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Raivo Aeg, Director General of the Security Police
The security situation of Estonia is improving constantly. This statement is easy to make and certainly right as well, but is not convincing enough without deeper analysis. Also, the statement will not be viable, if we assume that someone else must be responsible for the security of our country. The main goal of the Annual Review of the Security Police is to analyze and improve our common security together with our partners and the public.

The task of the Security Police is to guarantee the security of the Republic of Estonia by non-military means. In my view, this means creating and sustaining an environment in which Estonia’s territorial integrity is never called into question and, as stipulated in our constitution, the conditions for preserving the Estonian language and culture are guaranteed.

As Director General of the Security Police, I do my best, at all times, to ensure that the resources entrusted to me will be put to their best possible use to ensure that this goal is met. This, however, is the easy part. What, then, is the more difficult one? Security can only be efficiently guaranteed by engaging all of society. The task of the Security Police is to ensure security for all of us. The prerequisite for this is dialogue and cooperation between the Security Police and the citizen, for whom the Security Police works.

Every now and then I notice that certain mental barriers have not yet been overcome. In my view, this is a vestige of the past decades. There is a barrier that sometimes holds people – decent, law-abiding citizens – back from informing law enforcement and security authorities of offences, but also from discussing potential threats and communicating willingly and without fear with the authorities. Fear on the part of the residents of a democratic state, who are in possession of the highest power, can not be rationally justified. The only logical explanation that makes sense is that we have not entirely forgotten the actions of the repressive organs of the ruthless Soviet regime. Even the word “security” probably subconsciously conjures up old associations and fears in many people. Overcoming these associations in contemporary Estonian society is one of the more challenging tasks in my work.

There is no military threat now or in the visible near future, the state and its institutions function and develop, inter-agency co-operation works, Estonia’s reputation in international organizations and partnerships is high. And the most important thing – the public’s trust towards the state is steady and unaffected by provocations. A part of this trust is certainly the knowledge that no political party or interest group is able to take advantage of our law enforcement and security agencies in their own interest.

The definite priority of the Security Police is to develop its personnel and activities in such a way that they meet the expectations of the citizens increasingly better and are constantly capable of effectively standing against those who wish ill to our state and people. We strive to be as open in our activities, as the features of our work enable, and hope to increase citizens’ trust towards us. One possibility to do so is this annual review.

Think along with us!

Raivo Aeg
Director General
NEW SERVICE RANKS AND STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITY POLICE
From January 1, 2010, a new structure, and a new system of service ranks and offices apply in the Security Police.

**Offices**
- Junior Specialist
- Senior Specialist
- Leading Specialist
- Executive Officer of Structural Unit
- Deputy Director General
- Director General

**The Service Ranks of the Officers of the Security Police**
- Junior Assistant
- Assistant
- Senior Assistant
- Chief Assistant
- Superintendent
- Senior Superintendent
- Police Lieutenant
- Police Captain
- Police Major
- Police Lieutenant Colonel
- Police Colonel
- Police General-Inspector
- Police General

**The Structure**
From January 1, 2010, the Security Police has also the new structure. The structure of the Security Police contains:
- Central Structural Units
- Northern Department
- Eastern Department
- Southern Department
- Western Department
Rightwing and Leftwing Extremists

The rightwing extremist groups in Scandinavia and Western Europe are continually active, and increasing activity during recent years can be observed in several Central- and East-European countries, as well. This tendency can be considered to be a reaction to globalization and constantly increasing immigration into Europe. Several rightwing parties have been successful at elections of both, parliamentary and local governments, by spreading populist slogans. Several such parties are represented in the European Parliament.

Conflicts between rightwing and leftwing extremists are a continually increasing threat to law and order, and security in several European countries. Conflicts usually flare up during demonstrations held by one party, and violence accompanying the encounter is directed towards the activists of the opposing party or the police, protecting law and order. As Estonian rightwing and leftwing extremists have contacts with extremists in Europe, our local extremists may get inspiration for violent activities. Possibility of such events must definitely be considered in Estonia.

It is characteristic of the leftwing extremists of European countries to express their views by means of violent actions that are accompanied with antagonism from the part of rightwing extremists. A notorious example was the protest demonstrations with tens of thousands of participants held against the summit dedicated to the 60th anniversary of NATO in Kehl and Strasbourg in April 2009. In the course of demonstrations, which developed into violent actions, one hotel was set on fire, one gas station and one pharmacy were robbed, and other property was damaged. In Strasbourg alone, 10,000 police officers were to be deployed to guarantee order.

The activities of Estonian chauvinists’ and rightwing extremists’ circles in 2009 were characterized by incapability to cooperate and conflicts between the leaders of these groups. The results achieved at the elections
of the European Parliament and local governments were moderate. Modest support of Estonian electors to chauvinist and rightwing extremist activists confirms that their empty and populist message has no serious foothold in Estonia, even during economically complicated times.

There are still persons in various groups acting in Estonia, who don’t want or are simply not capable of discerning the difference between commemorating Estonian men, who were fetched to fight for Germany in the World War II, and praising the national socialist terror regime. Thus, worshipping the foreign power that occupied Estonia and its symbols has and cannot have justification. It is impossible to see respect towards bravery and courage of Estonian soldiers in this. Attempt to dress up in others’ clothes would, at most, make one a pawn in the hands of those, whose wishful belief is to depict Estonia, in reality protecting democratic values, as “a small, unpleasant country, favoring national socialism.”

Extremists Supported from Russia

The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Estonia and the Council of Russian Compatriots contribute in Kremlin’s so-called compatriots policy increasingly more to persons and organizations with extremist views. In reality, Estonian Russian-speaking population does not identify themselves with extremists.

The best-known union of Russian community, mobilizing persons with extremist views, the Nochnoi Dozor (Night Watch) did not stand out with anything special in 2009, and the organization has no distinct aim or strategy. The issue of relocating the Tõnismägi monument has run out of steam. So, the activities of Nochnoi Dozor are mainly limited with expressing vague accusations on the government institutions offices of the Republic of Estonia via Internet portals and Russian media. There is massive use of rhetoric and expressions, characteristic to Russian propagandists, such as “Russofobia”, “praising of Fascism”, “apartheid”, etc. Besides opposing the Government of Estonia they actively observe everything in connection with Russia and respond painfully, when Russia is “wronged.” As for the members of Nochnoi Dozor, they are mostly persons, who get inspired by propaganda, proceeding from Russia, who see themselves as some kind of freedom fighters. Intrinsic to extremists, they usually act against something, but not for something. The members of Nochnoi Dozor, attempting to split Estonian society on the grounds of nationality,
have suggested several weird ideas, e.g. Russian community's own currency, separate trade unions for Russian-speaking employees, etc.

As there is not enough to deal with in Estonia, the members of Nochnoi Dozor and its suborganization Molodoye Slovo repeatedly participated in events organized by the extremists in Latvia and Finland. The most active person, involving local extremists into his activities, has been the leader of Finnish Anti-Fascist Committee Johan Bäckman, who has no supporters in Finland. Without reinforcement from Estonia he would be incapable of organizing any demonstrations. For several members of Nochnoi Dozor, and especially Molodoye Slovo, the top priority of these “missions” is free travelling tickets and catering, and of course the attention of media, rather than picketing.

Johan Bäckman defines himself publicly as a leftwing extremist and admits that his views proceed from Russia. Bäckman has repeatedly given speeches that are hostile towards Estonia and approve the behavior of Stalinist Soviet Union, justifying deportation and denying the occupation of the Baltic States. Peculiar here is the fact that Bäckman, who publicly accuses Estonia in prizing Fascism, has good relations with Risto Mikael Teinonen, who propagates national socialist ideology. The latter has made translations for him.

At times, Nochnoi Dozor, having no fresh ideas, has received support from the Russian Embassy in Estonia; a meeting on “Commemorating those, who perished in the Georgian aggression in 2008” was held under the Embassy’s windows on August 8, 2009, incited by the Embassy.

Several members of Nochnoi Dozor stood for local government elections in October 2009, but their harvest of votes was poor. If failure at the elections of the European Parliament was explained with the fact that non-citizens could not participate at elections, then after the local government elections it had to be admitted that neither Nochnoi Dozor nor its activists have gathered support in the Es-
tonian community. After setbacks at elections the leaders of Nochnoi Dozor have quite a problem to speak in the name of all Russian-speaking population of Estonia. At the same time, it would be naïve to hope that they would readily give up the role of leaders imputed to them by Russian media.

Among extremists, supported by Russia, the most well-known is the Russian chauvinist youth organization Nashi and its Estonian-origin commissar Mark Siryk. Being financially dependant on Nashi, Siryk is obliged to execute the orders of the financier in the interests of propaganda, and organize various events in Russia, as well as in Estonia. For example, he chained himself at the embassies of Estonia and Ukraine in Moscow, but also made an attempt to organize a provocative demonstration during an ex-servicemen’s gathering at Sinimäed (a World War II battleground) in July. As Nochnoi Dozor, Siryk has inconsiderable number of supporters in Estonia. So far, he has managed to hide this fact from the leaders of Nashi. Siryk, who stood for local government elections in Tallinn, Lasnamäe District and gathered only 64 votes, definitely did not justify the expectations of his “sponsors.” Likewise, Siryk did not manage to carry out the action plans composed by the leaders of Nashi for the “Victory Day” (May 9) and the anniversary of “liberating” Tallinn (September 22).

The popularity of Nashi among Russian youth has significantly decreased during last year, and that is mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the budgets of youth organizations in Russia have been cut down due to economic depression and with that a lot of members have lost motivation to participate in “public activities.” Second, but not at all less important reason is the fact that Nashi has no distinct ideology to mobilize young people, because not nearly all Russian youngsters are interested in protesting against Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Georgia or some international organization from week to week. Many also understand by now that participation in a youth organization does not guarantee a job in some state administrative agency or municipal agency in the future, let alone an office in the Duma. That is why at the forefront of Nashi there are extremist activists, such as Mark Siryk and Konstantin Goloskokov, who see potential income in executing political orders.

An attempt to increase Nashi’s reputation was made with the help of a traditional summer camp in Russia, at Lake Seliger, where more attention was paid to subjects like innovation, education and science. Despite all this
anti-Fascist and chauvinist rhetoric dominated in the camp, an eternal fire was flaming and there was a 24-hour memorial guard in trench coats. The wish of the leaders of the youth organization to get rid of the Hitler-Jugend-reputation forced the organizers to invite to the Seliger camp young people from all over Europe. Unfortunately, following the Soviet-era traditions, the foreigners’ group was secluded from others and the program of lectures differed remarkably on the subjects meant for the youth of the native land.

Ironically, Molodaya Gvardiya and Nashi, organizations fighting against Fascism and Nazism, fell victim to Russian anti-Fascists violent activity. In November the headquarters of both organizations were attacked in Moscow. The attackers were probably the so-called antifas, who consider the Kremlin-minded groups chauvinist in essence and orientated to autocratic Russia.

Russia’s so-called Compatriots Policy

Every state’s obligation is to protect its citizens and support its compatriots abroad. Problems arise, when this is an excuse to intervene constantly in another state’s internal affairs and carrying out the policy of its own spheres of influence. For a short time, such activity may significantly harm the security interests of another country. However, in longer perspective such activity has negative influence on the intervening state itself, because compatriots and national culture are made hostages of foreign policy.

Russia’s efforts in compatriots’ (this is how the central powers of Russia calls ethnic Russians and ideological followers living abroad) policy can be summarized in four words, which makes an acronym CCCP:

- Coordination
- Consolidation
- Communication
- Protection

The purpose of this policy is to turn, with the help of an information field controlled from Russia, the so-called compatriots into an unified crowd that could be manipulated, and by that increase the foreign policy arsenal significantly.

Although Russia’s official rhetoric excludes any kind of influential activity in the framework of compatriots policy, there have been several converse examples in the context of Estonia. Thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergei Lavrov confirmed on January 16, 2009, in his commentary about supporting Russian compatriots: “There will be no activity or decisions that would mean intervention in the internal affairs of the countries, where our compatriots live.” Only four days later the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots agitated Russian-speaking candidates striving into the European Parliament in Estonia to form a joint list. Let it be mentioned here that the Coordination Council has an important role in performed compatriots national democracy. The meetings of the Council take place in the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Tallinn under the observant eyes of Russian diplomats, including the ambassador. The majority of the Council members belong to the United Leftwing Party of Estonia. Although the Coordination Council is a publicly active organization, it has not been officially registered in Estonia. The motive of such behavior is obvious and clear: to avoid responsibility for its actions and cover the details of the financing of the organization.

During the 2009 European Parliament elections in Estonia it occurred once again, how Russia’s politicians “do not intervene” in other states’ internal affairs via their compatriots policy. The activity of the Head of Department of Foreign Relations of Moscow City Government Georgi Muradov is also worth mentioning. On February 28, 2009, when Russia’s Compatriots organizations had a meeting in Tallinn, began Muradov’s two-day visit to Estonia. At the beginning of the visit Muradov claimed in his interview to the Estonian media that he came into to rest and visit his friend. In reality the visit passed in the Embassy of Russian Federation in Tallinn holding conversations with compatriots who had been called out. The purpose was to agree on how to form a joint list of Russian candidates for elections, with Aleksey Semyonov, an active member of the Coordination Council and the Head of the non-profit association Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, being number one candidate. Highlighting him was understandable, as he is a person dealing with the subject of human rights from the position of Russia and his activity is being financed from Moscow. According to the annual report of the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, financial support from the Embassy of Russian Federation formed nearly half of the total support to their projects in 2008. At the meeting the candidates of the planned joint list were offered a motivation package of over 10 million EEK, if they would fulfill established conditions. How large sum would have arrived in Estonia for real remains unknown, as they did not manage to form the joint candidates list and thus the purpose of motivation vanished.

The global economic crisis also affected Russia’s compatriots policy in 2009. Shortage of money caused competition between persons, whose income depends on compatriots policy. A good example was detention of
the Deputy Head of the Compatriots Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Aleksandr Gussev by the FSB on April 8, 2009. Allegedly, Gussev claimed a bribe in the amount of 200,000 rubles in order to make the participation of the OKA Fund, connected with supporting compatriots, in national compatriots programme possible. In the context of Estonia it is important that the Head of the OKA Fund Tatyana Poloshkova, who cooperated with the FSB, is the mentor of Andrey Zarenkov, the de facto leader of the Coordination Council of compatriots living in Estonia, who tried to influence processes in Estonia before the 2007 Riigikogu (parliament) elections, while himself still working in Roszarubezhsentr.

The case, as claimed already in the Annual Review of the Security Police of 2007, confirmed that in essence the financing of Russia’s compatriots programmes has remained the same – co-operation between corrupt civil servants and local activists. In this case corruption was prevented due to co-operation between the Head of the Fund and Russian power structures, but according to the Security Police it was a case of a clan-fight for public finances that concluded with Gussev being caught.

Shortage of money influenced significantly the organization of several compatriots conferences. Despite that the main worry of Russia’s administration was to ensure that compatriots would express their gratitude and to leave an impression that despite economic crisis there are no changes in supporting compatriots. An expressive example of a national democratic spectacle was the activity of the delegation from Estonia at the worldwide Russian Compatriots Congress in Moscow, where the Director of the Maardu Community Center Andrey Zarenkov, who is educated as a director of mass and entertainment events, made a speech. Recognition should be given to his assistants in Russia, who managed to organize his speech right before the speech of Russia’s President and thus created the possibility to turn attention to him. President Dmitry Medvedev arrived at the Congress right before his speech and left immediately after the speech had been given.

Interest of foreign intelligence services in Estonian oil shale technology is increasing.
Economic Security

Economic security and guaranteeing it is a complex system, involving public, private and the third sector. The basis of a safe and sustainable economic environment is transparency, stability of the economic and financial system and fair rules. The Security Police has a role in guaranteeing such environment by implementing various measures to prevent corruption and industrial espionage.

Due to the global finance and economic crisis, Russia’s political manipulations with enterprises based on Russian capital and acting in Estonia decreased, because the actual situation forced Russian institutions and administration to take economic profitability into account. The so-called administrative measures applied towards Estonia since 2007 have also somewhat eased off. We are not dealing with direct economic sanctions. Fluent trade is impeded by technical problems in transportation, delays in communication, handling documents, etc.

The conditions of economic crisis inevitably increase the risk of industrial espionage. Due to decreasing financial possibilities some countries and the private sector are, in order to save money, up to using means that would ensure them the benefit of unfair competition.

In intelligence terminology industrial espionage is considered different from economic intelligence. The first is more limited and involves inter-company intelligence that includes illegal acquisition of information, technology, etc. Economic intelligence, however, has much wider content and means secret information gathering by states, usually by their special services. At the same time this is the field of activity, where the line between public and private sector, and also between industrial espionage and economic intelligence is quite hazy. This is especially true about such countries as Russia and China, where enterprises are dominantly state-owned.

The greatest weakness in the prevention of industrial espionage in Estonia is limited knowledge of our entrepreneurs about the existence of such a threat, and due to that quite little is done to manage risk. We are not talking of a problem concerning only corporations and research institutions. The attacked targets may also be small and medium sized enterprises. In preventing industrial espionage it is extremely important to exchange information between the Security Police and entrepreneurs.
In Estonia foreign intelligence is most interested in energy (nuclear energy projects and attitude towards the Nord Stream project) and transport sector. Intense attention is also paid to scientific research in biotechnology and military areas. An attractive industrial target is the Virumaa Region in Estonia with its large enterprises, such as Viru Keemia Grupp (chemistry) and Eesti Energia Õlitööstus (Narva Oil Plant). Much interest has also been shown towards oil shale technology, but unfortunately there has only been interest in acquiring know-how, without wishing to contribute in development and making investments.

Russia is very active with its energy projects, as there is an understanding that in economically uncertain times energy security is of utmost importance. The state is independent, and its energy mediums varied. In the conditions of an open energy market Estonia has to take into consideration risks that accompany consumption of exterior energy resources. Breaking off of foreign supply is possible, also manipulations with prices and political influential activity, to harm the sustainability and competitiveness of the state’s energy area.

Estonia, together with Latvia and Lithuania, has so far been an “energy island” in the EU, possessing electricity and gas networks, tightly connected with Russia and with each other due to historic reasons. Russia uses energy projects as means of political influencing and has officially declared that its aim is to guarantee a place in foreign energy markets (including Estonia).

In the conditions of economic crisis inevitably increase the risk of industrial espionage.

Among the main aims of Russia’s energy development plan till the year 2020, is guaranteeing national security. The content and aim of this plan are the following:

- Extraction and commissioning of energy resources of other countries in their territory;
- Entering the energy markets in foreign states, and buying co-ownership of their energy sales network and infrastructure objects;
- State support to Russia’s enterprises in participating foreign investment projects.
RUSSIA’S PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST ESTONIA

In December 2009, the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev announced at the European and Asian media forum that Russia has to support Russian-language journalism abroad. Media, first of all targeting the so-called Russian compatriots, use Russia’s public programmes, support funds and private investments. Consolidating the tool of increasing Russia’s international influence is one of the priorities of Russia’s foreign policy. It is evident that in order to achieve this aim, Russia tries to expand the range of influence of media under its control, to increase the efficiency of their messages and to interfere in internal affairs of other states, using so-called soft power.

It is probable that in the near future Russia will attempt to expand its range of influence in the neighboring countries, including Estonia, and difficult economic situation in the (Russian-language) media market inevitably creates favorable ground for that. In spring 2009, two Russian-language periodicals were closed in Estonia – Molodyozh Estonii and Vesti Dnya – and several others have worked on the edge of profitability or at a loss. In Latvia and Lithuania the owners of the biggest daily newspapers changed, causing quite a few speculations on the subject. By now, there are no statewide newscast, let alone foreign news producers in Russia that are not dependent on the central power. Among available media channels Estonian Russian-speaking population still most preferred Pervyi Baltiiskii Kanal that represents in the Baltic States Russia’s greatest TV-channel Pervyi Kanal and the latter also produces at least 75% of the broadcasts here. In 2009 several journalists working in Estonia, participated in the state-financed journalists’ “workshop” in Russia, and it can be predicted that such events will be carried out in the future, as well. The website baltija.eu, managed by the members of Nochnoi Dozor, has its share of Russian propaganda money already now.
One distinct aim of Russia’s psychological warfare is attempt to weaken international position of Estonia and other neighboring countries that are disturbingly independent. As for Estonia, much time has been spent on creating the impression of the bad situation of compatriots living here, and of public “praising of Nazism” or “rewriting history.” Into the same scheme fall two institutions that were created by the Presidential Administration of Russia in May 2009: the Commission to counter attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests and the Commission to promote a positive image of Russia. The activity of the Commission to promote a positive image that formerly prevailed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has remained quite covert. The Commission to counter attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests, on the other hand, is more active and focuses, first of all, on supporting Russia’s propaganda by offering financial and logistic support to publishing propagandistic publications and organizing events. At the same time, the Commission works on developing tactics and strategy against “attempts to forge history.”

Myth creation of Russia is characterized by focusing on the so-called soft power and psychological warfare. Attempt to make criticism on Stalinism a criminal offence testifies Moscow’s ambition to have monopoly on historical truth. Formation of the commission combating forging of history chronologically coincided with the initiative by a group of Duma delegates submitting the draft to amend the Penal Code of the Russian Federation. The draft provided criminal liability to those, who decrease the role of the USSR in achieving victory over Germany in the WWII. The provisions of the draft proposed actual imprisonment and large penalties to the citizens of Russia, but also other countries, for “denying historical truth” and “rehabilitating Nazism.” One proposed measure of influence was termination of diplomatic relations with the country of location of an institution forging history. Although this draft, which caused international confusion, has been quietly withdrawn from the agenda by now, extreme propagandists’ calls for repressing dissidents are far from disappearing from Russian media.
Since the first presidency period of Vladimir Putin the long-term strategic aim of the administration of the Russian Federation has been restoring the sphere of influence in the so-called near-foreign countries, and securing Russia’s status as a superpower on the international level. As there is insufficient economic and military power to fulfill this dream at the moment, Russia has contributed in the creation of supporting myths, in order to make people in their native land and abroad believe in this wishful belief. Myth creation of Russia is characterized by focusing on the so-called soft power and psychological warfare. National security strategy, approved in May 2009, has been provided separately. Russia’s budget for 2009, where a lot of expenses were significantly cut, expenses for public propaganda were increased for more than 30%, all in all for over 15 billion EEK. For instance, more money was allocated to involve the audience of TV, radio and Internet.

In influencing with information, it is important to be aware that the so-called traditional journalism is only one possible channel to forward a message. Russia as one of the leading countries in propaganda uses every opportunity to methodically spread its positions and values: feature films, entertainment shows, advertising, science conferences, cultural programmes, meetings and workshops, books, scientific researches, works of popular science, etc. The aim is to reach to the sub-conscious of decision-makers, and then influence them to make choices and decisions favorable for Russia. A good example of this in Estonia is media-club Impressum that celebrated its first anniversary in October 2009.

The Activity of Impressum

On October 28, 2008, the local businessman Igor Teterin and the correspondent of Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda Galina Sapozhnikova founded the non-profit association Impressum that organizes meetings and thematic evenings of various fields of life. They have quite famous media and public figures and opinion leaders from Russia and other countries lecturing there. An attempt is always made to coax some Estonian lecturer to attend, in order to create
a deceptive balance and objectivity to these events by taking advantage of the high reputation of these unsuspecting persons. The regular audience at these events is current and former Russia-speaking media professionals, members of Nochnoi Dozor, local activists of Russia’s compatriots policy and persons connected with them. Besides lectures and meetings Impressum also organizes creative competitions and workshops, and has financed the trips of several journalists to Russia. Competitions organized so far, have had a modest number of participants and due to that the winners are basically known beforehand. Until now Impressum has not achieved the covert aim of their activity, which is involving Estonian journalists and media publications into spreading Russia’s convictions, and nervousness proceeding from this fact has been clearly distinguishable at their recent events.

Although it seems at the first glance that media club Impressum is harmless and their events, if taken individually, are not remarkably provocative or propagandistic, the key of their activity as a whole is a purposeful long-term and regular activity. A constantly repetitive subject is the yearning for the USSR and convincing the public in the circumstance that after gaining (they never talk about restoration) independence, Estonia—one, what was one of the most developed regions of the USSR, has become a country on a poor economic level with no perspective and is one of the most depressed areas in the European Union. The invited lecturers and organizers always bring out one and the same reason for this misery: that Estonia is too inclined towards the West and has bad relations with Russia. In the latter, of course, the main fault falls on the leading politicians and parties of Estonia, just as if the priorities of the Kremlin foreign policy were determined in Tallinn. This inevitably reminds the direct statement of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Ivanov, who half-secretly visited Tallinn on November 19, 2009, about the fact that Russia has absolutely no interest in amending the relations between the two countries in the foreseeable future. This propagandistic message is repeated directly and indirectly in discussions of various fields of activities, be it economy, culture, history or achievements of Estonian sportsmen in the composition of the Soviet sports teams.

In order to sway the stability of economic environment Impressum has spread the panic of devaluation of Estonian kroon and stirred up opposition to transition to euro. An event with distinct purpose to spread hostility was held, where Efraim Zuroff spoke, who is well known for his offensive and inconsiderate statements. Besides that Impressum has made several attempts to involve the representatives of Estonian Jewish community into their activities – needless to say, without results.

Article compendiums support the speeches made at the meetings and other books published by Impressum. The most noteworthy example that could be brought out is the article compendium “Long-term Memory,” introduced in Meriton Grand Conference & Spa hotel on December 16, 2009, and included among the articles were several earlier published by Estonian authors. The permission of the authors was not asked and so they have become the co-authors of a nostalgic propaganda publication of the USSR against their will. The names of the art and technical editors of this compendium, Jegor Vassilyev and Irina Tamm, also raise a question. They are probably fictitious characters, which serve a selfish purpose to defraud additional payment from the sponsors in Moscow.

It is evident that massive influencing activity, characteristic to the Soviet system, is continued with approval of Russia’s political administration with full speed. Investors in propaganda hope that their expenses will one day be profitable. That is why it is important to recognize such aggressive, but sometimes covert influencing activity, not to be influenced by lies and not provoked into a fight on battlefield chosen by the enemy, much less with the weapons chosen by the enemy. The most dependable means against influencing activity and propaganda is our wide knowledge, source criticism and analytical ability.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The Security Police is the only public institution in Estonia that executes internal counterintelligence. Counterintelligence is the means to guarantee state security, the main purpose being prevention of intelligence activities of foreign special services aimed against Estonia.

The methods of intelligence are predominantly secret and due to that their ascertaining them is difficult, and demands a specific approach and skill of action. In order that opposing party would not spot the activity of counterintelligence, its measures must be secret, as well. Crime statistics do not reflect espionage in the same form as the dynamics of other violations of law is adjudged. The year 2009 confirmed the trend of the last decade – intelligence services’ interest towards Estonia is constant and increasing.

The counterintelligence activity of the Security Police is focused on the following activities:

- **Prevention** – acknowledgement of security threats in society and by persons who are of interest to foreign intelligence services. This especially applies to politicians, opinion leaders, power structures and enterprises, who work in the field of defense industry or possess high scientific potential. It is important to notify Estonian residents about how to recognize intelligence activity and how to behave, if one has fallen under the interest of foreign intelligence;
- **Prevention** of anti-Estonia intelligence activity – gathering and processing information to ascertain intelligence activity, identify intelligence agents and apply preventive measures;
- **Carrying out surveillance** and criminal procedures in case there is enough information that a person deals or has dealt with treason or espionage.

Estonia has a determined position in the security system of the European Union and NATO. This increases Estonia’s obligation to deal with protecting security interests internationally, including the sphere of counterintelligence. The best example in this field was disclosing treason by Herman Simm and his conviction in the court as per terms of his plea bargaining agreement.

International security co-operation is one of the most important guarantees that Estonia’s interests are protected in our contemporary globalizing world. Amenities, like absence of border control, extended freedom and visa-free travelling gives the opposing parties the possibility to acquire information from Estonian residents easily. This means that besides Estonia, also third countries are used for approaching, recruiting and influencing. This method against Estonia has mostly been used by Russian special services. Thus, according to the Security Police, it is necessary to inform Estonian citizens working abroad of such threats that might be caused by special services and intelligence interests of unfriendly states.

On the basis of the cases it is possible to bring out the following elements of recruitment cycle:

1) Approaches at audiences, public events, on the pretext of official meeting, mediated by someone (former colleague, schoolfellow or army mate);
2) Developing relations, expressing a wish to meet again;
3) Getting to know the person, asking personal questions, praising;
International security co-operation is one of the most important guarantees that Estonia’s interests are protected in our contemporary globalizing world.

4) The wish that the person would share certain information, even not with particular value;
5) Increasing interest towards more important information with higher quality, promises to pay for services (money, useful relations, success in career, etc);
6) After the service has been rendered, especially if it has been done for money, the recruiter becomes more predominant. New and more rapid results will be required from the recruited person. Flattering is forgotten and promised payment is quite often decreased. The person has fallen into the circle of betrayal and lives with the knowledge that he/she can be compromised any moment;
7) Continuing co-operation and constant fear until disclosing.

The best way to avoid ending up in such situation is to seek contact with the Security Police as quickly as possible. If staying abroad, the best choice is to turn to Estonian Embassy, or in case of its absence to some other representation of the Member State of the European Union.

In Russia the Federal Security Service (the FSB) has been an active recruiter of agents. Quite aggressive harassing of the residents of Estonia, visiting Russia, mainly present and former public officials, military personnel or businessmen, and manipulating with the relatives and acquaintances of Estonian residents has an important place in their arsenal. Although the FSB is an internal security agency, it implements increasingly actively its intelligence capability, where the targets are Estonia’s internal policy, local Russian community, economic information, Estonian students studying abroad and Russian citizens studying in Estonia.

According to the Security Police the lines of interest of the anti-Estonian intelligence agencies, among which the most active are Russian special services, have been the same in the last decade:

- The policy of NATO and the European Union;
- Estonia’s influence and decisions in international organizations;
- Internal, foreign and defense policy of Estonia;
- Russian community;
- Potential (secret) co-workers;
- Special services and defense forces of Estonia;
- Cyber security;
- Energy.

Certain emphases could be observed in these areas. Russian intelligence services have been attentive towards issues connected with the construction of Nord Stream pipeline, but also potential developments in Estonian energy policy. One Russian company tried to use a so-called positive approach in collecting information. This company offered help to Estonia for impeding the foundation of the pipeline, trying to get access to internal information by that.

The new constitution of the European Union gives an important place to the new foreign service of Europe and its developing, and this includes Estonia’s contribution. This is a field of activity that will certainly not remain out of Russia’s interest.

Cyber security has become topical and a vital field of activity. Everything connected with digital data and systems gets intelligence services to act in order to gather information and to attack, and forces the possessors of such sensitive information or systems to protect them. Important keywords here are data gathering viruses, interception of information (including phone connections and e-mails), safety of massive volumes of information and institutions dealing with cyber protection.
PROTECTION OF STATE SECRET

Since 2009, there are two agencies which perform security checks in Estonia – the Security Police and the Information Board. Security checks of the staff of Estonian Defense Forces and National Defense League that was previously in the competence of the General Staff of the Defense Forces, is the task of the Security Police since 2009. Due to that, the volume of security checks that we pass has increased by 2/3. To avoid a quality decrease of security checks we contributed into making the checking methods and tactics more efficient, but this does not bring along any additional obligations for the applicants of permit.

Increase in the volume of security checks, unfortunately brought along increase in refusing to give permit for access to state secrets. One newly forming reason is economic difficulties – people have problems with paying home loans, additional obligations are taken with overdraft and limited loans. Temporary financial problems do not necessarily bring along refusal of access permit to state secrets. A positive factor is the person’s own wish to improve the situation. Problems may occur in case the person who has solvency problems does not understand his/her situation and the seriousness of the obligations. The Security Police is on a position that such person is not reliable enough and it is not possible to trust such person with state secrets. The purpose of security checks is to ascertain risks that could endanger protection of state secrets and the security of the state.

As a positive development, we should mention a significant decrease of refusals in connection with the applicant’s gambling addiction in 2009. In 2009 there were less violations of the state secret protection requirements compared to previous years.
There are several reasons why people have lost interest in casinos. The most important among them is undoubtedly smaller incomes and the fact that money earned will be spent on daily payments. Instead, former casino addicts now satisfy their gambling and winning passion more modestly, by buying lottery tickets. Frequency of attendance in casinos has definitely also decreased due to the Gambling Tax Act that entered into force on January 1, 2009, where according to § 37 subsection 8 requires the organizers of gambling to identify all visitors by an ID-document and record them. According to the law the Security Police has the right to check this data in the course of proceedings.

In 2009 there were less violations of the state secret protection requirements compared to previous years. One criminal case and one misdemeanor matter were initiated. Proceedings in these matters are still ongoing. There were some minor violations, but these did not bring along more serious proceedings. As violating state secret protection requirements is a subject of interest to the public, we give here a list of more typical violations:

- Classified information is proceeded outside secure area;
- Classified data medium is lost;
- Classified data medium is destroyed, but corresponding note is not made in the record of classified data media and no document about destruction is composed;
- Access to state secret is given to a person, whose access permit has not been issued yet;
- Validity of state secret handling certificate of an institution or enterprise is forgotten, and state secret is handled in electronic environment that is not in accordance with requirements;
- Classified information is forwarded via Internet or non-accredited system (via e-mail);
- Data mediums are classified on improper legal basis or such data medium is classified that does not actually include state secret or classified foreign information;
- Data medium with classified information is not marked, i.e. data medium with classified information is not filed;
- The Security Police is not immediately notified of violation of requirements, by that hindering rapid elimination of negative results.

Correct execution of requirements of handling the state secret is at the same time under constant attention of Estonia’s foreign partners (foreign countries, NATO, the European Union), while being one of the touchstones of our state’s credibility on international level.
Islamic terrorism is one of the biggest threats in Europe and in the world. Terrorist attacks that have taken place in the recent past and repetitive attack attempts indicate the capacity of Islamic radicals to attack the western countries and harm the security of these countries. So far, Estonia has still been one of the European countries untouched by direct terrorist attacks.

In 2009, the terrorist attacks with the greatest number of victims took place in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mainly local Muslims perished or were injured in these attacks. Besides Pakistan and Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen have come forth as the main areas of action of the terrorist groupings. Another area under heightened threat is North Africa, where the local branch of Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is very active. Among their means of action are hostage taking of western citizens and kidnapping.

The name Al-Qaida is connected with many terrorist attacks that either took place or were prevented in Europe in 2009. An Islamic radical of Nigerian origin failed to commit a terrorist attack in an airliner heading from Amsterdam to Detroit on the Christmas Day in 2009. An Islamic radical belonging to a terrorist group, al-Shabab, active in Somalia, ally of Al-Qaida, made an attempt to kill the author of notorious caricature of Muhammad, Kurt Westergaard in Denmark, Århus on January 1, 2010. Although no large-scale terrorist attacks were committed in Europe during 2009, it is impossible to conclude that there is no threat in our region. Due to conducted operations, terrorist attacks were prevented in many European countries.
The US administration decided to close down the Guantanamo custodial institution in 2009. Therefore, the imprisoned persons were released and relocated into several countries, also in Europe, under bilateral agreement. Estonia has not accepted the prisoners from Guantanamo. It should be pointed out that many persons released from Guantanamo have turned to terrorism. Amongst them is one of the commanders of Taliban, Mullah Abdullah Zakir, who is active in the Helmand province in Afghanistan – the area, where Estonian soldiers are carrying out the mission.

**Estonian Muslim Community**

Estonian Muslim community follows moderate Islam and is therefore not a security threat for the Estonian nation. Most Estonian Muslims have lived here for a long time and have integrated into the society. The Security Police has no knowledge of persons, who support radical Islam or Islamic terrorist groupings amongst Muslims who have come here in recent years.

In 2009 growth in activity, and the number of people participating in religious life increased, also, characterized the activities of Estonian Muslims. This could mainly be observed amongst Muslims from the regions of the former Soviet Union, who are rediscovering their religion. The number of converts in Estonia is constantly growing and the main reason for accepting Islam is due to marrying with a person from some Islamic country. At the same time, more and more people find their way to Islam on their own. In such case the main source of information about Islam is the Internet. However, people who make their way to Islam via Internet have a much greater chance of reaching radical Islam, because radical Islamic groupings actively use forums and chat rooms to find new supporters, and there the novices interested in Islam could be easily affected.

**Islamic Center and Mosque**

The increased activity of the Islamic community in Estonia is mainly connected with the founding of the Islamic center in Tallinn in spring 2009. The building was financed by the Saudi Arabian Islamic organization Al-Waqq Al-Islami, which was mentioned also in the Security Police 2008 annual review. It is a charity organization, which finances the founding of mosques and Islamic schools all over the world. Although nothing indicates that the representatives of Al-Waqq Al-Islami, who visited Estonia, have spread radical messages, so extensive participation of the organization in financing the activities of Estonian Muslims is worrying. Experiences of other countries show that funding by any Saudi Arabian charity organization is often accompanied with the wish to control and direct the actions of local Muslim communities.

The new building, which is completely used only by the congregation, is very attractive. More and more Muslims, both, locals who rather avoided the former house of prayer, and the Muslims arriving from foreign countries, visit the brand new Islamic center in Tallinn. At the same time, the problem with the lack of space that was solved with the foundation of the Center has not made Estonian Muslims give up the idea of building a traditional mosque in Estonia. They search actively, to find financiers for this endeavor, mainly in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.
Other Islamic Organizations

Besides Al-Waqf Al-Islami, Estonian Muslims have contacts with other Islamic organizations in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates and several European countries. Local Muslims are invited to participate in events, are offered studying opportunities in Islamic countries or offered funding for local activities. Invitation and supports like these have been warmly welcomed by local Muslims and they have visited Islamic conferences in foreign countries, short-term religious camps and in some cases people have studied in Islamic universities for a longer period of time.

A repeatedly handled subject in previous Security Police annual reviews are the visits of the members of Jamaat Tabligh, an Islamic organization with a missionary character, into Estonia, which were more rare in 2009, compared with previous years. The decrease of these visits was not due to Jamaat Tablighs smaller interest in “educating” Estonian Muslims, rather than our local communities hesitance towards those missionaries. The Estonian Muslim community is quite suspicious towards preachers from foreign countries, who might propagate radical Islam.

Financing Terrorism

To avoid financing of terrorism via Estonia, the Security Police continued active preventive activity in 2009. In that realm the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Police and Border Guard Board does intensive cooperation and constant monitoring of financial transactions between credit institutions and alternative money transfer channels with the so-called risk countries. Consequently the Security Police and the Financial Intelligence Unit also pay attention to the cooperation partners in Islamic countries of non-profit associations active in Estonia, because earlier, donations given to the non-profit organizations have sometimes been used in financing international terrorism schemes.

Illegal Immigration

In 2009 citizens from the so-called risk countries became significantly more interested in coming into Estonia in the context of fighting against terrorism via some illegal way. There are more and more cases in which the Police and Border Guard Board have detained at the border the citizens of Afghanistan, whose general aim was to go to West-Europe through Estonia.

Other illegal ways besides illegal border crossing are used to get to Estonia, e.g. fictitious marriages or unfounded visa requests. In that manner, several citizens of foreign countries applied for student visas in 2009 in order to study in one of Estonian private schools, but after receiving the visa, they never began their studies. There were some, who never reached Estonia, but entered into other Schengen countries. Lately a scheme is spreading in which a foreigner who wants to make a buy via Internet wishes to come and see the product here himself and pay for it in
PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Cash. For that an Estonian visa is applied, but it could be used for totally different goals. There have also been visa applications which have been accounted for as a wish to participate in an international sports or culture event taking place in Estonia – later the person who received the visa has not participated in the event.

The real goal for a great part of people, who come to Estonia in connection with described cases, is to move quickly from here to West-Europe, where the living standard is higher and social guarantees better. So far it has not been confirmed that people who have come to Estonia illegally had been connected with terrorist or radical Islamic groupings.

Prevention of Smuggling Weapons of Mass Destruction and Strategic Goods

No significant changes took place in this area in 2009. Parts of weapons of mass destruction or weapons themselves were not brought to or taken out of Estonia, and Estonia was not used for transit of such products, as well. Major infringements of law in handling other strategic goods did not occur. 19 criminal cases were initiated on the basis of § 392 of the Penal Code on illegal import or export of strategic goods. In 17 cases a crime was established in the actions of concerned persons and two cases were dropped due to absence of necessary elements of a criminal offence.

In 2009 the following strategic goods were the objects of illegal import and export: parts for helicopters, electric shock devices, details for firearms and gas masks. Nine crimes were connected to electric shock devices. In five cases the objects of crime were parts for firearms, the importing, exporting or transiting of which, although not handled as important parts of firearms in the meaning of the Weapons Act, require the license from the Strategic Goods Commission according to the law and list of military and strategic goods.

Considering the circumstances of the committed crime and the scale of guilt of involved persons, criminal proceedings were ended in seven cases due to lack of public interest. In two cases detention of the suspect was replaced with other means. Eight criminal matters involving strategic goods are waiting for legal verdicts in 2010.

People who violated control requirements had to pay a total of 80,800 EEK as penalty payments or cover damages in connection with crimes to public revenues. The smallest penalty payment was 3,000 EEK and the largest 20,000 EEK. At the same time the state fee for a timely applied license from the Commission of Strategic Goods is only 200 EEK.

The majority of established law violations in 2009 were connected with electric shock devices and parts for firearms. Therefore we wish to point out that in case of firearms which are listed as military goods, a special permit has to be applied for importing, exporting or transiting, and that
includes not only important components in the meaning of the Weapons Act, but also other accessories or special components (adapters, compensators, sights, etc) for firearms that are listed as military goods. Estonian Weapons Act, however, forbids electric shock devices, for civil use. It is important to remember that in case of bringing military goods to Estonia, the special permit has to be released before the goods reach Estonia (that means before reaching to the customs warehouse).

In 2009 the Security Police tracked down a large-scaled smuggling of dangerous waste when checking a suspicion of illegal transportation of strategic goods. As the result of investigation and surveillance the officers of the Security Police detained six people who are suspected of illegal contraband of dangerous waste from the Russian Federation to Estonia. During the search detectives found 250 kg of a black powdery substance hidden inside a van, the composition of this product conforms to electrolyte-refined residue of copper and/or nickel, which has high consistence of precious metals (silver, palladium, gold, platinum and tellurium). The confiscated substance can be reused as a secondary raw material for gold, silver and platinum. As the powder consists, amongst others substances that are dangerous and poisonous to health and environment, special requests are allotted for handling it. These requests were not complied with and the people associated did not have the special permit for transporting dangerous waste.

Of the six detained, there is a strong basis to suspect three of them in being involved in at least two other illegal imports of dangerous waste into Estonia in 2006 and 2007. It is suspected that the amount of dangerous waste illegally imported from the Russian Federation to Estonia by train and from Estonia to Great Britain at the beginning of 2006 was 100 kg. In January 2007, the same suspects tried to organize the import of 131 kg of dangerous waste to Estonia, but the Russian locomotive-drivers, who were supposed to deliver the contraband were caught and the dangerous waste hidden in the engine room of the locomotive, was confiscated.

According to § 392, subsection 2, of the Penal Code, the penalty for importing or exporting dangerous chemicals to or from Estonia foresees imprisonment from 2 to 10 years, and other sanctions include extended confiscation of assets acquired with the crime. The criminal procedure continues in the year 2010.

About Explosions

In 2009, there were six explosions in Estonia that were connected with handling illegal explosives which brought along criminal investigations, and in one of these explosions one person perished. Three of these explosions took place in Tallinn, others in Kallaste, Tapa and Sillamäe. None of these were committed for terrorist goals.

The one explosion that ended with death took place in Tapa on May 28, 2009, when a 53-year old man found a reactive grenade on a military training area and started to remove metal details from an explosive body unknown to him. This activity triggered an explosion as a result of which the man was killed and his 30-year old son received minor injuries.

On March 10, 2009, a man living in Kallaste tried to resolve a conflict, that occurred in the course of drinking, with a hand grenade. When the quarrel arose, the man fetched a grenade from home and tried to throw it in through the window, but the
grenade did not hit the window and bounced back from the wall. Only the facade of the house was damaged in the explosion. The Security Police officials found 4 more hand grenades, 1.4 kg of explosives, 41 detonators, 26 m of blasting fuse, 4 firearms and 513 cartridges from the “grenade hero’s” house. This person is brought to justice by today and he is charged with the following: attempted murder of three people, creating an explosion, and illegal handling of explosive devices, firearms, ammunition and large quantities of explosives.

On April 25, 2009, a man living in Sillamäe, exploded in his dwelling place an electric detonator, which was in his possession illegally. Fortunately this time no one was injured.

On October 8, 2009, at night, an explosive device, placed under the living room window of a residence house, exploded in Tallinn, Nõmme. The effect of the explosion damaged the facade and windows of the house. The family, living in the house, was not injured, because none of the habitats were in the living room at the moment of explosion.

On October 23, 2009, an explosion took place in Tallinn, Pirita, where an explosive placed under a parked car in the parking lot created significant damages to the base of the car and the engine and also other nearby vehicles. People were not injured in the incident.

By the end of 2009, investigators had not succeeded in apprehending the organizers of neither explosion that took place in Tallinn. When analyzing the details of these explosions, it can be assumed that these were organized due to revenge or to frighten. As both targets of these assaults are involved in complex business relations, ascertaining of criminals can be time-consuming. The investigation continues in 2010.

On December 4, 2009, an explosion took place in direct vicinity of an apartment house in Tallinn, Mustamäe, in which one man received minor injuries. The person suspected in organizing the explosion is detained and the circumstances of the explosion will be further investigated in 2010.

Of six explosions that took place in 2009, four were connected with solving personal issues between people. By the assessment of the Security Police it shows that the relatively mild penalties for illegal handling of explosives do not have a preventive effect. Although attempts to frighten with explosive devices made lately have not brought along injuries or deaths, this might not be the case in the future. Besides, people who are really not the targets of criminals can become victims by these assaults.

Eliminating Illegal Explosives and Firearms from Circulation

During 2009, the Security Police officials detected and eliminated from circulation the total of 61 kg of explosive substance, 565 detonators for different use, 39 grenades, 25 mines and projectiles, 16 primers and 1.3 kg of detonating cord, 64 firearms, 6,074 cartridges of different calibers, 8 electric shock devices and a lot of firearms’ parts.
Marijuana (above) and hashish (left) confiscated from criminals as a result of international co-operation.

For example, during one search in Tallinn the investigators found 27 kg of explosive substance, 40 electric detonators, 4,500 cartridges and 43 firearms. During a search in South-Estonia 20 kg of explosive substance, 90 detonators, 7 projectiles, 6 mines, 7 primers, 22 grenades, 31 firearms, 2,107 cartridges and 3 firearms mufflers were found.

In 2009, during the joint campaign “Notify Explosives” of the Security Police, Rescue Board and the Prosecutors Office, people turned over 9 mines, 8,000 cartridges, 4 kg of explosive substance and gunpowder, 5 detonators, 3 m of detonating cord, 12 explosive packages, 20 pyrotechnic charges, 40 signal rockets and 250 liters of napalm. Because people likely possess more illegal explosive substances, these campaigns will continue in the future. Despite of that, when explosive substances are found, one should not wait until the campaign begins, but must immediately call on the number 112.

In 2009, the Security Police officials identified several persons who brought deactivated firearms to Estonia and then illegally turned these firearms usable again. The Estonian Weapons Act does not apply in case of permanently unusable firearms. Therefore, firearms, which are deactivated abroad, do not need registering in Estonia, also permit for use is unnecessary. Thus, Estonian law enforcement authorities do not have a clear overview of the general number of this sort of weapons and of people who possess them.

The requirements in Estonia on making a weapon unusable are much stricter than in many other countries: here it has to be done by the permit applied by the Police and then realized by a licensed gunsmith. This it to ensure that every gun that has been made unusable leaves a record, which in turn should ensure that it will not be modified for use again. When taken advantage of certain peculiarities of gun laws in foreign countries, it is possible to bring guns that have been deactivated to Estonia and then modify them for use again and sell them here, at the local black gun market.

To improve this situation, the Security Police has suggested enforcing a law by which it is compulsory in Estonia to bring a gun in for inspection by the Police, if it has been made unusable in some foreign country. This would make it possible to enforce the conformity of deactivate weapon with the requirements valid in Estonia. Such control would guarantee the real deactivation of firearms, not only formal. People who own firearms that have been deactivated in foreign countries would have to apply for a gun permit or deactivate the weapons according to the requirements valid in Estonia.

Investigating Other Serious Crimes

In 2009, the Security Police concluded the preliminary investigation of a criminal case on illegal handling of 66 kg of hashish and it’s importing from the Netherlands to Estonia in August 2006. Six people have to stand court for that.

Also, in 2009, the Security Police brought to an end the preliminary investigation of a criminal case on illegal attempt of transiting 98 kg of hashish, 23.9 kg of marijuana and 1.2 kg of ecstasy pills from the Netherlands to the Russian Federation through Esto-
nia in October 2006. The drug cargo, which weighed 124 kg and was hidden into the floor of a lorry trailer, was detained in cooperation with Lithuanian authorities before it reached Estonia. Cleverly hidden narcotic substance in vacuum packages was confiscated. The Security Police and Public Prosecutor’s Office suspect nine people in illegal handling and attempt of illegal importing of these drugs. The Security Police tracked down both above-mentioned crimes while investigating illegal handling and export from Estonia of large number of machine guns PPS-43.

**The case of the Arctic Sea**

On August 18, 2009, the Security Police initiated legislative proceedings according to § 110 (piracy) of the Penal Code. The goal was to check information published in media circuits, by which on July 24, 2009, unidentified persons forced their way onto a cargo ship Arctic Sea, sailing on the Baltic Sea under the flag of Malta, hijacked it and kept the crew hostage for a while. Legislative proceedings were commenced, because according to the information in possession of the Security Police there might have been Estonians among those people who hijacked the cargo ship Arctic Sea.

In the course of investigation it soon became clear that the misleading information, claiming that there were four Estonians among the Arctic Sea hijackers, had been given to media by the authorities of the Russian Federation. In reality, of six detained persons only one had Estonian citizenship. Two were the citizens of the Russian Federation and three had Estonian residence permits, but lived here with foreign passports.

On August 21, 2009, Estonia joined an international investigation group to find out the circumstances of hijacking the cargo ship Arctic Sea and speed up the information exchange between countries. In this investigation group there are also representatives from Finland, Sweden, Malta and Latvia. Estonian and other members of the investigation group have turned to the authorities of the Russian Federation with letter rogatory, to take part in questioning the people suspected in hijacking the ship, but in 2009, the authorities of the Russian Federation did not give permission for that. The investigation continues in 2010.
From the left: the former Police Prefect of East Prefecture Aivar Otsalt, the former Leading Police Inspector Voikko Vulf and the Head of Tartu Criminal Department, Superintendent Janek Prits heading to hunting and fishing expedition, where an unlawful firearm with silencer and electric fishing equipment were used.

COMBATING CORRUPTION

Combating corruption is a part of securing general internal security. Therefore we find it important to stress that despite the lower than average international level of corruption in Estonia – by the index of Transparency International Estonia holds the 27th position among 180 countries – corruption of officials is still under the attention of police. This necessity is confirmed by several corruption cases, which were disclosed in 2009. Due to the economy crisis and smaller income, dishonest officials are more apt to turn to infringing law. Easily influenced officials, who selfishly base their decisions on their own profit, can in certain areas and in worst cases bring about the decrease in investments and budget revenues, decrease of honest competition and the trustworthiness of the state on international level. In addition to the abovementioned issues, a corrupt official is a potential target of interest and recruiting for the special services of foreign countries.

In criminal proceedings conducted by the Security Police in 2009, increase of crimes connected with power-bargaining and hidden participation in enterprises could be observed. It is often characteristic of these crimes that corrupt action is initiated by official himself/herself. The most prevalent crime of corruption amongst public officials and local government officials is still accepting bribe and gratuities.
Corruption in Fulfilling Non-proprietary Functions in Public Sector

This area primarily involves cases of corruption connected with making decisions in criminal proceedings and executing them in law enforcement institutions, but also bribe and gratuity crimes in connection with issuing permits, licenses or national coordination decisions.

In 2009, the Security Police disclosed two cases, which involved law enforcement authorities that decreased corruption in the court and police system. In December 2009 the Security Police detained Mihhail Komchatnikov, the judge of Narva County Court courthouse, on suspicion of repetitive demand and acceptance of bribe for making favorable decisions. For a case in his proceeding, Komchatnikov demanded a bribe from the criminal acquaintances of the accused at trial for murder, in order to, firstly, release the accused from custody for bail and, secondly, to adjudicate the verdict in favor of the accused. In January 2010, the Court punished Komchatnikov with actual imprisonment for the committed crime.

Systematic corruption in law enforcement authorities should be considered the biggest threat. For example, it could be collusion between officials and creation of illegal benefits. The most large-scale police corruption case was the criminal proceeding conducted on the former Police Prefect of East and South Police Prefectures Aivar Otsalt and 11 officials from these prefectures. They were charged on the following: misappropriation of prefecture assets, illegal surveillance, illegal handling of firearms and ammunition and important parts of explosive devices, and also illegal hunting and fishing. By now the court has settled to the former police official’s conditional sentences and pecuniary punishments by compromise procedure.
Corruption cases in fulfilling non-proprietary functions, concerning licenses, permits and coordinations and state supervision, occurred in the public sector in 2009. Among other cases the Security Police forwarded materials of a criminal case to the Prosecutor’s Office for convicting Egon Hirvesoo, former Deputy Director General of the Technical Supervisory Authority, who is suspected of repeatedly accepting gratuities from enterprises dealing with pyrotechnics for issuing permits for explosive substances. Also in 2009, the Security Police compiled a summary of pre-trial proceedings about the actions of Margus Lehiste, the Director of Võru County Põlva Bureau of the Environmental Inspectorate. He is suspected in accepting a bribe, conducting illegal surveillance and acquiring the Environmental Inspectorate’s money. Both cases are in the stage of court proceedings at the moment.

In the conditions of economic crisis, tax corruption is a subject of utmost topicality and connected mainly with tax revisions and fiscal controls. There have been cases in which officials executing control in an enterprise have illegally cooperated with the controlled person. For example, Harju County Court convicted the Manager of the Service Department of the Northern Tax and Customs Center Aime Uusmaa and her subordinate Heli Alamets in conducting illegal surveillance and punished them with conditional sentence. The convicted offenders have appealed the court order.

**Corruptive Use of State Budget Funds and Public Property**

The main corruption threats in the area in question are connected with offences in carrying out public procurements, trading with authority or officials’ covert participation in enterprises. By the estimate of the Security Police more attention must be paid to corruption in infrastructure development projects and the sector of medicine, also in organizing national defense and information technology procurements. Projects for developing infrastructure often contain voluminous resources and are financed with supports from the European Union. The inevitable side effect of illegal and uncontrollable use of foreign investments means decrease of Estonia’s reputation. In addition the institutions and funds of the European Union have the right to claim back misused money.
In 2009, the Security Police initiated a criminal proceeding against Kristo Kärmas, the Counselor of the Water Department of the Ministry of Environment, of whom there is reason to believe that he accepted gratuities for organizing and conducting public procurements in water economy. In addition to that, Kärmas has participated in assessing applications for projects, which were to be financed by the European Union’s Cohesion Fund. Enterprises that participated in compiling these projects bribed Kärmas via a company in which he was secretly involved. The proceedings of this criminal case will continue in 2010.

Another corruption threat besides infrastructure procurements are expenses for national defense. In April 2009, the Security Police initiated criminal proceedings against the Head of the Ship Repair Section of Estonian Marine Corps Repair and Maintenance Service, Lieutenant Commander Vladlen Marov. Marov required and accepted bribes from the representatives of the enterprises conducting repair and maintenance of ships and in return created certain competitive advantages to these enterprises in public procurements. Together with Marov, also Lieutenant Commander Aleksandr Saarse, the Head of Armament Section of Estonian Marine Corps Repair and Maintenance Service, to whom Marov repeatedly mediated bribes, was declared a suspect. As a result of bribes the enterprises that executed ship repair works received advantages in competition. In January 2010, the court punished Marov with part-time imprisonment and Saarse with conditional sentence.

The risk of corruption in medical spheres is mainly due to heavy competition on a small market and the cases are mainly connected with procurement decisions made in that area. In 2008, the Security Police initiated criminal proceedings against Andres Tsahkna, the former Counsellor of the Minister of Social Affairs, who according to suspicion used his authority to gain favorable decisions for third parties and received benefits for doing so. Proceeding of this criminal matter is still ongoing.

The case of the former Counsellor of the Minister of Agriculture Alar Oppar, which is in the middle of court proceedings, also deals with trading with authority and misuse of foreign investments. According to the charges, Oppar accepted gratuities from one enterprise and traded with his authority in order to create unfounded advantages to that company to receive funds for a fish-farming project from the European Fisheries Fund.
In November 2009, Tallinn Circuit Court did not change the decision of Harju County Court, by which the former Minister of Environment Villu Reiljan, who demanded a bribe, the sworn advocate Tarmo Sild, who mediated the bribe, and businessman Aivo Pärn, who granted the bribe, were found guilty in selling of a real estate in Rävala Avenue 8, Tallinn. The accused have contested the verdict in the Supreme Court.

The verdict against the former Deputy Director General of the Social Insurance Board Indrek Kressa has entered into force. He was punished for accepting gratuities in part-time imprisonment. The former Head of the

System Technology Department of the Social Insurance Board Teet Kallas was punished for accepting bribes with conditional imprisonment.

**Corruption in Local Governments**

Corruption of local governments inhibits the development of local life and deepens distrust towards the authority of the state. The Security Police is carrying out pre-trial proceeding of potential corruption crimes of the leaders of six largest local governments of Estonia (Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Jõhvi).

From the point of view of state security the situation in Ida-Virumaa must be specifically brought out. There are signs that show that the level of corruption in that county is higher than anywhere else in Estonia. The reason for that may be the half-closed community of Ida-Virumaa and the widespread corporative-club relationships in business and work relations. Corruption impedes the development of the community and economic life in that area. It also creates the situation in which people diverge from local government and state authority and criminal activities increase. In order to change this situation constant attention of the state must be provided to prevent corruption in Ida-Virumaa and to deal with disclosing criminal official misconduct thoroughly and systematically.

In November 2009, the Security Police submitted against the Mayor of Kohtla-Järve Jevgeni Solovyov a suspicion on accepting gratuities. Solovyov is suspected of using his office and authority as a mayor. According to suspicion, Solovyov accepted gratuities from April to October 2009, for creating unfoundedly favorable conditions and advantages to some private enterprises in competitions the Kohtla-Järve City Government organized for public procurements. By suspicion Solovyov disregarded requirements of confidentiality, violated the prohibition of negotiations and directed the course of procurement competition in favor of certain enterprises. Proceedings of this criminal case are ongoing.

A summary of pre-court proceedings in a criminal matter concerning the former Assistant of the Mayor of Narva, Sofya Homyakova was compiled, according to which she is suspected in trading with authority and consciously making an illegal decision on a misdemeanor procedure. At the moment, the case is in the stage of court proceedings. The court proceeding is also ongoing on Narva city representative Aleksandr Moisseyev, who is accused of granting and promising a bribe to a police detective.

In 2009, the Security Police concluded a precourt proceeding concerning

Ivo Parbus, the Counselor of the Assistant of the Mayor of Tallinn, who is suspected of accepting gratuities for solving problems that occur in proceeding real estate detailed planning, arranging necessary agreements and speeding up processes. A criminal matter concerning North Tallinn District Government’s Economics Department Director Allar Oviri, who is suspected of accepting a bribe and gratuities for targeting construction procurements and the illegal extension of rent contracts of municipal apartments, was also forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office. Both corruption cases are in the stage of court proceedings. In the beginning of 2010, Harju County Court punished the former leading specialist of the Engineering Department of Tallinn Public Utilities Department Jaan Maanas, with conditional sentence for accepting gratuities. Maanas misused his official position to advise for reciprocity a private enterprise in communicating with Tallinn City Government, by that making possible for the enterprise to apply for additional development funds and receive payment for the work done by accelerated or favorable order.

An example of the corrupt behavior of the leaders of local governments is the behavior of the former Mayor of Pärnu Mart Viisitamm and the former Deputy Mayor Simmo Saar. In 2009, the Security Police concluded a pre-court proceeding in a criminal matter by which Mart Viisitamm is suspected of accepting a bribe, of an attempt to misuse trust and of violating the commitment of keeping secrets acquired in the course of professional activity. Simmo Saar is suspected of the last two crimes. The criminal case is in the stage of court proceedings at the moment.
One of the fields of work for the Security Police is to ascertain individuals who have been connected with special services of countries that have occupied Estonia. This activity is regulated by "Procedure for Registration and Disclosure of Persons who Have Served in or Co-operated with Intelligence or Counter-intelligence Organizations of Security Organizations or Military Forces of States which Have Occupied Estonia Act" passed on February 6, 1995, by the Supreme Court. Co-operation with intelligence or counter-intelligence means that a person co-operated or granted consent for co-operation with security or intelligence organizations without having had labor law relationships with the latter shall be deemed to be an agent, a resident, a keeper of a conspiratorial flat or a trustee.

Co-operation with "security organizations" of occupational powers and by that taking part in executing communist repressions is a very sensitive subject. Data gathered about the State Security Committee (KGB) and archive documents must be viewed with utmost critique to the source, none of the facts of being recruited or being an agent could be interpreted hastily. On the other hand, gathering information about individuals who have co-operated with Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence is of utmost importance in terms of protecting the Estonian Republic's independence and security, because the agency has been the main tool of chekist [The Cheka (ЧК - Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya - Extraordinary Commission) first Soviet state security organization, predecessor of KGB] activities throughout history.

Informers and Forest Brothers

In the years following the Second World War the main purpose of the Soviet security organizations was to suppress the partisan movement that resisted the occupational regime. The
number of agents working against the forest brothers remained quite modest between 1944–1945, and more attention was paid to military raids and operations conducted by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People’s Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) with the help of which they hoped to suffocate resistance quickly and thoroughly. After the mass operations failed, this tactic was abandoned and transition to “more thorough intelligence work” commenced, which primarily meant enlivening agency work, which was so far deprived of necessary attention. Henceforth the agency network of recruits from amongst local dwellers and imprisoned people gained the main role in the fight against the forest brothers.

In the 1940s–50s informers, agents, residents and registrars of conspirative apartments formed the Soviet security agency network. They all had certain contact persons in the security organization and in records they figured strictly under pseudonyms or agent names. According to missions, agents divided into route agents, internal agents and assassin agents. The route agents had fixed paths and from time to time they met with operative workers destined for them. According to the dictionary of F. E. Dzerzhinski Counter-intelligence High-school the route agents were used for pursuing especially dangerous national criminals and ascertaining “nationalist anti-Soviet” and denominational groupings. Internal agents had to join resistance organizations or forest brothers’ units, collect operative information of interest and, if possible, put the forest brothers under attack.

Residents were intermediates between the security organization operative workers and recruited people. One resident could have contacts with up to 15 agents or informers. Informers constituted the lowest and most numerous part of the agency network. They were not trustworthy or capable enough for the “organs” to be given active missions. All that was demanded from them was to pass on what they had heard or seen, although the credibility of that information was difficult to check.

Chekists themselves appreciated the assassin agents the most; their mission was the so-called physical elimination of the leaders of forest brothers or more active single forest brothers. The KGB counter-intelligence dictionary reads that although elsewhere in the Soviet Union these sorts of agents were recruited from amongst “Soviet patriots,” then in West-Ukraine and the Baltic States they were mostly recruited from amongst the members of “nationalist underground organizations” in the 1940s–1950s. This confirms that the amount of ideological fellow travelers was small in these areas.

The KGB subdivisions were constantly under demand to recruit and use assassin agents, but in Estonia their number remained modest. In 1952, at its peak, there were merely 23 assassin agents listed in Department 2N of the Ministry of State Security of the ESSR. Based on the security documents it can be regarded that through all times there were altogether 50–60 hired killers active in Estonia. Usually units were not formed of them, the method of action was to filter into a forest brothers unit or get acquainted with single forest brothers and win their trust. In previous years the Security Police has sent to court criminal cases of Rudolf Tuvi, Paul Lõhmus and Karl-Leonhard Paulov, who were recruited to the Ministry of State Security as assassin agents for destroying forest brothers.

It is still not possible to separate different types of agents strictly. A route agent could be quickly interchanged to an internal agent when it was necessary, or when manifested circumstances were favorable, an agent could be “upgraded” to assassin agent. Also, an agent with an order for murder, had to gain the trust of the victim(s), firstly, and often wait for months in order to fulfill his primary mission, at the same time acting as an internal agent. It could happen that the person primarily recruited as a assassin agent could not kill the victim, but was still valuable to the chekists as an internal agent.

It is well known that August Sabbe, known as the last forest brother in Estonia, was recruited by the security organization and given the name Jaan, but once he made it back to the woods he avoided all co-operation and hid himself until he perished in 1978. Forest brother Endel Redlich “became legal” in 1945, was subordinated to co-operation and was given the agent name Röövel (Villain). Soon Endel Redlich went back to the woods and became the leader of the largest resistance organization in Estonia, the League of Armed Fight.
Each KGB informant had a personal file and working file.

An excerpt from an informant’s personal file.
Reasons for Co-operation

Reasons for recruiting were different, but, in general, three main groups were distinguished: ideological beliefs, personal (foremost material) benefit and “compromising materials”. This was the preferred queue. But the occurrence frequency of the real motives of the agents was actually in an opposite queue. The main sanction in recruiting was fear of repres-
sions to oneself or those who were related. Fear of getting caught was also the reason that made villagers deny shelter to the forest brothers or, in worst cases, fear made people give the forest brothers up to organizations. Believers of ideology, so much as there were, rather joined the Communist Party and Communist Youth Organization, or at least the destruction battalions, which in turn made them useless as agents.

One personal “benefit” in motivating an agent could have been personal foe, which officially could have been presented as an ideological reason. Although that kind of statistic has not been made, it can be said on the basis of investigative experience that personal grudge or motives originating from jealousy are rather the favorite subject of current rumors than an actual prevalent motive for action. Firstly, it seems that during the post-war years people preferred to clarify is-

sions and extra work. In pursuing the forest brothers, these kinds of sources were to some extent still usable, but not as much as could be concluded from rumors. In compiling the 1949 deportation lists, the main culprits in rumors, the “jealous neighbors,” did not affect anything in reality. The “kulak” families were ascertained one year earlier for tax reasons. Also the characteristics of the second category of deportees, the “nationalists”, were strictly limited and identifiable via documents. If some additional data – for example the composition of a family – needed to be detailed by means of the agency, then this information was received from the parish with some other excuse, or more trustworthy agents were used, not informers with personal interests at stake. Besides, preparation for deportation was a strictly confidential operation, therefore a question to any agent: “Whom do you think should be deported from your village?” was excluded.

In recruiting agents and informers, chekists relied mainly on “compromising materials,” and to acquire such materials was not very difficult: it was enough if the recruit himself or his relative had at some point belonged to the National Defense League, Self-Defense Force or the German Army, had helped forest brothers, etc. Besides political “compromising materials” the militia data about ordinary criminal delinquency or other violation of law was used a lot. In case of declining co-operation, the gathered information was threatened to put to official use, people were threatened with ar-
rest and violence. In case of the forest brothers, attempts were made by all means to recruit their “legal” fam-

ily members, because often they were the only people who had some kind of connection with the wanted person. From the viewpoint of the agency network the already “legalized” forest brothers were under special attention, because they knew local conditions and could thus be forced to serve the organizations in return for freedom. Often these people were demanded to extradite hidden co-fighters and the habitats of those, who continued to hide themselves.

Taking this into consideration, it is not surprising how many forest brothers were the victims of betray-
ers. Surprising was rather the fact that despite constant demand in archive documents to make the work of the agency more efficient, the total of recruits remained quite modest con-
sidering the time and conditions. On January 1, 1951, chekists themselves claim that they had 33 residents, 167 agents and 1526 informers at the dispo-
sal of the security in the “line of fight against banditism.” Let us re-
member that informers, who formed the majority (88%) of the human sources of the state security organiza-
tions of the ESSR, was the most un-
trusty category, whose loyalty and validity of passed information was mostly difficult to check.

Agents and Trustees

The structure of the KGB agent net-
work changed very little through times. As can be read from the USSR state security organizations agency apparatus statutes of 1983: “Based on the state of domestic policy, this kind of sharp chekist measures, as is the agency, area of use should be con-
fined. But because imperialism has not given up and never will give up to bring to life secret subversive activity against the USSR, the Soviet security organizations cannot function without the agency.” Almost twenty other wider fields of activities that always need help from the agents, is listed in the same document – beginning with revealing the residences of enemies and ending with the guarding of USSR state border. In Estonia, the KGB mainly needed its widespread network of agents due to “intra-state necessities,” i.e. for securing the occupying

In the 1980s the KGB agency still consisted of agents, residents and registrars of conspirative and meeting apartments. In general, citizens who were loyal to the power were attempted to recruit, but in special cases “persons who had fallen under the influence of anti-Soviet propaganda” could be subject to co-operation. Of course, in recruiting them the “compromising materials” were put to use. Persons recruited as residents had, on the contrary, to be verified Party members, because they were trusted with leading a group of agents. People could not be forced to become a resident.

Already at the beginning of the 1950s, the informers as the most useless part of the agency were deleted from co-worker categories. Soon the KGB trustees took their place, which by the governing rule had to be recruited on a voluntary basis and only from amongst loyal Soviet citizens. Usually they were higher officials, leaders of establishments or enterprises. Missions with lesser importance given to them could not assume special training or following of conspiracy requirements. Trustees had contact only when necessary and the verbal information received from them was later recorded by operative workers as certificates. The main difference between trustees and agents was that their co-operation with the KGB workers was not strictly secret, but the more specific reason for contact had to remain hidden. If all KGB agents and residents had thorough personal and work files, then records of trustees were kept only in litera files. They did not have to give a signature about their secret co-operation nor did they have pseudonyms.

Although the KGB’s goal was to cover all aspects of life with their agency, a certain order of importance applied here, also. Under the special guard of agents and trustees were all subject fields connected with foreign countries and foreigners, especially tourism and maritime. Larger industrial enterprises, education, culture and science institutions followed these. It was considered important that the agency existed in religious circuits.

Of more than a thousand testimonies presented to the Security Police in 1995–1996, the overwhelming part constituted of confessions of former KGB secret co-operators (agents, residents and registrars of conspirative apartments). Many of these people felt impelled to confess because of the sense of guilt before the Estonian Security Police in the 1990s to come forth and confess, are easy targets to unfriendly special services and they can be recruited again by threatening to compromise these people. In that manner they are also a real danger to the security of the Estonian Republic. The background of Herman Simm’s treason was also his former co-operation with the KGB.

With the goal to prevent and stop security risks, the Security Police asks people who have co-operated with the KGB to come forth.

Notifying the Security Police of contacts with the KGB, even if individuals were forced into co-operation due to compromising materials, helps people to decrease the risk of compromising, gives important information to the state security and affirms loyalty to the Estonian Republic.

The main sanction in recruiting was fear of repressions to oneself or those who were related.