FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Extremism 4
Russia’s so-called compatriots policy and other anti-integration activities 5
„Soft power” and influence operations 7
Media Assisted Influence operations 9

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The main interests of Russian special services in Estonia 10
Intelligence Methods 11
How to recognize a recruitment attempt and what to do 11
Treason 12

PROTECTION OF STATE SECRETS

THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

Corruption threatening national external and economic security 17
Corruption that poses a threat to domestic security 18

PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

International Events 21
Salafism and Europe 21
Developments within the Estonian Muslim Community 22
The Protection of Targets Against Terrorism 23
Risks Related to Immigration and Travelling 24
Threat Trends 24
Crimes involving explosive devices 26
The investigation of crimes related to the illegal import and export of firearms, their key components and ammunition 27

THE INVESTIGATION OF TIMELESS UNIVERSAL CRIMES 28
FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

Dear Reader,
The Estonian Internal Security Service is pleased to present to you our 15th annual review. With this document, we seek to give our partners and the wider public an account of our work as well as an overview of the observations and conclusions that we believe are important to securing Estonia’s security. It contains news that is both good and bad, as well as some warnings. Above all, however, we hope that this review makes you think and that it helps start some new discussions.

By publishing this document, we seek to underline that the Internal Security Service is a modern security organisation, not a secret agency. Our aim is to not only forward classified information to designated authorities or to carry out covert actions, but to engage in dialogue with our constitutional sovereign - the people. We want to increase people’s knowledge of the security threats that Estonia faces - thus we dare to be as open as possible and as cautious as necessary. Indeed, in our line of work, there are details that we cannot disclose as this would endanger our employees and partners and their chances of success. However, the most important aspect of our work - our mains objectives - are public. By the time that this annual review is published, the constitutional order in Estonia will have lasted longer than ever before, longer than before it was lost in 1940. To ensure that it continues to last, we must learn from our mistakes and make an even greater effort in our work to protect our constitution, being thereby faithful to the people. We hope that our
annual review helps its readers make informed and considered decisions and - most importantly - that helps them make up their own minds.

We have put together this annual review based on the fundamental principle that information should be made public on a need to know basis and that disclosure is a proportional measure to be used for preventing possible threats. In a democratic country, citizens have the right to know and security organisations have the responsibility to inform society about the threats that they may face. Thus, if there is no legal basis for withholding information, then it should be made public. The information put forward in this review has been obtained from a variety of sources using legally permissible tools and methods. The same principle also underlines the analysis, interpretations, conclusions and added judgments that it contains.

When looking at the facts, then we are, once again, pleased to conclude that extremism, in any of its forms, has not taken root in Estonia. Indeed, there are no forces in Estonia that could pose a serious threat to our state’s continued existence and territory.

The greatest threats to our constitutional order are linked to sovereignty - the freedom to make key decisions on our own that are in Estonia’s interests. Influence operations that interfere with our internal matters, countering integration, attempts to either tempt or pressure people into betraying their country and - the most vulgar of all - the bribing of our officials are all actions that seek to undermine our sovereignty. The smaller the state, the greater is each decision-maker’s weight and responsibility.

Despite setbacks, Russian special services continue to try to recruit Estonians with increasing aggressiveness as reflected in the number of attempts that are made and the methods that are being used. In our counterintelligence work, we have demonstrated that we can respond to these attempts adequately. It is, however, also possible to threaten our state’s interests and security in a more refined manner, without spying or betrayal. This year’s review looks at the use of “soft power”. I use quotation marks on purpose because the conventional definition of soft power is gaining support through values and should therefore not be of direct interest to security organisations. The Internal Security Service, however, cannot ignore the fact that behind the kind words are more clandestine goals. When a foreign country or interest group works systematically to influence our domestic decisions, then this can no longer be considered soft power but rather influence operations.

The investigation of timeless international crimes is as vital as ever. Recently we uncovered victims who were murdered by Soviet repressive structures more than 60 years ago and who the Soviet authorities tried to forever conceal. I apologize if the inhumane way in which these victims were treated is described in too much detail. Perhaps even more appalling is the fact that among the world’s most influential countries there are still some where Stalin’s terror regime is idealized and where its victims are maligned. This is about more than just history or the facts that continue to be important and relevant today, not to mention the lessons that should be learned. As the last sentence of this annual review pledges: “We will continue to make efforts to ensure that even the most horrible truths are uncovered.”

Raivo Aeg, Director General of the Estonian Internal Security Service
The Republic of Estonia’s constitutional order did not come under any direct threat in 2012. Indirect threats nevertheless existed. Estonia’s constitutional order is not only secured by internal security and defence but also by the functioning of our society and economy according to democratic laws and practices. Security agencies do not and should not have a supervisory role in these fields. The Internal Security Service, however, is obliged to ascertain and analyse systematic behaviour, including criminal offenses that are directed against Estonia’s security interests.

Indirect security threats to Estonia were similar to those of previous years. Most of them stemmed from the Russian Federation’s strategic decision to influence both the domestic and foreign policy decision-making processes in other countries. Official Russian representatives have started to refer to this policy as the use of „soft power“. This chapter will deal with this issue in more detail.

The threat that influence operations pose is also linked to economic security. An economy that is dependent on weak, unstable and uncertain partners creates ample opportunities to manipulate with the population, from voters to decision-makers. With its small domestic market and open economy, Estonia is inevitably influenced by the upturns and downturns in our partners’ economies. This means that there is always a security policy dimension to our choice of strategic economic partners. A clear security threat exists if, in addition to economic risks, a substantial political risk and the threat of being pressured enter the equation. And therefore, it is important from the constitutional order perspective that important national economic decisions be transparent and rule out any corruptive interests.

Extremism

Extremism and its prevention is one of the most common security threats that democratic security agencies must deal with. 2012 confirmed, once again, that extremist ideologies are not common in Estonia. In the last years, extremism’s form of expression has changed. In Europe, a new generation of right-wing extremists, so-called autonomous nationalists, who do not make use of familiar extremist symbolism and keep their views hidden from the public, are gaining support. They are ready to use violence in order to achieve their goals. And according to law enforcement structures, these types of circles could potentially give rise to right-wing terrorism. In Estonia, attempts to promote „anonymous activism“ An economy that is dependent on weak, unstable and uncertain partners creates ample opportunities to manipulate with decision-makers.
via certain websites have so far been unsuccessful. Right-wing extremism has only about one hundred active supporters in Estonia and therefore, compared to the rest of the world, is clearly marginal.

Last year marked the fifth anniversary of the April Riots providing the opportunity to make a longer-term assessment of the impact that these events and decisions had on extremism. It is important to recall that tensions around the World War II memorial in Tallinn and its controversial meaning were mounting in the years leading up to the riots as myths surrounding the Soviet Union and the Red Army were being revived in Russian state propaganda and media. In 2006, these tensions culminated in a series of manifestations by extremists as well as clashes forcing the police to restrict access to the war memorial for the entire summer. Sporadic coverage of these events in the media overshadowed more important issues throughout the entire year.

Today, the leaders of the extremist actions no longer interest the general public nor could they mobilize tens or hundreds of people onto the streets. By today, those people who, on an emotional level, are deeply bothered by the glorification of criminal totalitarian regimes have restored their trust in Estonia’s constitutional order. And others, who place importance on commemorating those who lost their lives in the war, can now do so in accordance with European practices and without insulting anyone.

Extremist ideologies have no bearing on Estonia. The greatest potential threat is the importation of extremist ideas from other countries or the radicalization of small groups thanks to propaganda available on the Internet. So far, experience has shown that the most effective way of preventing extremism is through the widespread availability of high-quality education.

Unlawful behaviour purposefully aimed at attracting public attention is not necessarily always extremism. Extremism is mainly characterized by an underlying extremist ideology. But even with no ideology, for example, provocative and aggressive actions on the Internet, can pose an indirect threat to a state’s constitutional order. Mostly this occurs when actions that have already received attention in other countries, are copied here in Estonia. Individuals seeking to test their “abilities” carry out attacks on government and electronic infrastructure and, in the process, keep people from carrying out their daily actions and hinder their access to information. The misuse of cyberspace is a new possible security threat that could threaten the state’s constitutional order. As a modern security agency, the Internal Security Service has developed the ability to identify extremism and other activities that could pose a threat to security.

In 2012, the Internal Security Service identified individuals threatening to carry out cyber attacks in Estonia. The youths did not pose any actual danger to state security. In the future, however, the Internal Security Service will continue to cooperate with the Estonian Information System’s Authority, the Police and Border Guard Board and other relevant authorities in order to ensure that such cases do not develop into serious security threats.

Russia’s so-called compatriots policy and other anti-integration activities

Russia’s so-called compatriots policy is multifaceted - it includes the direct aim of binding the Russian-speaking diaspora to Russia while it also fits in more broadly with Russian foreign policy goals. Russia uses diaspora activists to implement its interests, including damaging the authority and the international position of the states where they live as well as directly meddling in the domestic affairs of independent states.

Behaviour that is insulting from an ethnic, religious or racial point of view is usually not caused by extremism, rather by thoughtlessness and poor education.

The ambition of Russia’s compatriots policy is to unite the Russian-speaking diaspora while bringing them under the control of the Russian authorities and leadership. It is implemented mainly by the Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad, the Russian Foreign Ministry and embassies. Indeed, embassies are responsible for running the many Coordination Councils of Russian Compatriots that have been established abroad. The goal is to try to manipulate so-called compatriots by means of a Russian-controlled information field. If necessary, compatriots are used as a tool for implementing foreign policy goals. The need to protect the rights of compatriots is mostly used as an excuse to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.

Treating Russian-speaking diaspora as compatriots who are loyal to Russia and Estonia’s wish to integrate its Russian-speaking population into Estonian society are competing concepts, a fact that Russian compatriots policy ideologues are well aware of. The success of Russia’s compatriots
policy is dependent on the segregation of the Russian-speaking population within its country of residence. Thus criticism of the integration process in Estonia, including certain specific aspects originating from the Russian Foreign Ministry and other state institutions, is neither credible nor sincere. In reality, Russian compatriots policy authors are worried by the advances that minorities in Estonia have made in the field of integration including acquiring enough of the state language, continuing studies in Estonian institutions of higher learning, participating in the protection of the state and increased public participation in areas that have nothing to with Russia but are linked to Estonia’s development as a part of Europe.

The segregation of the Russian-speaking population within its country of residence is a critical prerequisite for the success of the Russian compatriots policy.

Last year, Russian Embassy diplomats, who have a decisive say in who belongs to the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots, participated in and shaped the outcome of the Council’s of meetings in Estonia. The Embassy encourages suitable Russian-speaking diaspora activists to participate in public events of interest to them, to forward information about the events to the Embassy and to publish articles favourable to Russia. The activists are also encouraged to make critical public statements about specific events or public statements made by Estonian politicians as well as to make critical statements about Estonia in international organizations. In other words - efforts are made to include members of the Russian-speaking diaspora in campaigns that are aimed at manipulating with Estonian and international public opinion.

Preserving the special Soviet era status of the Russian language and Russian-language education are still an important part of Russia’s compatriots policy. Russia hopes to preserve its long-term political influence over the Baltic states and its opportunities for mobilizing the local Russian-speaking population to exert political pressure. With this aim in mind, Russian Embassy officials meet with locals who are opposed to secondary education in the state language and offer cooperation with the Fund to Support and Protect the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad. They include compatriots policy activists as well as professional so-called antifascists as well as other radically minded individuals. Neither the key persons involved nor their activities have changed in the past year. They have also not managed to engage a significant amount of teachers, students and parents at Russian schools, in other words their actual target group.

The impact of the counteractions described above was smaller in 2012 than in 2011. In 2011, 11 secondary schools in Tallinn applied to continue education in the Russian language. In 2012, there were only 4 applications. The Internal Security Service will continue to pay attention to this issue as long as the Russian Federation plans to play an even greater role in influencing Estonia’s educational and language policies and other youth projects.

A new approach in the compatriots policy is what Russian officials call the abandonment of the parental model in working with compatriots. According to Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov this means that Russia will help compatriots consolidate so that in the future, they can receive praise and stand up for their rights on their own. Even more striking, however, are the aims formulated by Konstantin Kosachev, leader of the agency specializing in compatriots policy. According to Kosachev, Russian compatriots could develop into the main link between Russia and the local civil society and elites. They should shift from the consolidation stage over to the stage in which they legitimize themselves as influential civil society players who play a role in local power structures and decision-making.

This is much more than just a public statement about the need to defend somebody’s rights. It surprisingly openly expresses the real aim of Russia’s compatriots policy - the establishment of organized groups linked to Russia capable of influencing another country’s sovereign decisions without obvious intervention by Russia.

A new dimension was also added to Russia’s old rhetoric about „defending the rights and legal interests of compatriots”. In 2012, the Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad started work. Its main area of operation is Russia’s „near abroad” and it has started to create a network of legal protection centres throughout the CIS and Baltic states. The fund’s management board has already approved the allocation of grants for the establishment of many centres, including the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights in Tallinn, whose director Alexei Semjonov belongs to the Compatriots Coordination Commission run by the Russian Federation’s Embassy in
Tallinn. It is also characteristic that the fund decided to provide financial support to the Estonian resident Anton Gruzdev so that he could compensate the material damages that he caused in Jõhvi in 2007 in the course of mass unrest.

The same fund also financed the participation of the organization „World Without Nazism“ – Mir bez Natsisma (MBN) - activists in OSCE conferences and made donations to MBN to support the organisation of their General Assembly in October 2012 in Strasbourg. The General Assembly’s aim was to develop a reputation for MBN of an international non-governmental organization, provide legitimacy for its messages and goals and create favourable conditions for strengthening the organization’s cooperation with international organizations.

The abovementioned organizations continue to be mainly run by Russian citizens and compatriots policy activists despite efforts to conceal their membership. MBN defines itself as an international legal protection movement. Yet its assembly failed to endorse the suggestion that MBN’s charter should include the need to stand up for the rights of sexual minorities. The suggestion was met by so-called „legal protectors” and „antifascists” with homophobic comments and was therefore omitted from the charter. Instead, the assembly decided to focus on making already familiar accusations that Nazi war criminals are hailed as heroes in the Baltic states, that history is being rewritten, that neonazism is on the rise and that nationalistic government’s have discriminatory policies towards minorities. Many delegates made use of their presentation abilities to stamp out their domestic political opponents.

Also worth mentioning is the MBN seminar held to commemorate the day that the Red Army conquered Tallinn as well as the MBN’s attempts to spark conflicts at World War II memorial events.

„Soft power” and influence operations

In 2012, Russian authorities started to talk more openly about using „soft power” to achieve Russia’s foreign policy priorities. The internationally well-known term soft power is generally used in contrast to hard power, which is defined by the use of force or threats, but also offering compensation, for example, to the leader of another country or an influential political force. Soft power, the use of which is generally accepted, focuses exclusively on achieving aims through likeability and understanding, whereas cultural and social values play a vital role in this process.

Influence operations, however, are defined as activities that are aimed at changing another country’s target group’s (such as state authorities, voters or the media) decisions, behaviour and attitudes. The area of operation is much wider than in the case of soft power and includes diplomacy, information, military power, economic influence, covert operations by special services as well as any other means of gaining influence including offering money. Thus soft power and influence operations are in their means as well as goals clearly very different concepts. The distinction is an important one from the point of view of the Internal Security Service tasked moreover with the protection of Estonia’s sovereignty. It is also very important to be able to recognize an influence operation, even when attempts are made to either conceal or legitimize it by use of the „soft power” label. The genuine use of soft power by another country warrants the Internal Security Service’s attention only if it is combined with another country’s influence operations. It is therefore important to study and analyze what lies behind the new „soft power” rhetoric used by Russian officials.
The term “soft power” appears three times in the Russian Federation’s latest foreign policy concept approved by President Putin. It is defined as an instrument for fulfilling Russia’s foreign policy aims, which focuses on civil society, information and communication tools and humanitarian opportunities, and is therefore an alternative to classic diplomatic methods and tools. At the same time, the concept also notes that soft power can also be used to interfere in another country’s domestic affairs.

In the article “The Specifics of Russian Soft Power”, Konstantin Kosachev is more open and informative about how soft power can be used. In the article, which appeared in the English-language version of Russia in Global Affairs, he writes that “The “integration without incorporation” concept can be quite successful for assimilation by national (and even partly nationalist) intellectual elites and societies. However, the process is not easy because the ideas of national independence as independence particularly from Russia are still strong. For these peoples, the very emancipation became the most important change against the background of the Russian factor in history and at present.”

Taking into account the key role that Kosachev and the agency that he leads - Rossotrudnitshestvo - plays in Russia’s so-called compatriots policy and related “soft” activities, it must unfortunately be concluded that the new concepts and wordings are nothing more than attempts to hide and legitimize Russia’s traditional, KGB-style influence operations. Soft power elements such as popularization of national culture, support for collectives that are keen on national culture, financing of language training and other similar activities are included in the compatriots policy but unfortunately they are not at its forefront.

Unfortunately, Russia’s historical propaganda, which includes the rehabilitation of the Soviet Union, even Stalin, and the labelling of other versions of history as Nazism and the rewriting of history, also cannot be considered “soft power”. Over time, with the help of more distant history, the propaganda has come to include attempts to justify Russia’s sphere of influence and interests in other countries. Indeed, hampering the activities of opponents and the stigmatization of entire states and nations is, unfortunately, the reason why Russia’s historical propaganda cannot be considered classical soft power.

For years, Russia has developed and promoted an approach to history that it sees as being appropriate for a modern great power. Unfortunately, it has so far been unable to give up its Soviet legacy and Stalin era values. The selective release of archive materials continues. This is supposed to give the impression of greater openness. At the same time, however, Russian authorities reserve the right to choose appropriate historians to work with appropriate materials. Russia still refuses to admit the violent occupation and annexation of the Baltic states and tends to justify Communist repressions. This inevitably means questioning Estonia’s legitimacy and continuity. Those who doubt the Russian concept are accused of faking history and supporting Nazism.

In 2012, some changes were nevertheless introduced to Russia’s policy on history, which point to a desire to increasingly use soft power and move away from the current crude rhetoric. On 14 February 2012, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a decree, which, among other things, concluded the work of the commission established in 2009 to fight against anti-Russian attempts to falsify history. News of the dissolution of the so-called falsification commission appeared in the media almost a month later and was, for many, quite unexpected. Attempts were made to demonstrate to the public that the commission fulfilled its aims by helping to identify problems and publish archive materials. But the fact that the commission was dissolved quietly and discreetly points to the failure of the entire project. The commission was first established as a response to the “historical claims” being put forward by former Soviet Republics, but ended up exposing Russia’s own
attempts to limit the freedom of research. The commission’s calls on research establishments to expose falsifiers of history and its other strange anachronistic statements had a negative effect on researchers.

The Founding Congress of the Russian Historical Society, chaired by Speaker of the Russian Duma and former chairman of the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests Sergei Naryshkin, took place in Moscow on 20 June 2012. And on 29 December 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree re-establishing the Russian Military Historical Society. The roots to these societies date back to the end of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th Century and their re-establishment is part of Russia’s attempt to revive some imperial traditions. The establishment of historical societies can also be seen as an attempt to improve the reputation of the „fight against the falsification of history” by using the paraphernalia of research societies with long traditions. Compared to the „falsification commission” that ended its work, the membership of the Russian Historical Society includes more historians and leaders from various cultural and memorial societies. This provides hope that the organisation’s work will be more substantive and free and, from our point of view especially, that it will focus on Russia’s own historical problems instead of accusing and labelling neighbouring countries and their researchers of falsification. The first real test for the societies will be Vladimir Putin’s requirement that a new high school history textbook without contradictions or inconclusive interpretations, be worked out.

Media Assisted Influence operations

Last year, in addition to the usual accusations of having the wrong interpretation of history as well as citizenship and language laws, media channels loyal to the Russian leadership were inexplicably impatient in receiving the results of the Estonian census. Well before the official results of the census became available, the news portals regnum.ru and newspub.ru tried to gain the upper hand by writing about census results that supposedly indicated that the Estonian population is dying out. News items published in March 2012 did not gain any ground in Estonia so the issue was brought up again and more thoroughly in the autumn. Predictably, the TV channel Russia (Россия) made a news story on the census. The story’s author was Jekaterina Zorina, who became well known in Estonia thanks to her unique take on the events that took place in Estonia in April 2007.

The television channel RT, previously known as Russia Today, is the main tool that the Russian Federation uses in its international influence operations. RT’s activities in Estonia were described in detail in last year’s annual review, which resulted in two new video stories: „RT reporter – enemy of the state in Estonia?!” 12.04.2012 and „Baltic blacklist: Professor sacked for speaking to RT” 02.06.2012. Following these stories, RT has shown no interest in Estonia. They channel has not sent any reporters here. Its activities in other European Union and NATO states have not changed, which leads to the conclusion that they will soon reactivate their interest in Estonia.
The year 2012 underlined the fact every Estonian agency, company and person in possession of interesting information or a certain position in society may become a target for unfriendly intelligence agencies depending on the country’s interests and how good their access is to the target. Despite its small size, Estonia has been active in domestic and foreign policy, economic policy and defence. Special services are generally focused on the most topical issues that may have a direct impact on future developments and decisions. States tend to shape their strategic and tactical conduct in certain areas based on assessments and suggestions made by intelligence agencies. Intelligence is the tool necessary for gaining influence in another country. The special services of many countries operate in Estonia, however, the presence of Russian ones has always been very clearly felt. The priority of Russian special services is to increase Russia’s influence within the Estonian political landscape. They are also, however, interested in Estonia’s contacts within international organizations. While they seek to gather information, creating a position from which they can influence Estonian politics - either through human sources, media outlets or economic instruments - is their main priority.

Positions from which one can influence Estonian politics — either through human sources, media outlets or economic instruments — are more dangerous than gathering information.

It can be expected that in 2013 the number of political intelligence influence operations will increase ahead of the autumn local government (municipal) elections in Estonia. The political trends that will emerge in the autumn will provide an indication of what the European Parliament elections in June 2014 will bring. It can also be assumed that more active measures will be taken in the media.

The main interests of Russian special services in Estonia are the following:

- Estonian internal politics: processes, trends, decision-makers, players and elections;
- Law enforcement authorities, security services;
- Estonia’s economic success: impact of the euro, developments in the energy sector;
- Defence capability and international cooperation, the Estonian defence industry;
- Estonia’s international cooperation and position within the European Union, NATO and bilateral relations;
- The cyber environment, electronic access to sensitive data;
- To increase Russia’s influence.
Intelligence Methods

It is said that intelligence methods have changed little over time. This certainly applies to human intelligence, where intelligence officer gathers information through contact with other people. Cyber and signals intelligence are different but equally as important. ¹

Technology is, of course, developing at an extremely rapid pace and, therefore, the threat of cyber intelligence too is growing - both on the level of states as well as in the private sector in the form of economic intelligence. New viruses, their ability to gather information and the manner in which they are disseminated are constantly being upgraded. As viruses become more targeted, they are also becoming more veiled, smarter, faster and more intensive.

With fairly limited resources, a large amount of valuable documents or other important information can be stolen by means of cyber intelligence. Cyber thieves know how to hide their tracks and in retrospect, it is often not possible to assess exactly how many digital documents might have leaked via a particular intelligence channel. The protection of sensitive electronic data should be a priority, including in situations where the information is being managed on either a tablet PC or a smart phone.

In recent years, the number of cases where the FSB has approached people in seeking to recruit them has consistently grown showing an increased interest in Estonia. They often approach people in an aggressive manner, using compromising materials. They wish to have a quick response and quick recruitments. It is important to note that Russia’s internal security service - the FSB - is more active in Estonia than its external intelligence agency - the SRV or military intelligence - the GRU. It seems that Russia’s special services cannot accept that Estonia and other formerly occupied countries are now independent countries and no longer part of Russia or the virtual Soviet Union.

How to recognize a recruitment attempt and what to do

Usually recruitment begins with the thorough research of a potential candidate. High-risk individuals are those with vulnerabilities and a fragile emotional state including infidelity, disappointed employees, people with financial difficulties, addiction to alcohol, drugs or gambling. Possible targets are people whose lives include compromising episodes such as secret contacts with the KGB or GRU. The most common ways of getting to know a candidate is either through an existing agent, another individual, social networks, open sources, electronic intelligence or direct contact with the candidate. Direct contact with the candidate is also known as the so-called cultivation phase, which precedes actual recruitment.

At this stage, the agency itself has approached the candidate and is now getting to know them more closely. Usually the candidate is asked about their private life, work and contacts. The aim is also to get to know the candidate’s personality and behaviour in different situations. Even in the most skilful recruitments, the conversation eventually leads to work related issues, a person’s contacts and relationships within the state sector, research agencies, the military and other sensitive sectors. When these particular signs appear, then it is advisable to contact the Internal Security Service for advice on either how to act in the future or for an assessment of what might actually be going on.

¹ For an overview of the exact methods of intelligence used see the Internal Security Service’s 2011 Annual Review
Treason

It is well known that security agencies are always heightened targets for hostile special services.

The main milestone for the Internal Security Service’s counterintelligence efforts in 2012 was the resolution of a case of treason committed by a former colleague Aleksei Dressen. Dressens’ case was the second time in the past four years when Estonian citizens were to be convicted of treason. The case itself was obviously not a pleasant one for the Internal Security Service. Thanks to Dressen’s apprehension, however, the FSB’s position in Estonia was seriously harmed.

From 1993 until 2012, Aleksei Dressen worked at different positions within the Internal Security Service. He was arrested on 22 February 2012 together with his wife Viktoria Dressen who was attempting to bring classified information from Estonia to Russia on a memory stick.

Aleksei Dressen was recruited by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) as the result of a long-term operation lasting from 1998 until 2001, in the course of which, while on vacation, he visited his wife’s relatives in Russia. For years, Aleksei Dressen worked for the FSB’s counterintelligence service’s counterintelligence department known by its Russian abbreviation DKRO, previously UKRO. This particular unit within the FSB deals with operations directed against the security services of other countries.

Aleksei Dressen’s recruitment was a multistage process involving many FSB officers in both the recruitment as well as the operational phase.
Major General Evgeny Tyazhkun and Colonel Mikhail Loginov were the two main officers who dealt with Dressen.

The FSB took advantage of the fact that Aleksei Dressen did not inform the Internal Security Service when the FSB first approached him and tried to establish contact. If Dressen had informed his superiors, then the FSB’s further recruitment action would have been thwarted. Unfortunately, this is a typical mistake that people make when meeting with officers of hostile special services. Such a mistake was all the more unforgivable for a security agency employee. At the beginning, the special services officer is not aggressive, which in fact indicates that a longer-term and better-prepared operation is at hand. Why Dressen did not follow procedures that were well known to him is not clear. But the FSB officers that recruited him detected his mistake early on and a little later also Dressen himself.

At the beginning, Aleksei Dressen and his handlers met in Russia. But since the beginning of 2002, their meetings took place in third countries including Cyprus (2002), Turkey (2002), Tunisia (2003), Malaysia (2004), Vietnam (2006), Dominican Republic (2007) and Morocco (2009). The meetings preferably took place in non-EU countries. Dressen also used his wife Viktoria Dressen, who from time to time visited Russia on work assignments, to forward stolen information.

On 3 July 2012, Harju County Court found both Aleksei and Viktoria Dressen guilty of treason and of forwarding classified information. Aleksei Dressen was sentenced to 16 years in jail and Viktoria Dressen was sentenced to 6 years in jail with 5 years probation. Dressen was also ordered to pay criminal damages in the sum of 142,900 EUR for 23,500 EUR found in their apartment and for the apartment itself.

Alexei Dressen received a compounded sentence of 16 years in jail and Viktoria Dressen was sentenced to 6 years in jail with 5 years probation.

Unfortunately, due to the nature of this treason case, the Internal Security Service is unable to disclose all of its details and the extent of the damage that was caused. Serious harm was prevented thanks to the Internal Security Service’s adherence to the need to know principle, which underpins the protection of classified information. Thus Aleksei Dressen had information pertaining to the Internal Security Service’s staffing and management only so far as it was completely necessary in order for him to carry out his duties.

Since officials working in a security agency are accustomed to following this principle on a daily basis and expect other colleagues to also act in a professional manner, then the traitor did not reveal himself by showing a detailed interest in other people’s work. It is also important to note that awareness that a traitor exists did not occur suddenly. The Internal Security Service was able to implement clandestine measures in order to protect critical information.

Naturally, this was done so that neither the traitor nor his handlers had any idea that they had been caught. Many of the details of this case must remain classified for several decades so as not to help the FSB. The Internal Security Service must come to terms with the fact that, just like the largest and most powerful security organisations in the world, it too is not immune to traitors. At the same time, however, the independent resolution of such a case is comparable to a combatant unit’s baptism of fire, which cannot be replaced by any exercise.

Both the Aleksei Dressen case as well as the one involving Herman Simm demonstrate that Russian special services are ready to carry out complicated and costly operations in order to recruit Estonian informants in important positions. From time to time, they are successful in their efforts and the traitors end up working for Russia for years. Yet sooner or later, they are uncovered. Russian special services, however, have shown that they care about their agents for only so long as they are able to deliver important information to their services.
PROTECTION OF STATE SECRETS

Last year was customarily busy in this field. The Internal Security Service inspected a variety of establishments and, on the positive side, did not discover any serious violations of the requirements for the protection of state secrets. At the same time, the Internal Security Service dealt consistently with smaller procedural infringements and the prevention of any new ones.

The Internal Security Service is committed to ensuring that organisations know how to protect state secrets and, during the past year, organised many training courses to raise the overall level of awareness within state institutions. Last year, the Internal Security Service paid particular attention to raising awareness of the protection of state secrets and security within the Defence Forces as more than half of the security clearances that are issued are to members of the Defence Forces. Indeed, the Defence Forces and the Defence League process more state secrets than any other organisations.

Participants of the training courses are provided with an overview of how the protection of state secrets is organised in Estonia, how to receive security clearance and how to process state secrets. The courses also include an overview of the most common infringements of existing laws. Participants tend to be most interested in finding out what the Internal Security Service focuses on during the vetting process for security clearance.

In the course of vetting, the Internal Security Service does not assess an individual’s competency or qualifications to do their job. This
is left to each employer. The vetting process assesses whether there are any security risks linked to the individual such as risky hobbies, a developed patterns of behaviour, attitudes towards the constitutional order or possible risks related to the individual’s social circle. The conditions - both certain and possible - for refusing clearance are set out in § 32, Subsections 1 and 2 of the State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Act.

The most common security risk encountered in the course of vetting is living beyond means and becoming more vulnerable to pressure from special services of unfriendly countries. It is, above all, considered a risk if a person is unable to properly meet his or her personal financial commitments. It is worth noting that a small income is not necessarily the only reason behind financial difficulties. People often make imprudent use of their monthly income (for example, by spending it on gambling) forcing them to take out short-term loans to cover daily expenses.

In 2009, as a positive development, the number of persons with a passion for gambling who applied for and had security clearance decreased. This was due to the implementation of a requirement as of the beginning of 2009 that all persons entering a casino must present identification and register themselves. Unfortunately, this measure had but a short-term impact on curbing people’s desire to gamble. By today, the people who at first felt uncomfortable at having to register in public when entering a casino, have either gotten over their discomfort or have discovered internet based casinos.

In 2012, the Internal Security Service also focused more attention on the handling of classified information within private companies. The Internal Security Service held a number of training courses for private enterprises, just as for government institutions, and checked that the requirements for handling classified information were being met. The Internal Security Service also provided advice on building a secure area for handling classified information. Companies participating in public tenders must know how to and be able to handle state secrets. Estonian companies are well known for implementing innovative e-solutions. Those seeking to handle state secrets electronically, however, must factor in heightened security requirements in order to receive the proper accreditation.

Forwarding classified information through a technical channel of communication is permitted only if both the sender and the recipient are using an accredited system at the appropriate level of classification.
The fight against corruption

Corruption needs to be viewed widely in order to better understand its impact and spread as well as its consequences in our society. Foreign and domestic developments as well as financial and economic trends in Estonia need to be monitored and assessed. In the fight against corruption, the Internal Security Service’s main aim is to prevent and stop potential security threats arising from corruption as well as to minimize any possible damage. Corruption is a security threat when important decisions concerning the state are no longer made with the public interest in mind but rather in someone else’s interests - either those of a narrow business circle, a corrupt pressure group or even a foreign country. By failing to serve the public, the official or organisation is neglecting its obligations within the democratic legal order and thereby hurting the existing constitutional order. The view that corruption is a serious security threat is reflected in the amended Security Authorities Act, which stipulates that the Internal Security Service must, as of 2013, not only investigate certain crimes of corruption, but also deal with the problem on a wider scale. The Internal Security Service must tackle the fight against corruption based on the same principles as its other core tasks including defence of the constitutional order, counterespionage and the fight against terrorism.

Estonia’s position in the internationally recognised Transparency International corruption perceptions index has somewhat worsened in recent years, which once again testifies to the fact that people do not perceive that corruption has declined within society. It is also worth noting that based on surveys carried out in 2012, a large number of Estonians view corruption in the public sector as a serious problem that requires continued attention.

2012 was an important year in terms of recognising the dangers of corruption, above all due to the disclosure of many cases that pointed to the need to make society more transparent. In order to achieve more transparency, Estonia’s corruption prevention system and the legal framework for fighting against corruption need to function more effectively. Successful cooperation between the legislative and executive branches as well as between the public sector, non-governmental organisations and the general public is also needed.

Legal problems related to ethics in the public sector came to the fore thanks to a number of cases that were made public in 2012. They clearly point to the need to make the financing of political parties more transparent, to specify the question of immunity for senior public servants, to implement functioning lobbying rules and to bring the criminal offence of influence peddling into compliance with international requirements.
The Internal Security Service believes that in order to be effective in the fight against corruption, recent trends and security threats need to be taken into account. One also needs to function systematically on all levels and be perspicacious in terms of criminal law. Legal problems that appear in practice should not promote the emergence of a long-term, so-called corporate shield. Every public servant should acknowledge that in addition to legal norms, generally recognised ethical beliefs also exist within society and that an honest person adheres to these beliefs regardless of whether he or she is legally bound to do so.

As a security agency, the Internal Security Service has focused its anti-corruption attention and activities on preventing and thwarting corruption that threatens the state’s foreign, domestic and economic security. The principal corruption offenses committed by state and municipal officials are accepting either gratuities or bribes in return for making certain procedural decisions and influencing the outcome of public procurements. At the same time, the number of cases of nepotism has also increased as well as the tendency to abuse one’s influence in a manner that does not necessarily appear to bring any material benefits.

A separate issue that warrants mentioning is corruption related to tenders, which is caused by the stiff competition between companies bidding for public procurements. In addition to contesting the outcome of procurements, parties may also actively influence each other and exert pressure to come to a mutually acceptable agreement. Businessmen also frequently try to influence those officials who are responsible for making the decisions.

The abovementioned behaviour has not been deemed as criminal or illegal, however, it is dangerous from the point of view of corruption. Many companies follow business ethics in words but in practice do not do enough to decrease the risk of corruption. In doing so, they do not want to actually punish the employee, but try to solve the problem by finding a compromise solution as in the short-term this seems to make the most economic sense.

Adoption of the new anticorruption and public service acts were important developments in 2012, especially from the prevention perspective. Completion of the local municipalities corruption threats handbook and the start of the drafting of a new 2013-2017 anticorruption strategy were also significant.

Corruption threatening national external and economic security

In this field, it is above all important to follow national strategic external and economic processes that either concern large public procurements, foreign investments or could be influenced by unfriendly foreign states. This is a multifaceted and extensive field in which attention needs to be paid to investments into extensive infrastructure projects, information technology, defence and the medical sector thanks to funding provided nationally as well as through European Union structural funds.

Businessmen frequently try to influence those officials who are responsible for making the decisions. The most common violations continue to be the taking of bribes or gratuities for influencing the outcome of public procurements and agreements. There is also the additional threat that a corrupt official may decide to sell strategic information outside of Estonia. The most sensitive sectors include information technology, defence, energy and transit, where corruptive behaviour may, unknown to the official, increase the threat to national security.

Just as the security services of many other European Union countries (France, Spain, Italy and most Central
European countries), the Internal Security Service is increasingly paying attention to the prevention of corruption that poses a threat to economic security. This type of corruption often falls outside of criminal proceedings and its negative impact on the economy and the general welfare of citizens may not become evident until later.

The Internal Security Service is also responsible for the prevention of activities by members of either the management or the board of public, state-owned or state instituted corporations that pose a threat to state security as well as for any possible criminal proceedings. The activities of state-owned companies in the transport, information technology and energy sectors are most sensitive as here personal and company interests may easily intertwine. For example, one may be tempted to carry out the interests of a commercial group at the expense of the state-owned company or to influence procurements and agreements. These activities threaten the state-owned company’s competitiveness and productivity. They also increase the chance of a strategic economic or industrial sector becoming a tool in the influence operations of an unfriendly country.

The Internal Security Service’s task is to prevent cases of corruption where the behaviour of the corrupt local government official could eventually lead to a greater threat to domestic security.

**Legal judgments that came into force in 2012**

**Jaanus Christoffel**, former head of the Information Systems Service at the Ministry of Education and Research was convicted under Penal Code § 293, Subsection 2, Point 1 for taking bribes in exchange for ensuring that the Ministry purchase IT instruments from a specific company. J. Christoffel received a one year suspended sentence with three years probation.

**Vladimir Razumovski**, former Deputy Director General of the Veterinary and Food Board was convicted under Penal Code § 293, Subsection 2, Point 2 for accepting a bribe from businessmen transporting frozen fish in thermos wagons from Russia and Ukraine in exchange for issuing transportation permits. V. Razumovski received a suspended sentenced of one year and six months with three years probation.

**Erkki Mikenberg**, former Director of the Northern Regional Estonian Road Administration was convicted under Penal Code § 400, Subsections 1 and 2 and § 22, Subsection 2 (as of 27.02.2010 § 400, Subsection 2, Points 1 and 3 and Subsection 4 and § 22, Subsection 2) for convincing a company belonging to his acquaintance to enter into a contract that undermined competition and to coordinate prices and other requirements with a state-owned company, thereby ensuring that his acquaintance’s company won the tender for carrying out an inventory of the defects of state highways. E. Mikenberg was ordered to pay a financial penalty for his crimes.

**Raivo Kütt**, former Senior Expert in the Environmental Inspectorate’s Department of Management was accused under Penal Code § 300, Subsection 2 and § 400, Subsection 2, Point 1 of influencing the outcome of procurements for the purchase of motorboats and equipment for the Environmental Inspectorate. The procurements were won by companies belonging to his acquaintances. R. Kütt also concluded an agreement between his own company and companies belonging to his acquaintances that undermined competition. The aim of the agreement was to win the procurement for the purchase of a research vessel and equipment for the University of Agriculture. R. Kütt was ordered to pay a financial penalty for his crimes.

**Corruption that poses a threat to domestic security**

In order to ensure that domestic security is effectively guaranteed, the Internal Security Service has been tasked with fighting corruption within law enforcements agencies and six of the largest local governments. People’s trust in the state is seriously compromised by any abuse of authority by institutions that deal with the state’s legal order and safety such as the courts, the Prosecutor’s Office and investigators. In the long term, this may develop into a direct security threat. The leaking of sensitive information from law enforcement agencies is also a problem.

The risk of corruption within the largest municipalities has not changed over the past year. The most common forms of corruption continue to be the taking of bribes or gratuities and the channelling of procurements, contracts and order to companies where the official has either direct or hidden interests.
The Internal Security Service is also tasked with preventing cases of corruption on the local level that could eventually lead to a greater threat to domestic security.

**Legal judgments that came into force in 2012**

**Mati Songisepp**, former Director of the Tallinn Transport Authority’s Traffic Service was convicted under Penal Code § 29, Subsection 2, Point 1 of taking bribes amounting to close to 145 000 EUR from the representatives of two companies in exchange for ordering, receiving and paying them for installing and doing maintenance on traffic control devices in the city of Tallinn. M. Songisepp received a suspended sentence of three years with three years probation.

**Boris Goldman**, former Head of the Department of Education in the Tartu City Government was convicted under Penal Code § 201, Subsection 2, Points 1, 3 and 4 and § 202, Subsection 1. **Jevgenia Lindevald**, former Principal of the Annelinna Gymnasium, was convicted under Penal Code § 201, Subsection 2, Points 2, 3 and 4. B. Goldman and J. Lindevald embezzled assets belonging to city of Tartu amounting to more than 90 000 EUR.

Former Security Police Board senior expert **Indrek Põder** was convicted under Penal Code § 294, Subsection 2, Points 1 and 4 of accepting bribes from many private persons amounting to at least 276 198 EUR of which 178 358 EUR went directly into his own pocket. I. Põder also asked for bribes for at least 1 577 772 EUR. In exchange, he promised to illegally use his position as a police official in the interests of the private individuals. He received a four year jail sentence for his crimes.

Former senior investigator **Maksim Viks** of the Police and Border Guard Board’s Central Criminal Police was convicted under Penal Code § 294, Subsection 1, § 25, Subsection 2, § 418, Subsection 2, Point 1 and § 418 section 1 for receiving a bribe from a private person in exchange for agreeing to exploit his position as a criminal investigator and use make use of available tools and information. M. Viks also illegally acquired a flat iron hunting rifle, which he failed to register, a rifle’s gunlock and hazardous ammunition all of which he stored in his home and car. M. Viks received a sentence of two years and seven months in jail with three years probation, whereas he was ordered to immediately serve five months of his sentence.

Former chief inspector and adviser of the Environmental Inspectorate’s Southern Region **Tõnis Saariste** was convicted under Penal Code § 291, § 293, Subsection 1 and § 294, Subsection 2, Point 1 of failing to prevent serious fishing violations committed by his acquaintances and for helping to bring about the violations. T. Saariste repeatedly received bribes from the same acquaintances in exchange for abusing his position. T. Saariste also took a bribe from a member of the management of a company dealing with fishing. In exchange, he omitted to carry out an inspection of the company. T. Saariste received a sentence of two years and six months with three years probation, whereas he was ordered to immediately serve one month and one day in jail.

**Andres Vako** who worked at the Koidula border and customs check point was convicted under Penal Code § 294, Subsection 2, Point 3 for taking a bribe together with a group of persons, from a private citizen amounting to 236 000 Estonian crowns, in exchange for which the private citizen was allowed to carry goods from Russia to Estonia, if necessary without any customs checks. A. Vako received a suspended sentenced of two years in jail with two years probation. He was ordered to immediately serve our four months and 26 days in jail.

Former guard at the Murru jail **Olaf Tšarnetski** was convicted under Penal Code § 113 and § 22, Subsection 3 helping in the killing of an inmate by moving him to a cell where, at the hands of other inmates, he received fatal injuries. O. Tšarnetski later helped return the inmate with fatal injuries to his own cell where he died the same night. O. Tšarnetski was sentenced to three years in jail.
PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

International Events

In 2012, the world saw many acts of violence that qualify as terrorist attacks. The attack by the lone terrorist Mohammed Merah in France and the terrorist act committed in Burgas, Bulgaria received the most attention in the Estonian media. While Merah’s wave of attacks ended with his death during a shoot out with the French police, then the persons behind the terrorist attack in Burgas are to this day unknown.

In autumn 2012, the Islamic world was shaken by the video “Innocence of Muslims” denigrating the prophet Muhammad. The spread of the video caused violent protests in many Middle Eastern and North African countries as well as a wave of attacks on US diplomatic representations. The Western world’s notion that freedom of speech is one of democracy’s fundamental concepts clashed with the Islamic world’s ban on denigrating Islam and depicting its prophet. The resulting wave of violence that swept through the Islamic world was also accompanied by the view that Western society as a whole was to blame, not just the individuals who produced the video. The event highlighted how easily the threat of terrorism can occur and how behaviour that we view as acceptable and in line with our basic rights can lead to international violence, especially when it involves somebody’s identity and religion. The reserved reaction of the Muslim community in Estonia highlighted its high level of legal and cultural integration into Estonian society.

Salafism and Europe

Wahhabism is briefly described in last year’s annual review. In general, this form of Islam believes that Muslims should live only according to the Koran and the teachings of prophet Muhammad. The movement’s centre is located in Saudi Arabia, which holds influence among many Islamic organisations, including the Estonian Muslim community. The term Wahhabism is closely linked to Salafism, which in large European countries has become increasingly topical in recent years thanks to an increase in problems related to radical Islam.

Neither scholars nor Western researchers of Islam have been able to offer a single definition of Salafism and therefore it is unclear who exactly are Salafists. Salafists refer to Muslims who strictly follow prophet Muhammad in both theirs words as well as their actions. According to Salafists, observance of modern Islam has brought with it a “false” interpretation of Islam. Salafists therefore believe in the need to observe the original “pure” Islam as it was presented by prophet Muhammad and his closest disciples. According to Salafists, Muslims should live their lives as during the 7-9th centuries. “Pure” Islam according to Salafists means the constant confirmation of one Allah as the highest authority, opposition to religious reforms, declaring that so-called “not real” Muslims are apostates and propagating holy war or jihad against unbelievers. According to Salafism, Islam is superior to all other religions and their followers, who must conform to Islam or be destroyed. In other words, Salafi ideology is directly at odds with Western understandings of human rights and individual freedoms more generally.

The threat that Salafists pose to the state and its people stems from their political aim of establishing a social order based entirely on Sharia law, which runs counter to Western beliefs.

In Western society, all radical Muslims are generally considered to be Salafists. It is believed that they make up approximately 1-5% of the Muslim population. Yet it has also been observed that there may be many more Muslims who support their values. Ultraconservative Salafists follow and disseminate information on fundamental Islam not only on religious practices but all areas of life.

The threat that Salafists pose to the state and its population stems from their political aim of establishing a social order based entirely on Sharia law, which runs counter to Western beliefs. For years Saudi Arabia, which is based mostly on Islamic law, has supported the Muslim community in Estonia. Although there are no Salafist movements or Salafists in Estonia, the Internal Security Service has observed certain Salafist manifestations and the spread of its beliefs within the Estonian Muslim community.
The decision to ban the Salafist movement Millatu Ibrahim in Germany in summer 2012 underlines the danger of Salafism to national security. Millatu Ibrahim called on Muslims to violently resist the German constitutional order and establish Sharia law in Germany. In summer 2012, German police forces organised an extensive operation, in the course of which checks were carried out in many Salafist homes, meeting rooms and mosques. Based on the information that was gathered, the operation was concluded with the decision to ban Millatu Ibrahim in Germany.

Within larger states, Salafists have created their own communities that are completely opposed to Western values and integration. Tallinn and surrounding areas continue to be the Estonian Muslim community’s main centre of activity. The Muslim cultural centre Turath is located on Keevise Street in Tallinn. If the Muslim community splits, however, the emergence of new centres elsewhere in Estonia cannot be discounted.

Since use of the Internet has increased, most information is obtained through the web. The vast amount of information and sources on the web has also involved the widespread distribution of misinformation. One can find misinterpretations of Islam as well as websites created in other countries promoting extremist and violent Islam. Estonian Muslim’s are becoming increasingly aware of these websites. In the long term, this could lead to the wider spread of violent Islamist propaganda and radicalism.

The international organisations Jamaat Tabligh, Awqaf General Trust (United Arab Emirates), Al-Waqq Al-Islam (Saudi Arabia), Muslim World League (Saudi Arabia) and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), mentioned in previous annual reviews, continue to have contacts with Estonian Muslims. In 2012, representatives from the Estonian Muslim community once again participated in the WAMY Eastern European youth camp for Muslims. Islam continues to be promoted and spread through contacts. The same applies to supporting the local community. Thanks to the support and organisation of foreign Islamic organisations, many young Estonian Muslims have gone to study the Arabic language and Islam in North African and Middle Eastern countries.

### Risks Related to Immigration and Travelling

Illegal immigration to Europe continues to be on the rise. As a result, members of extremist organisations or their supporters may also find their way to Estonia. At the same time, attempts to enter Schengen territory via Estonia are also made through the abuse of the existing legal system and, for example, by concluding fictitious marriages, by abusing the visa system or by faking property transactions.

With the economy recovering, the number of Estonian citizens travelling to crisis areas or countries with unstable leaderships in North Africa and the Middle East is increasing. The risk of being taken hostage has inevitably increased as a result. In the Middle East and North Africa, terrorist cells have adopted as their main modus operandi the kidnapping of Europeans and asking for ransom in return. The Internal Security Service, therefore, asks that each individual,

---

The Salafist movement Millatu Ibrahim in Germany turned violent and became a threat to the constitutional order. The extremist movement was banned.
The Protection of Targets Against Terrorism

Security agencies around the world try to prevent terrorist acts by implementing preventative measures such as gathering information and improving mechanisms for the assessment of developing trends and risks. The security of potential terrorist targets, however, is also important. The Internal Security Service provides advice to the owners of potential high-risk targets so as to ensure that effective defensive systems capable of deterring an attack are in place. It is also important to work out a common understanding of which defensive mechanisms should be implemented in case of an increase in the existing risk level.

According to the Emergency Act, a high-risk target is a territory, building or equipment used to provide vital services and whose physical damage or destruction would seriously disrupt the consistent provision of the vital service and therefore runs a greater risk of being attacked. The government has mandated that the following requirements must be met to defend these sites: a physical external perimeter, an entry and exist control system, the use of trackers, lighting, the use of safety glasses and manned guarding.

The Internal Security Service’s task is to ensure that these requirements are properly met. The minimum requirements should be taken into account in both the planning stage of a building as well as during its renovation. They provide helpful guidance to planners and developers. Meeting the minimum requirements cannot rule out an attack against or even the destruction of a carefully planned site. Everyday security measures should, however, deter anyone from trying and, in case of an attack, they facilitate a response that will minimize the possibility of casualties, material damages and a negative impact on the state’s economic security.

Everyday security measures should deter anyone from trying to carry out an attack. In case of an attack, they should enable a proper response and minimize the possibility of casualties.
A balance must be found between a site’s openness and its security

Risks that need to be assessed in order to ensure security include:

- the probability of an attack;
- what are the aims that the attack is supposed to achieve;
- the possible motives of the attacker(s);
- the capabilities and likelihood of individuals and organisations to carry out an attack;
- the nature and location of the site;
- possible consequences.

The implementation of security measures aimed at preventing an attack requires a shift in mentality away from convenience and openness. Security measures are not set to restrict the rights of employees and visitors, but to ensure people’s safety and protect information. Due to the potential target’s nature, they are an extra temporary part of it and should viewed as being just as natural as for example putting a lock on your front door. An open society must also be a safe one.

Measures necessary for achieving an acceptable level of risk include:

- physical measures: a standards-based system for protecting personnel, information and property that must decrease the probability of an attack because existing security measures make an effective attack difficult;
- procedural measures: in combination with physical security, the existence of standards, operations and instructions for warning, defending and reacting; they must ensure that employees inform those responsible for security about suspicious events or unusual incidents;
- technical measures: alarm and surveillance systems, in other words security systems. However, even the most expensive technology cannot replace structural measures and manned guarding.

Thus when assessing the different risk scenarios for a particular site, it is important to find the right balance between the acceptable level of risk should an attack materialize and the investments that need to be made to ensure security.

In 2012, the government approved the first list of sites that are at high risk of being attacked. The list includes mainly governmental departments that are necessary for the functioning of the state and state-owned trading companies. The list itself is classified. The discussion over what criteria should be used to add additional vulnerable sites to the list will certainly continue next year. The proprietor of a high-risk site must provide constant physical protection and draw up a risk analysis and plan, which can help define the exact risks related to the site and enhance security measures. The Internal Security Service plans to enhance cooperation with these proprietors through a network of contact persons and to provide input into the drawing up of a yearly risk analysis and physical defence plan for each site. The aim is to identify each site’s essential needs and promote the most effective use of funds.

In order to prevent attacks, it is important to receive information about any suspicious incidents at the site. This means that the site’s proprietor must analyze events (time, place and background) and if they do not fit the normal pattern, treat them as a risk and forward the information to the Internal Security Service.

Threat Trends

In recent years, the number of attacks by so-called lone wolves has increased. Often these attacks are mass shootings in crowded places. According to different threat assessments, Al-Qaeda too is trying to attack crowded places and is planning to attack important sites where there is less security, the aim being to achieve the same result - economic damage and coverage in mass media - but with less resources. Many letter bombs have recently also gone off in Europe thereby underlining the importance of examining the mail and its distribution within an organisation, especially within those at higher risk of coming under an attack.

Examples of attacks in Europe by people working on their own

On 18 July 2012, a homemade explosive device exploded in the waiting area for tour buses at Burgas airport in Bulgaria. Seven people were killed in the attack; five Israeli tourists, a buss driver and the perpetrator himself.

On 22 July 2011 Anders Behring Breivik shot and killed 69 persons on Utøya island and killed eight persons in a bomb explosion in Oslo. On 24 August 2012, Breivik was found guilty and sentenced to 21 years in jail.

At the end of 2011, Polish security services tracked down an assistant professor of the Agricultural University of Krakow who was preparing a terrorist attack on the Polish parliament. According to his own words, Dr. Brunon K. wanted to cause more destruction than the
Norwegian mass murderer Breivik who made mistakes that he would not repeat. Dr. Brunon K. was planning to attack during the discussion on the Poland’s budget when both the President and the Prime Minister would have been in the building. The suspect had ordered four tons of explosives and intended to ram the parliament building with a car full of explosives.

On 13 December 2011, four people (a 17-year old, a 15-year old, a 75-year old woman and an 18 month old child) were killed in a grenade attack in Liège, Belgium. An additional 75 persons were injured during the attack. The attack was carried out by 33 years old Nordine Amrani, who lived in the same city and, besides grenades, also owned a Kalashnikov automatic weapon. Amrani had been previously punished for growing cannabis as well as owning tens of firearms and weapons details.

On 13 December 2011, 50-year old Gianluca Casseri, member of the rightwing extremist group Casa Pound, opened fire in Piazza Dalmazia in Firenze killing two street vendors of Somali origin and injuring three. From there Casseri drove to the popular San Lorenzo market, where he opened fire again and injured two street vendors of African origin. Casseri also killed himself at the end of the attack.

On 11 August 2011, Karen Drambian attacked the Ministry of Defence in Tallinn. He used a firearm, threw homemade explosives and took two persons who worked in the Ministry under his control. Two policemen were hit by shots fired by Drambian. Drambian himself died during his exchange of fire with the police.

Examples from the recent past of letter bombs sent through the mail

In December 2011, a letter bomb was sent to the President of Deutsche Bank Josef Ackermann. The A5 sized envelope was supposedly sent to the bank’s headquarters in Frankfurt by the Central European Bank, also located in Frankfurt. The bank’s security service discovered the envelope addressed to Mr. Ackermann during the x-ray examination.

On 31 March 2011, an explosion took place at the Swiss firm Swissnuclear’s office as a package was being inspected. Two workers were injured.

On 1 November 2012 in Athens a handmade explosive device, hidden inside an envelope, exploded in the hands of an employee of a private courier firm. The letter was addressed to the Embassy of Mexico in Athens. Following the blast, the police arrested two men and two women. More explosive devices in envelopes addressed to the Embassies of Belgium and the President of France were discovered in the hands of those arrested.

On 2 November 2010, similar envelopes were found in the Embassies of Bulgaria, Chile, Switzerland, Germany and Russia. The devices exploded in the Embassies of Bulgaria and Switzerland, nobody was injured. Following a routine check at Athens airport, further envelopes with explosive devices addressed to the European Court and Europol were found. On the same day in Germany, an envelope sent to the Federal Chancellery in Berlin was x-rayed and a similar device was found inside.

On 29 October 2010, an explosive device was discovered in a consignment of goods that was being transported from Yemen to the United States via Dubai. The goods were addressed to the Jewish synagogue in Chicago. It is believed that the device was planted by Al-Qaeda. The movement and location of the consignment could be followed on the web. It contained printers that had been modified into explosive devices. The printers’ toner cartridges had been filled with explosives. The intention was to trigger the devices by mobile phone.

Cases of letter bombs in Estonia all date back to more than ten years ago.

On 17 December 1999 a letter bomb disguised as a book was sent to a businessman who lived in central Tallinn. The man, who started to leaf through the book upon its arrival, was slightly injured in the blast.

On 6 March 2000 a letter bomb was sent to an artist in Tartu. The letter, which arrived by courier, was supposedly sent by a museum that the artist had never worked with. When the artist called the museum, they said that they knew nothing of the letter. Following a phone call to the police, the bomb squad came and disarmed the bomb thereby averting disaster.
Crimes involving explosive devices

A life was lost in 2012 due to the detonation of an explosive device. On 14 January at 9 in the morning, a device exploded in a five-story apartment building on Gagarin Street in Sillamööke, Ida-Virumaa. Dmitri (born 1978), the resident of the 4th floor apartment where the blast took place, was killed. The blast was so strong that it ripped off his hands, legs and head. The building was also damaged due to the fire and water that was used to put it out following the blast. Further investigation showed that the explosive device that exploded in Dmitri’s hands contained TNT and hexogen. 295 additional grams of TNT were also found in the apartment. The case was concluded because Dmitri, who caused the blast and illegally handled explosives, died.

In recent years, Estonian criminals have not used explosive devices that could pose a threat to people and the environment to settle debts.

Regrettably there were also other crimes involving explosives that were committed in 2012. On the morning of 31 May in Tallinn, a handmade explosive was discovered under a Mercedes-Benz SUV belonging to a businessman who was driving to work through the city centre. The device’s trigger and the way in which it was attached to the bottom of the vehicle suggest that it was meant to explode once the vehicle started moving. This, however, did not happen and the businessman as well as his 11-year-old son who he was driving to school, were unhurt. The businessman, who heard a strange noise when he started to drive, asked his colleagues at his central Tallinn office to have a look at the vehicle. The suspicious device was thereby discovered and they informed the authorities. Members of the Estonian Rescue Service’s Explosives Ordnance Disposal Centre’s Bomb Squad removed the explosive device and moved it safely out of the city centre. For safety reasons, part of the device was detonated on the same night at a polygon. The Internal Security Service opened a criminal investigation into the matter. The initial investigations were completed in December 2012 and the case files were forwarded to the Northern District Prosecutor’s Office. At the very end of the year, the Prosecutor’s Office forwarded the indictment to the Harju County Court.

At the time of writing this annual review, the trial of this case had not yet started so it is not yet possible to reveal what was uncovered in the course of the investigation nor provide details on the construction of the explosive device. The Internal Security Service arrested the suspects two months after the discovery of the device. The men are suspected of attempted murder with an explosive device thus presenting a danger to the public. They are also accused of the illegal handling of an explosive device and a large amount of explosives.

Based on the components of the explosive device and the amount of explosives that it contained, it is possible to argue that if the device had exploded then it would have put the lives and health of the people in and near the vehicle in very serious danger. It would have also caused substantial damage to property near the blast. In the 1990s, criminals often used powerful homemade explosive devices to settle debts. In recent years, however, these types of devices that pose a serious threat to both people as well as the environment have no longer been used. According to the Penal Code, the punishment for murder in a manner that causes danger to the general public, out of self-interest or with the aid of an explosive device is 8 to 20 years loss of freedom or life in prison. Two of the accused and one more individual are also suspected of illegally handling large amounts of the narcotic marihuana. A large amount of marihuana - enough to get as many as 500 persons high - was found in Tallinn in the garage of one of the suspected murderers. Smaller amounts of marihuana were found in the homes of the other two suspects.

The Internal Security Service continues to be concerned that explosives and devices are kept illegally in apartment buildings were they present a danger to not only the owner and his family but also others living in the same building. Even if in the case of...
smaller explosions the apartment and the construction between floors are not harmed, the blast often triggers a fire that can be extremely dangerous due to the heat and fumes that are emitted. The life, health and property of the neighbours is also put at risk. One does not have to look far for tragic examples - the blast that took place in Sillamäe in 2012 and the blast with extremely tragic consequences that took place in nine-story apartment building on Kuldnokka Street on 28 March 2010 in Tallinn. Two people - 38 year old Sergei who caused the blast and his partner’s one year old daughter - were killed in the explosion and the fire that followed. Vladimir (born in 1925) who lived in the apartment above was seriously injured in the blast and died a month and half later. Five additional persons were also injured, including a policeman who had been called to resolve a domestic argument. The blast cause substantial damage to the building’s construction. And water used to put out the fire cause damage to the interior of many of the apartments.

It was later determined that the blast was preceded by an argument between Sergei, who was drunk, and his partner. Sergei decided to end the argument by blowing himself up.

In conclusion, in 2012, a total of 80,8 kg of explosives, 13 grenades, 197 detonators, 14 triggers and 14 mines were discovered and confiscated in the course of criminal investigations carried out by the Internal Security Service.

The investigation of crimes related to the illegal import and export of firearms, their key components and ammunition

In 2012, in the course of criminal investigations, the Internal Security Service confiscated a total of 51 illegal firearms and 2210 cartridges. Four of the criminal cases involving firearms that the Internal Security Service was dealing with reached a conclusion in court in 2012.

Besides investigating cases related to the illegal handling of firearms, the Internal Security Service also contributed to shutting down a dangerous international arms smuggling channel. Upon receiving information about possible illegal activities related to arms smuggling on the border that might involve persons living in Estonia, the Internal Security Service carried out a thorough check of its sources and identified some persons who could be linked to the illegal export of arms. In cooperation with the Latvian security police, it was discovered that these persons were reactivating deactivated firearms and were planning to illegally sell them. They were purchasing the firearms from the Czech Republic and Slovakia and reactivating them in Latvia and Estonia.

Once the Internal Security Service had gathered enough information on the illegal export of firearms in order to officially launch an investigation, it transpired that colleagues from the Northern Prefecture had already opened a criminal investigation into the illegal handling of firearms by the same persons. After consulting with the Prosecutor’s Office, the Internal Security Service forwarded the information that it had gathered to the Police thereby helping to catch the criminals. At the same time, the Internal Security Service continued to cooperate with its Latvian colleagues in order to gather addition information.

In August 2012, there was enough evidence to arrest a number of persons in Estonia and Latvia who were suspected of the illegal import and export of firearms. In a search carried out by Northern Prefecture officers, 8 submachine guns and 4 pistols were taken from the suspects. Latvian security police officials got 31 reactivated firearms, mainly including Kalashnikov-type submachine guns. Six persons in Estonia and three in Latvia have been charged. The investigation was concluded in the end of 2012. The trial will take place in 2013.
THE INVESTIGATION OF TIMELESS UNIVERSAL CRIMES

The discovery and investigation of the secret grave of murdered civilians in Võrumaa

In 2011, the Internal Security Service was informed of the discovery of either a war grave or a secret burial site located in the Reedopalu forest by the Võru-Valga highway at 1.6 km from the city of Võru in Võru parish. The site coincided with statements by locals and relatives of former Forest Brothers about the existence of a secret grave where victims of the occupying Soviet power had been buried.

The Internal Security Service set out to verify these reports as part of a criminal investigation into the killing of civilians by Soviet authorities with the attributes of a crime against humanity and an attack against the civilian population. In August 2011, Internal Security Service investigators, assisted by relevant experts, carried out the first excavations at the site. The skeletal remains of 10 persons wearing civilian clothes were discovered in an unmarked common grave. The excavated skeletons were handed over to the Estonian Forensic Science Institute (EFSI) for forensics expertise.

The EFSI's thorough expertise established that the 7 males (including 1 underage teenager) and 3 females buried in the common grave had died violent deaths more than 40 years ago. The injuries uncovered following expert examinations painted a terrible picture of the way in which they died and how their corpses had been defiled. This picture did not coincide with typical injuries sustained in the course of battle. The victims had been shot repeatedly in the head and chest, whereas in other parts of the body there were substantially less gunshot wounds. This suggests that the already wounded victims, in a state of helplessness, were shot deliberately from a short distance with a volley of bullets or with repeated single shots from the same direction. Furthermore, the individuals had been severely beaten in the head and face with a hard, blunt
object with a rigid contact surface. After they had been killed, the individuals’ faces were beaten, probably with the butt of a rifle, to make their identification more difficult should local residents discover the common grave. Many of the victims also have pelvic fractures, possibly caused by blows made by a blunt object or strong pressure, for example, caused by a car driving over the body. In parallel with the medical expertise being carried out, investigators went through information on missing persons and killings committed in the Võru region after World War II. The disappearance of 10 persons at once or within a limited period of time was not common in Estonia, even during the Communist terror that followed World War II. Thus it was, from the beginning, probable that the individuals belonged to either a larger group or to many smaller groups of Forest Brothers who had been hiding from Soviet repressions and were killed within a short period of time of each other.

World War II did not end for either the Republic of Estonia or the Soviet Union in 1945. An extensive resistance movement broke out in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine and other regions occupied in 1939-40. Suppressing these movements proved to be unexpectedly difficult and time-consuming for the Soviet authorities. After the end of the war, the Communists were ready to use all methods necessary to conclusively and rapidly suppress the resistance movements: they organised military-chekist operations and deportations, recruited agents who would carry out murders and tortured arrested individuals. Yet despite all of the orders, efforts and target dates, they did not succeed in breaking the nationalist armed resistance and the population’s non-subordination until the mid-1950s.

The last substantial military attack coordinated from Moscow against the resistance movement took place in 1953. On 30 December 1952, the Central Committee of the CPSU ordered the Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarus Soviet Republics to bring to a rapid end the activities of all resistance groups and underground organisations. Based on the Communist Party’s decision, the USSR’s Ministry of State Security (MGB) issued a decree (Nr 0062) on 24 January 1953: „Measures for Eliminating the Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bandits in Western Oblasts of Ukraine and Belarus, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR“. A Ministry of State Security’s decree required all subordinate establishments to work out concrete plans for crushing all resistance groups and organisations.

The Minister for State Security of the Estonian SSR Valentin Moskalenko ordered that in order to execute decree Nr. 0062, „all existing tools and opportunities“ must be put to use. On 2 February 1953 leading ministry officials responsible for eliminating bands of Forest Brothers were briefed and thereafter sent to their regional posts. On 10 February 1953 V. Moskalenko already sent a detailed „Plan of measures to be taken for the elimination of the nationalist underground and its armed bands in the Estonian SSR“. The plan foresaw the destruction of 15 known bands of Forest Brothers and 91 individual Forest Brothers. The plan included a list of all known members of resistance groups, all agents that were tracking them and all responsible chekists.

After the end of the war, the Communists were ready to use all methods necessary to conclusively and rapidly suppress the resistance movements: they organised military-chekist operations and deportations, recruited agents who would carry out murders and tortured arrested individuals.

On 31 January 1953, a meeting attended by the local leadership of the MGB and central structure leaders was held in Tallinn. The Ministry of State Security’s 2-N and Fifth Departments were tasked with drafting practical plans of action, while other departments were ordered to send more experienced officials to the counties. The MGB’s 2-N Department’s assignment was to combat „nationalistic underground movements and rebel-terrorist factions hostile to the Soviet Union“, in other words Forest Brothers and resistance organisations. The Fifth Department was responsible for uncovering „elements hostile to the Soviet Union“ among students, intellectuals and the clergy. They also traced those who disseminated and composed leaflets.

At the beginning of 1953, the MGB considered the districts of Vastseliina and Võru the most „polluted by banditry“ in Estonia. According to the local MGB 2-N Directorate, in these areas there were 4 bands of Forest Brothers with a total of 30 members who were also known to be active in Pskov Oblast and Latvia. The band with 7 members led by Richard Vähi (born in 1918) was considered the greatest security threat at the time.

Many years earlier, the MGB had opened a file «Ползучие» (“The Creepers”) on Richard Vähi’s band of Forest Brothers. Richard Vähi and his wife Elsa had been on the list of Kulaks that were to be deported from
Estonia, but they managed to escape from the operational group searching for them. Fearing new repressions, Richard Vähi hid in the forest near the area of Misso and, at first, Elsa Vähi hid in her sister-in-law Julie Härm’s farm. On 7 March 1951, the MGB attacked the Saika bunker, located near Kunda village, killing six Forest Brothers in the process. The attackers themselves lost five soldiers. Richard Vähi was injured, but together with August Knus managed to escape the siege. An extensive operation was thereby launched to try to capture the two men. Farms on both sides of the Estonian-Latvian border were searched and many locals who had helped the Forest Brothers were tortured and repressed. In order to escape capture and violence, Elsa Vähi and Julie Härm’s family decided to hide in the forest. In 1951, Richard Vähi’s brother Rafael Vähi joined the Forest Brethren.

The inhuman methods used by Soviet security officials in the course of the interrogations that were carried out following the battle at Saika bunker are described in surprising detail in documents produced by the MGB’s Special Inspectorate: „At the end of March and beginning of April 1951, Burakov (Grigori Burakov, Head of the MGB’s Vastseliina Regional Department) and Trussov (Alekandr Trussov, Deputy Head of the MGB’s Vastseliina Regional Department) illegally arrested citizens (August) Raag, Enda Eenla, Ludvig Eenla and (Karolina) Härm and in July 1951, citizen (Peteris) Kitle. Burakov and Trussov, in the presence of other employees of the MGB Department, electrocuted the arrestees if they refused to confess by attaching the bare tips of a telephone wire to their fingers and toes. The wire tips were also attached to citizen Raag’s teeth and citizen Kitle’s head, after which the telephone’s handle was turned to create an electric shock”. In addition to electrocution, the chekists also tortured prisoners by carrying out brutal beatings. The Internal Security Service has been informed about many such cases mainly thanks to reports by the victims themselves and eyewitnesses. In the archives, there are few MGB Special Inspectorate documents describing torture methods as so-called „the exertion of physical influence” was sanctioned by the Minister of State Security himself and details were rarely described in writing.

By 1953, the band led by Richard Vähi was considered the most impor-

Richard and Elsa Vähi murdered on 29 March 1953 in Puutlipalu by Soviet chekists

Forest Brother Richard Vähi with his daughter. Vähi chose the life of a Forest Brother in March 1949, because his daughter, who was six months old at the time, would not have survived deportation. The Communist terror robbed many children born in the 1940’s and 1950’s of their fathers, mothers and homes.
tant target in the fight against Forest Brothers. R. Vähi and his partners were actually guilty of no more than taking essential food and supplies from stores in order to stay alive, but they could not be forgiven for surviving the battle at the Saika bunker. A group of 12 MGB officers, led by Estonian SSR Deputy Minister of State Security Colonel Alexander Chernov personally, were responsible for eliminating the Vähi band. The group also included First Lieutenant Valter Mürk, Deputy Head of the First Division in the local MGB’s 2-N Department, Captain Mikhail Kalikov, Senior Operational Commissioner in the 2-N Department, First Lieutenant Nikolai Panikovski, Deputy Head of the Vastseliina Regional Department, First Lieutenant Konstantin Kuznetsov, Senior Operational Commissioner in the Fifth Department, Capten Vladimir Kukanov, Deputy Head of the Fifth Department, Major Nikolai Lapsin, Head of the Fifth Main Directorate’s Investigative Department and the Department’s Senior Investigators Nikolai Gontšarov, Aleksei Pärnasalu and Randar Hii. Three additional chekists had been sent to Võrumaa from the Pskov oblast as support. The officers in charge could call on local MGB troops to attack the Forest Brothers.

In addition to Richard Vähi’s band, a large number of local residents hid themselves in the forests in the Viru and Vastseliina regions, hoping to escape the increasing violence and terror of the occupying power. Many, however, were caught in the course of a major operation conducted in 1953. On 28 February 1953, the Härämäe bunker was attacked. 2 Forest Brothers were killed and 3 were arrested. This was followed up with a battle on 15 March 1953 at Vossa bunker, where in the course of a shoot out, 4 Forest Brothers were killed and one arrested. The main target for the chekists, however, remained the elimination of the Richard Vähi’s band.

On 27 March 1953, an attack on the Võrgasoo bunker, where Rafael Vähi and his sister Julie Härn’s family were hiding, was carried out. On the previous day, Richard Vähi, together with Endel Leiman, had visited the Viglasoo bunker. They returned to their own bunker in Puutlipalu forest. Rafael Vähi and his 17 year old nephew Väino Härn were killed in the course of the battle. Väino Härn’s parents Julie and Aleksander Härn were also arrested. The bunker was destroyed.

Only 2 days later the chekists attacked the Puutlipalu bunker. The local farmer Joosep Piholaan, who was described as „legally living bandit”, was forced to disclose its location through torture (referred to by chekists as „persistent treatment“ and „a series of operational combinations“). The operation to find the bunker began in the early morning of 29 March 1953. Twice, J. Piholaan directed the attackers away from the bunker. The area that he pointed out was surrounded, but no bunker was found. After being „worked on“ again by Mikhail Kalikov, J. Piholaan took the operational group close to the bunker. The Forest Brothers refused to surrender and decided to defend themselves. The battle at Puutlipalu bunker lasted 9 hours. Richard Vähi, Elsa Vähi, August Kuus, Endel Leiman, August Kurra, Karl Kaur, Lehte-Kai Ojamäe and Leida Grünthal were all killed. 1 of the attackers was killed and 2 soldiers were injured.

Most of those murdered in Puutlipalu had, like Richard and Elsa Vähi, decided to take to the forests after the mass deportation of March 1949. Lehte-Kai Ojamäe had belonged to the secret youth organisation „For Estonian Freedom” that operated out of Võru Secondary School.

The act sanctioning the Puutlipalu operation was signed by Colonel Aver-
janov, Commander of the Third Internal Protection Squad at the USSR Ministry of Interior (MVD), Captain Deikin, Assistant to the Commander of the Third Internal Protection Squad, Major Igor Andreev, Deputy

the battles surrounding the Viglasoo and Puutlipalu bunkers. Their bodies were taken for identification to the MVD’s Võru Department, where on 30 and 31 March 1953 they were shown for recognition to Forest Brothers who had been previously arrested. The bodies were not released to relatives and their burial site was not revealed. Soviet security organs had been ordered to conceal corpses and their crimes against humanity as early as 9 August 1946. The Head of the MVD’s Department for the Fight Against Banditry Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Leontyev decreed that: “As a rule, the bodies of bandits that have been killed must be brought to the MVD regional or county department for photographing, identification and burial so that the burial sites cannot be found by the bandits. This rule can be broken only if the bodies can be photographed and indentified on site, in which case their burial must be conducted in strict confidence.”

In Estonian forests, there are still many unmarked graves where brave Estonians are buried, people who against their will and forgotten by the democratic world, fought an unequal battle with one of the world’s most violent regimes. We will continue to make efforts to ensure that even the most horrible truths are uncovered.

We will continue to make efforts to ensure that even the most horrible truths are uncovered.

Head of the local 2-N Department, First Lieutenant Valter Mürk, Deputy Head of the First Division in the local MGB 2-N Department, Captain Mikhail Kalikov, Senior Operational Commissioner in the 2-N Department, First Lieutenant Konstantin Mikhailov, Head of the Vastseliina Regional Department, Tartu Oblast, Major Johan Mägi, Deputy Head of the Tartu Regional Department and Lieutenant Lembit Ahermaa Senior Operational Commissioner of the Vastseliina Regional Department.

In April 1953, Estonian SSR Minister of State Security Valentin Moskalenko proudly reported to the First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party’s Central Committee Ivan Käbin that “nationalist bandit-like formations” have been totally eliminated in the Vastseliina region. During the course of many operations, 16 Forest Brothers were killed and 11 arrested. Additionally, 16 persons were arrested for helping Forest Brothers as well as 2 “illegals”. 15 bunkers were destroyed. In total, in the Vastseliina region alone, 45 persons were either imprisoned or murdered in the course of two months. Analogous attacks that took place elsewhere in Estonia in 1953 were also bloody and saw many casualties. During the first 3 months of 1953, 44 Forest Brothers were killed - as many as in 1945.

A total of 10 Forest Brothers - 7 men and 3 women - were killed in

The Internal Security Service has searched for the relatives of killed Forest Brothers with the aim of finding out, with the help of DNA testing, who the skeletal remains in Võrumaa belong to. Thanks to people’s cooperation and testing, it is possible to say with full certainty that the remains that were unearthed in August 2011 belong to Richard Vähi, Elsa Vähi, August Kuus, Endal Leiman, August Kurra, Karl Kaur, Lehte-Kai Ojamäe, Leida Grünthal, Rafael Vähi and Väino Härm, killed on 27 March 1953 in Viglasoo and 29 March 1953 in Puutlipalu by occupying Soviet forces. 60 years after being murdered at the hands of the Soviets, they can finally be given a worthy resting place.

The criminal Soviet regime was mistaken in thinking that by concealing serious crimes against humanity, their victims would be forgotten. In September 2012, investigators and experts found the skeletal remains of another 5 unidentified individuals close to the first burial site in Võrumaa. The Internal Security Service is currently dealing with their identification and eager to find out what happened to them.

In Estonian forests, there are still many unmarked graves where brave Estonians are buried, people who against their will and forgotten by the democratic world, fought an unequal battle with one of the world’s most violent regimes. We will continue to make efforts to ensure that even the most horrible truths are uncovered.
Compiled by:
Harrys Puusepp

Design:
Smile Group

Photos:
Archives of Estonian Internal Security Service, Archives of the Police and Border Guard Board,
Archives of Drošības Policija, Martin Kempner, Valmar Valdmann, Scanpix Baltics, Delfi, baltija.eu

Print:
Uniprint

ISSN 2228-1789 (print)
ISSN 2228-1797 (internet)