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HEADS OF THE SECURITY POLICE

ANNUAL REVIEW 2010
Kaitsepolitseiameti peadirektor Raivo Aeg
FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

Dear Reader,

It is, once again, a great pleasure to present to you the Estonian Security Police’s annual review. The year 2010 was without a doubt productive and successful for the Security Police. The agency clearly fulfilled its principal aim – to ensure democratic rule in our state. This annual review provides a brief overview of our work in safeguarding the Republic of Estonia’s constitutional order and security.

A brief reminder to the reader of the Security Police’s main tasks: to safeguard the Republic of Estonia’s constitutional order and territorial integrity, to prevent and combat intelligence operations directed against the state, to protect state secrets, to fight terrorism, to expose possible corruptive acts committed by senior state and local government officials and to investigate offenses within the Security Police’s remit.

The size of particular chapters in this annual review is not a reflection of the actual amount of work that the agency expends on a particular area. In this review, a relatively large amount of attention is paid to Russia’s use of information to increase its influence over Estonia. The Russian activities described in this review are directly aimed at influencing the public (including the international one).

As usual, the review cannot properly satisfy the public’s interest in counterintelligence activities – this is and will largely remain a classified subject. It can, however, be noted that hostile intelligence services continue to show an active interest in Estonia and its activities, as demonstrated by the network of Russian illegal agents exposed by the United States of America.

Threats to Estonia’s constitutional order persisted in 2010, as in previous years. Extremism that could pose a serious risk to national security does not exist in Estonia. The Security Police, however, will continue to work on preventing its emergence. Russia’s compatriots policy and efforts to influence Estonia continue to be of concern.

National security cannot be guaranteed unless state secrets are properly protected. Estonia is a member of international organisations and ensuring that state secrets do not end up in the hands of the wrong people is important for maintaining our international credibility and reputation.

In 2010, many successful operations to avert the threat of Islamic terrorism were carried out globally and within Europe. Islamic terrorism, however, continues to be a threat. In Estonia, the threat of terrorism is low. Indeed, we are one of Europe’s least endangered areas. We cannot, however, lose vigilance in the fight against terrorism. Preventative measures, risk assessment and readiness to act in a dangerous situation continue to be our priorities. International cooperation is the only way to prevent terrorist attacks.

Illegal explosive devices and their illegal handling present a significant danger to the population. The Security Police continues to work on reducing the risks in this area. Our efforts are also linked to the fight against terrorism. The explosion of bombs is still the most common method of attack used by terrorists.

Corruption is a direct threat to national security and the Security Police’s efforts in fighting corruption are under great public scrutiny. In 2010, a number of cases involving judges captured the public’s attention. The fight against corruption in local governments continues to be a priority. Corruption in local governments can impact negatively on a region’s competitiveness and ability to develop and in the long-term, could lead to an irreversible socio-economic downturn in society.

In 2010, the Security Police also paid increasing attention to identifying competition-related crimes linked to corruption. As of June 2010, according to the Defence Forces Service Act, the Security Police is also responsible for investigating corruption crimes committed by defence forces’ officers.

The Security Police celebrated its 90th anniversary in 2010. The last chapter of this annual review is, therefore, dedicated to the first heads of the Security Police.

On behalf of the Security Police, I would like to thank all of the individuals and partners who cooperated with us and helped us safeguard our national security and the security of all Estonian citizens.

I wish you interesting reading and look forward to cooperating with you,

Raivo Aeg
Director General of the Security Police
Estonia’s security is affected by events and processes in our direct neighbourhood as well as further abroad. The Security Police’s tasks are cross-border in scope and the international exchange of information is an important part of Estonia’s wider security policy interests. The Security Police exchanges and processes classified information strictly in accordance with Estonian laws, international agreements and legal norms.

The Security Police cooperates and exchanges information with its partner services on a variety of mutually relevant security-related issues. We are mindful of the need to collect information and investigate crimes and

Risk assessment and early warning mechanisms - the main outputs of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation - also continue to be important.

The Security Police regularly exchanges information with other EU and NATO member states as well as with EU and NATO security structures. The prevention of international terrorism and the export of strategic goods have become more relevant over the past decade due to terrorist attacks aimed against the West and the armament of rogue states who fail to abide by UN resolutions. Risk assessment and early warning mechanisms - the main outputs of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation - also continue to be important.

In addition to NATO, Estonia also participates in several informal formats for cooperation where security issues such as the international security situation are discussed. These formats provide an opportunity to exchange information and experiences on terrorism, proliferation, counterintelligence, extremism and many other threats on both a strategic and operational level.

Since its re-establishment, the Security Police has also given priority to maintaining regional bilateral links with the security and police structures of other Nordic and Baltic states. Cooperation with partners in the field of training has helped to increase Estonia’s know-how in the security field.
In 2010, threats to the constitutional order remained similar to those of previous years. Extremism that might pose a threat to national security does not exist in Estonia, however, the Security Police continues its efforts to prevent its emergence. Russia’s compatriots policy and efforts to gain influence in Estonia continue to be issues of concern.

**Right-wing extremism**

In Estonia, the activity and popularity of ultranationalists and right-wing extremists continues to be low. In 2010, groups of supporters of individual activists failed to consolidate prior to the parliamentary elections and the formation of a right-wing populist party failed. In the near future, the creation of a populist right-wing political movement is unlikely due to disunity within far-right organisations and power struggles among their leaders. Organisations facing financial difficulties are keen to involve well-known individuals in their activities. Due to conflicts between leading figures within the movements, ultra-nationalists took part in the 2011 elections mainly as individual candidates. Their populist and unpractical positions have found very little support among the general public. They therefore have little prospects for succeeding in elections.

**Left-wing extremism**

In many countries in Europe, the economic crisis sparked violent demonstrations, which were actively attended by extremist left-wing groups. In Greece, demonstrations by anarchists and anticapitalists resulted in injuries and fatalities. Greek left-wing extremists also organised letter-bomb attacks against state agencies. One person died as a result. So far Estonian left-wing radicals have been peaceful. The Security Police has, however, noticed that the operating practices of extremists in other countries - such as Germany - are being imported to Estonia. Local left-wing extremists have stepped up their opposition to right-wing extremists – a database of well-known Estonian right-wing extremists was created on a restricted anarchist website and provocative videoclips of the opposite side have been posted on YouTube. Provoking the opposition in this manner could over time lead to real violent conflicts.

Throughout the year, left-wing extremists organised several peaceful public events aimed at introducing their views and activities as well as at strengthening links between their members. Typical to left-wing extremists in Estonia, these events were peaceful and turn-out was low.
Russia’s so-called compatriots policy and efforts to increase its influence in Estonia

Implementation of Russia’s compatriots policy in Estonia remains unchanged. With the help of a controlled field of information, its aim and substance continues to be to turn fellow nationals and sympathisers living abroad into a united group that can be manipulated and used as an instrument of Russian foreign policy.

In 2010, however, some cracks in the implementation of the so-called CCCP (Communication, Coordination, Consolidation and Protection) strategy started to appear. A general lack of funds caused by the global economic crisis sparked a power struggle over the distribution of financial resources. Clear differences appeared between those who have traditionally supported a more rigid line and those who favour a softer approach. The former group is in favour of applying more aggressive and active foreign policy pressure in support of compatriots. While the latter believes that a more effective compatriots policy can be implemented through culture and education.

Supporters of the rigid line, led by the head of the news portal Regnum.ru, Modest Kolerov, made efforts to convince the Russian government to continue implementing its traditional, unfriendly policy towards Estonia.

In Spring 2010, Regnum launched a massive media campaign against the Russian Foreign Ministry. During this period, Regnum published critical articles about the Russian Foreign Ministry almost every day.

Regnum also published a memorandum called Public Memorandum on the Principles of Russia’s Estonia Policy, which was drawn up upon Modest Kolerov’s initiative. The memorandum reproached the Russian Foreign Ministry for trying to improve relations with Estonia, accused Russian businessmen of seeking better ties with Estonia and called for the continuation of a more rigid foreign policy approach. The memorandum was mainly meant for domestic use, but in order to add an international

The power struggle unfolding in Russia between different interest groups was also reflected among local activists who were responsible for implementing the compatriots policy.
dimension to it, Estonian and Finnish pro-Russian extremists were included in the project.

The memorandum did not receive much notice in other Russian media channels. Even use of the local Estonian extremist group Nochnoi Dozor (Night Watch) did not help attract significant interest in the initiative. A demonstration in support of the memorandum, organised by Russian political scientist and so-called expert on Latvian problems Dmitri Yermolajev and editor-in-chief of the magazine Baltiski Mir Dmitri Kondrashov, passed unnoticed. They managed to only briefly catch the media’s attention by announcing their intention to start collecting signatures in support of the memorandum.

In April 2010, with the Nochnoi Dozor’s help, Regnum launched a targeted attack against the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Tallinn and, specifically, against diplomat Vjaecheslav Tutchnin.

On 22 April 2010, Regnum published a statement by Nochnoi Dozor activist Maksim Reva. The statement, which was written under the guidance of Dmitri Yermolajev, Dmitri Kondrashov and Andrei Zarenkov, accused the Embassy of preparing to improve relations with Estonia. According to Reva, the Embassy was supposedly preparing to officially recognise Estonia’s occupation by the Soviet Union and, as a consequence, to also recognise the SS legionaries as freedom fighters. Reva also claimed that the Embassy’s counselor Tutchnin was in favour of educating Russian children in the Estonian language, supported cooperating with Russian politicians who belonged to so-called ethnic parties and believed that World War II veterans who fought on opposite sides should jointly place flowers at monuments commemorating the war. An article by Mikhail Demurin supporting Reva appeared in Regnum on the same day as the memorandum. On 24 April 2010, Tutchnin left Estonia for health reasons.

The campaign waged against the Russian Embassy did not stem from an actual fear that the Embassy wanted to and, indeed, could somehow alter Russia’s policy towards Estonia. Rather, a couple of months earlier, Tutchnin had started to question the expediency of allocating millions of roubles to the magazine Baltiskij Mir and for financing the festival Vivat Rossiya. He had started to question whether this was not in fact a hidden money laundering scheme and suggested that it might make more sense to use this money to directly support Russian veterans and cultural groups in Estonia.

This shows how the economic interests of the individuals and interest groups linked to the Russian compatriots policy can influence Russian foreign policy towards its neighbours. Those who are implementing the compatriots policy do not necessarily care about its idealistic aim. To them it is mainly a lucrative opportunity for economic gain.

Supporters of a more rigid line at Regnum altered their course of action and focus as concern about their economic situation grew. In order to find new financial resources, they started to contribute to the activities of the organisation World Without Nazism. In private, they openly admitted that World Without Nazism is an even bigger pot of gold than the compatriots policy. In January 2011, more than 300 000 USD worth of funds and valuables belonging to World Without Nazism’s main sponsor Boris Shpigel were stolen from a hotel. The organisation World Without Nazism is examined in more detail in the next chapter.
RUSSIA’S INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST ESTONIA

Estonia in the Russian media

Russian media channels send their print media journalists and television film crews on a fairly regular basis to Estonia to report on topical issues and subjects that fit into Russia’s Estonian agenda. The majority of Russia’s media channels, including the most influential ones, are controlled by the Russian central government. Their aim is not to convey what is actually happening in the world, but to help shape Russia’s image and to nourish the domestic and foreign policy base. Russian journalists representing state-owned channels do not actually deal with journalism while in Estonia. They stage productions according to centrally-prescribed scenarios.

The messages conveyed by these productions have varied over the years, but the main scenario remains unchanged. All of them paint a picture of post-Soviet Estonia as an economically, socially and culturally degenerate country on Europe’s periphery where neonazism has taken ground and the Russian-speaking population is glaringly discriminated against. The anti-Russian Estonian government, it is claimed, is responsible for this sad state of affairs.

This message, particularly the claim about nazism and discrimination of Russian-speakers is aimed at both the international community, as well as at a domestic Russian audience. The claim that Estonia has been doing poorly since leaving the Soviet Union has inevitably had some impact on how Estonia is perceived.

One of Russia’s most notable information operations carried out against Estonia unfolded on 31 July in Vaivara parish, Ida-Virumaa, at the commemoration of defensive battles that took place in 1944 at Sinimäed Hills. This event, as well as the demonstration organised by the radical grouping Nochnoi Dozor at the same time and in the same place, received extensive coverage in Russia.
RUSSIA’S INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST ESTONIA

The Bronze Soldier can no longer be used as a source of conflict and, therefore, Russia is trying to find a new irritant, in order to bolster the myth of the Soviet Union as a liberator and to portray resistance to the occupation as a manifestation of nazism. For the past 17 years, commemorative events attended by former World War II soldiers who fought on the front have taken place in Virumaa. The events are similar to those that take place elsewhere in the world. In 2010, Russian media representatives were more numerous at Sinimäed Hills than in previous years. They portrayed what was a peaceful gathering without any disturbances, as the manifestation of a new wave of state-sanctioned nazism in Estonia and as a manifestation of a new wave of state-sanctioned nazism in Estonia and as a radical attempt at reevaluating history. Later many additional news stories portraying Estonia as a Nazi state were aired. Unfortunately, local media helped to significantly amplify Russia’s message before the event itself had taken place and the real number of participants had been determined. In this sense, this was a successful operation.

Federation Council of Russia member Boris Shpigel and Russian compatriots policy activists Dmitri Kondrashov and Andrei Zarenkov were involved in organising and financing the Nochnoi Dozor’s provocative counter-demonstration. The entire event was thought-provokingly similar to the counter-demonstration that takes place every year on 16 March in Riga. People who come to commemorate World War II battles and lay flowers at the Freedom Monument are provoked by insulting chants and Soviet Union symbols.

Another good example is when, at the beginning of September 2010, a film crew from St. Petersburg’s Channel 5 came to Estonia to make a documentary of life in Russia’s neighbouring countries, the Baltic States and Poland. The supposed aim of the film was to introduce each country and overturn any false stereotypes about them. The documentary that was aired on 31 October, however, conveyed a message that fit in well with Russian propaganda - life in the Baltic States was good when they were part of the Soviet Union, however, since becoming independent, living conditions have significantly declined. In the part about Estonia, the film talks about the systematic destruction of the Russian language and culture in Estonia. Facts and fabrications are skillfully manipulated. People who were interviewed for the film are portrayed as saying things that they never said or that are simply untrue. For example, the film shows images from Yuri Lotman’s last public lecture, in which he spoke about the meaning of terms such as ‘honour’ and ‘shame’ for the Russian nobility in the 19th Century. Lotman’s statement that...
‘humiliation is worse than death...’ is presented as evidence of the fact that Lotman died of the humiliation that he suffered while living in Estonia. The film was followed by a talk show attended by the well-known spin doctors Vladimir Simindei (former diplomat and head of research programs at the Historical Memory Foundation) and Dmitri Kondrashov (Russian compatriots policy spokesman and editor-in-chief of the magazine Baltiiski Mir).

Local assistance

Russian journalists tend to contact the representatives of local Russian-speaking extremist organisations (such as Nochnoi Dozor) when reporting on Estonian events or describing the local situation in Estonia. Unfortunately, these extremists are the only sources used in the so-called news stories about Estonia.

In addition to activists, there are also other people in Estonia who assist Russian television channels in their propaganda efforts. One of their main collaborators is Tallinn entrepreneur Oleg Bessedin, who claims to represent the TV channels ORT, RTR, Zvezda, REN TV and Peterburg 5 in Estonia. His main focus is producing the channel TVN, which belongs to his parents and is available as a part of many Estonian cable TV packages.

Bessedin is in close contact with many Russian journalists who have produced extremely biased reports on Estonia. He provides them logistical support, help in finding contacts and even acts as cameraman when necessary. In Sinimäed Hills, he helped out the television channel Zvezda, financed by the Russian Ministry of Defence, by filling in for their cameraman. He was also the cameraman for a news story produced by Zvezda at the beginning of November, which reported on the trial of Väino Pehk, accused on participating in the March deportations of 1949.

In order to acquire information on Estonia and coax unsuspecting people into giving interviews, Bessedin has presented himself as an Estonian national television (ETV) employee working in the Russian-language broadcasts department. He has told other lies in order to gain the trust of a variety of institutions and key figures.

The Security Police advises state institutions as well as entrepreneurs and representatives of non-governmental organisations to be wary of Russian
RUSSIA’S INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST ESTONIA

state-controlled media channels and their collaborators.

**World Without Nazism**

Historical propaganda continues to play an important part in Russia’s efforts to increase its influence over Estonia. Most of the themes used in information attacks on Estonia are drawn from the 20th century and, especially, World War II. The commission to prevent the falsification of history to the detriment of Russia set up in 2009 has operated rather inconspicuously. Yet efforts continue to develop a law ‘against the heroization of nazism.’

In 2010, conservative circles in Russia were deeply angered and disappointed by a definitive loss in the European Court of Human Rights in a case put forward by Vassili Kononov, a Red partisan convicted of war crimes in Latvia. On 27 May 1944, the partisan squad led by Kononov entered into Mazie Bati village and killed six men and three women. The youngest of those murdered was a 34-year old pregnant woman, who together with three other victims, was burned alive. Kononov claimed that all of those who were murdered were ‘fascist minions.’

The Russian Foreign Ministry regarded the Kononov case as yet another attempt to reassess the results of World War II and falsify history. After the verdict was announced, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that: This ruling is difficult to understand: we have just marked the 65th anniversary of victory in World War II and now a ruling is passed against those who fought against fascism.’

At conference in Kiev in June 2010, Russian Federation Council member Boris Shipgel initiated the launch of the international human rights movement World Without Nazism (Международное правозащитное движение “Мир без нацизма”).

Radical nationalists Maksim Reva and Andrei Zarenkov, who promote Russian chauvinism, represent Estonia in the World Without Nazism’s management board. The organisation, which claims to unite all anti-fascists of the world, has decided to closely link the Holocaust, the Nuremberg trials and other key historical events with a Soviet-era approach to World War II. The aim is to create an unusual situation according to which questioning Moscow’s version of history is equated with denial of the Holocaust and the results of the Nuremberg trials. This is quite an effective means for Russia to spread and strengthen its positions. According to the World Without Nazism, the most extensive state-supported falsification of history and glorification of nazism is taking place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine. The movement also has focused the bulk of its activities on these countries. It is no coincidence that the Nochnoi Dozor demonstration that took place in July 2010 at Sinimäed Hills was organised under the aegis of World Without Nazism.

At the beginning of 2011, World Without Nazism presidium member Algirdas Paleckis, a member of the Lithuanian Socialist Populist Front, was accused of denying that the USSR committed aggression against the independent state of Lithuania on 13 January 1991. Although Paleckis’ statements had no link to either nazism or the Holocaust, World Without Nazism defended its member, offering him any legal assistance necessary. This is a good example of the movement’s actual aims.
The Historical Memory Foundation and the Victims of Nationalist Terror Database

The Historical Memory Foundation led by propagandist Aleksandr Dyu-kov continues to focus its activities against the Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova. The foundation pays special attention to the resistance movements that arose in these countries following World War II and clearly do not fit with the Great Patriotic War and traditional Soviet myths. Its aim is to comprehensively discredit and belittle resistance to the Soviet occupation. In keeping with the traditions of Soviet-style propaganda, the forest brethren who participated in the resistance movements, are portrayed as blood-thirsty bandits, who were motivated by self-interest and revenge against the local population. In 2010, Historical Memory even launched an internet-based database called Victims of the Nationalist Terror in the USSR’s Western Regions, where they intend to gather information on victims of the armed resistance movements in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus.

The project draws on sources found in the archives of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MVD) Anti-Banditry Division, mostly from daily reports that were filed by local NKVD and MVD offices in the republics. The MVD ran the fight against bandits in the Baltic states and Ukraine until 1947. Thereafter the relevant departments and personnel were transferred to the Ministry of State Security (MGB). Until then, however, the Ministry of Interior, not the Ministry of Security, was oddly-enough in charge of suppressing national resistance in the so-called ‘western regions’ of the USSR. Elsewhere in the USSR, the fight against bandits was led by the Ministry of Interior until 1951, which underlines that fact that in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine, the forest brethren were national resistance fighters, not criminal bandits. The MVD’s own statistics clearly prove this: only 27 of the 1196 (2.2%) ‘nationalist gangs’ that were disbanded originated from outside the ‘western regions.’ In contrast, 2427 (83.8%) of the criminal gangs that were apprehended originated from the so-called ‘old’ republics of the USSR. Only 164 (5.6%) of criminal bands were from the three Baltic states.

In order to leave a more objective impression, Historical Memory has not included members of the Red Army or MVD and MGB employees among the victims who were either killed or wounded in the course of operations aimed at destroying the forest brethren. On the other hand, all attacks by the forest brethren against the Soviet army and MGB officials are qualified as ‘nationalistic terror’ so that the number of innocent victims appear larger and the forest brethren’s resistance be seen as illegal. One of the most curious examples is the following report from Tartu: ‘On 14 April 1945, an explosion took place in the Tartu Leather Factory caused by the careless handling of fire. Over 30 people were injured, 5 seriously. The equipment in the factory was not damaged. An investigation has been launched.’ (State Archive of the Russian Federation – GARF, f. R-9478, i. 1, i. 356 p. 147-148.) All of the 30 individuals who were injured in the Tartu Leather Factor accident have been carefully entered into the Historical Memory database as victims of nationalistic terror.

By the beginning of 2011, 575 individuals from Estonia had been entered into the database. The publishing of documents pertaining to Estonia in Russian archives would be welcome if this were done in a professional manner and without propagandistic aims. This would mean, however, opening up the archives of Stalinistic repressive organs to all historians, as has been done in Estonia and other countries who regained their independence. For Russia, this would be a test of democratic and modern behaviour.

The Amber Bridge Fund („Yantarny Most“)

The aggressive steps that Russia made against its neighbours a few years ago, such as the conflict with Ukraine over gas and the military attack against Georgia, sent a clear signal that the countries who regained their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union belong to Russia’s sphere of interest. In the short-term, aggressive behaviour achieved the desired result, but, at the same, also pushed Russia’s neighbours to seek new opportunities to cooperate with other countries. Russia’s poor reputation as an aggressive country, the global economic crisis and rapidly decreasing energy prices have forced it to choose a new approach for meeting its interests.

Russia’s foreign policy aims have, despite everything, not changed. Yet developments in relations with Poland, attest to a change in tactics. More attention is being paid to activities aimed at increasing Russia’s influence through the use of soft power. Threats have been replaced with offers of friendship and cooperation. Activities aimed at increasing Russian influence are not easy to recognise when carried out in a positive setting – its aims and results are not reflected in rhetoric and often more than one method is used to gain greater impact.

The fund Amber Bridge, quietly established at the beginning of 2010, is becoming one of Russia’s main instru-
ments for increasing its influence in the Baltic Sea Region. The fund has declared promoting information exchange between Russia and the Baltic states as its main goal. Its priorities include resolving historical differences as these are the main impediment to closer economic cooperation. The fund is also interested in transit, environmental issues and energy cooperation. It intends to establish a permanent mechanism to promote student exchanges between Russian and Baltic universities even though the door to student exchanges between Estonian and Russian universities is already open. Both Tallinn and Tartu Universities have already signed cooperation agreements with the main Russian universities. Amber Bridge, however, is trying to increase its influence through the use of soft power.

The fund is mainly focused on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but it would ultimately like to engage all of the countries around the Baltic Sea. The fund’s president Yuri Sizov, who modestly calls himself a diplomat of the people, intends to create a ‘people’s diplomacy’ network in all Baltic Sea states. The fund is especially proud of the fact that, in a short space of time, they have managed to take discussion beyond a strictly academic framework.

It is questionable whether there is a need for this kind of a fund given that the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) - aimed at strengthening cooperation around the Baltic Sea - has been operating for many years and includes Russia as a member. The CBSS’s main areas of activity include the environment, economic issues, energy, education and humanitarian issues. If Russia genuinely wanted to improve cooperation with the Baltic states, then this could also be achieved through the CBSS framework.

In summer 2010, the fund’s sister fund Amber Bridge Baltic Fonds organised a small conference in Riga - its first public event - to celebrate 300 years since the incorporation of the Estonian and Latvian territories into the Russian Empire. The Public Committee for the Celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Uniting of Livonia and Estonia with the Russian Empire (Общественный комитет по празднованию 300-летия присоединения Лифляндии и Эстляндии к Российской империи), based in Riga, organised a much bigger event than the Amber Bridge Baltic Fonds. The committee also issued a special anniversary medal (see picture). The first medals were awarded in June 2010 at the Institute for Dynamic Conservatism, which unites Russian imperialists and chauvinists. A number of Russian compatriots, policy activists and propagandists received medals including: Modest Sizov, who lived in Latvia until 1981, made a career for himself in the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) during the 1980’s. He worked as a foreign correspondent and went on to be promoted to editor-in-chief. In 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reorganisation of TASS, he became Deputy Director General of the Russian New Agency ITAR-TASS.

Andrei Yakovlev has been a journalist both in newspapers as well as in television in Latvia since 1976. From 1992 until 2000, he was the Russian television channel RTR’s Latvian correspondent for the news show Vestti. In 2002, he graduated from the Moscow School of Political Studies (Московская школа политических исследований). He is also connected to the European Russian Alliance and the society For Human Rights in a United Latvia led by the Latvian pro-Russian politician Tatjana Ždanoka.

The fund Amber Bridge calls itself an international and public organisation, but, in fact, is neither. The fund’s board of trustees is led by Valeri Parfyonov, who is a member of the Federation Council’s (Upper House of the Russian Parliament) Committee on the development of non-governmental institutions. The fund is international only so much as its sister fund was established in Latvia and has an English name. The Institute for Baltic Civilisations, affiliated with the fund, has been established with support of Moscow State University. Its management board includes the Director of the Institute of General History at the Russian Academy of Sciences Aleksandr Chubarian and Senior Analyst Aleksandr Tchetchevishnikov at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The aim is to develop the institute into the leading research center in the Baltic Sea region.
One of the Security Police's main areas of activity is counterintelligence, i.e. ascertaining, preventing and obstructing illegal activities carried out by foreign intelligence services against Estonia. According to the Law on Security Services, the Security Police is the only service permitted to conduct counterintelligence in Estonia. Counterintelligence is not a separate activity, but part of a complex set of actions for safeguarding national security: defence of the constitutional order, military defence, defence of state secrets, economic security, cyber security, defence of scientific secrets, etc.

In 2010, Russian special services - the most active actors in Estonia - showed an interest in the following fields:

- **Estonian special services**
- **NATO and EU policies and institutions**
- **Estonian military installations**
- **the Russian community in Estonia, including veterans' organisations**
- **Estonian domestic, foreign and defence policy**
- **information technology and cyber defence**
- **the policies of countries that are diplomatically represented in Estonia, the foreign policy of third countries**
- **economic information related to the parliamentary elections**

In 2010, more foreign intelligence activities were carried out on Estonian territory and against Estonian citizens than in previous years. According to Security Police estimates, the number of recruitment attempts by Russian special services has increased by almost 30 percent in the past two years prompting the agency to pay attention to new security aspects. The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), who has a particular interest in Estonian foreign and domestic politics, has carried out many failed recruitment attempts. Other Russian intelligences services - the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Russian military's intelligence directorate (GRU) - are also represented in Estonia and interested in gaining access to both Estonian as well as NATO and EU information.

**Methods for Gathering Intelligence**

It is often said that intelligence and the methods for gathering intelligence have changed little over the centuries. Indeed, human psychology remains more or less unchanged. Yet electronic methods for gathering intelligence are developing rapidly and in an increasingly open world, intelligence covers are changing. The use of legal intelligence or diplomatic covers is...
decreasing. They are increasingly being replaced by the use of covers that are covert, active and involve non-governmental organisations, companies, etc. Russian intelligence is using illegals and businessmen. They are also establishing and maintaining contacts in third countries and for intelligence gathering from Russia. Contacts are made in Russia. Signals intelligence stations are operating close to the border. An illegal spy or ‘illegal’ is a Russian intelligence officer who usually poses as the citizen of a third country and either collects information or fulfills intelligence assignments while using a fictitious origin or job as a cover. Illegals receive comprehensive, individual training in order to perfectly master another language and false identity. They learn sophisticated conspiracy methods, communications skills, etc. Despite decades of experience in this field, cracks in the system are starting to appear. Significant behavioural errors have helped expose specific facets of this particular method of intelligence. In summer 2010, a group of illegal spies was uncovered in the United States of America and, two years ago, an illegal spy was used as head agent in the Hermann Simm case in Estonia. At the end, no matter what their covers are, spies always stand out by their desire to gain information by inducing their contacts into cooperating with them and engaging in illegal activities (treason).

Signals intelligence and collecting information in a cyber environment are among the most rapidly developing methods of intelligence. Thanks to technological developments, with the help of signals intelligence, it is now possible to observe, listen, record and process a very large amount of information. Signals intelligence is also one of the most covert forms of intelligence. Several signals intelligence centers belonging to the FSB and GRU operate in close proximity to the Estonian border.

Looking for ways to gain access to cyber issues and IT solutions has been a priority for intelligence services, including Russian ones. Modern social networks offer many positive opportunities for interacting and spreading ideas, however, they are also a significant resource for intelligence services. User accounts provide the opportunity to gather useful background information on individuals of interest, to map out the best and most accessible objects and to establish contact with someone both anonymously and with little effort.

The use of intelligent software to access sensitive information is also a threat. Malicious software, mainly hidden onto memory sticks or flash drives, can find its way into protected computer networks (not connected to the internet). Once inside, it can secretly gather information, when possible save itself onto another flash drive and, once inserted into a computer that is connected to the internet, forward the information to an unidentifiable destination or so-called mothership.

The computer virus called agent.btz is an example of this type of malicious software. Information on the nature and ability to detect it can be found on the internet.

Prevention

The best defence against intelligence activities is civic responsibility and public awareness of security threats. It is important to recognise that certain areas and representatives of certain state institutions in Estonia are of real interest to foreign intelligence services. This group includes officials who deal with foreign and defence policy issues, members of the military, politicians, information technology specialists who have access to sensitive information, scientists, opinion leaders, prominent businessmen and officials responsible for national security. Areas that are of interest to foreign intelligence services include information technology, state institutions, science, business and political circles. Private records may be used for illegal purposes and, therefore, this information needs to be protected. In order to successfully recruit someone, certain foreign intelligence services will not hesitate to use compromising information such as a previous connection with the KGB or recordings revealing an individual’s lifestyle, habits and mistakes. The use of this method is particularly common to the FSB. For the individual being recruited, giving in may seem easier than to risk being exposed but the end result will still be a dead end. This is why we recommend that anybody who believes that they are of interest to foreign intelligence services or believes that an attempt to recruit them has been made, contact the Security Police for advice and help. While abroad, individuals should contact the nearest Estonian Embassy. The Security Police’s responsibility is to protect Estonian citizens and we will take all measures necessary to ensure every individual’s safety. Information given to the Security Police is classified.
PROTECTION OF STATE SECRETS

In 2010, as in previous years, the Security Police had a significant amount of work in this field. Due to the NATO foreign ministers meeting held in Tallinn during the first half of the year, the number of vettings that the Security Police had to perform increased substantially. In accordance with NATO requirements, state secrets permits had to be issued to many individuals involved with organising the event. In the second half of the year, many inspections were carried out in both state institutions where state secrets are handled as well as private firms that have the right to process state secrets. No serious violations of the requirements for protecting state secrets were found.

On 21 October 2010, the Riigikogu adopted changes to the Law on State Secrets and Classified Foreign Information. Security Police experts participated in the drafting of these amendments that came into force on 18 November 2010. Changes were necessary due to problems that had arisen during the practical implementation of the old law (in force as of 1 January 2008).

For those individuals who either already have security clearance or will apply for it in the future, the most important change is the addition of some grounds for refusing somebody clearance. For example, from now on an individual may be denied clearance if they have cooperated with foreign intelligence or security services. The earlier version of the law applied only to those individuals who have legally been employed by foreign intelligence or security services. Individuals who secretly cooperate with foreign intelligence and security services are not necessarily always on their payroll. Their actions may, however, present as big a threat to national security. Clearance may also be refused if an individual has committed a crime as an official, but according to criminal law cannot be accused of committing an official offence. For example, when an official has abused his position in order to smuggle goods or has abused power in the defence forces. These types of actions clearly show the individual’s attitude towards the rule of law and the state in general. It is questionable whether this individual
should be allowed access to state secrets.

Clearance can also be denied to individuals who have been investigated for either white-collar or anti-state crimes but whose criminal proceedings have been terminated for the following reasons: lack of public interest in the proceedings, inexpediency of the sentence, if the individual’s fault is not great, or if the individual has cooperated during the criminal proceedings and has helped shed light on the particulars of the crime. In these cases, the individual has admitted to committing the crime, but has not been punished in accordance with criminal law. An infringement to the legal system, however, has taken place. Indeed, the state’s executive authority and legitimacy have been damaged and, therefore, depending on the crime, there are grounds to question the individual’s trustworthiness in keeping state secrets.

Additionally, clearance can be denied to individuals who have a developed, habitual manner or hobby that may lead to economic dependency. According to the previous law, it was assumed that economic dependency can only be caused by compulsive gambling or an addiction to gambling, which is a medical condition. Unfortunately, experience in carrying out security checks has shown that economic dependency can develop as a result of behaviour that is not medically diagnosed as an addiction. This type of behaviour can involve frequent visits to gambling spots and gambling away one’s income. Or, for example, the tendency to take a quick loan in order to buy something new without considering if you have enough money to pay back the loan. Having a hobby that you spend most of your income on so that you are unable to pay your daily bills, also qualifies as an activity that can lead to economic dependency.

In all of these additional cases, it is at the administrative decision-maker’s discretion to decide on whether or not to give clearance. If these circumstances appear, then it does not necessarily mean that the individual will be denied clearance. Each decision is made based on concrete circumstances. The potential threat to keeping state secrets is considered according to the security risks posed by a particular individual, the position that the individual holds and how sensitive is the information that they will have access to.

The Security Police will have additional work in 2011. An amendment came into effect as of 18 November 2010 stipulating that all information pertaining to the Bank of Estonia’s security, alarm, communications and information systems as well as the transportation of cash is classified provided that its disclosure could hurt Estonian national security. The euro currency is in use in many countries and is therefore a tempting target not only for locals with criminal intentions but also for similar individuals abroad, including terrorists. In order to ensure greater security, information regarding the storage and transportation of cash needs better protection. This is the reason why individuals who have access to this type of information must vetted, trained and advised on how to keep state secrets.
PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Threats posed by Radical Islam

Islamic terrorism, being bred in Iraq and Afghanistan and in recent years also Yemen and Somalia, continues to be a serious global threat. The situation in these countries affects the threat level in countries belonging to the international coalition of forces. One of the main demands of terrorists groups is the withdrawal of international coalition troops from the conflict areas. Developments unleashed by the publishing of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in many Western media publications also continue to have a negative effect on international and European security.

Islamic fundamentalists in different European countries are not necessarily active only in their own country, but may also be active in other regions of the world. They may provide financial and other kinds of support to Islamic fundamentalists elsewhere.

Islamic fundamentalists continue to be interested in carrying out terrorist attacks in Europe. European tourists, journalists and individuals working in international aid organisations abroad, however, have become easy targets. Kidnappings have increased in recent years.

Interest of International Islamic Organisations in Estonia

In 2010 - as in earlier years - representatives of Islamic organisations, including those promoting fundamentalist views, either visited Estonia or were in contact through other means with Estonia’s muslim community. When visiting Estonia, their main goal has been encouraging the local muslim community to be more active. They have sought to lead them
back onto a ‘proper’ muslim path. These organisations have financed many of the local muslim community’s activities – the celebration of regional holidays, organisation of a variety of training courses, publishing of pamphlets, books and newspapers, organising religious camps and supporting the participation in the yearly pilgrimage. In 2010, for the first time, many young muslims from Estonia received financial support to study in Saudi Arabia at the Medina University, which propagates Wahhabi ideology.

In 2009, the Estonian muslim community purchased an Islamic center with financial resources provided by an Islamic organisation from Saudi Arabia. In 2010, Islamic organisations from a variety of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Arab United Emirates and Turkey provided funding for the center as well as support for other community activities. The Islamic center has already become a place of religious and cultural importance for both the local muslim community as well as for Islamic organisations of other countries even though it has not yet been officially opened.

Despite the foundation of an Islamic center, different national groups within the muslim community have not abandoned the plan of building a mosque in Estonia. In 2010, they continued to reach out to Islamic organisations from other countries with a view to finding sponsors for the construction of a mosque.

Signs of Radicalisation

The number of converts or people who have converted to Islam continues to grow within the Estonian muslim community. Alarminglly, converts tend to follow Islamic fundamentalist principles, along with its negative effects and dangers. Analysis by different security institutions confirms that Islamic terrorists are interested in using converts for the organisation and implementation of attacks against the West.

The number of converts or people who have converted to Islam continues to grow within the Estonian muslim community.

The Estonian muslim community’s religious and community activities have in recent years become more active. This trend continued also in 2010 and expressed itself in contacts with the Islamic organisations of other countries. More openness has unfortunately increased the influence of radical Islam in Estonia. In 2010, the Security Police received information about individuals within the Estonian muslim community who have started to support radical Islam, to display hatred of western society and to justify the use of violence against so-called ‘non-believers.’ No contacts have been discovered between these individuals and radical groups in other countries. Their extremist views seem to stem mainly from global events and radical internet forums.

Radicalisation does not automatically lead to violent behaviour or terrorist activities. Experience, however, has shown that, as a next step, these individuals may wish to go to the assistance of their religious brothers in a conflict zone or in some way contribute to the holy war.
Ensuring Security at Large Events and for Visits

For large events and incoming visits to Estonia, the Security Police provides threat assessments, vetts individuals, provides technical help and, if necessary, provides additional support in order to ensure physical security at events. In 2010, the most important events that the Security Police helped provide security for were:

The informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn on 22-23 April 2010.

Usually demonstrations and acts of violence occur at such events. Yet the NATO meeting in Tallinn passed off peacefully and without any major incidents that could have posed a threat to security.

The Security Police also had a role to play in Estonia’s transition to the euro. The Security Police, in cooperation with other institutions, helped ensure the safe arrival of euro notes to the Bank of Estonia. The Security Police made background checks and collected information on possible threats.

Increasing the security of objects with a high risk of attack and crisis management

Objects under high risk of attack in Estonia are not yet legally defined, however, the Security Police continues to advise those in possession of objects that are deemed to be important to the state and are under high risk of attack.

In addition to gathering intelligence and preparing for the management of a crisis, the security of objects that are possible targets for terrorist attack must be increased in order to prevent terrorism. According to the experiences of other European countries, terrorists tend to mainly target the transport, financial and governmental sectors.

In 2010, a draft law on the Safety Measures for Objects Under High Risk of Attack was presented to the Ministry of Interior. It will enter into force in 2011 together with a list of vulnerable sites in Estonia.

On 31 May-4 June 2010, the Security Police and the Police and Border Guard Agency, in cooperation with international partners, organised...
a counterterrorism exercise called Cruise Ship 2010. Special forces practiced landing onto a moving ship from an aircraft and vessel, taking control of the ship and its communications, defusing explosive ordnances, freeing hostages and other tactical activities.

**Explosions**

In 2010, there were four explosions in Estonia involving the illegal handling of explosive materials in which three people died. These explosions led to criminal investigations. None of them were linked to terrorist activities. Two of the four explosions took place in Jõgevamaa County, one explosion took place in Tallinn and one in Kõrha-Järve.

One of the explosions with the most tragic consequences took place at 00:16 am on 28 March 2010 in an apartment on the 4th floor of a 9-stroy building on Kuldnoa street in Tallinn. Two individuals died in the blast and the subsequent fire – 38 year old Sergei, who was responsible for the explosion, and his partner’s 1 year old daughter. Vladimir, born in 1925, who lived in the apartment above the explosion, was seriously injured and died a month and a half later. Five more people were injured in the blast. Thanks to Eduard Demida, who lived in the neighbouring apartment and acted quickly and selfservingly, Sergei’s partner’s second child – her two and half year old daughter - was saved from the fire. The building’s construction was seriously damaged and the water used to put out the fire, damaged the interior of many apartments in the building. In the course of the preliminary investigation, it was uncovered that the explosion was preceded by an argument, between Sergei and his partner while under the influence of alcohol. Sergei decided to end the argument by blowing himself up.

The second large explosion of 2010 happened on the night of 1 January 2010 in an apartment building in Pajusi, Jõgevamaa. Vahur (born in 1967), who was celebrating the arrival of the New Year with his daughter’s family, decided to burn a bundle of detonation cord in his kitchen stove. It is estimated that the detonation cord contained explosive materials of 10-15 grams of TNT equivalent. Vahur suffered bodily injuries as a result of the explosion. The kitchen walls and interior of the apartment were damaged. Luckily none of the other people present at the time, including a three year old child, were injured. Following a thorough search of the apartment, Security Police officials also found 3.7 kg explosive materials and four detonators.

On 12 March 2010, another smaller explosion took place in which a youngster decided to kill time by making a small ‘hell’s machine’ out of gunpowder and a wick. Nobody was injured in the blast, but the windows of at least one house were broken. This forbidden form of ‘entertainment’ let to the opening of a criminal investigation.
The fourth and last explosion of 2010 happened on 26 October in Kohtla-Järve. Grigori (born in 1971) was putting together a small explosive device made of a metal cylinder and gunpowder at this home, when it exploded causing light injuries to his arm and face. The shell of a World War II hand grenade RG-42 with pieces of TNT, a revolver, cartridges and gunpowder were found in Grigori’s home and confiscated. Later, Grigori voluntarily gave up another 15 electric detonators and 8 hunting rifle cartridges.

A case was resolved involving an incident that took place in Tallinn, 56 Vilde tee, on 4 December 2009, when 52-year old Vladimir tried to kill Sergii (born in 1959) with an F1 type hand grenade in exchange for a sum of 20 000 Estonian kroons. Sergii luckily survived the attack with mild bodily injuries. On 14 October 2010, Harju County Court sentenced Vladimir to 9 years in jail for attempting to commit murder in a manner dangerous to the general public, illegally handling an explosive device and causing a blast with an explosive device. The Security Police has arrested an individual born in 1970 on suspicion of ordering and organising the attempted murder.

In 2010, a sentence was passed on an incident involving a smaller sort of explosion that took place on 25 April 2009 in Sillamäe. Yuri, born in 1981, tried to explode an electric detonator in his apartment. As the detonator exploded, it destroyed the apartment’s window panes, but nobody was injured and property was not destroyed. On 22 March 2010, the Viru County Court sentenced Yuri to two years in jail for illegally handling explosives. This particular explosion was small and did not result in any injuries, but is still a good example of the force and danger posed by explosives. In this case, in order to create a blast, an electric detonator containing just 2 grams of explosives was attached to a metal can of spray paint.

Removal of illegal explosives from circulation

In 2010, Security Police officials discovered and removed from illegal circulation 40.8 kg of explosives, 349 detonators, 632 mines and projectiles, 44 fuse and 31 grenades. World War II era battlefields continue to be the main source of illegal explosive materials. So-called detectorists look for military items and resell any explosive ordnances or the explosive materials inside them.

On 3 December 2010, Harju County Court sentenced a 29-year old male to three years in jail with a three year probationary period for illegally handling explosives and ammunition. The court also ordered the convicted person to pay 10 875 Estonian kroons for committing a first degree crime and 75 790 Estonian kroons for processing fees. According to the prosecution, the individual held 11.1

The consequences of throwing explosives into an oven
kg of explosives in the basement of his house. He had scraped the explosive material out of shells found in a Harjumaa forest. On 29 January 2010, in the course of investigations, the Security Police confiscated the explosive material as well as 15 rounds from a hand gun.

On 4 November 2010, Tartu County Court sentenced Andrei, born in 1970, for handling a large amount of explosives, explosive devices, a firearm and ammunition. According to the prosecution, Andrei found a large amount of shells of different calibres, fuses and mines in the course of excavations in Tartumaa. By the time that the Security Police detained him as a suspect, Andrei had managed to scrape out 1.3 kg of TNT. He had also managed to acquire a rifle and cartridges. It was discovered that Andrei tried to sell some of the excavated items on the internet.

The court sentenced Andrei to 3 years and 6 months in jail, confiscated the metal detector used to excavate the explosive ordnances and asked that he pay 7500 Estonian kroons in processing fees.

In 2010, a joint campaign Notify us of your explosive materials was carried out for the third time in cooperation with the Rescue Board and the Prosecutor’s Office. In the course of the campaign, close to 60 kg of explosives and many explosive materials were handed over to the authorities.

PREVENTION THE SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONS AND STRATEGIC GOODS

In 2010, there were 28 infringements related to the suspected illegal import and export of strategic goods. In two of these cases, proceeding were not started due to the application of paragraph 219 of the Criminal Proceedings Code. The individuals who breached the law were not detained. They did not live in Estonia and had paid enough funds to cover both the costs of the preliminary investigation as well as any possible fines. The goods were also confiscated.

Objects that have been discovered:

- Firearms, their key parts, other parts of weapons or ammunition (16 cases)
- Electroshock weapons (7 cases)
- Spare parts belonging to the helicopter Mi-8 that are listed as military goods - on one occasion, a set of rotor blades and, on another occasion, 4 reducers and 2 devices to automatically change rotor blade pitch (2 cases)
- An all-terrain tracked carrier BV-206, listed as military goods, that was being transported from Sweden to Russia via Estonia (1 case)
- 14 telescopic batons being transported from the United States of America to Latvia via Estonia (1 case)
• 6 mortar simulators, 2 machine gun simulators ning 3 three fire controller’s and battle simulators whose special export permits had expired (1 case).

Four of the twenty-six criminal cases were concluded due to a lack of public interest in the proceedings and the individuals paid fines amounting to 397 000 Estonian kroons. The smallest payment was 500 kroons and the largest was 200 000 kroons.

Investigation of other serious crimes

In the course of investigating the illegal dealing and export of a large amount of submachine guns PPS-43 (more information on this can be found in the 2007 Annual Review), the Security Police tracked down a series of drugs crimes. In 2010, these crimes were tried in court.

In 2010, of the five cases related to the illegal dealing, import and export of large amounts of narcotics investigated by the Security Police, the Harju County Court convicted:

A group of seven individuals who, from August to December 2005, delivered from Holland to Estonia, on three occasions, a total of 120 kg of the narcotic substance hashish and, on one occasion, 6 kg of the narcotic substance marijuana. The individuals were handed down jail terms of various lengths (from 5 years and 2 month to 14 years and 6 months). The individual who was responsible for ordering and financing the purchase of the narcotics was additionally fined a sum of 11.5 million Estonian kroons (ca 734 984 euros).

A group of five individuals, who delivered 66 kg of hashish from Holland to Estonia in August 2006. Members of the group received sentenced, depending on their actions, ranging from 4 years and 6 months to 10 years in jail.

A group of seven individuals who, from November 2006 until February 2007, on four occasions, acquired and imported 17 kg of marijuana from Lithuania to Estonia. Thanks to cooperation between Estonian and Lithuanian law enforcement agencies, a 5 kg amount of marijuana was also seized in Lithuania. The Court handed down jail terms ranging from 3 to 8 years to members of the group. The individual who was partially responsible for financing the purchase of the narcotics and who resold 5 kg was ordered to pay a fine amounting to 700 000 Estonian kroons (ca 44 738 euros).

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A group of twelve individuals, who committed the following crimes: in 2006, they delivered, on five occasions, 500 kg of hashish from Holland to Russia via Estonia; in 2006 December, on two occasions, they delivered 110 kg of hashish from Estonia to Russia; in October-November 2007, they delivered 29.6 kg of hashish and 4 kg of hydrochloride cocaine (contains approximately 3,6 kg of pure cocaine) from Tallinn to Ida-Virumaa; in September 2007, they attempted to deliver 90,57 kg of hashish, 30 tablets (9,53 gr) of MDMA and amphetamines from Latvia to Estonia. Members of the group received sentences ranging from 3 to 18 years in jail.

A group of five individuals, who delivered 3 kg of cocaine from Estonia to Finland from May to October 2006. The individual who ordered and financed the delivery was sentenced to 12 years and 6 months in jail. The rest of the members of the group received sentences ranging from 3 years and 6 months to 8 years and 6 months, depending on their actions.
According to different polls and studies, corruption is regarded as a serious problem by both Estonian inhabitants and entrepreneurs. Awareness of the nature of corruption is increasing, in part, due to the detection and investigation of corruption cases and ensuing legal proceedings. Estonia’s ranking in Transparency International’s global corruption index remains virtually unchanged – in 2010 Estonia was ranked 26th out of 180 countries. Based on all of the criminal cases handled by the Security Police in 2010, it is evident that the most common form of corruption among state and local officials continues to be the taking of payoffs and bribes either in the decision-making stage or while carrying out procurement transactions. Increasingly, in the case of payoffs or bribes, it is becoming customary to either ask for or offer property or services as opposed to cash. As of June 2010, the Security Police is also responsible for investigating corruption crimes committed by defense forces’ officers.

**Corruption in the fulfillment of non-proprietary tasks within the state sector**

This area mainly includes corruption cases within law enforcement establishments – primarily in the course of making and implementing procedural decisions. It also includes bribery and payoff cases linked to the issuing of state permits and licences or the granting of approvals by relevant authorities.

In 2010, the Security Police continued to expose corruption in law enforcement establishments, where, in recent years, many unfortunate violations by judges have been uncovered. Incidents investigated by the Security Police, however, certainly does not mean that the entire judicial system is corrupt. Above all, these have been isolated cases with very different backgrounds and causes. The cases suggest that within the judicial system, the risk of corruption is highest in areas related to procedural decisions and the disclosure of surveillance.

In January 2010, Viru County’s Narva courthouse judge Mikhail Komtshatnikov, who worked as a prosecutor in 2009, was sentenced to two years in jail for repeatedly demanding and taking bribes. It was proven in the course of legal proceedings that Komtshatnikov accepted, via acquaintances, a bribe of 100 000 Estonian kroons.
neurs. As a serious problem by both Estonian inhabitants and entrepreneurs.

According to different polls and studies, corruption is regarded as a serious problem by both Estonian inhabitants and entrepreneurs.

In March 2010, Viru County Court judge Jüri Sakkart was sentenced to 2 years and 8 months in prison for knowingly annulled a ruling made in a case handled by the Security Police. In return for a bribe, Olli also engaged in other activities, including their form, method and timing. In return, Sakkart accepted a 50 000 kroon (ca 3195 Euros) bribe.

In November 2010, Tartu County’s Circuit Court decided not to overturn a decision convicting Gunnar Suur for repeatedly taking bribes. Suur was a former senior officer of the Pärnu Police Prefecture’s law enforcement department; he later worked as an adviser at the South Prefecture and as a senior officer of the Security Services. Suur was sentenced to prison but was permitted to serve his term on probation. The court found that Suur unlawfully intervened many times in the activities of other police officers who were dealing with the infringements of one of his acquaintances. Suur tried to convince police officers to be more lenient than usual on his acquaintance. In return, as a payoff, he received an overall preventative impact on this field.

For example, in May 2010, the Tallinn Circuit Court decided not to overturn a decision convicting Gunnar Suur for repeatedly taking bribes. Suur was a former senior officer of the Pärnu Police Prefecture’s law enforcement department; he later worked as an adviser at the South Prefecture and as a senior officer of the Security Services. Suur was sentenced to prison but was permitted to serve his term on probation. The court found that Suur unlawfully intervened many times in the activities of other police officers who were dealing with the infringements of one of his acquaintances. Suur tried to convince police officers to be more lenient than usual on his acquaintance. In return, as a payoff, he received a loan at preferential terms.

In 2010, Erik Teder, a senior superintendent at the West Prefecture and founder and shareholder of a company dealing with the technical inspection of motor vehicles, was sentenced to prison but was permitted to serve his term on probation. The court found that Teder gave bribes and repeatedly acted as the go-between in cases where technical inspectors were paid to approve vehicles that were technically unfit to drive. He also facilitated the forging of the necessary documents.

Corruption in the use of state resources and property

In this area, the greatest risk of corruption exists in public procurements, especially those that are large, specific and usually involve the use of European Union grants. Unlike so-called common corruption cases, criminal schemes used in this area are often more conspiratorial - shadow companies or partnerships are used instead of directly asking for and taking money, influence peddling occurs and crimes of competitiveness are committed. In the long-term perspective, this kind of behaviour can impact negatively on the particular field (construction, healthcare, etc.) and lead to the non-purposeful use of state funds.

The fact that corruption is becoming more hidden is also illustrated by criminal schemes that involve favouring certain companies in tenders for buying services, performing certain jobs or purchasing tools. Decisions are predetermined thanks to corrupt deals. Bribes are not always paid in cash directly to the official. Money is transferred to a company belonging...
to the official or his acquaintances. Also goods or services may be purchased from the company in question instead. Moreover, it is fairly common that, in order to achieve a favourable result, an official may be offered a variety of benefits and advantages (gift cards, trips, training, etc).

Quite often these crimes tend to be very well hidden and difficult to prove. Individuals (competitors and consumers) have difficulty finding out about their existence, extent and nature. Law enforcement agencies, however, cannot prove these types of crimes by traditional investigative methods (evidence, searches), but must use a variety of covert investigative methods.

In 2010, sentences were handed down by the court on many criminal cases handled by the Security Police in earlier years. In May, the Supreme Court decided not to overturn sentences by the Harju County Court and the Tallinn Circuit Court concerning former Minister of Environment Villu Reiljan who was accused of asking for a payoff in the sale of property located at Rävala 8 in Tallinn. Sentences for attorney Tarmo Silla, who acted as an intermediary, and businessman Aivo Pärna, who paid the bribe, were also not overturned.

In March 2010, former governor of Valga County Georg Trashanov was sentenced to jail for repeatedly taking bribes and payoffs. Twice in 2006, Trashanov accepted a total of 50 000 kroons (ca 3195 Euros) from a board member of a company and, in return, on behalf of Valga County, unlawfully concluded a contract with the same company, thereby disregarding the results of the tender for Valga County’s bus transportation as well as general legal procurement requirements. In return for payoffs, agreements were concluded between Valga County Government and the company on terms that were favourable to the latter. Previously concluded transportation agreements were also altered. The District Court decided not to change the guilty verdict handed down to Trashanov and the Supreme Court decided not to consider the accused’s request for an appeal.

In 2010, Harbour Enterprise Ltd employees Marina Sklyarova ja Dmitri Shmatkov were found guilty of attempting to offer, on behalf of the company, payoffs to an Estonian Navy’s Naval Base officer so as to secure a contract for the maintenance and repair of rescue equipment.

Corruption within local governments

As of July 2007, the Security Police has been investigating possible corruption related crimes in six of Estonia’s largest local governments (Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Jõhvi).

The situation in local governments differs from the state sector. Different measures for minimising the risk of corruption exist and control mechanisms are not as effective, thereby leading to a situation in which the individual official has greater opportunities for breaching the law. Yet the methods used for committing a crime – hidden actions – are the same. In September 2010, Narva City commissioner Aleksandr Moisseyev was found guilty of offering and attempting to give a tradeoff. Moisseyev tried to influence the course of the East Prefecture’s criminal cases in a direction that would be useful to him. Moisseyev was given time in prison and forced to serve out his sentence.
In 2010, the Estonian Security Police celebrated its 90th anniversary. The following chapter introduces the men who have been in charge of the Security Police. Their lives reflect the history of the Security Police and, more broadly, the Republic of Estonia.

On 12 April 1920, the Estonian government adopted an order charging the Security Police with the task of fighting against crimes aimed at overthrowing the democratic republic and the existing political order. The Directorate of the Security Police, led by a Director General, was created. In 1924, the Security Police was subordinated to the Police Directorate as a separate department. This organisational structure remained in place until 1940. From 1925 onwards, the Security Police bore the name of Political Police and its commissioners were subordinated to the Assistant Director of the Police Directorate and to the Political Police’s inspector’s apparatus.

After Estonia’s occupation by the Soviet Union on 17 June 1940, the majority of the Security Police’s personnel fell victim to represessions. Most police chiefs were either executed in Estonia or imprisoned in Russia. The fate of many is to this day unknown.

Helmut Traugott Veem
Born 07.07.1896 in Russia
Died 23.04.1941 in Tallinn
Helmut Veem was born in Ülem-Suetuk Village, Minussinski Province, Russia. He graduated from the Tallinn Nikolai Gymnasium and, in 1916, from the Vladimir Military Academy. Veem was thereafter mobilised to fight in World War I. He was seriously wounded on 12 July 1916 on the Galician front. Before the War of Independence, Veem served as the commander of the 7th Company, 1st Estonian Regiment and some time as the manager of the soldiers’ store. In November 1918, immediately after the War of Independence broke out, he was
Eduard Alver was born in Valga. He acquired his secondary education in Tartu and graduated from the Tartu Alexander Gymnasium in 1906. He then went on to briefly study medicine in Vienna but soon returned to Tartu, where he continued his studies at the Faculty of Law at the University of Tartu. As a university student, he joined the fraternity Fraternitas Esttica. He then went on to study in Moscow, where, in 1911, he received a masters degree in law from the University of Moscow.

In 1911, Alver went to work as a court official at the Riga Circuit Court, while working at the same time as an assistant to attorney Jüri Jaakson in Riga. While living in Riga, Alver took active part in the work of the Estonian Educational and Aid Society. He served as both a member of the society’s board as well as its chairman (1914-1915).

In 1915, Alver moved to Tartu where he served as director of the organisation Northern Assistance which assisted war refugees. In 1917, he was assistant to the Tallinn Chief of Police. Later he became Läänemaa Commissioner, Head of the Haapsalu City Council and member of the Tallinn National Congress. In 1918, he was arrested by the Bolsheviks. He also spent some days in prison during the German occupation (in June 1918).

In November 1918, the Estonian Provisional Government appointed Alver as Commissioner to Haapsalu, however, by the end of the same months he was called to Tallinn and was made acting head of the Department of Military at the Ministry of Interior. In January 1919, the department was renamed as Police Department. In February, the Police Directorate was formed and Alver became its head.

In March 1919, in addition to his responsibilities as Chief of Police, Alver was also in charge of the Defence League. In May, Alver requested to be relieved of his duties are director of the Police Directorate and in October, he also resigned from the post of Chief of Defence League. In 1920, he served as chairman of the committee responsible for requisitioning and assessing war damages and he also participated in the committee responsible for resolving the Estonian-Latvian border issue.

In 1921, he married Frieda Aurelie Press (born in 1896). On 19.02.1921 the Government of Estonia appointed Alver, legal adviser to the Ministry of Interior, to the post of Director of the Security Police Directorate. He did not serve long in this post. On 15.08.1921, he was dismissed from the director's position upon the suggestion of the Ministry of Interior. Later Alver went into business. He established and served on the board of many companies, including the insurance company Lloyd Estonia. In the mid-1930’s he was the director of the film studio Eesti Kultuurfilm and managing director of the foundation State-wide Exhibitions. Alver died on 15.08.1939 in Tallinn and is buried in Liiva cemetery. Alver was the recipient of the Cross of Liberty (grade I, 3rd class) and the Defence League’s Eagle’s Cross (2nd class).

Eduard Lensin

Born 25.12.1868 in Paistu parish
Died unknown

Eduard Lensin was born in Paistu parish in Viljandimaa. He graduated from Viljandi County Gymnasium and then went to study law at the University of Tartu. He graduated in 1893 and applied for work at the Vilnius Circuit Court. Lensin later worked for an extended period in Russia as a city judge, a senior notary, a member of the circuit court and a lawyer. After the establishment of Soviet rule, Lensin worked in the administrative field in the Turkestan region and a little later as the head of the military district court in the territory that was under control of the army led by Admiral Kolchak. As the War of Independence drew to a close, Lensin continued to live in Russia with his family in the city of Novo-
Eduard Lensin then worked as a lawyer in Tallinn. In March 1923, he became a member of the Council of Statutory Attorneys. It is unclear what happened later. According to unconfirmed sources, he went to live with his family in Italy, where, either at the end of the 1920s or the beginning of the 1930s, he died. His name was struck from the register of statutory attorneys in 1929.

Johan Sooman

Born 17.11.1889 in Massu parish
Died 17.06.1942 in Solikamsk, Perm oblast, Russia

Johan Sooman was born in Massu parish Läänemaa. He started his education at Hanila elementary school and later transferred to the Karuse parish school. In 1906, he graduated from the Paatsalu 8-grade state school and went on to acquire a teacher’s diploma at the Pärnu Boys Gymnasium. He was, however, not awarded a diploma because he was considered politically untrustworthy. He nevertheless worked from 1908 onwards as an elementary school teacher at the Penijõe school in Lihula.

In 1910, Sooman was elected as Secretary to the Kiiu Parish in Harjumaa, but was removed from this position some months later by the Governor of Estonia for being politically untrustworthy. He then worked again as a teacher but was soon forced to leave his job.

From 1911 until 1914, Sooman worked as a clerk in the Office of the Haapsalu District Chief. He then served in the Haapsalu field police until 4.11.1915. When World War I started, Sooman was mobilised into the Russian army, but was released for health reasons half a year later.

In 1917, following the February Revolution, Sooman was appointed secretary for the Läänemaa Commissioner of the Russian Provisional Government. In the same year, he was elected chairman of the county’s food committee. From the beginning of 1918, he worked in the Tallinn food committee. During the German occupation period, Sooman was unemployed. After formation of the Estonian Provisional Government, Sooman worked in the Ministry of Interior, initially as a secretary and later as an administrator.

After Eduard Lensin left the post of head of the Security Police Directorate, Sooman was appointed as its acting chief on 5.01.1923 and as of 3.10.1923 as its chief. In 1924, in the course of a reform of police structures and a reduction of personnel, Sooman was dismissed from his post and went briefly into private business.

On 23.12.1924 he was re-hired by the Ministry of Interior and appointed assistant to the head of the Police Directorate. His job was to organise the work of the Political Police. In the second half of 1933, Sooman worked briefly as assistant director of the Prisons Department. From 23.12.1933, he was, once again, assistant director of the Police Directorate. On 10.05.1938, Sooman was promoted to the post of director of the Police Services, where he remained until the Republic of Estonia was occupied in 1940.

Once Soviet power was imposed, Sooman was immediately let go and arrested a month later. A special meeting of the NKVD sentenced Sooman to death on 31.03.1942. He died on 17.06.1942 in Solikamsk prison camp before the sentence was carried out.

The Republic of Estonia awarded Sooman the Order of the National Coat of Arms (3rd class) and the Order of the White Star (5th class). He was also bestowed the Order of the Estonian Red Cross (grade I, 2nd class; grade II, 1st class; grade II, 2nd class) as well as the Defence League’s Order of the Cross of the Eagle (3rd Class). In 1932, Sooman was chairman on the football association Estonia and belonged to the management board of the Estonian shooting club.
August Tuulse (Tõns, Tenson)  
*Born 18.09.1894 in Kastre-Võnnu parish*  
*Died 23.06.1940 in Tallinn*  

August Tuulse started his education at the Võnnu parish school in Tartumaa. In 1915, he received a secondary school diploma from Tartu Science School. In 1918, he completed examinations at the Tartu Alexander Gymnasium to become a student apothecary. In 1924, Tuulse went to study at the private gymnasium run by the Tallinn Public Universities Society college. He graduated in 1926. And in 1933, he graduated from Faculty of Law at the University of Tartu.

From 1913 until 1917, Tuulse worked in the crime department of the Tartu police, at first as a copyist, later, during the Russian Provisional Government, as an assistant to the commissioner. Thereafter, he was mobilised and worked as an aide in the counterintelligence department in the headquarters of the 12th army. He later served as chief of the counterintelligence unit in the 2nd Siberian corps staff. When the Bolsheviks abolished these agencies in December 1917, he was relieved of his duties and declared a counterrevolutionary. In spring 1918, Tuulse returned to the crime department in Tartu. At the end of 1918, we worked on the editorial board of the newspaper Postimees. At the beginning of 1919, Tuulse enlisted in the Estonian army as volunteer. He was appointed as an official with extraordinary responsibilities answering directly to the Tartumaa commander. From 1.02.1919 until 1.06.1920, Tuulse served as assistant to the chief of intelligence of Tartu section in the Operational Headquarters. He thereafter became acting assistant to the chief of the Security Police. He was appointed assistant to the chief on 16.09.1921.

On 20.02.1926, he became the police inspector, whose job was to organise the work of the political police. On 1.07.1929, Tuulse was renamed the inspector of the political police. As of 29.10.1935, Tuulse was the assistant to the Minister of Interior. In 1937, he participated in the drafting of the new Estonian constitution. From 17.08.1937 onwards he was head of the ministry’s local governments’ department. In 1938, for a short period of time, he was the head of domestic defence and, the same year, was appointed as chairman of the national defence committee.

Shattered by the communist coup, Tuulse committed suicide on 23.06.1940 in Tallinn.

Tuulse was a recipient of the Defence League’s Order of the Eagle (3rd class).

Konstantin Kirsimägi (Kirschberg)  
*Born 14.01.1902 in Põlgaste parish*  
*Died 1941 in Moscow, Russia*  

Konstantin Kirsimägi was born in Põlgaste parish in Võrumaa. He studied at the Põlva parish school, the Tartu Trade Gymnasium and the Tallinn Science Gymnasium for Boys. In 1924 – 1928 he studied law at the University of Tartu. In spring 1928, Kirsimägi completed higher studies at the police school. Kirsimägi participated in the War of Independence. He joined the Defence League’s Põlva military unit in 1919. After the war, he continued to serve in the military.

In summer 1928, after finishing police school, Kirsimägi went to work as an assistant for Viljandi criminal police. A year later, he served in the Tartu criminal police as an assistant commissioner and in 1932 as a commissioner in Valga.

In 1933, Kirsimägi went to work in the Political Police and served as a commissioner in Pärnu. From April to November 1935, he was a Political Police commissioner in Tartu. Thereafter, he was appointed as political police inspector and in 1938 was appointed as assistant director of the Police Services.

Following Estonia’s occupation, Kirsimägi was relieved of his duties on 24.06.1940 and arrested by the NKVD. In autumn 1940, he was taken to Moscow where he was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad. Kirsimägi was bestowed by the Republic of Estonia with the Order of the White Star (Third class) and by the Re-
Tanel Võhma (Daniel Võhman)

Born 02.02.1898 in Voka parish  
Died unknown

Tanel Võhma was born in Voka parish in Virumaa. He acquired his elementary education at the Jõhvi 8-grade state school which he completed in 1913. In 1917, he studied briefly at the Marinsky Gymnasium in Helsinki. He finally graduated from Narva gymnasium in 1928. In 1933, he graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Tartu.

In 1917, Võhma served as an official on the Russian Northern railway. In the same year, he was mobilised into the army. He served in Suomenlinna (Sveaborg) fort as an artilleryman. Võhma participated in the War of Independence. In March 1919, he enlisted in the Estonian army as a volunteer. At first he served in the 5th Rakvere infantry regiment. Later he was transferred to the artillery division. From September 1919 until entering the reserves, Võhma served as a staff clerk. After demobilisation at the end of 1921, he worked for some months as a clerk at the state manor in Kuie.

In March 1922, Võhma joined the Security Police and, until 31.12.1922, worked as a senior staff official in the Narva division. Due to cutbacks in personnel, Võhma had to leave. At the beginning of 1923, he worked as a staff official in the inspector’s chancellery of the 1. division’s staff. On 10.02.1923, Võhma joined the Narva city police and became the acting head of district in the 2nd station. On 15.03.1924, he was transferred to the Narva Police Department where he worked as a ledger clerk.

Võhma rejoined the Security Police in May 1925 and was appointed as a junior official in the Narva station. He thereafter also worked as an assistant and as a senior assistant. As of summer 1934, he worked in Tapa as a grade 2 senior assistant. On 15.05.1935 he was appointed as a commissioner of the political police in Pärnu and, as of 16.11.1935, as a commissioner in Tartu. On 22.06.1938, Võhma became an inspector of the Political Police. After Estonia was occupied, Võhma became the victim of oppression, as most of his colleagues. He was arrested in 16.07.1940 and taken to Moscow. His fate is unknown.

Võhma was the recipient of the Defence League’s Order of the Cross of the Eagle (4th class).

Director Generals of the Security Police since the restoration of independence

The Security Police was reestablished by Government decree on 18 June 1993 on the basis of the Police Board’s security police division. Since the restoration of independence, the Security Police has been led by:

1993 – 2003    Jüri Pihl
2003 – 2008    Aldis Alus
2008 –    Raivo Aeg