regulate conflict, use of political and diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and blockades, breaking diplomatic relations, shifting the state’s economy onto a war footing, formation of a political opposition, activities of opposition forces, replacement of the politico-military elite and détente between the relevant countries. Military means, on the other hand, include measures of strategic deterrence, strategic repositioning of troops, peacekeeping operations and acts of war.

The Gerasimov Doctrine sees information warfare as both a non-military and a military measure, which means that psychological operations are used in peacetime (during crises) as well as in wartime. Nowadays, the methods typical of asymmetric warfare are widely used, making it possible to reduce the enemy’s advantage in armed conflict. Such methods include the use of special forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front throughout the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as information warfare, while the forms and method of the latter are perfected all the time. Non-military methods – political, economic and informational, as well as humanitarian – are applied in combination with the potential for protest among the population of the target state. All this is, in turn, supplemented by military means of a concealed nature, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and special forces operations. The open use of the armed forces acting in the guise of peacekeeping operations is resorted to only at a later stage of the conflict, once it becomes necessary for the achievement of final success. We can therefore say that the Gerasimov Doctrine sums up the warfare theory of the next generation of Russian military strategists, which is characterised by the use of a mixture of non-military and military means to achieve one’s goals (aka hybrid warfare).
So, if we want to examine the role of the Russian secret services again, this time in light of the Gerasimov Doctrine, we have to remember that the Russians’ definition of the term “intelligence operations” has always differed from that of the Western world. Even though the definitions can vary a bit from country to country as well, most Western countries have always defined and still define intelligence operations as the gathering of classified information. However, the approach carried over from the Soviet Union is fundamentally different. The First Chief Directorate of the KGB responsible for the Soviet Union’s foreign intelligence operations (predecessor of the present-day SVR) defined intelligence operations as “a secret form of political struggle” that uses means and methods of a concealed character to gather classified information and implement active measures in order to influence the opponents and weaken their political, economic, scientific, technical and military positions. We have no reason to believe that this definition has changed fundamentally, even though some details have indeed been altered – for example, active measures have been renamed, and are now called “support measures”.

The methods of influence operations have become significantly more elaborate thanks to developments in technology; however, their very essence – the goal of influencing public opinion in and the decision-making processes of democratic countries – has remained the same. The gathering of classified information is masterfully combined with the act of spreading information.

We can see that Russia is implementing the Gerasimov Doctrine to fulfil its goals beyond Crimea and Ukraine as a whole as well. In recent years, the Russian Federation has employed all possible means to battle the so-called unipolar world order dominated by the United States. Russia has been working systematically towards inhibiting transatlantic cooperation and creating an atmosphere of doubt and mistrust among the member states of the EU and NATO.

This has also been one of the main goals of the special services of the Russian Federation in the past year, especially when it comes to the invasion of Ukraine. The measures employed by the secret services of the Russian Federation to achieve their goals include the influencing of opinion leaders, pressuring the political elite via the business sector, and exploitation of the press (which is often possible due to general naivety) to spread messages important for Russian foreign policy.

For the past year, the Republic of Estonia has also been a target of similar influence operations. The fact that a phone conversation between the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was somehow “leaked” and ended up on Russia Today in March 2014 is a good example. The “sincere” confession of Uno Puusepp, a former employee of the Estonian Internal Security Service, in an interview given to a Russian TV channel, can also be placed in this category. One of the goals of this TV show was to damage the international reputation of the Estonian security authorities. The last similar documentary about Estonia was aired after the capture of the traitor Herman Simm in 2008 – the security authorities of other European countries have faced the same problem. As a rule, secret services never expose the people they have recruited for secret operations. A criminal investigation has been launched to check the statements presented in the TV programme.

In some European countries, Russia’s influence operations have indeed had some success, often due to the historical background of those countries or close commercial ties with Russia. This is why we sometimes hear the representatives of certain European countries expressing opinions that may not always coincide with our usual understanding of the relationship with Russia. Upon closer examination, however, it often turns out that the people expressing their “opinions” have business interests in Russia. Money talks. Unfortunately, this merely shows that the Russian secret services are inextricably intertwined with the business sector. On one hand, the secret services act in the best interests of the businessmen (because they have been ordered to, but also on their own initiative). On the other, business has also proved to be a good cover for intelligence activities and – as stated above – half of intelligence activities are, by Russia’s own definition, made up of influence operations.

We should add, however, that such statements in support of Russia are usually only aimed at simplifying international and commercial relations with Russia. In its day-to-day activities, the Estonian Internal Security Service has not detected any such discrepancy between the attitudes of different European countries towards Russia. Quite the contrary, in fact – our colleagues working for the security services of other Western countries have a very clear and uniform understanding of the dangers resulting from the current activities of the secret services of the Russian Federation. The dangers are analysed in close cooperation with partners, and the consequent reactions are adequate.

In December 2014, Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine for the Russian Federation that contains, among other things, a section characterising modern military conflicts. The description coincides with the contents of the Gerasimov Doctrine – meaning that the idea of hybrid warfare has been formalised in Russia’s military doctrine, a strategic document specifying the measures used by Russia in military conflict.
PROTECTION OF STATE SECRETS

Generally speaking, measures for the safeguarding of state secrets can be divided into two categories: preventive and protective. We have to admit that Russia’s more aggressive behaviour towards its neighbours has not left the protection of state secrets unaffected. Every security institution has to find a way to withstand the increasing dangers of the changing security situation. Most people in possession of state secrets are not employees of security authorities, which means that, for such people, the conditions for effective protection of classified material must be created by their employer. While the right to access state secrets clearly depends on the person’s position, in this year’s review we shall concentrate on organisational issues and the role of the employer.

Visits to high-risk countries

According to the State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Act, a person with the right of access to state secrets is required to notify immediately the agency or corporate body in whose service the person obtained the right (due to a service or some other contractual relationship), as well as the Internal Security Service, about any person who has attempted or is attempting in any way to obtain unlawful access to state secrets.

Due to the evolving security situation, the security authorities of the Russian Federation have become even more aggressive in trying to gain access to the state secrets of the Republic of Estonia and the classified information of foreign states; their attempts to put pressure on people with access to state secrets have become even more frequent. In the current situation, the Estonian Internal Security Service is of the opinion that if people who are allowed to access state secrets visit high-risk countries — even for personal reasons — this poses a great danger to the protection of classified information.

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secrets and classified information of foreign states and thereby committed treason. This never happened on the person’s own initiative – they had been recruited and convinced to commit treason by the Russian secret services. What makes such recruitment possible is not always connected with disloyalty or a prior intention to betray the country. The secret services of hostile countries are very good at exploiting all the weaknesses of the people they want to recruit, including their inability to assess the dangers correctly, and their negligence and indolence.

When it comes to granting or renewing access to state secrets, it is important to ensure that the people in possession of classified information will not be targeted by a foreign country and forced to disclose or forward state secrets unlawfully, regardless of their own wishes.

Secure area

The protection of state secrets can best be achieved by: compliance with access and information security (INFOSEC) procedures; protection against unlawful disclosure; annual inspection of the existence and integrity of media containing state secrets; imposition of disciplinary, misdemeanour or criminal liability; and informing individuals of the requirements for the protection of state secrets.

One of the most important requirements for processing media containing classified information is that such information must only be processed in a secure area or an administrative area. Information classified “confidential” or higher can only be processed in the secure area; “restricted” information can be processed in the administrative area as well. Media classified as “confidential” may only be taken out of the secure area and administrative area in order to be forwarded from one secure area to another.

Why is it necessary to limit the processing of classified data only to the secure area, and why have we established special requirements for the construction of such areas, different from those of regular office space?

The requirements for the construction of secure areas and the selection of security measures are based on the principle of defence in depth. This must ensure sufficient protection and delay a perpetrator long enough for security staff to be able to react to an attack or attempted intrusion before the perpetrator has had a chance to get past the physical barriers and access or damage the classified information. The requirement that classified data may be processed only in the secure area protects the data against different types of attack, preventing individuals without the right of access or a need to know from accessing the classified information and damaging its integrity. We must stress that the secret services of other countries are not the only ones interested in accessing our classified information – there may be other interested parties, such as so-called “whistleblowers”, criminal organisations, extremist groups and data brokers, and also the media.

A person with the right of access to state secrets is required to notify one’s employer of any visit to a high-risk country.

7 The requirements for the construction and guarding of secure areas, the presence of persons in the secure area and the processing of classified information are discussed more thoroughly in sections 1 and 4 of Chapter 5 of the Procedure for Protection of State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States.

8 A whistleblower is a person who acts in the public interest and informs the internal investigative bodies of the relevant institution or organisation, external investigative bodies or the general public of any damage that has already been caused or might be caused due to undignified behaviour (i.e. illegal and unethical conduct, including corruption).
Generally speaking, attacks on classified information and countermeasures against them can be categorised as follows (this list is not exhaustive):

1. Forced entry – In the case of a physical attack, the perpetrator tries to enter the secure area unlawfully by damaging its perimeter (walls, ceiling, floor, doors or windows) by various means.
   As a countermeasure, the perimeter of the secure area must be made of materials offering sufficient protection against attack, supplemented by an intrusion detection system and a human guard. If possible, the secure area should be surrounded by an administrative area serving as the first line of defence to delay the perpetrator.

2. Concealed entry – The perpetrator tries to enter the secure area unlawfully without leaving any trace of forced entry by using elaborate lock-picking devices or forged entry permits, hacking the intrusion detection system or manipulating the security devices.
   Countermeasures include graduated security measures, an additional perimeter and local and properly installed intrusion detection systems.

3. Electronic wiretapping and surveillance – The perpetrator tries to install illegal intercept and surveillance devices in the secure area or use the electronic equipment already within the secure area for unlawful wire-tapping and surveillance.
   As a countermeasure, establish a procedure for persons to be present in a secure area; all technical devices and objects brought into the security area must be checked before entering; it must be clear what the secure area should and actually does contain.

4. Visual surveillance – From outside the secure area, the perpetrator tries to ascertain what is going on inside by visual surveillance and thereby gain unlawful access to classified information or identify bottlenecks in security measures (activation of the security system, passwords, movement patterns etc.).
   As countermeasures, properly installed intrusion detection systems must be used, and any windows to the secure area must be obscured, making it impossible to see activity inside.

5. Acoustic wiretapping – While outside the security area, the perpetrator tries to find out what is going on inside by using wiretapping devices in order to listen in on the conversations within.
   Countermeasures include an adequately soundproofed perimeter and an additional perimeter.

6. Electromagnetic eavesdropping – From outside the secure area, the perpetrator tries to intercept the signals of electronic devices (computers, copying machines, phones, monitors etc.) inside with the help of special equipment in order to process those signals and gain access to classified information.
   As a countermeasure, only accredited data-processing systems must be used, the secure area should be surrounded by an administrative area and the perimeter should be made as large as possible.

7. Saboteur or disloyal employee – Even when the secure area is accessed only by authorised means, people without a need to know can gain access to classified information and are able to damage its integrity.
   Countermeasures include the principle of granting access to classified information on a strict need-to-know basis; the isolation of different data-processing units; and background checks, security screenings and follow-up checks.

In the context of secure areas, the most common questions asked by people dealing with classified information include:

1. Why do all doors, windows and other means of entry to the secure area have to be closed? Why is it necessary to ensure that people outside the area cannot see what is going on inside?
   This is to avoid acoustic wiretapping and visual surveillance; to obstruct any view of furnishings and equipment that could be used for electronic wiretapping/surveillance; and to make it impossible to see what security measures are used in the secure area.

2. Why does classified information have to be processed on an accredited data-processing system?
   Accredited data-processing systems ensure the integrity of the data; the structure of such systems complies with INFOSEC requirements. The use of the relevant approved devices (TEMPEST) ensures that the data is shielded from electromagnetic eavesdropping.

3. Why is it not acceptable to leave people without the right of access or need to know unattended in the secure area?
   This creates a risk of unlawful access to classified information, compromises the security measures of the secure area and makes it possible to install illegal devices for wiretapping and surveillance or manipulate the intrusion detection system.

4. Why is it not acceptable to go to a meeting discussing classified information and take with you a mobile phone, laptop or other technical devices and objects that have not undergone prior checks?
   Above all, technical equipment and objects brought into the secure area without prior checks increase the risk of electromagnetic eavesdropping/surveillance. Technical devices can be manipulated remotely (for example, a mobile phone can be switched to talk mode without the owner’s knowledge, making it possible to listen in on the conversation). Electronic devices can also emit electromagnetic radiation, which can be traced with special equipment.

The requirements for the protection of classified information limit the possibilities for processing the data and make the work more difficult compared to the processing of regular data. However, the requirements do serve their purpose and are necessary to avoid unlawful access to classified data and to ensure the integrity of such data. By meeting the requirements for the protection of classified information, we ensure the safety of our state as a whole as well as that of all individuals. Failure to meet the requirements for the
processing of classified information established by the relevant legislation and procedures can result in misdemeanour or criminal liability.

**Additional powers of those responsible for the secure area**

Corporate bodies are becoming increasingly interested in obtaining the right to process state secrets and classified information of foreign states. A permit to process state secrets gives the body a right to do so outside the immovable or movable assets of a state agency or the Bank of Estonia. It also makes it possible for them to participate in procurement tenders organised either by a foreign state or at international level, which require such a permit. The provisions of the State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Act state that all secure areas must be free of illegal intercept devices. The detection of such devices is the responsibility of institutions organising the protection of state secrets; however, those responsible for the secure area should also be able to inspect all people who enter without the right of access. An amendment to the Act that entered into force on 1 July 2014 prescribes that, when granting access to the secure area, the owner of the classified information has the right to employ the following special supervisory measures provided for in the Law Enforcement Act: security checks, examination of persons and their movable assets and storage of those assets. These special law enforcement measures require those responsible for implementing them to be very precise when it comes to their rights and obligations, and they have certain competencies. The Internal Security Service must be able to acquaint those responsible for secure areas with the necessary knowledge and competencies in the years to come.

**Aviation background checks**

Since 2008, the Internal Security Service has been performing background checks on a certain number of people working in the aviation industry. We assess suitability for unescorted access to restricted areas of an airport or heliport, for obtaining a crew member certificate or a crew identification card and for performing aviation security functions. First, the air operator submits an application to the Internal Security Service, ordering it to perform a security check. We then analyse the information to determine whether the person in question may pose a threat to the security of the state or aviation, and whether he/she is a law-abiding citizen or might have any kind of addiction. In general, most of the reasons for not granting a security clearance, crew member certificate or crew ID card coincide with the grounds for refusal to grant access to state secrets, although the latter are much more numerous. The Internal Security Service passes the results of the checks to the air operator, who then decides whether or not to issue the relevant documents. The most important goal of aviation background checks is to prevent people connected with international terrorism from gaining access to aviation infrastructure and aeronautical information.

The European Union has a common policy for background checks, regulated by Commission Regulation No 185/2010 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of common basic standards in aviation security. Aviation is an international business and many aviation professionals are either foreigners or Estonians who have lived in other countries for a long period. This means that international cooperation is essential for background checks.

People entering a secure area must undergo security checks, physical examination, and inspection and storage of movable assets
In 2014, there were repeated attempts by foreign states to penetrate the computer networks of Estonian government departments and access the information therein.

PROVIDING CYBER SECURITY

In its work to provide cyber security, the Internal Security Service focuses on cyber threats and attacks initiated by a foreign state or those that can threaten national security. Cyber intelligence operations of foreign states directed at Estonia are persistent, streamlined and technologically advanced. This type of cyber threat is internationally known as APT – advanced persistent threat. In an APT the attacker possesses sufficiently sophisticated technology and skills and time to ultimately gain access through the internet to information which the target person or organisation is trying to protect. The attackers are persistent, gathering and mapping the information publicly available about the target, searching for vulnerabilities, and attempting various attack techniques (fake e-mails containing malware, web pages infecting with malware, etc.). As the attackers’ physical location will normally be concealed by means of various proxy servers and anonymiser services, they will not worry about making occasional mistakes and will try again in case of failure. The attacker’s so-called employer is usually a foreign state, and the purpose of attacks is to gain access to non-public economic, political, military or security information. Obtaining such information will give the foreign state an advantage: it will know about the plans and cooperation of Estonian government departments, or discover a commercial secret from an Estonian company or research and development facility which can be used for the improvement of the attacking state’s economic situation. The information received as the result of such attacks is, of course, also valuable for planning contacts with specific people and recruitment for collaboration.

Using the same password in several applications carries a risk: once stolen, it may be misused on other information systems.
In 2014, there were repeated attempts by foreign states to penetrate the computer networks of Estonian government departments and access the information therein. Such concealed probing was constant and in a couple of cases there was an attempt to gain access to sensitive information describing the resources and capacities of various Estonian departments. The technique used consisted of sending and opening a fake e-mail infected with malware.

Targeted attacks by means of e-mails are the most widespread form of attack. It is an old and well-known technique, but unfortunately still effective. The recipient of the e-mail is led to believe that the message has been sent by an acquaintance or someone connected to their work, but it contains an attachment with malware which will try to infect the recipient’s computer with spyware. Another method implies spreading spyware by means of web pages: attackers create or modify web pages whose content is supposed to attract the target’s attention, and they are used as a disguise for attempts to infect the computer, after which links to such pages are spread through the internet or by e-mail. The spread of malware by means of removable media (memory sticks, USB drives, CDs and DVDs) is also still widespread. All of the above attack techniques were seen in Estonia during 2014. Such attack campaigns as CosmicDuke\(^9\) and Ke3Chang\(^{10}\) can be mentioned as particular examples of malware that found their targets in Estonia in 2014. (More information about attack techniques and technology can be found in the reports of computer security companies referred to in the footnotes.)

Complete mitigation of the risk of attacks launched from another country is hardly ever possible, but our experience so far has clearly shown that stricter IT security policies could have prevented some of the successful attacks or decreased their scale. Those responsible for information security in organisations and institutions can do most to protect their organisation’s overall security. In addition to financial costs, better security measures often result in restrictions and some inconvenience for users. The Internal Security Service believes that the existing security policy of numerous institutions is unacceptably weak. Security managers must exercise their responsibility and choose security measures appropriate to the sensitivity of the data to be protected. The incorrect choice of security measures may result in genuine harm to Estonian national security.

It is also important that each person should exercise reasonable caution when using the internet. Some general recommendations are:

- do not use public and free wireless connections (Wi-Fi) to access sensitive information;
- do not open e-mails or attachments that seem in any way suspicious or are from an unknown sender;
- do not connect to your computer any removable media (memory sticks, memory cards, CDs/DVDs) that you have found or do not know the origin of;
- use different browsers for surfing the internet and for pages with secure access (internet banking, e-mail etc.);
- set a reasonable security level in your browser: it does not have to store all your passwords or allow all cookies;
- use long non-standard passwords and, where possible, two-factor authentication (with some other means such as a code, your ID card, etc., in addition to the password);
- do not use the same password in several applications;
- do not leave your phone or computer unattended when you are in a foreign country;
- use encryption (complete encryption of the computer hard drive, file encryption by means of special software or the ID card application);
- do not install or update any software on your devices when you are using an unknown and potentially unsafe computer network (airport, hotel, Wi-Fi provided during events, etc.);
- if you must use a computer or smart device in an unfriendly foreign state, make a backup copy of the data on your device and, where possible, use temporary devices cleaned before and after the visit instead of taking your own computer or telephone with you.

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\(^{10}\) www2.fireeye.com/OFFR-14Q1GoveBook_ReportDownloadLP-GoveBook.html
Along with the Ukraine crisis and the spread of Ebola, terrorism continues to be one of the main threats to international security. In April 2014, the Nigerian terrorist organisation Boko Haram\footnote{"Western education in forbidden"} kidnapped over 200 young schoolgirls in the state of Borno, Nigeria. In August 2014, members of the terrorist organisation ISIL\footnote{ISIL = Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.} beheaded the US journalist James Foley. A number of similar murders occurred before and since. In September 2014, Australian authorities raised the country’s terrorist threat level to high, due to Australians fighting in the Middle East. In October 2014, a convert to Islam, Martin Couture-Rouleau, rammed his car into two soldiers in Canada, one of whom died. The next day, the convert Michael Zehaf-Bibeau killed a guard at the Canadian National War Memorial. In December, Man Haron Monis took 17 people hostage at gunpoint at the Lindt Café in Sydney. Police decided to storm the café after shots were heard inside; two of the hostages and Monis died. During the same week, a terrorist attack occurred in Peshawar in northern Pakistan, in which seven militants entered a school and opened fire with handguns, killing 141 people, including 132 children. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the massacre.

This is but a short list of some of the terrorist attacks that occurred around the world in 2014 and, because of the distances involved, the Estonian public does not generally consider them very alarming. Events geographically closer to Estonia have a different effect altogether. In May 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche, who had returned from Syria, entered a synagogue in Brussels and killed four people. In October 2014, the Central Criminal Police of Finland announced that a number of Finnish citizens were suspected of terrorist activities. In November 2014, the Norwegian authorities stated that the likelihood of an Islamist terrorist attack in Norway in 2015 was 60–90%.

This list of terrorist attacks confirms that, despite the efficient and intensive work of European law enforcement authorities, terrorist threats as such were not reduced. The threat in Western countries arises increasingly from individual perpetrators or small groups who are usually not under any specific instructions from the leaders of terrorist organisations. This year’s sad examples of this trend were the tragic events in France in January and Denmark in February.

The current propaganda message of terrorist organisations can be summarised as: “If you are with us and...
want to contribute to our goals, act locally and use the means at your disposal!” It is difficult for law enforcement agencies to identify the targets of such propaganda, as they are often people who have been radicalised in an online environment and, in some cases, even people close to them do not recognise them as advocates of radical ideas.

People who have participated in hostilities in crisis hot spots present a real security threat. Thousands of people have left Europe for Syria and Iraq to engage in jihad or support it. The most acute threat arises from those who have fought in Syria and Iraq. Attention must also be paid to other hot spots such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Mali, where, however, fewer people from Europe and other Western countries have participated.

**Syria and Iraq**

Our annual review for 2013 contained a brief description of the Syrian Civil War and its global impacts. The conflict has now widened to the territory of Iraq and, by the end of 2014, ISIL had become the most powerful party to the conflict, and declared an Islamic caliphate in the occupied areas of Syria and Iraq on 29 June 2014. Kurds, the Iraqi Army and coalition forces of Western and Arab countries have also become parties to the conflict due to the success of ISIL and other extremist groups.

ISIL has contributed remarkably to its success through online propaganda, thanks to which an increasing number of people of a fanatical mindset wish to travel to Syria and Iraq and contribute to the success of the “Islamic caliphate”. ISIL’s propaganda is systematic, violent and emotionally extremely disturbing for ordinary people. Nevertheless, such propaganda has an inspiring effect on people who have been radicalised or are becoming so.

Along with the magazine *Inspire*, ISIL’s magazine Dabiq has become a popular channel of terrorist propaganda. It is an effective periodical, with carefully designed content and attractive layout, “enthralling” articles and issues in various languages. Dabiq is mainly a recruitment tool aimed at potential foreign fighters in Western countries.

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ISIL’s activities, both military and in other areas, are based exclusively on sharia. According to public sources, ISIL has created an effective sharia-based administrative organisation that covers hospitals, nursing homes, schools, courts, prisons, police, etc. This social system is, in some cases, comparable to that of a government.

Individuals leaving for and returning from Syria and Iraq are a challenge for law enforcement authorities. Thousands of foreign fighters are active in Syria and Iraq, including hundreds of people from countries geographically close to us. As some people have participated in military action in Syria repeatedly and increasingly, an answer is being sought to the threat arising from such fighters and the question of how to prevent such travel. The United Nations Security Council has stressed the importance of combatting this phenomenon. For the law enforcement authorities of Estonia and many other countries, this implies further intensification of mutual cooperation and the implementation of relevant systems for ship and air passenger lists. Fighting

Jihadist propaganda appallingly uses children in spreading their messages
leaving Estonia. There are other individuals of similar interest in Estonia, and we have established that foreign nationals connected with terrorist or extremist groups are visiting Estonia with increasing frequency.

Various factors have motivated people to leave Estonia for Syria and Iraq, and there has been no single motive in the case of specific individuals, as their decisions are usually based on several influences. A radical interpretation of religion need not be the main motive in all cases. For example, in 2014, Robert Lindmets left Estonia to participate in hostilities, but was not an active follower of any religion. His known purpose was to fight against ISIL and, in this conflict between many parties, he is among those whose activities are not based on religious fanaticism.

**Guantanamo Bay detention camp**

A political decision was taken in Estonia in 2014 to contribute to the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. One former detainee was transferred to Estonia at the beginning of 2015. This person has not been convicted of any terrorist crimes or established to have participated in violent terrorist acts.

Although some of the detainees released from Guantanamo have gone on to commit terrorism-related crimes, the various Estonian authorities have made and will continue to make efforts to integrate the transferred former detainee into Estonian society as quickly as possible.

**The Muslim community in Estonia**

While the size of the Estonian Muslim community and its relationships with foreign Islamic organisations and mosques have grown steadily in recent years, developments in 2014 were much more dynamic. The number of Muslim immigrants grew considerably, especially students studying in Estonian universities. There were also cases where such foreign students “disappeared” to Western Europe.

A record number of visits were made to Estonia by representatives of foreign Islamic organisations and mosques in 2014. While in previous years, fewer than ten visits were made by groups from the Islamic organisation Jamaat Tabligh, the number has risen to over ten such visits in 2014. The Muslim Brotherhood was noted as a new Islamic organisation in Estonia, and people related to it tried to establish permanent contacts with Estonian Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood has been behind terrorist acts in Arab countries and Terrorist threat is still considered low in Estonia, but the intensification of manifestations of radicalism and their growing frequency are concerns.

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Media interest led to photos being removed from Sazanakov’s social media page.
its activities are based on fundamentalist Islam, aiming to unite Islamic countries into a caliphate governed by strict sharia.

In the light of these developments, the terrorist threat is still considered low in Estonia, but the intensification of manifestations of radicalism and their growing frequency among some members of the Estonian Muslim community are concerns. Unfortunately, we have noticed a tacit ignorance of radical views and manifestations on the part of some leaders of the community.

In general, the activities and effects of the Muslim community in Estonia can be considered uncoordinated. An Islamic prayer room operated in Tartu in 2013 and 2014, but has now been closed. The prayer room was largely the initiative of Estonian converts and foreign students from Muslim countries. It had no official religious leader with any special education to conduct Islamic religious ceremonies. Neither did the leader of the Estonian Muslim Community, Ildar Muhhamedshin, participate in coordinating the Tartu prayer room’s activities.

The religious rituals of Muslims in Estonia are mainly conducted in the Islamic Cultural Centre at Keenuse in Tallinn. The number of Muslim illegal immigrants has increased year by year, increasingly finding their way to this centre, and a number were detained there in 2014. In terms of illegal immigration in general, the difficult cooperation with the Russian border guard must be mentioned. Even in the presence of clear evidence, Russia does not agree to receive persons coming from its territory, even though it has the duty to do so. As a rule, persons originating from Muslim countries have travelled legally to Russia, with the eventual goal of moving illegally on to Europe – or, more specifically, via Estonia to Scandinavia. They are willing to pay human trafficking networks and assume potentially fatal risks in order to enter Europe. A sad example is the incident in January 2014 when three people of Sudanese origin entered Estonia by swimming across the River Piusa, one of them later dying of hypothermia.

A number of volunteer non-profit organisations operate in Estonia in the field of immigration and asylum. The activities of these well-meaning organisations are usually aimed at helping those in need. The Internal Security Service advises such non-profit organisations to cooperate more with government agencies and, aside from pursuing short term goals, formulate long-term strategies.

In addition to genuine refugees, people related to terrorist organisations, whose aims threaten the security of Europe, are using the same routes to enter Europe. Such individuals claim to be refugees, and in a situation of increasing immigration pressures, the likelihood of such people being accepted in Europe, including Estonia, is growing.
At the beginning of this chapter we mentioned individual perpetrators, who are influenced by various extremist ideologies and have been radicalised without anyone close to them noticing. It is very difficult spots or extremist ideologies. By so doing, an informant should not feel like a traitor, but rather someone contributing to the security of us all. The primary aim of the Internal Security Service is to prevent threats. As the about designing and implementing deradicalisation programmes in the near future.

Release of OSCE observers

On 26 May 2014, a group of observers from the OSCE SMM UKR (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine) was detained in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine. The group included Estonian, Danish, Czech and Turkish nationals. Three days later, another group of observers from the mission was detained in nearby Lugansk, this time consisting of German, Spanish, Russian and Dutch nationals.

CAs representatives of a number of states had been taken hostage and since the OSCE had no previous experience of solving such situations, the leader of OSCE SMM UKR, Ertegrul Apakan, requested help from EuNAT (European Network of Advisory Teams), of which Estonia has been a member since 2011. EuNAT is a cooperation platform operating under Europol and financed by the European Union, focusing on solving hostage and blackmail cases through international cooperation and sharing of experience.

Efforts to release the hostages began simultaneously in the relevant countries, and the Berlin branch of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) was appointed as the headquarters for the operation. The Internal Security Service represented Estonia in the crisis management group. The Estonian foreign ministry made major efforts on the international level and via the Estonian embassy in Ukraine. Cooperation with the Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeky

In addition to genuine refugees, people related to terrorist organisations, whose aims threaten the security of Europe, are using the same routes to enter Europe.

for security services to identify such people and we ask that people should inform the Internal Security Service if they notice that any family members or acquaintances are taking an unwarranted interest in political hot first steps towards this goal, we identify at an early stage people who have been led down the “wrong path”, and communicate with them to offer them information and guidance. The government may need to think
Ukrainy, SBU) proved to be crucial, as it provided all-round support in the solution of the hostage situation.

The crisis management group analysed and advised on negotiations, collected and analysed general information, designed potential release solutions, and planned and coordinated post-release activity between relevant countries. It also actively counselled members of the hostages’ families and other persons close to them.

Based on Apakan’s appeal to EuNAT and the decision of the crisis management group, an advisory team was set up to represent EuNAT on the ground in Ukraine.

According to the information obtained, one of the observer teams was held in the city of Perevalsk by a group led by Aleksandr Sokol, while the other team was held in Severodonetsk by a group led by Pavel Dremov. Both groups of hostage-takers were under the control of Nikolay Kozitsyn, a Cossack leader (ataman) in charge of operations against Ukrainian government troops in the region. As the situation evolved, both the crisis group and the OSCE management in Ukraine became convinced that Kozitsyn was under the command of Moscow, including in matters concerning the hostages. One of the key figures was the “prime minister” of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic”, Aleksandr Borodai, who was expecting to earn public approval for resolving the case by appearing in videos and statements in the mass media as “liberator” of the hostages.

Despite the relatively exact identification of the location of the hostages, it was impossible to free them by military or police operations, given the armed conflict in the region.

Coordinated work on many levels – heads of state and government of the countries concerned, the European Parliament, OSCE headquarters in Vienna, the Church of Russia, pressure from social and other mass media, etc. – led to a positive result: on the night of 26/27 June, the Estonian representative received confirmation of the release of one group of hostages and their transfer to a layover in the city of Donetsk, and on 28 June the release of the other group was confirmed.

For Estonia, efforts to remove all the released hostages from the crisis area and bring them home culminated in the arrival in Tallinn of the Estonian hostage later that day.
International cooperation in general

The Internal Security Service’s international cooperation covers the exchange of information with a view to analysing and preventing security threats, particularly with foreign partners in our vicinity and the Euro-Atlantic area, but such cooperation with security and police services is not restricted geographically and reaches around the world. Although the types of international cooperation are quite similar in terms of their functions, bilateral cooperation is mostly focused on the exchange of information to identify and prevent security threats, while multilateral cooperation is focused on exchanging experience to ensure collective security.

Multilateral cooperation is mainly carried out in security-related fora in NATO and the European Union, in which the Internal Security Service actively participates. The activities of the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in analysing the internal security of the EU are becoming increasingly important. The EU INTCEN synthesises intelligence relevant to the European Union from all over the world, using information from diplomatic and public sources, as well as from the security services of the EU member states.

Ensuring the security of the US President

High-level visits deserve public attention everywhere in the world and impose great responsibility on host law-enforcement authorities for ensuring the security of individuals and the places they visit. The Estonian security and police services assess threats prior to each visit and take measures to prevent potential attacks. For major events and visits, the Internal Security Service prepares threat assessments, conducts background checks of the people involved, and provides technical support and, where necessary, also physical security and readiness to react.
to incidents with additional forces. The threat of terrorism continues to be low in Estonia, but the increasing terrorist threat in the world makes it more likely that senior representatives of foreign countries or organisations who visit Estonia could be attacked.

2014 will be remembered for one of the most important visits to Estonia in recent years, when the President of the United States, Barack Obama, visited Tallinn before the NATO summit in Wales. The US President is considered to be the most vulnerable head of state in the world, so ensuring his security in Estonia required much stricter security measures than for other high-level visits. While visits of the US President are usually announced several months in advance, his Estonian visit was scheduled at unusually short notice. Such a visit entails a large-scale joint operation, leading to intensive security preparations involving thousands of people. The Police and Border Guard Board bore the heaviest burden, with important contributions from the Internal Security Service, the US President’s own security team and many other institutions. Many scenarios were rehearsed and readiness to respond to the worst possible scenario was practised in order to ensure security during the visit.

In a situation of free movement of people, which is a fundamental principle of the European Union, it must be kept in mind that terrorists or extremists can enter Estonia unnoticed. Information on individuals and groups that might threaten the visit was exchanged with foreign partners. Simplified border control was established as a temporary measure on the EU internal border for persons entering Estonia to establish their identity. This measure justified itself and will certainly be used again for security purposes in the future.

Well-known places to be visited are potential targets for terrorists, so security measures were strengthened to protect them in line with international agreements and domestic regulations. To reduce the likelihood of a successful attack, additional forces were deployed to ensure cyber security; the surroundings of visit sites were observed and people were checked. Several traffic and parking restrictions were established in Tallinn, with some streets closed to traffic and pedestrians alike. Thanks to coordination between various institutions, the daily life of residents was disturbed as little as possible.

Emotionally charged demonstrations and acts of violence are often known to occur during high-level visits, but this visit was peaceful and passed off without any remarkable incidents to threaten security. The US President’s visit was a success thanks to smooth inter-institutional and international cooperation.
The awareness that corruption is one cause of financial crises in various countries has increased worldwide, but less attention is paid to the link between organised crime and national security. The Corruption Perception Index Report 2014 by Transparency International gave Estonia a score of 69 points. In the overall ranking, Estonia has risen to 26th out of 175 countries (from 28th of 177 in 2013, and 32nd of 176 in 2012). The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index 2014–15, which also takes the level of corruption into consideration, lists Estonia 29th out of 144 countries, a rise of three places in one year. Estonia’s position in other similar rankings has also improved, which is important, above all, for the country’s international reputation and competitiveness (i.e. openness for investment).

The corruption perception of Estonian residents is affected by frequent media coverage of bribery and similar issues. The Internal Security Service believes that the disclosure of violations plays a mainly informative but also a deterrent role. Entrepreneurs have more direct exposure to corruption in the public and private sector, and numerous international reports (by the OECD, European Commission, etc.) have emphasised the need to raise their awareness.

The awareness that corruption is one cause of financial crises in various countries has increased worldwide, but less attention is paid to the link between organised crime and national security.

In 2014, the European Commission issued its first EU Anti-Corruption Report. According to this, people’s experience of corruption in Estonia is low, and the perception of corruption is lower than the EU average. Nevertheless, the European Commission recommends that Estonia enhance its monitoring of the financing of political parties and, most importantly, public procurement by local governments, and that the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) should pass a code of conduct. According to the report, the scale of corruption is still a major problem in Europe, despite the efforts made by member states. The review in question is more evidence that the attitudes of various groups in society need to be changed in order for a breakthrough to be achieved. The EU’s governing bodies can only provide general guidance and the necessary legal environment. For example, in 2014 the European Parliament established extensive regulations for the confiscation of criminally obtained assets (including those obtained by corruption) anywhere on EU territory.

The awareness that corruption is one cause of financial crises in various countries has increased worldwide, but less attention is paid to the link between organised crime and national security. According to the UN, protest demonstrations in Ukraine were largely due to massive corruption within the country’s previous government. Corruption deepens inequality, decreases public trust...
in government agencies and leads to impunity. Such a situation may be nurtured and used by an unfriendly neighbouring state, threatening the other country’s territorial integrity or even its sovereignty.

Additional pressure on the citizens and governments of the EU is caused by various crises related to Europe. To prevent their escalation and for their prompt resolution, people expect, above all, protection from organised crime, financial and tax fraud, money laundering and the growth of corruption. One of the basic messages of international reviews on this is the positive example and will of the state’s legislative and executive power. There is some room for improvement in Estonia, too, in this respect. Compliance with the above principles in the drastically changed security situation since 2014 is of the utmost importance.

**Corruption that affects national security**

The state’s capability to prevent and, if necessary, protect itself from hostile external influence has been one of the burning topics of the past year. On one hand, we interpret this as meaning the state is sufficiently informed about potential plans and activities against Estonia initiated or run from outside our territory. Such information, which is often of a covert nature, is necessary for taking countermeasures in order to prevent the realisation or escalation of threats. On the other hand, security is directly linked to the defensive capabilities of the state and its development. Deterrence that can be taken seriously drains the potential aggressor’s will to implement any method of attack. Members of the Estonian security institutions and defence forces have been objects of interest for Russian special services for years, and that pressure is growing. Thus it is important that officials are aware of the threats and do not conduct corrupt behaviour, which could make them the targets of recruitment by unfriendly foreign states.

In a complicated security situation, especially as exemplified by the situation in Ukraine, it is important to reach the right conclusions at an early stage. The security expert John R. Schindler advises Ukraine to root deep corruption out of the military, as this would have a salutary effect on the whole country. He strongly recommends spreading the message that corrupt officials are helping Moscow, and should be dealt with as traitors.13

The state and the private sector are, above all, partners in the pursuit of common goals and need to take certain rules into considera-

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13 [http://20committee.com/2015/03/08/how-ukraine-can-win/](http://20committee.com/2015/03/08/how-ukraine-can-win/)
Major court verdicts related to corruption at senior level in 2014

- Harju County Court found Sergei Bõstrov, a former employee of the Estonian Information Board, guilty under Penal Code § 201.2.2, 2, 3 and 4; § 241.1, and § 183.1; found Pavel Kotkin, Ines Piibeleht and Sven Randlane guilty under § 201.2.2, 3 and 4 and § 241.1; and found Lauri Vihula guilty under § 201.2.2, 3 and 4. Bõstrov, Kotkin, Randlane and Piibeleht disclosed state secrets they had obtained for official purposes. Bõstrov also illegally handled a small amount of a narcotic substance, cocaine. Bõstrov was sentenced to 4 years 6 months in prison; Kotkin was sentenced to 3 years’ parole with 4 years of probation, with 11 months of the parole to be served immediately; Randlane was sentenced to 2 years 4 months of parole with 3 years of probation, with 6 months 24 days of the parole to be served immediately; Piibeleht was sentenced to 2 years’ parole with 3 years of probation, with 6 months 10 days of the parole to be served immediately; and Vihula was sentenced to 2 years 7 months of parole with 4 years of probation.

- Paul-Indrek Rajamäe-Volmer, who worked as the Chief of Staff at the Baltic Defence College, was found guilty under Penal Code § 201.2.4. As part of a group of persons, Rajamäe-Volmer appropriated property of the Baltic Defence College worth at least 24,373.86 euros, which was used to illegally cover the travelling expenses of college employees and members of their families. Rajamäe-Volmer was sentenced to 1 year 4 months of parole with 3 years’ probation.

Corruption at senior levels poses a threat to national security. A high-profile corruption case in court

Recent years have shown that the borderline between the interests of officials (politicians) and enterprises has become so blurred that precedent-setting decisions concerning numerous cases of corruption were made only by the Supreme Court. In 2014 the court ruling concerning the “land exchange” dispute that had lasted for years came into force: top politicians, officials and representatives of the private sector were put on trial for corruption. In cooperation with the Prosecutor’s Office, the Internal Security Service proved that the law applies equally to everyone. Attempts by the convicted corrupt individuals to influence public opinion were fruitless; the Supreme Court conclusively rejected the defendants’ unfounded accusations against the Internal Security Service and the Prosecutor’s Office of illegal intelligence activities, and found the defendants guilty of corruption that threatened national security.
• Marek Vesiaid, a former chief of material service of the Estonian Navy, was found guilty under Penal Code § 300.1. As a government official, Vesiaid ordered services and goods for the Estonian Navy worth a total of 90,450.09 euros from two firms with which he had connections, thus committing a major violation of procedural regulations established by the Anti-Corruption Act. Vesiaid was fined 3,525 euros.

• Villu Reiljan, a former Minister of the Environment, was found guilty under Penal Code § 293.2.1; Ester Tuiksoo, former Minister of Agriculture, was found guilty under § 293.1; and the former Director General of the Land Board, Kalev Kangur, was found guilty under § 293.2.1 and 4. Reiljan and Kangur took bribes repeatedly, and agreed to accept more in the future, from representatives of numerous firms, abusing and promising to abuse their position in the implementation of the Nature Conservation Act in the process of exchanging immovable assets belonging to the persons connected with these firms and subject to nature conservation restrictions governing immovable assets belonging to the state. As a reward, Reiljan was promised future participation in another legal entity, and at his request an apartment was provided for the use of an acquaintance free of charge. Kangur was rewarded in the form of the opportunity to participate covertly in business activity, to finance the purchase of immovable assets subject to nature conservation restrictions and to obtain furniture. Tuiksoo took a bribe from the representative of a real estate firm and abused her position to ensure that the ministry she headed concluded a rental contract for new premises with that particular firm. For abusing her position, Tuiksoo was provided with the use of an apartment free of charge by the representative of the firm. Reiljan was sentenced to 3 years 6 months of parole with 4 years’ probation; Tuiksoo was sentenced to 3 months of parole with 3 years of probation; and Kangur was sentenced to 4 years 6 months of parole with 5 years’ probation. The firms that participated in these crimes were fined a total of 925,823 euros.

• The former Director General of the Road Administration, Tamur Tsäkko, was found guilty under Penal Code § 201.2.3 and under § 300. Tsäkko violated the requirements of public procurement procedure and illegally allowed the scope of work set out in the terms and conditions of the procurement contract for a state highway renovation to be reduced before the contract was signed without decreasing the amount to be paid to the contractor. As a result of Tsäkko’s actions, the state overpaid the firm undertaking the highway renovation for work that it did not perform, following its agreement with Tsäkko. His actions inflicted damage of 33,668 euros on the state and Tsäkko was sentenced to 4 months’ parole with 3 years’ probation. By his actions, Tsäkko damaged the reliability of Estonia in the use of money received from the EU structural funds.

• Alar Oppar, who worked as an adviser to the Minister of Agriculture and a member of the board of the Rural Development Foundation, was found guilty under Penal Code § 293.1. Oppar accepted a bribe from a representative of a firm, having promised to ensure that the ministry and its agencies would provide the firm with favourable conditions in the financing of a fish-farming project from a variety of sources, including the European Fisheries Fund, and by means of government-guaranteed loans. As a reward for abusing his position, Oppar received a concessional loan of 400,000 kroons, plus 513,000 kroons allegedly as an advance of salary from the firm’s representative after Oppar accepted the proposal that, after leaving government service, he would receive a 2% stake in the firm and work in the management of the fish farming project. Oppar was sentenced to 6 months’ parole with 3 years’ probation.

• Anders Tsahkna, who worked as an adviser to the Minister of Social Affairs, was found guilty under Penal Code § 344.1 and § 345.1; Balti Radiodiagnostika OÜ was found guilty under § 344.2, and § 345.2. As a board member of Balti Radiodiagnostika OÜ, Tsahkna issued fictitious invoices to another firm in the amount of 107,990.23 euros for healthcare services which were not in fact provided. As the fictitious invoices were recorded on the books of Balti Radiodiagnostika OÜ as tax-exempt revenue, the firm was, among other things, released from the obligation to pay VAT. Tsahkna was sentenced to 4 months of parole with 3 years of probation, and Balti Radiodiagnostika OÜ was fined 5,000 euros.

• Ago Jakobson, the former Operations Manager of AS Eesti Energia Tehnoloogiakontserdus, was found guilty under Penal Code § 294.2.1 and 3; Alexey Andreev, the former Head of Production, was found guilty under § 294.2.1 and 3; and Tarmo Vahtra, the former Head of Production Preparation, was found guilty under § 294.2.3. Jakobson, Andreev and Vahtra accepted bribes from representatives of several companies in exchange for abusing their positions to influence the selection of these firms as winning bidders in tenders announced by AS Eesti Energia Tehnoloogiakontserdus. Jakobson received a total of 16,100 euros in bribes, Andreev a total of 5,900 euros, and Vahtra 900 euros. Jakobson was sentenced to 3 years 5 months’ parole with 3 years 6 months of probation, with 8 months of the parole to be served immediately; Andreev was sentenced to 3 years 1 month of parole with 3 years 2 months of probation, with 6 months of the parole to be served immediately; and Vahtra was sentenced to 2 months’ parole with 3 years’ probation.
Corruption that undermines the law enforcement system

Providing internal security starts at the state border, as was repeatedly proven in 2014. It is Estonia’s obligation, as the defender of the EU’s external border, to stop cross-border crime regardless of the “balance of power” on the eastern border. In fact, corruption in customs and at the border has a wider influence on the security of the entire EU, which is why we pay greater attention to this issue. The main problem lies in collaboration between organised crime and corrupt officials, both in Estonia and in Russia. Responding to this is made more difficult because organised crime in Russia is, in turn, closely linked to government special services. This makes corruption on the border an even more serious threat to security. The events in Ukraine showed that the realisation of this threat meant an attack against the country’s integrity, where the Russian special services in cooperation with organised crime participated in the annexation of Crimea and are participating in illegal armed formations in the armed conflict against the state of Ukraine.

Major court verdicts related to border corruption in 2014

- **Oleg Bochin**, a former senior constable of the East Prefecture border office of the Police and Border Guard Board, was found guilty under Penal Code § 294.2.1; § 296.2.1; § 391.2.1 and 2; and § 22.3. Bochin abused his position to contribute to cigarette smuggling across the state border, having repeatedly received bribes totaling 620 euros. Bochin also involved another officer in his activities, splitting the bribes with him. Bochin was sentenced to 2 years 4 months of parole with 4 years of probation, with 10 months of the parole to be served immediately.

- **Sergei Platonov**, a former senior inspector of the Eastern Division of the Tax and Customs Board’s Investigation Department, was found guilty under Penal Code § 294.2.1 and § 316; Vassili Sachuk was found guilty under § 298.1; and Sergey Zykov was found guilty under § 296.1 and § 298.1. Platonov leaked information related to the pre-trial and surveillance proceedings of one of his pending criminal cases to Sachuk, and Zykov was connected to organised crime in Ida-Virumaa, from which he received a bribe. Platonov also contributed directly to smuggling cigarettes over the border. He was sentenced to 2 years in prison; with the unserved part of a previously imposed punishment, Zykov was sentenced to a total of 5 years 7 months in prison; and Sachuk was sentenced to 1 year of parole, with 1 month 21 days to be served immediately.
The corruption cases related to local municipalities and discovered by the Internal Security Service, as well as the increased capacity of the state’s response in this field, reduced the number of dishonest officials but also made other potential offenders more cautious. For this reason, the number of cases uncovered does not represent the current situation and gives no cause for complacency. We handle cases in a broad-based manner, taking into account the extent and effect of corruption in a particular municipality. This is intended to provide national security at the grass-roots level in larger municipalities, in order to prevent corrupt officials from reaching important positions in government institutions or strategic companies owned by the state.

At a time when Estonia is looking for ways to improve the financing of education, there were people who used such funds for their own benefit rather than that of education. Major court verdicts related local municipalities in 2014

- **Irina Aab**, a former senior specialist in the Department of Education of Tartu City Government, was found guilty under Penal Code § 201.2.2, 3 and 4; § 344.1; and § 345.1; **Ants Serk**, former headmaster of Tartu Kivilinna High School, and **Priit Hänni**, former headmaster of Tartu Commercial High School, were found guilty under § 201.2.3. As a senior finance specialist and Acting Head of Department, and partly in collaboration with Serk and Hänni – as well as **Boris Goldman**, the Head of the Tartu City Department of Education (who was convicted in 2012) and **Jevgenia Lindevaldt**, headmistress of Tartu Annelinna High School – Aab appropriated property belonging to the City of Tartu valued at a total of 143,980.87 euros. Aab issued fictitious invoices on behalf of several firms for goods and services that were not in fact sold or provided to the Tartu City Department of Education, Tartu Commercial High School, Tartu Annelinna High School, Tartu Kivilinna High School and Tartu Slavic High School. In addition, as an official of the Department of Education, Aab purchased shopping-centre gift vouchers that she later used to pay for personal purchases, among other things. Together with her partner **Jüri Karu**, Aab also used city finances to buy goods for personal use by paying for these on the basis of fictitious invoices as an official of the Department of Education. Aab was sentenced to 3 years 6 months of parole with 3 years of probation, with 5 months 27 days of the parole to be served immediately. Serk was sentenced to 6 months of parole with 3 years of probation; and Hänni was sentenced to 4 months’ parole with 3 years’ probation.
In the autumn of 2012 Internal Security Service officers cooperated with experts to exhume the remains of five people from unmarked graves in Redopalo forest near the Võru–Valga road in Võru County. A year earlier, the same forest had revealed a mass grave with the remains of ten people. As investigations suggested that the Soviet occupying authorities may have used the Redopalo forest to cover up crimes against humanity and for the secret burial of the bodies of murdered civilians for quite a while, the surrounding area was checked.

The survey yielded four graves, with the remains of one person in each of three graves and two bodies buried in one grave. The forensic medical examination performed by the Estonian Forensic Science Institute found that the individual graves held the remains of men aged 35–45 and the shared grave the remains of a young man aged 17–19 and a woman in her 30s. All the bodies displayed gunshot wounds to the head and chest; in addition, the woman’s remains bore the signs of unhealed jaw and nose fractures, which imply that the person was beaten before being killed.

While it was easier to find a lead to the identity of the ten discovered bodies because the disappearance of ten people in one area

There is no doubt that Estonian forests conceal many more unidentified graves containing the remains of fine Estonians murdered by the criminal regime.
was an uncommon event for Estonia even during the communist terror following World War II, hundreds of middle-aged men had lost their lives fighting the occupying forces in the forests of Estonia. Investigators initially focused on identifying the murdered woman and teenager. Archive documents and people’s memories helped the search for information about women and male teenagers who had disappeared in southern Estonia in the early 1950s, but many initial findings were disproved by DNA analysis until the mystery was partially solved in the summer of 2014. DNA analysis confirmed that the remains of the man found in the grave were those of Eduard Kandver, born in 1933. It could be then concluded that the woman buried in the same grave was Helmi Pikk, born in 1925. Kandver and Pikk were killed by the Võru County Department operations group of the ESSR Ministry of State Security (MGB) in Lepistu village in Võru County on 14 August 1950.

The men whose remains were found in individual graves have still not been identified. It should be noted that MGB used the Redopalo forest for burying murdered civilians for years (Kandver and Pikk were killed in 1950, and the party of ten Forest Brothers led by Richard Vähi in 1953). There is no doubt that Estonian forests conceal many more unidentified graves containing the remains of fine Estonians murdered by the criminal regime. Crimes against humanity are timeless, and so is our debt of gratitude – which we are repaying by discovering and identifying the crimes and victims of the violent “Red regime”.

Memorial stones to fallen Estonian Forest Brothers were raised in Vastseliina cemetery on 21 September 2014