ANNUAL REVIEW 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 4

THE ORDER OF MERIT OF THE SECURITY POLICE 6

DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 7
  Extremism 7
  Russia’s so-called compatriots policy 9
  Exploitation of Russian-language gymnasiums 11

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 16
  Political intelligence 16
  Military intelligence 16
  Commercial intelligence 16
  Methods of gathering intelligence 17

SAFEGUARDING STATE SECRETS 19

PREVENTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 21
  The illegal smuggling of weapons 22
  The rescue of Estonian citizens from Lebanon 24

THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 26
  Corruption in the state sector, not related to resources 26
  Corruption surrounding public finances and property 28
  Corruption in local governments 29

70 YEARS SINCE THE COMMUNIST MASS MURDER IN PIRITA-KOSE 30
  SECURITY POLICE OFFICERS INDICTED BY THE WAR TRIBUNAL OF THE ARMED FORCES
  OF THE NKVD IN 1941 IN TALLINN 32

IN MEMORIAM TARMO LAUL 34
FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

Dear Reader,

You hold in your hands the Security Police’s latest annual review, which outlines last year’s most important observations and events. As a security organisation, we consider sharing them with the wider public both possible and necessary. As is customary, our annual review contains an overview of threats to our constitutional order, including influence operations, comments on counterintelligence and a description of our activities related to the fight against international terrorism. We also provide an overview of our activities aimed at safeguarding state secrets and fighting corruption as a threat to national security.

We also look at one of the most tragic periods in the history of the Republic of Estonia and the Security Police – the first year of Soviet occupation. The violent occupying power failed to meet its principal aim of forever severing the underpinnings of Estonian statehood. It did, however, destroy thousands of lives, entire families and lineages. Fellow Security Police officers were among the Communist terror’s first victims.

International cooperation, both within the NATO and EU frameworks as well as on a bilateral basis with various security and police institutions, has become an integral part of the Security Police Board’s day-to-day work. Mutual trust and professionalism are important criteria for building an effective cooperative network with partner services.

In May 2011, the Security Police participated in the international exercise EUCREMEX2011 aimed at preventing and stopping a terrorist attack on Tallinn airport. Participating in the exercise was an interesting experience for the Security Board’s partner services from the Baltic states and other European Union countries who left Tallinn satisfied.

Unfortunately, 2011 was not just limited to exercises. In the first half of 2011,
Estonian security services were challenged by a hostage-taking incident in Lebanon. Thanks to the successful involvement of international partners and efficient cooperation at home, the situation was successfully resolved and seven Estonians returned home safely.

During an investigation into a case of illegal arms trading, our colleague Tarmo Laul gave his life to prevent international terrorism. Looking back at 2011, we remember him with eternal gratitude and respect.

Dear Reader, Co-Thinker,

Looking at our geographic location, recognising the size of our population and knowing our history and its paradoxes, the question inevitably arises as to how will we secure our freedom and security for the next decades and even centuries to come. There are many answers – building strong alliances with partner countries, contributing systematically to national defence and security, sustainable economic development, social stability, education and culture. More importantly, however, none of these factors that make up the backbone of a free and secure country can exist in isolation.

At the Estonian Independence Day concert in 2006, the young Estonian artist Jarek Kasar remarked in his song ‘My People’ that ‘together, together, together; together we can sack fools, together we can employ specialists, but nobody else can make these decisions for us.’ This applies to both the Security Police and the Republic of Estonia. This is a value that we defend. We have something to defend and something to share with others. Being as open as possible to Estonians and our partners, both here in Estonia and abroad, makes the Security Police stronger and more capable of fulfilling its duties.

In democratic countries, security services are becoming more open than ever before and the Security Police is also part of this trend. While becoming more open, we have encountered some misunderstandings, including accusations of trying to influence people. Any type of information can have an impact on people’s behaviour. But we must keep in mind that Estonian authorities exist so that decisions in Estonia can be made by us - together - and not by those who continue to object to Estonian independence.

The Security Police Board, we express our opinion because we consider ourselves to be part of Estonian society. In a democratic country, nobody – neither the security services nor PR companies - has a monopoly over the truth. When opinions differ, then the truth is determined in the course of debates. When a person’s guilt is disputed, then the courts have the final say.

It has been asked why the Security Police mentions certain individuals by name in its annual review - does this practise not run counter to the presumption of innocence? No, it does not and I will explain why.

In 2011, a public discussion arose on the grey zone that exists between illegal but ethically acceptable behaviour. The Security Police is not nor does it aim to act as a judge over what is or isn’t ethically reprehensible. Yet the Security Police does have the legal responsibility to collect information on facts that have a dangerous impact on national security. We do not collect information for ourselves, but in order to inform our nation’s decision-makers so that they can make informed decisions that will benefit the Estonian people, not the interests of a foreign country or anti-Estonian interest groups.

Nevertheless, the principle that information can be withheld only according to the strict letter of the law and if it is justified, applies. According to the law, security services are allowed and required to inform the public if it is necessary for the prevention of security risks or crimes. This approach is entirely in line with our Constitution.

In this annual review, we, therefore, describe facts and events that in our view are important from the perspective of state security. We do so as openly as possible. Not all of the acts described here can be considered criminal according to the law, so those perpetrators that are named here are not necessarily criminals just because they are mentioned. I hope that you will find this review interesting reading and I encourage you to draw your own conclusions. Hopefully what the authors have written will help you do so by forming a piece of a larger mosaic.

Raivo Aeg
Director General of the Security Police
On 10 April 2011, according to a decree issued by the Minister of Interior, the Security Police acquired the right to bestow its own decorations thereby adding it to our existing symbols.

The Security Police’s 2nd Class Order is given to either Estonians or foreigners for fruitful cooperation with the Security Police.

The Security Police’s Order of Merit has two classes – 1st and 2nd Class. The 1st Class Order has three grades.

The Security Police’s 1st Class Order consists of a cross and a lapel ribbon. The cross is gold-rimmed and has a black background with rounded internal edges. The Security Police’s coat of arms is in the centre. Two golden crossed swords are added to the 1st Class Order in cases of particular bravery and selflessness.

The Security Police’s 2nd Class Order also consists of a cross and a lapel ribbon, yet the cross is white.

The Security Police’s coat of arms is also at its centre.

Generally, the Security Police’s decorations are bestowed once a year on April the 12th, the anniversary of the establishment of the Security Police. The rest of the year, decorations are given only in exceptional cases by a decision by the Director General of the Security Police.
DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

As the service responsible for internal security in Estonia, the Security Board’s central task is the defence of constitutional order in its broadest sense. All of the Board’s main functions – counterintelligence, protection of state secrets, prevention of international terrorism and investigation of crimes that pose a threat to national security – are necessary so that national authority can function according to the basic principles of our Constitution throughout Estonia.

Violent displays of extremism, attempts to alter the existing political order, separatism and foreign aggression may pose a direct threat to the state’s constitutional order and territorial integrity. Looking back at 2011, we can say that there were no serious threats to Estonia’s constitutional order.

Extremism

Classical, organised right- and left-wing extremism does not exist in Estonia. There are, however, individuals who hold extremist views and, in certain circumstances, these views can influence their behaviour. Preventing the organised activities and ideas of extremist groups operating in both the East and the West from being imported to Estonia continues to be a challenge for the Security Police.

The Internet, including the new opportunities and information that it provides, is playing an increasingly important role in the spread of extremist ideas and radicalisation. Traditionally the process of radicalisation occurs as a result of direct contact between like-minded individuals who share and adopt common radical views. In the age of the Internet, however, radicalisation takes place either through social media in different social networks or entirely on its own through so-called self-radicalisation. In past years, the Security Policy Board has stressed that radicalisation does not necessarily result in either violent or terrorist activities. Yet the tragic incidents that took place in Norway in July 2011 and Estonia in August 2011 demonstrated, once again, how difficult it is to detect when an individual’s extremist views have escalated into violent action.

Yet the tragic incidents that took place in Norway in July 2011 and Estonia in August 2011 demonstrated, once again, how difficult it is to detect when an individual’s extremist views have escalated into violent action. A connection can be made between targeted information disseminated on the Internet and violent radical actions. Indeed, the systematic labelling of Estonia in Russia’s controlled media environment and the messages coming out of Russia (including announcements made by the Russian Foreign Ministry) prior to the attack on the Ministry of Defence by Karen Drambyan in August, demon-
strate what the purposeful manipulation of a predisposed individual whose life is a mess can ultimately lead to.

Although the opportunities presented by social media attempt to cancel them out, in a controlled media environment the aim is not to explicitly goad an individual into violent action, but rather to create an all-encompassing context where the individual, supposedly on his own, finds a target that he can project his failures on. This is one of the reasons why authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are eager to establish the same kind of control over social media as they have over more traditional sources.

The ideology supported by Karen Drambyan and shared by other like-minded individuals does not fit into the classical definition of either right- or left-wing extremism. It is best defined as radical chauvinism stemming from the Soviet Union’s Russification policy, which includes elements of both right- and left-wing extremism. These elements are mainly limited to verbal references to ‘antifascism’ as a way of covering for chauvinism.

The mixing of different extremist views is not unique to Russian-Soviet chauvinism. This trend can also be observed in other European countries, where seemingly opposite extremist groups start to become similar in their violent activities and motives.

The aim of propaganda is to influence people’s behaviour. Its aftermath is, in most cases, difficult to control.

An attack on police officers is an attack on the state and its constitutional order. Drambyan’s bullets did not penetrate the police’s shields.
Russia’s so-called compatriots policy

Both direct and indirect threats can undermine the constitutional order of a state. Indirect threats include attacks aimed at undermining a state’s sovereignty and/or international position. Sovereignty means that a state is able to make important decisions on its own and in the interests of its people as foreseen by the Constitution. Covert attempts by either a foreign country or an aggressive interest group to influence these decisions, either illegally or secretly, by targeting authorised decision-makers or the wider public, qualify as attacks against a state’s sovereignty.

The Estonian Constitution guarantees basic rights and freedoms to all people living in Estonia and prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, colour, sex, ethnic origin, religion, political and other convictions, also based on material and social status or other factors. Indeed, this is the case in all democratic countries. Estonian citizens have the right to elect the Riigikogu. Yet unlike many other countries, Estonia allows citizens of other countries and individuals with no citizenship but who have lived in Estonia for a number of years, to participate in local elections.

In Estonia, compatriots are either citizens of Estonia or all of the people who live in Estonia. Any attempt to try to limit the definition of a compatriot according to nationality, language, ethnicity or convictions would be perceived as odd or even anti-constitutional.

Russia, on the other hand, defines a 'compatriot' as a resident of another country who is not necessarily even a Russian citizen, but who for historical reasons has special status according to Russian law. This differs significantly from Estonia’s definition. Russia’s aim is not to maintain cultural links with these people nor invite them to return to Russia. Rather its goal is to influence the sovereign decisions of other countries and to divert attention away from its own problems through the manipulation of these groups.

As international attention towards problems of human rights and political freedoms in Russia increases, authorities in Moscow are being provided with additional resources for issues related to the rights and defence of so-called compatriots in Russia’s near abroad. On 25 May 2011, according to a law of the President of the Russian Federation, a national fund was established for the defence and support of the rights of Russian compatriots living abroad. The fund was founded by the Russian Foreign Ministry and the affiliated national agency ‘Rossotrudnichestvo’ that handles relations with CIS countries, compatriots living abroad and international humanitarian cooperation. The fund receives most of its financing from the Russian state budget.

The fund, which started operating in January 2012, is, among other things, responsible for monitoring the observance of the rights of compatriots in various countries. The fund also provides legal and material assistance, including legal assistance in cases where Russia believes that the rights of its compatriots abroad have been violated. In the past, similar monitoring exercises have produced clearly biased reports. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s first human rights report published in December 2011 focuses only on the United States and European Union countries. Russia’s accusations towards the Baltic states are dealt with in a separate section, underlining yet again that Russia views Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a region where it has special interests.
The fund’s main partners are meant to be the Russian state organised coordination councils of Russian compatriots and ‘compatriots’ organisations that have been created to control and direct Russian compatriots abroad.

Many high-level Russian officials have mentioned that one of the fund’s assignments is ‘to support the ethno-cultural rights of compatriots.’ It has also been repeatedly stressed that Russia aims, above all, to support those ‘compatriots’ who show initiative in standing up for their rights.

All of this is closely linked to the special focus placed on the status of the Russian language abroad. Last year, in particular, this issue received a lot of attention at a number of events organised in Russia, including the annual worldwide compatriots conference in Moscow on 17-18 October 2011. At the conference, it was decided that Russian ‘compatriots’ living in European Union countries would establish national citizens’ committees and that under the European citizens’ initiative, they would launch a campaign to seek official EU status for the Russian language (the European citizens’ initiative is applicable as of 1 April 2012). Support was also given to those Russian compatriots organisations that plan to carry out campaigns to win official status for the Russian language in their country of residence.

Ambassador told the conference attendees that Russian compatriots must consolidate and coordinate their positions, particularly on the issue of preserving Russian-language education and the status of the Russian language in Estonia.

Non-governmental organisations established by the Russian state also known as GONGOs (Government-organised non-governmental organisations) are an important part of the compatriots policy as outlined in the Russian Foreign Ministry’s three-year work plan (2012-2014). With the help of GONGOs the aim for the future is to be more active in individual countries as well as on the international stage. The use of GONGOs in meeting Russian foreign policy goals is outlined in more detail in the chapter on information-based activities.

**Exploitation of Russian-language gymnasiums**

The partial transition to Estonian-language teaching in Russian-language gymnasiums began in Estonia in 2007. In autumn 2010, some teachers and parents who objected to the transition founded a non-governmental organisation called ‘Russian School in Estonia’ to express their opinions. The organisation, however, did not gain widespread support from the Russian community.

Prior to the Riigikogu elections in 2011, Yana Toom, Deputy Major of Tallinn responsible for educational and cultural issues, took up the anti-transition cause. In cooperation with the Human Rights Information Centre, which takes active part in implementing Russian compatriots policy in Estonia, Yana Toom started pressuring Tallinn’s Russian schools to submit applications to the Tallinn City Council calling for the continuation of Russian-language education after 1 September 2011. 1 September 2011 was the deadline after which Russian-language gymnasiums had to start teaching 60% of subjects in Estonian.

Thanks to pressure exerted by Mikhail Stalnukhin, five Russian-language gymnasiums in Narva submitted similar applications. After Yana Toom was elected to the Riigikogu, the new Deputy Major of Tallinn Mikhail Kōlvart continued in his predecessor’s footsteps by working against the transition both publicly and through hidden activities. Kōlvart’s goal was to consolidate Russian-speaking youth and demonstrate that they are opposed to the transition. On 1 September 2011, he launched a white ribbon campaign supported by Nochnoi Dozor (Night Watch) members in Tallinn and other cities. Wearing a white ribbon was supposed to demonstrate opposition to having studies in the Estonian-language but the initiative was not met with widespread support and understanding. The white ribbon became much better known among Russians as the symbol of those fighting against election fraud in the Russian elections held at the end of 2011.

Kōlvart, who took control over the ‘Russian School in Estonia’ organisation in autumn 2011, organised a signature-gathering campaign in support of Russian-language schools. The expectation was that the campaign would be as successful as in Latvia,
where over 180,000 signatures were gathered in support of the Russian language in November 2011. The results in Estonia, however, were much weaker despite the visibility that the campaign received in the Tallinn City Government sponsored newspaper Stolitsa and the Russian-speaking TV channel PBK.

With assistance from members of the extremist group Nochnoi Dozor, Kõlvart organised a number of demonstrations in Tallinn in October, November and December 2011. Tens of students were included in the demonstrations thanks to the extremists, yet the events were nevertheless dominated by individuals well-known to the Security Police. Only a minority of those who took part in the demonstrations actually belonged to their main target group – students and their parents.

A ‘nation-wide parents’ meeting’ was also organised by the Tallinn City Government (more precisely by Kõlvart) at the request of ‘Russian School in Estonia’ (more precisely by Kõlvart). It was mainly attended by elderly people, including many well-known Kremlin-minded extremists.

The Russian-language educational system and the special status of the Russian language were established as part of the Soviet Union’s Russification policy. Preserving them is a priority of Russian influence operations. The Russian-language educational system and the special status of the Russian language were established as part of the Soviet Union’s Russification policy. Preserving them is a priority of Russian influence operations. The Russian Embassy in Estonia supports these activities through the Russian compatriots coordination council in Estonia. Mikhail Kõlvart has had both public and secret contact with the Russian Embassy diplomat Jury Tsetkov who may be using these contacts to influence and direct Kõlvart. It is regrettable that the Russian Federation attempts to use young people as instruments in its influence operations as the future of young Russians in Estonia and Europe depends, above all, on them receiving a competitive education.

Russian information-based influence operations

On 28 December 2011, the Russian Foreign Ministry published a ‘Report on the Situation with Human Rights in Certain States,’ that can be viewed as a response to the United States of America’s annual and often Russian-critical human rights report. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s document contains complaints and warnings directed at the US and many European countries, in particular, the Baltic states. The accusations made in the report are the same as those used year after year in Russian information-based influence operations against Estonia.

As usual, the Russian Foreign Ministry stresses the ‘massive problem of statelessness in Estonia and the consequent violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking minority.’ It also points out that the Russian language has not been awarded status as an official language in Ida-Virumaa. The legal situation of non-citizens is described as the ‘particular invention’ of the Estonian authorities who seek to avoid the application of international conventions to these individuals. According to Russia, the Estonian authorities are aiming to assimilate their ‘compatriots.’ On the other hand, it is not mentioned in the report that the number of stateless persons in Estonia has consistently decreased since the restoration of independence. In 1992, 32 percent of individuals living in Estonia were stateless. By 1999, this figure had dropped to 13 percent. Today, less than 9 percent of people living in Estonia are without citizenship.

Accusations of neo-Nazism and xenophobia continue to dominate in Russian anti-Baltic rhetoric. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s human rights report, the Kremlin is...
particularly worried about the supposed revision of Second World War history, public meetings by Waffen SS legionnaires, the violation of war memorials, nationalistic youth marches and camps, the persecution of veterans, the equating of Nazi and Soviet crimes and attempts to portray Nazis and their local henchmen as heroes. The international military-sporting competition Erna Raid and the annual commemoration event marking the battles at Sinimäe in 1944 are impassively defined as dangerous neo-Nazi manifestations. The displacement of the Bronze soldier statue from central Tallinn in 2007 is also mentioned in this context.

Attacks against Estonia and, more generally, against Europe’s approach to history, can be explained by the increasingly consistent efforts of the Russian authorities to revive Soviet traditions and historiography.

These angry attacks against Estonia and, more generally, against Europe’s approach to history, can be explained by the increasingly consistent efforts of the Russian authorities to revive Soviet traditions and historiography. On 17 November 2011, the Russian Foreign Ministry published a document outlining Soviet foreign policy prior to the USSR’s Great Patriotic War. It justifies the occupation of territories that fell within the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s sphere of influence and fully denies the occupation of the Baltic states. ‘The majority of the population in the Baltic states did not support the policies of the ruling classes and after parliamentary elections in these countries in July 1940, forces loyal to the Soviet Union came to power,’ affirms the Russian Foreign Ministry. ‘The highest legislative organs in the Baltic states asked the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to admit their countries into the USSR and in 1940 these requests were met.’

Many Russian opinion leaders and political figures have also started to
actively promote this neo-Stalinist approach to history. On 18 June 2011, Maxim Shevchenko, the ‘Perviy Kanal’ presenter of a talk show ‘The Edge of the Week’ shown on the Russian television channel RTV and member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, claimed that only 3500-4000 individuals - not thousands - were deported from the Baltic states before the outbreak of the Second World War. In Shevchenko’s opinion, ‘the fact that during the war a significant part of the Baltic intelligentsia defected to the Nazi side,’ demonstrates that the methods used by the Soviet authorities were, if not right, then at least justified. The Soviet authorities were able to diminish the base of Nazi minions. According to Shevchenko, there are many more tragic fates than the one suffered by the Balts, ‘whom the Soviet authorities treated like children.’ A couple of days later in Tallinn, on 20 June, the non-governmental organisation Impressum, a so-called international media club, organised a public meeting ‘Russia and Estonia: what stands in the way of us being friends?’ The special guest Shevchenko was introduced to the audience as an erudite, professional and patriotic journalist.

Alongside the continued justification and tempering of Communist repres- sions, Russian information-based influence operations continue to focus on negating the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. On 17 June 2011, the information agency Regnum published a lengthy interview with Renald Simonyan, director of the Northern European and Baltic Studies Center at the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). In 2004, Simonyan, who is also Director of the Russian-Baltic Center at Russia’s Academy of Science’s Sociological Institute, received the Republic of Estonia’s state decoration – the Cross of Terra Mariana (4th Class) - for the first part of his book ‘Russia and the Baltic States’ and for promoting academic relations between Estonia and Russian. In the interview, Simonyan observes that according to international law, there was no Soviet occupation because occupation implies a military conflict between two sides. Simonyan also claims that the theory of Soviet occupation has no substantive justification as the Soviet Union invested generously in the Baltic republics and in fact increased the standard of living in this region. In Simonyan’s opinion, the Soviet occupation is simply an emotional view put forth by the Baltic states.

The use of GONGOs¹ as means of gaining influence

While Russia employs various opinion leaders in its information-based influence operations, it also makes active use of government organised non-governmental organisations – GONGOs. Their main aim is to replace and, if necessary, completely displace genuine non-governmental organisations that tend to closely scrutinise governments and their activities. GONGOs are trustworthy and more or less secret collaborators to the Russian authorities. They help implement domestic and foreign policy and thwart attacks by opponents.

¹ Government organised non-governmental organisation
worked with the pro-Russian (so-called antifascist) organisation ‘Future Without Fascism.’ One of this organisation’s instigators Josef Korens is head of the Latvian Anti-Fascist Committee and now also a member of ‘World Without Nazism’s’ presidium. Other members of ‘World Without Nazism’s’ management board include Modest Kolerov, Editor-in-Chief of the information agency Regnum and former high-ranking official in the Russian Presidential Administration, Efraim Zuroff, director of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s Jerusalem Office, Johan Bäckman, leader of the Finnish Anti-Fascist Committee, Tatyana Zhdanoka, Latvian Member of the European Parliament, Giulietto Chiesa, Italian communist and former Member of the European Parliament, Algidas Paleckis, leader of the Lithuanian Socialist Popular Front and so on.

At the end of 2011, ‘World Without Nazism’ applied for registration as a legal entity in Strasbourg. The step was justified with the need to make it more difficult for others to hinder the activities of organisations affiliated with ‘World Without Nazism’ in their countries of residence. However, it raises the inevitable question of why would anyone want to hinder the activities of an organisation that stands for humane principles. ‘World Without Nazism,’ despite its external attributes and legal status, cannot be considered an international organisation. It is ‘international’ only so far as it consolidates and coordinates Russian compatriots policy activists in various countries around the world. According to the organisation’s website, a total of 14 organisations from Estonia (including Nochnoi Dozor, the Arnold Meri Public Union Against New Nazism’s management board include Andrey Lugovoy, the US, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland. As in Estonia, the affiliates are for the most part pre-existing re-named anti-fascist committees.

At a meeting with non-governmental organisations in Moscow on 23 March 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that there is an acute need for associations ready to forcefully stand up to attempts to falsify and re-write the history of the Second World War. ‘Rossotrudnichestvo’, the agency in charge of CIS states, compatriots living abroad and international humanitarian cooperation, the fund ‘Russkiy Mir’ and ‘World Without Nazism’ were all mentioned as positive examples in this field. The Russian Foreign Ministry praised the exhibition on the Great Patriotic War organised by ‘World Without Nazism’ in January 2011 at the OSCE session in Strasbourg. The conferences, where Estonia and Latvia were falsely accused of rewriting history and rehabilititating Nazism, also received positive mention.

On 3-4 December 2011, a seminar ‘For a World Without Nazism: social monitoring of the resurgence of neo-Nazi tendencies in Russia and the near abroad’ was held at the ‘World Without Nazism’ Moscow headquarters. Groups of activists in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova were tasked with monitoring the media with a view to gathering information on neo-Nazism, the falsification of history and the so-called rehabilitation or honouring of Nazi collaborators.

In the coming years, Russia plans to significantly intensify its influence operations with the help of GONGOs. Upon Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s...
orders, A Russian Council for International Relations and a Public Diplomacy Support Fund have been created. Their task is to fund projects that will help achieve national foreign policy goals. Both of these organisations are classical GONGOs that have been established and funded by the state with a view to implementing Russian foreign policy by ‘soft power’ means.

**Influence operations and the media**

The Russian Federation carries out many of its information-based influence operations with the help of its own media landscape over which it has full control. Attention is drawn away from domestic problems by creating foreign enemies. Estonia continues to be depicted as an enemy and the main propaganda points remain unchanged – Estonia is accused of harbouring Nazi sympathies and discriminating the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. Estonia is also depicted as a failed or useless small state.

The transition of Russian-speaking gymnasiums to an Estonian-language curriculum has been used as an example of alleged discrimination of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. It is also repeatedly claimed that the Soviet Union’s most successful Soviet republic is now one of the European Union’s most underdeveloped countries.

In 2011, the Russian media paid the most attention to the traditional gathering of veterans of the 20th Estonian Grenadiers Division held on 30 July at Sinimäe in Vaivara, Ida-Virumaa. To the disappointment of extremists and the Russian media, the event passed off peacefully and without incident. Russian Federation television channels, radio, internet websites and the written press nevertheless reported on the event by stressing that the commemoration, tacitly sanctioned by the Estonian authorities, was a glaring example of Nazi glorification and neo-Nazi and xenophobia promotion.

The Russian Federation owned television channel RT (formerly known as Russia Today) played an important role in the reporting on the event. RT’s head office is in Moscow but the channel has a studio in Washington and offices in Miami, Los Angeles, London, Paris, New Delhi and Tel Aviv. RT reports international news in Russian, English, Spanish and Arabic. RT correspondent Sara Firth was sent to report on the event at Sinimäe. She produced two English-language news reports: Estonia keeps anti-fascists away from SS veterans’ meeting and Estonia openly supports Nazis.

Another RT film crew visited Estonia in November 2011. RT reporter Aleksey Yaroshevsky visited various Estonian government agencies and gathered material on many timely issues. The result was three news reports in English: Estonia: Nazi safe haven, Language inquisition: Estonia gets tough on Russian speakers, Fund Fiasco: EU poorest state rescuing richer members.

RT’s target group is the wider international public not familiar with the situation in Estonia and therefore more susceptible to manipulation.

RT is not aimed at the domestic audience in Estonia and Russia. Its target group is the wider international public not familiar with the situation in Estonia and therefore more susceptible to manipulation. The topics that RT chooses and the manner in which they are presented coincide with Russia’s usual anti-Estonian rhetoric. The structure, presentation and tone of RT news reports have nothing to do with the reality on the ground in Estonia nor with the research carried out by RT correspondents.
2011 was an eventful year in Estonia also making it an interesting year for representatives of foreign intelligence services. Key events that sparked an interest included the after-effects of the Russian money scandal, changes in the Estonian political landscape, the Riigikogu and Presidential elections, the state of the Estonian economy in the face of the financial crisis and, more generally, Estonia’s successes and developments in the IT field. The most dominant intelligence services continue to be the Russian ones who work through local residencies. They also gather information from Estonians who work and travel to Russia based on the territorial intelligence principle.

**Political intelligence**

In 2011, we focused our counterintelligence activities on identifying traditional foreign intelligence aims with regard to Estonia. Before and after the Riigikogu elections in March 2011, foreign intelligence services conspicuously conducted constant and comprehensive analysis of the domestic political landscape including the different political parties and their political prospects. In accordance with the way that intelligence work is set up, both visiting intelligence officers as well as residents based in Estonia, operated at this time. Between elections intelligence residencies in Estonia have customarily focused their efforts on following and influencing developments within the local Russian community. The aim is to acquire information from key individuals with either political or economic influence and to try to exert influence over them.

**Military intelligence**

According to experts, an increase in tensions and developments in international relations has resulted in a greater military component in the safeguarding of security. In 2011, Russian military intelligence activities were more targeted and focused. This took place against the background of the planning of missile defence shields, the positioning of missiles, the development of Russia’s military industry, the import of Western military equipment and the search for offensive behaviour in NATO’s own development.

A rise in the relative importance of military intelligence can be predicted, which is why it is important to determine what kind of activities the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have planned in Estonia.

The main aim of intelligence activities in Estonia is to gain access to information on the defence capabilities and developments within NATO and its members. In 2011, intelligence activities against Estonia as a NATO member were aimed mainly at developing defence cooperation and training exercises. At the same time, however, we were also targets for active measures carried out by Russian military intelligence.
Commercial intelligence

In the commercial field, it is often difficult to determine whether information is being collected by a competitor or a foreign intelligence service. Cover jobs tend to vary and are often not linked to state institutions. For example, intelligence officers pose as journalists, researchers and entrepreneurs allowing them access to commercial intelligence that may interest foreign countries, not just competitors. Countries often seek information that is in their strategic interest and therefore focus on sectors such as energy, transit, banking, industry and technology development.

In an economic recession, ascertaining the extent to which foreign intelligence services have been engaging in commercial intelligence operations is particularly important as it becomes more likely that a foreign country will try to plan and carry out a successful expansion or take over in a strategic sector. The intelligence service will prepare the expansion. Our Eastern neighbour has a historic tendency to maintain strong state control over the most important economic sectors. Indeed, in the near future, we can predict that in our region various countries will try to ensure that their interests are met in the energy and other industrial sectors.

Methods of gathering intelligence

Human sources

Attempts are constantly made to recruit Estonian residents in Russia, including through direct contacts with Estonian officials. In recent years, the ‘quality’ of these recruitment attempts has improved. In the course of the operation, the official is presented with prepared compromising materials – recordings showing that the official has violated the law. An offer is made to disregard the violation in return for agreeing to cooperate. Other offers have included less bureaucracy in conducting business in Russia, access to closed national archives and simply friendship.

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In recent years, Russian special services have received increased funding and are become more active. We therefore do not agree with the fairly widespread view that reform of the Russian intelligence services will lead to a decrease in its capacity and loss of the strength of its services.

Cyber intelligence

The information technology sector has become the most rapidly developing channel for gathering intelligence. Thanks to cyber intelligence, information is gathered from mostly public networks. Popular social networks are vital for finding out about an individual’s background. In the domain of keeping track of electronic devices, viruses are increasingly being used to gain access to sensitive data. Viruses that damage the computer environment are being replaced by professionally developed malware that electronically gathers and forwards information found in computers and networks to a designated internet address.

The cyber intelligence field can provisionally be divided into two parts – the development of information collection capabilities and the ability to attack the continual operation of vital services. Estonia experienced cyber attacks in 2007. According to some analysts, this was the first cyber battle against a country in the history of the world. Today the most active country in our region in the cyber intelligence field is Russia who for years has invested in building up its technical intelligence capabilities, especially its offensive cyber intelligence ones. Yet Russia is not the only country to do so. Many different Russian departments and institutes offer training and infrastructure development services, which is a sign of a build-up of future threats and opportunities. In cyber space, today’s threats will not be fully realised until later. Cyber space provides good accessibility allowing access to a huge amount of information in the case of weak defensive capabilities. The newest viruses destroy themselves making it difficult to later ascertain the content and extent of the leak.

In order to identify and avoid these types of leaks, respective counterintelligence capabilities are needed. Above all, all authorities and their staff need to manage their information in a serious and conscious manner.

Often, however, the key problem is that they are unaware that information is being collected about them. They do not know about the leak nor that they are under surveillance. At best, they have recognised that information is being collected but do not know if it is being instigated by a competitor or a foreign intelligence service. A foreign country may be interested in collecting information in order to use it to influence the entire economic region and certain developments there or to gain knowledge about a targeted individual.
SAFEGUARDING STATE SECRETS

Estonia has been an EU and NATO member for already 8 years. During this time, our domestic legislation on the safeguarding of state secrets has been harmonised with European Union and NATO directives regulating the protection of classified information. Estonia participates as a partner in NATO peacekeeping operations together with other NATO member states. States and organisations entrust each other with classified information while carrying out common security related activities. The disclosure of this information could cause serious harm not only to another country but to the security of many and put many individual lives at risk. In order to be a trustworthy partner to other EU and NATO member states, we have committed ourselves to safeguarding our own classified information as well as that of other countries and organisations according to existing common EU and NATO rules.

Ongoing international cooperation

Cooperation between countries on the protection of classified information and security clearances has noticeably increased lately. This has been helped by the convergence of legislation. More and more often, countries ask for advice and know-how as they update their own legislation. The EU and NATO have also updated and harmonised their own regulations on classified information. On 31 March 2011, according to a European Council decision, new security guidelines for the safeguarding of EU classified information, very similar to NATO security directives, were adopted.

In 2011, the number of permits issued to employees of private firms increased dramatically

According to European Union and NATO regulations, member states are responsible for the vetting process of their own citizens and entrepreneurs registered in their country regardless of which country the citizens or entrepreneurs actually work. Thus the Security Police vets all Estonian citizens who work in European Union institutions despite the fact that some of these individuals have not lived in Estonia for years and do not come face to face with Estonian state secrets. Good cooperation and mutual trust is extremely important in exchanging information for these vetting.

Strict security requirements for processing classified information

Companies registered in Estonia who have permits to process classified information have not yet participated actively in classified procurements in other European Union member states or NATO. Yet they have shown an interest in these types of procurements. At the same time, the number of companies applying for domestic permits to process classified information, which allows them to participate in Estonian tenders, has increased. In 2011, the number of permits issued to employees of private firms increased dramatically.

These trends have prompted the Security Police to strengthen checks over private companies in order to ensure that they fulfil the requirements for safeguarding classified information.

According to a European Council decision, new security guidelines for the safeguarding of EU classified information, very similar to NATO security directives, were adopted.
The radicalisation of individuals influenced by public information can bring terrorism to the safest countries. Oslo 2011
PREVENTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

In 2010, events that began in Tunisia and Egypt came to be collectively referred to as the Arab Spring. Long-term socio-economic problems as well as the widespread restriction of individual rights finally led to extensive demonstrations and protests in Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. The consequences of the predominantly violent conflicts that erupted between the populations and the ruling regimes in these countries have been varied – in some countries, there has been a change in regime and efforts have began to rebuild the country, in others, however, the religious fragmentation of the population has led to confrontation and an ever increasing wave of violence. The events unfolding in North Africa and the Middle East are under the heightened attention of security institutions throughout the world. The above-mentioned events have not substantially increased domestic security risks in Estonia. Nevertheless, the risk of Estonian citizens ending up in a life threatening situation in a conflict region remains high. An example of this was the hostage-taking of seven Estonian cyclists in Lebanon. This incident is described in greater detail further in this chapter.

The year’s most important event for the prevention of international terrorism was the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, in Pakistan, followed closely by the removal of many other leaders. While what happened was undoubtedly a significant psychological blow to the grouping, it is nevertheless likely that the loss of its leader will not mean the end of the ideology promoted by Islamic extremists. Its weakening, however, is reflected in the slow reaction time to the Arab Spring events. Estonia’s Muslim community consists mainly of Tartars and Azeris, who have successfully integrated into Estonian society and can be considered peaceful by local standards. A few isolated statements justifying terrorism have appeared, but they have not amounted to any action.

It is also important to understand that the challenges that so-called Old Europe faces express themselves over a longer period of time, over many generations. For some time now, the radicalisation of second and third generation immigrants has been a problem.

Given Estonia’s geographic location, the threat posed by terrorism is inextricably linked to the question of illegal immigration, which may bring members of extremist organisations and those who support their activities to Estonia. Citizens from third countries continue to show a heightened interest in entering Estonia and, from here, in gaining access to Western Europe either by crossing the border illegally, entering into fictitious marriages, applying for a study visa or a visa for other fictitious reasons. International cooperation has become increasingly important as we have sought to identify persons crossing the Estonian and European Union external border and to ascertain their actual motives so as to prevent abuse of the principle of the free movement of persons within the Schengen area.

Certain events that have taken place in our neighbouring states clearly indicate that the threat of terrorism is shifting closer to Estonia: in 2011 many individuals linked to terrorism were arrested in both Finland and Sweden. There are people within their Muslim communities who have started to support Islamic radicalism in their country of residence. The probability that these individuals may end up in Estonia, a country that is closely linked to its neighbours, is great as demonstrated by the arrest of a Turkish citizen in October 2011. This resident of Sweden, wanted internationally by Interpol for supporting an extremist Kurdish group, was released and sent back to Sweden when it became evident that, at the time of his arrest, supporting a terrorist crime was not yet considered a crime in Estonia.
Foreign Islamic organisations continue to show an interest in Estonia. The Jamaat Tabligh movement, that is influenced by Islamic fundamentalism but is mainly focused on missionary work, has been visiting Estonia for more than ten years already. Islamic organisations supporting Islamic fundamentalist principles from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to show an interest in the Estonian Muslim community, mainly by providing it with financial support. The most active organisations include: Awqaf General Trust (United Arab Emirates) and World Assembly of Muslim Youth, which deals internationally with the education of young Muslims and creating favourable conditions for the conversion to Islam. As of 2004, every year Estonian Muslims have participated in the WAMY Eastern European Muslim youth camp in Poland. In August 2011, the WAMY camp took place in Estonia.

The influence of Saudi Arabian Wahhabism has led to an increasing number of younger Muslims and Muslim converts supporting Islamic fundamentalism, as underlined by young Muslims from Estonia studying in the Saudi Arabian Medina University, which propagates Wahhabist ideology. Wahhabism began in the 18th century and was named after the preacher and religious reformer Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhabi (1703-1792) who lived on the Arabian peninsula. Abd al-Wahhabi’s aim was, in the course of Islam’s revival, to get Muslim’s to turn back to the Koran, Allah’s beliefs and to live according to Islamic law. His disciples call themselves ‘the only witnesses of God,’ who, in legal and religious matters, base their behaviour strictly on the Koran and religious tradition. They do not worship saints or other gods. Wahhabis have long-term close ties with the Saudi family, who took them under its protection and employed them as warriors in the battle against other tribes. After Saudi Arabia was founded in 1932 and the Saudi family came to power, strict Wahhabist teaching spread throughout the entire peninsula. Wahhabist Islam is gaining ever more influence thanks to the funding of shrines, schools and philanthropic programmes by Saudi Arabia.

Although the terrorism threat in Estonia is low, the global spread of terrorism continues to require regular cooperation with partners and the implementation of necessary preventative measures. The Security Police will continue to work to prevent terrorism by paying even more attention to domestic and international cooperation.

The illegal smuggling of weapons

In 2011, the Security Police reached the end of a long investigation into a case that involved the illegal dealing of firearms and their illegal transport out of Estonia from Spring 2009 until March 2011.

By December 2011, it was discovered in the course of an investigation that started in November 2010, that there was reason to suspect 15 persons of dealing illegally in firearms. It was discovered that at least 14 firearms, 10 firearm silencers and a large amount of ammunition were illegally delivered from Estonia to Latvia. Of the 14 firearms, 6 were previously de-activated firearms that had been refitted to shoot again, 4 were self-manufac-

For some time now, the radicalisation of second and third generation immigrants has been a problem
tured and 2 were re-built from 9 mm airguns into pistols.

A large amount of illegally smuggled firearms, ammunition, grenades and explosives were also confiscated from the suspects. The investigation into these crimes is still going on.

The most tragic incident in the Security Police Board’s history since the re-establishment of independence unfolded in connection with the investigation of this case, which ended in the death of one of our colleagues while he was on duty. On 4 May 2011 in Põlva county, Ago-Ursel Waaks, who did not own a firearms permit, fired at security police and police officers who were searching Waaks’ farm on suspicion of Ago-Ursel Waaks’ son Peeter Waaks. Ago-Ursel Waaks hit three of the four police officers and later perished in the course of a counterattack. At the time, he was considered to be no more than simply a witness in the ongoing investigation. Ago-Ursel Waaks used a 7,62x39 mm hunting rifle OP-SKS registered in his son’s name. The police officers carrying out the search had no choice but to respond to Waaks by returning fire. The paramedics were called immediately once the exchange of fire ended. By the time that they arrived, Ago-Ursel Waaks had died due to multiple gunshot wounds and the most seriously injured security police officer Tarmo Laul was taken to the hospital. Sadly it was not possible for the doctors to save Tarmo’s life and he died in the hospital. Another injured security police officer and an injured police officer were also taken to the hospital. Both recovered rapidly and are continuing to serve in the Security Police and the police force.

Ammunition and grenades confiscated in the course of a search

At the time that this document went to print, there was no legal decision by the courts on the abovementioned case. The evidence uncovered in the course of the investigation, however, clearly demonstrates that sometimes there is insufficient control over the fulfilment of the technical requirements needed to decommission a firearm. It also points to the need to put into place more precise procedures for bringing decommissioned firearms into Estonia. The technical parameters and procedural rules for decommissioning vary from country to country.

According to the Estonian Weapons Act, a firearm is made inoperable by the mechanical processing of the firearm’s components so that it permanently loses the ability to execute a shot. The technical requirements for making a weapon inoperable are defined in decree No 93 issued by the Minister of Interior on 4 December 2001 ‘Determining the technical requirements for decommissioning a weapon.’ If during the course of decommissioning, an essential part

At the same time, the operation’s second group of investigators arrived at Waaksi farm, provided first aid to those in need and thereafter continued working according to procedure. By this time, the main suspect Peeter Waaks had been arrested. In the course of the search of his home, he voluntarily gave up many illegal firearms, ammunition, a missile/shell without a detonator and explosives. In the course of the search of the Waaks’ farm, which was carried out in Peeter Waaks’ presence, 11 illegal firearms – 2 of them with silencers, 1964 bullets, 3 barrels and a large amount of gunpowder were discovered.

There was reason to suspect 15 persons of dealing illegally in firearms

Illegal pistol TT found at the Waaks farm

Pistol Margo with a silencer whose registration number has been altered
of the firearm is left intact, then it is dealt with according to the same procedures as foreseen for firearms of the same type. According to paragraph 21 of the Weapons Act, a firearm’s integral parts include the barrel, the lock, the chamber, the drum and the adapter. In order to decommission a firearm, either the owner or the possessor of the firearm must ask for permission from the Police and Border Guard Board. Only an individual who possesses a permit for fixing or converting a weapon may decommission a firearm.

Never before has the Estonian state had to directly and immediately intervene in the resolution of an extensive international hostage crisis

Cases such as these prove that decommissioned firearms are converted back into use by whatever instruments are available. They should lead to a review of existing legal acts regarding the decommissioning of weapons and their amendment. This would ensure that once decommissioned, firearms remain decommissioned for good and are not made usable again and put back into illegal circulation.

The rescue of Estonian citizens from Lebanon

On 23 March 2011, seven Estonian tourists travelling from Syria to Lebanon were abducted in the Bekaa Valley near the town of Zahle. The Estonians were on a bicycle tour and had crossed the Syrian-Lebanese border immediately prior to being taken hostage. The men were forced at gunpoint into a car and for the next 114 days were held hostage in scant circumstances by a gang armed with grenades, bomb belts and Kalashnikov automatic weapons. The cyclists were constantly ‘worked on’ in order to ensure that they would not attempt to escape under emotional pressure.

The State Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal investigation into the matter that was conducted by the Security Police. A domestic crisis committee, headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was established. Relevant government agencies exchanged information and jointly put in place a plan of action. The State Prosecutor’s Office reached out to Lebanese legal authorities and requests for legal assistance were sent to partner agencies. The role played by the Information Board on the international level also deserves to be recognised.

While there is no such thing as ‘a typical hostage-taking,’ this particular case was in many ways truly exceptional. Since the civil war, there have been no similar hostage-takings in Lebanon and never before has the Estonian state had to directly and immediately intervene in the resolution of an extensive international hostage crisis. Resolving this case was particularly complicated as the region where the crime was committed is not under the control of the Lebanese central authorities and is known for its lawlessness, drug trafficking and clan disputes. The majority of the region’s active inhabitants, especially the men, have grown up in rough conditions with a weapon in hand. The region has been in a long drawn out conflict – the civil war, the armed conflict with Israel in 1975-1991 and the regional fighting with Israel during the first decade of the 21st century. All of this has helped destroy most of the region’s agriculture and industry replacing them with the smuggling of firearms, drugs and other goods. There has also been an increase of gun battles between criminals and weakened state agencies and the murder of uniformed officers.

At beginning of the crisis when it was still unclear who abducted the Estonians and why, many different possible options were considered for what could be the reasons and aims of the hostage-takers. Opinions were sought from specialists from different agencies around the world. The situation was complicated by the start of the so-called Arab Spring. In general, public opinion throughout the world reacted to the fall of dictatorships positively. These events, however, had a negative impact on the operation to free the hostages. The uprisings and disorder in countries close to Lebanon directly hindered the Security Police’s investigation. The security authorities in these countries were engaged in resolving the tense situation on the ground and therefore many requests for information remained unanswered. It became clear that Estonia needed to depend above all on its own efforts. Nevertheless many colleagues from other countries were helpful and open. Lives were saved thanks to their intellectual and practical assistance.

During the course of the ongoing investigation in Estonia and Lebanon, it has been determined that the crime was planned and carried out by extremist Sunnis. The suspects were mainly religious and poorly educated. Making money was important to them. The hostage-takers were motivated mainly by the hope that they would become rich quickly by abducting foreigners. It is believed that they wanted to abduct citizens of a large country and accidentally ending up with ‘poor Estonians’ was a disappointment to them. They later discovered that their chosen path was not the best one. Three sus-
pects were killed in a gun battle with the Lebanese internal security services and most of the organisers have been arrested and forced to account for their crimes. Despite these risks and the dangerous situation in the area located between the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and Syria, the Lebanese authorities were committed to solving this case. Sadly a Lebanese internal security services official died in a gun battle with the suspects. In his last moments, he acted selflessly by shooting dead one of the leading hostage-takers Darwich Khanjar. Their other leader Wael Abbas has apprehended in Qatar’s airport while trying to use a forged passport to escape to Brazil. He was delivered from Qatar to Syria and on 2 November 2011 was handed over to the Lebanese authorities for further procedures, during which he is known to have admitted to having committed this and other crimes.

The precedent setting Lebanese hostage crisis presented a serious challenge for Estonia. Yet, on the whole, the situation was resolved successfully and rapidly in relation to international practice. The resolution of hostage-taking situations can take years and end with tragic results. Thanks to consistent efforts and the assistance of partners, the Estonian case came to a head on 14 July 2011 when the Estonian hostages were rescued from their violent captors in the course of a joint operation.

In 2011, an increasing number of European citizens were taken hostage in the Maghreb and Sahel regions. Hostage-takings in these regions are mainly organized by Al-Qaeda and the motives are usually political. The security police asks that Estonian citizens travel with a sense of responsibility and common sense and that they put together a travel plan that is realistic and takes into account local circumstances. The information on high-risk countries provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has shown that despite great efforts, a tragic outcome cannot always be avoided. We should be pleased that, in this case, it was possible to save our fellow citizens, but we should also prepare for the worst when planning travel to extreme places.

The Security Police thanks those close to the hostages and all of its partners for their joint efforts. Communicating with the families during this extremely stressful time was a complex challenge from both a personal and professional perspective. All kinds of self-proclaimed experts and so-called mediators appeared offering their services in order to rapidly resolve the situation. Given the amount of time and resources that the security police and other state agencies spent on resolving the crisis, it is highly doubtful whether any private individual could have had the capacity to reach the same solution. It is also regrettable that some individuals who had nothing to do with the case are trying to promote themselves by claiming to have played a pivotal role in resolving the case.

From hostage to rescue in 114 days — the result of domestic and international cooperation

² includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania.
³ includes Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Sustained and targeted anticorruption work is important to a country’s external, internal and economic security. By taking into account developments and changes in a number of areas, the spread of new types of corruption can be prevented and their negative consequences can be neutralised. The consequences of corruption are clearly long-term. The economic difficulties that many countries are experiencing are undoubtedly caused by deeper problems than just long-standing ‘living beyond one’s means.’ Generally, Estonia has been successful in the fight against corruption. Work in this field, however, could always be accelerated and improved. Despite some clear successes, the situation in Estonia with regard to corruption could nevertheless be improved – according to the 2011 Transparency International corruption perception index, Estonia’s position became worse compared to 2010 – Estonia dropped down three places to 29th as did Estonia’s overall ranking. This means that the state’s legislative and executive branches must continue to make daily efforts to ensure less corruption and thereby more security within society. Based on the criminal cases processed by the Security Policy in recent years, we can see that the most common corruption crimes among national and local officials are grafting and the taking of bribes while executing procedural acts and public procurements. At the same time, there has been a noticeable increase in cases of trading in influence, especially pertaining to political corruption and the probability of competitive crimes being committed.

As of 10 October 2011, the Security Policy has also been mandated with the task of investigating the pre-trial proceedings for corruption crimes that have been committed by the member of a board or council of either a public legal entity, a legal entity with state participation or a legal entity founded by the state, if his or her actions may pose a threat to national security. Just as corruption can have a fairly long-term impact, it inevitably takes time for anticorruption measures to have an effect on society. The abovementioned entities manage a substantial proportion of Estonian and EU funds, which means that measures need to be in place to ensure that these funds are administered honestly and in the interests of the wider public, not according to the wishes of a hidden interest group or a foreign country.

**Corruption in the state sector, not related to resources**

This area mainly covers corruption cases within law-enforcement agencies – above all, in executing and implementing procedures, as well as crimes of bribery and graft committed while issuing state permits and licenses or approving documents.
In courts, the influencing of judges by the accused, their defence attorneys or by third parties seeking to either achieve a more favourable decision or find out details concerning investigations continues to be the most common form of corruption. Corruption cases that have been uncovered and investigated by the Security Police in recent years have had a positive impact on people’s sense of justice and helped clean up the legal system.

The most dangerous corruption crimes committed by the police are illegal bargains made with offenders in exchange for compensation or services. The fact that policemen have many tasks and rights creates a variety of opportunities for corrupt officials to break the law, for example, by not making wise use of resources in order to achieve personal gain, by engaging in embezzlement, by leaking police information, etc.

At the end of 2011, the Security Police apprehended one of its employees Indrek Põder on the suspicion of repeatedly accepting gratuities. The Security Police discovered the crime by itself and acted on it after a long investigation and penal proceeding. Indrek Põder has as of today been accused according to Penal Code § 294, Subsection 2, Points 1,2 and 4 for repeatedly asking for and receiving substantial gratuities from various individuals from Spring 2009 until December 2011 in exchange for promising to use and for using his position in their interests. In all, Põder is suspected of carrying out more than ten criminal acts. According to the accusation, he received more than 100,000 Euros in gratuities and asked for gratuities amounting to more than 1 million Euros. The exact sums will be determined at the end of the criminal proceedings as work on the case is still in progress. The former Head of the Internal Audit Office of the Police and Border Guard, suspected of not keeping secrets acquired in the course of his work, is also a suspect in the same case.

**Court sentences that entered into force in 2011**

Indrek Ploompuu, Head of Unit in the Crime Department of the Southern Police Department was convicted under Penal Code § 294, Subsection 1 for receiving a bribe of 40,762 Kroons in exchange for agreeing to not react to an individual’s possible offenses and for leaking information that became known to him while doing his job. He received a partial prison sentence.

Ilmar Ojasoo, Senior Commissary in the Crime Office of the Rakvere Police Department of the Eastern Police Department was convicted under Penal Code § 201, Subsection 2, Point 3 and § 299, Subsection 1 for appropriating police evidence and forging an official document. He was fined for his crime.

Discovering corruption related to the issuing of state licenses, permits, acknowledgements and supervisory tasks is also one of the Security Police’s most important tasks. This is above all linked to customs and border corruption. As a country located on the European Union’s external border, Estonia must be able to prevent the smuggling of strategic goods, illegal immigration, etc. Discovering these types of corruption crimes also
harm competition and procurements that are directed at specific companies. Often more conspiratorial crime schemes are used in this field as compared to so-called common corruption crimes so instead of simply asking/receiving money, shadow companies and participation is used, influence and competitive crimes are committed. The greatest risks are linked to corruptive agreements that harm competition and procurements that are directed at specific companies. Decisions made by senior officials who act out of self-interest and are easily influenced can lead to a loss in investments and revenue for the state. They can also lead to a decline in honest competition and a decrease in a state’s trustworthiness on the international arena.

**2011 court verdicts:**

Kristo Kārmas, Counsellor in the Projects Division of the Water Department at the Ministry of Environment, was found guilty under Penal Code § 293, Subsection 2, Point 1. Kārmas belonged to the evaluations committee for measures funded by the European Union Cohesion Fund. He also participated in the preparation of environmental procurements carried out by the Ministry and the review of applications for replacing pollution compensation necessary for wastewater reconstruction. He used his position to benefit many firms, who rewarded him by ordering consultative and planning services for water management projects from him in the total sum of 355 022 Kroons. Thus to increase his personal income, Kārmas bribed firms into giving him work. Kārmas’ jail sentence was replaced by a sentence of community service.

Margus Kanter, Head of IT Development at the Environmental Investment Centre, was found guilty of crimes under Penal Code § 209, Subsection 2, Point 1 and § 294, Subsection 2, Points 1 and 2. Kanter repeatedly asked a company for a 80 000 Kroon bribe in exchange for influencing the outcome of the Centre’s information technology procurements. He allowed the company to artificially increase the size of its offer. For his own personal benefit, he had the Centre pay fictitious receipts to an acquaintance’s company for work that was never actually carried out. In total, Kanter cost the Centre over 331 984 Kroons in damages. Kanter received a sentence of parole.

Andrus Aavik, Director of the Medical Equipment and Technology Department in the Technical Services Agency at the Tartu University Clinic was found guilty of crimes under Penal Code § 209, Subsection 2, Point 1. Aavik let a company dealing with the sale of medical technology pay for vacations and study trips for himself and those close to him. Later, as a way of settling the expenditures made, he allowed the company to present fictitious bills to the Tartu University Clinic for work that had never actually been carried out. Aavik himself accepted the fictitious bills in the name of the Clinic. Aavik also let another company dealing in medical technology secretly pay for his vacation thereby misleading the company about the actual situation. In total, Aavik received 176 125,4 Kroons in financial benefits as a result of the crimes that he committed. He was sentenced to parole.

Police sees a need to pay more attention to corruption in the development of infrastructure development projects (construction, road construction, etc) as well as in the management of national defence, information technology, the environment and medical procurements. Often more conspiratorial crime schemes are used in this field as compared to so-called common corruption crimes so instead of simply asking/receiving money, shadow companies and participation is used, influence and competitive crimes are committed. The greatest risks are linked to corruptive agreements that harm competition and procurements that are directed at specific companies. Decisions made by senior officials who act out of self-interest and are easily influenced can lead to a loss in investments and revenue for the state. They can also lead to a decline in honest competition and a decrease in a state’s trustworthiness on the international arena.

**Corruption surrounding public finances and property**

Large and specific state procurements that are linked to the use of EU subsidies present the greatest corruption risks in this field whereas the highest risk of corruption presents itself during the application phase for financing. The Security...
THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

mainly in relation to procurements and support service activities. Corruption in military structures weakens the state’s capacity to defend itself and calls into question our ability to meet our international commitments. The Security Police must also take into account that a corrupt member of the Defence Forces is a good target for recruitment by unfriendly foreign intelligence services.

Lieutenant Aivo Loigom, Staff Sergeant in the Medical Resources Planning Division in the Health Services Section of the Defence Forces Headquarters Logistics Department was found guilty under Penal Code § 293, Subsection 2, Point 1 and § 294, Subsection 1. Loigom repeatedly accepted payoffs from the representative of a company dealing with the sale of medical technology in the sum of 160 000 Kroons and bribes in exchange for accepting the offers made by the same company for purchasing medical supplies and equipment for the Estonian Defence Forces. He received a partial prison sentence.

**Corruption in local governments**

The Security Police is responsible for uncovering possible corruption crimes committed by the leaders of six of the largest local governments in Estonia including Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Narva, Kohila-Järv and Jõhvi. The Security Police believes that the greatest risk of corruption arises in relation to public tenders and the conclusion of procurement contracts. The majority of public purchases in local governments continue to be carried out without the holding of a public tender. Many local governments have also done deals with companies that have links to members or employees of the local government authority meaning that officials essentially make deals with themselves. In local governments, mechanisms for minimizing risks and carrying out internal audits tend to be ineffective compared to the state level leaving each official with more opportunities for infringements in areas such as constructions permits, contracts and directing orders, etc.

**2011 court decisions**

Toomas Öispuu, Director of the Tallinn Urban Planning Office, was found guilty of committing a crime under Penal Code § 293, Subsection 1. Viktor Kaasik, Attorney at Law, was found guilty under Penal Code § 297, Subsection 1. Öispuu accepted a payoff of 10 000 Euros in the form of a loan with favourable conditions from Kaasik in exchange for actively helping get approval for construction plans submitted by Kaasik. Öispuu was sentenced to parole and Kaasik was ordered to pay 27 106 Euros.

Kaimo Järvik, Director of the Tallinn Municipal Police Office, was found guilty of crimes committed under Penal Code §293, Subsection 1. Tallinn bailiff Priit Lantin was found guilty under Penal Code § 297, Subsection 1. Järvik preferred to use bailiff Priit Lantin in cases where the Municipal Police had issued a fine but it had not been paid. In return Järvik received a payoff of 9500 Euros. Järvik received a partial prison sentence and Lantin was ordered to pay 45 362 Euros.

Allar Oviir, Director of the North Tallinn City Finance Department, was found guilty of crimes under Penal Code § 293, Subsection 2. Oviir repeatedly accepted payoffs for a total sum of 383 840 Kroons for extending leases on municipal apartments and for channelling construction contracts to construction companies belonging to acquaintances. Payoffs were paid to Oviir either in cash, as transfers to his bank account or in the form of free services and goods. Oviir was sentenced to parole and assets totalling 7669 Euros were confiscated from him.

In local governments, mechanisms for minimizing risks and carrying out internal audits tend to be ineffective compared to the state level.
30

70 YEARS SINCE THE COMMUNIST MASS MURDER IN PIRITA-KOSE

2011 marked 70 years since the mass murder carried out on the Scheel property in Pirita-Kose. The NKVD’s Baltic Military District’s war tribunal sentenced tens of innocent civilians, public and political figures and War of Independence veterans to death and execution. All of them were accused of counterrevolutionary activities according to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic’s 1926 Criminal Code, which provided an excuse for interpreting patriotic activities aimed at either the establishment of the Estonian state, the protection of its independence or its organisation as criminal activities. Many policemen and security police officials, including among others the first director of the Security Police and recipient of the Cross of Liberty (1st Class, 3rd Grade) Helmut Veem, were murdered at the Scheel property.

According to a foreign country, they were found ‘guilty’ of establishing the Estonian state and protecting its independence and structures.

The property in Pirita-Kose belonging to banker Klaus Scheel was nationalised together with all its buildings in 1940 and handed over to the NKVD. As of 1941, secret sessions of a war tribunal of the Armed Forces of the NKVD were held there. After the accused were sentenced to death, they were executed on site and secretly buried beneath the floors in the buildings located on the property or in the garden. The families of those arrested were not told where their family members were being held nor given any details of their arrest. The whereabouts of most of the men and women who were taken remained initially unknown.

The activities of the war tribunal at the Scheel property and the fate of those arrested in 1940-41 did not become known to the public until the German occupation when the details were uncovered by the media. In October 1941, a mass grave of 9 bodies was discovered under the floor in the barn’s trolley shed. The hands of the executed persons had been tied behind...
their backs with twine. In November, another mass grave with 15 bodies was discovered by 3 pine trees in the garden. Their hands were tied behind their backs, their mouths had been plugged and mouths covered with bandages that had been tied behind their heads. In the same month, 16 more bodies were found under the floor of one of the outhouses located on the property. The bodies were already decomposed and identifying them proved difficult. Of the 40 bodies that were found and excavated in 1941, only 11 were identified. The most well-known among them was Lieutenant Colonel Oskar Luiga, a War of Independence officer and Head of the 3rd Armoured Train.

The NKVD military tribunals were held in the servants’ quarters located next to the property’s main gate. In May 1942, in the other end of the building, under a cement floor in the stables, a mass grave was discovered with 38 bodies. The individuals had been executed in April 1941. 23 of them were immediately identified. In 1941-42, a total of 78 executed persons were found on the Scheel property. 34 of them were identified. Identification of those who had been murdered was carried out based on descriptions, their clothing, personal effects and documents found on the bodies. At the same time as the arrests and executions took place, the Soviet authorities deported many of the relatives and family members from Estonia. They were therefore unable to participate in the identification of the bodies.

Neither the forensics records nor the inspection materials in Pürita-Kose were preserved. Throughout the entire period of Soviet occupation, the Scheel territory belonged to the Soviet Army and all of the archive materials pertaining to the executions were classified. Family members of those who were executed were not provided with any information and public disclosure of the events was strictly prohibited. The

Estonian SSR’s Prosecutor’s Office did not open a criminal case to investigate the murders that took place on the Scheel property until 1990. An article written by Mart Laar in 1989 in the newspaper ‘Pilk’ entitled ‘Mass murder in Tallinn-Kose in 1941,’ prompted the investigation. On 3 January 1990, the Estonian SSR’s KGB was for the first time forced to admit that the abovementioned events actually took place and that a military tribunal of the Armed Forces of the NKVD and investigative isolator did indeed exist.

Thanks to statements by witnesses and written documents it was possible to determine the names of many more of those executed at Pürita-Kose. 31 of the 38 persons discovered in May 1942 in a mass grave under the horse stables were later identified. Archive materials proved that victims were executed in three groups – on 5, 23 and 24 April 1941. Among others, a number of Security Police officers were murdered on the Scheel grounds. It is noted on Narva’s Political Police Assistant’s Vello Juurvee’s death certificate issued on March 1942 that he went missing on 18 November 1940. His body was found in a mass grave on the Scheel grounds a year later on 6 November 1941.

The war tribunal operated until August 1941. Many of those arrested were executed in urgency after war between the USSR and Germany had

Recipient of the Cross of Liberty Helmut Veem, the first head of the Security Police, who was murdered on the Scheel property

In May-June 1941, security police officers Vello Juurvee, Rudolf Ramla, Andres Puri, Albert Huik and Henn Puusepp were murdered on the Scheel grounds. It is noted on Narva’s Political Police Assistant’s Vello Juurvee’s death certificate issued on March 1942 that he went missing on 18 November 1940. His body was found in a mass grave on the Scheel grounds a year later on 6 November 1941.
Already erupted. The criminal investigation initiated in 1990 discovered many other people who were also executed by the Soviet authorities at the same time and for the same reasons as those people who had already been identified. It is probable that they too were executed at Pirita-Kose. Those who were arrested and executed were kept completely ignorant and the NKVD acted completely arbitrarily. The Soviet Union’s aim was to forever conceal its horrible crimes against humanity and therefore documentation of the murders and especially the burial sites was strictly forbidden.

The Soviet Union’s aim was to forever conceal its horrible crimes against humanity and therefore documentation of the murder and especially the burial sites was strictly forbidden. There is often no documented information about the exact place where the shootings took place and there are also many inaccuracies in the timings of the executions. Based on statements made by relatives of the victims, it is evident that those The exact fate of many Estonian Security Police leaders and employees is unknown to this day. It is likely that a number of them were executed by the NKVD in 1941 at Pirita-Kose and are buried in unmarked graves. To this day the location of former heads of state Jaan Tõnisson’s and Friedrich Akel’s graves are unknown. It is believed that they might have been executed on the Scheel grounds.

During the German occupation, the bodies found at Pirita-Kose were reburied at the Tallinn Liiva cemetery. Today, the memorial to victims of the Red Terror is located there. The bloody murders carried out by the communists at Scheel manor were some of the most barbarous in Estonian history. The memory of its victims definitely deserves to be preserved.

Security Police Officers indicted by the War Tribunal of the Armed Forces of the NKVD in 1941 in Tallinn

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Dates</th>
<th>Executed At</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Huik, Albert</td>
<td>Political Police Agent 1930-1932, Senior Agent 1932-1934, Assistant 1934-1935.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Juurvee, Vello</td>
<td>Political Police Assistant in Narva 1939-1940, Discharged on August 20, 1940.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kaljuraid, Aleksander</td>
<td>Political Police Agent in Narva 1929-1935, Senior Agent in Rakvere 1935-1940.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Koitorg, Hans</td>
<td>Agent in KAPO’s Tallinn Department 1922-1926, Assistant in the Political Police 1926-1940.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kolt, Mihkel</td>
<td>Agent in the Võru Department of the Political Police 1925-1927, in Petseri 1927-1940, Agent in Võru 1940.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lillimägi, Aleksander</td>
<td>KAPO photographer 1921-1924 Participated in the arrest of Viktor Kingissepp, secret co-worker of the Political Police 1930-1940.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Läve, Aleksander</td>
<td>KAPO Secretary in Tallinn 1920-1940.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Malsvell, Paul</td>
<td>Agent in the KAPO Tallinn Department 1920-1925, Assistant in the Political Police 1926-1931, Agent 1931-1940, President Konstantin Päts’ Bodyguard.</td>
<td>Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Date and Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Manner, Johannes</td>
<td>Agent in the Võru Department of the Political Police 1925-1927, Agent in the Petseri Department 1927-1939, Assistant 1939-1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on June 30, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Padar, Karl</td>
<td>Agent in the Võru Department of the Political Police 1925-1927, Senior Agent in Petseri 1927-1940, Senior Agent in Võru 1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on June 23, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Palm, Julius</td>
<td>Official in the KAPO Chancellery 1920, Executive Official in the KAPO Tallinn Department 1921, Acting Senior Assistant to the Head of Department 1922-1923.</td>
<td>Murdered on April 23, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Petik, Joann</td>
<td>KAPO Official</td>
<td>Murdered on July 3, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pipar, Hans</td>
<td>Agent in the Tallinn Department of the Political Police 1928-1932, Senior Agent 1932-1938, Senior Assistant 1938-1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on April 23, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ploom, Heinar</td>
<td>Agent in KAPO's Tartu Department 1920-1921.</td>
<td>Murdered on June 30, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pobul, Hugo</td>
<td>Assistant in the Political Police Tartu 1925-1931.</td>
<td>Murdered on April 24, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Puri, Andres</td>
<td>Acting Head of KAPO 1920-1922 Head of the Registration Department 1924, Head of the Registration Committee.</td>
<td>Murdered on June 23, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Puusepp, Henn</td>
<td>Agent in KAPO's Võru Department 1922, Senior Assistant in the Political Police 1925-1927, Senior Assistant in Petseri 1927-1938, Senior Assistant in Irbosk 1938-1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on June 23, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Raudsepp, Valter</td>
<td>Assistant in the Political Police in Narva 1939-1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on July 4, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Raukas, Albert</td>
<td>Secretary in the Political Police in Kuressaare 1939, Senior Agent 1939-1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on July 3, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Saik, Eduard</td>
<td>Head of the KAPO Viru Department 1920-1921.</td>
<td>Murdered on June 23, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Savisild, Paul</td>
<td>KAPO Agent 1920-1922 Head of the KAPO ‘A’ Department.</td>
<td>Murdered on April 23, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Siirma, Heinrich</td>
<td>Agent in the KAPO Tallinn Department 1921-1926, Assistant in the Political Police 1926-1934, Senior Agent 1934-40.</td>
<td>Murdered on April 23, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Taarma, Heinrich</td>
<td>Agent in the KAPO Narva Department 1922-1923</td>
<td>Murdered on June 23, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Tamar, Eno</td>
<td>Agent and Senior Agent in the Political Police in Tallinn 1928-1939, Senior Agent in Petseri 1939-1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on April 23, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Tupits, Nikolai</td>
<td>Executive Official in the KAPO Valga Department 1920, Assistant to the Head of the Narva Department 1921, Junior Official 1923, Assistant in Tallinn 1923-1925, Assistant in the Political Police in Narva 1925-1927.</td>
<td>Murdered on June 29, 1941 in Tallinn or Pirita-Kose</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Veem, Helmut</td>
<td>Worked in the General Staff Acting Head of the KAPO Administration 1 May 1920-15 October 1920, Head of the KAPO Administration 15 October 1920-1 November 1920, then returned to the General Staff. Worked in the Criminal Police in Rakvere, Paide and Võru 1924-1940.</td>
<td>Murdered on April 23, 1941 at Pirita-Kose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IN MEMORIAM TARMO LAUL

Tarmo Laul, an employee of the Security Police Board, died in the line of duty on 4 May 2011 in Piusa village, Põlvamaa.

Senior Specialist and Chief Assistant Tarmo Laul was born in 1978 in Sõmerpalu Parish, Võrumaa. He graduated from the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences where he studied criminal investigation.

Tarmo’s service to the Estonian state began in November 1997, first as an employee of the Police Board and, as of September 2001, in the Security Police. He was repeatedly rewarded for conscientiously fulfilling his duties and for excellent results in his work. The President of Estonia awarded Tarmo the Order of the Cross of the Eagle (Gold Cross). Posthumously, Tarmo received the Security Police Board’s Order of Merit (1st Class, 1st Grade with swords).

Tarmo was married. He is survived by two sons.