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Dear Reader,

You are holding the consecutive Annual, this time celebrating the 15th anniversary of the Security Police Board. June 18, 1993, was the day when the Security Police, established as a bureau of the Police Board in 1991, acquired the status of independent office.

This year the Annual of the Security Police Board also celebrates the first jubilee of publication – the 10th anniversary of publication. Similar to previous ones, the Annual gives interested persons an overview of our work in guaranteeing law and order in the Republic of Estonia – this time during the eventful year 2007.

The greatest threat to the state’s security in 2007, as well as during the whole re-independence period, was mass riots in Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa, provoked from Russia and followed by cyber-attacks. Prior to the riots, false information about events in Estonia and proclamations against the state were propagated on Internet. One author of the proclamation, aimed at violent conversion of independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Estonia, turned out to be a citizen of Russia, but Russia’s Prosecutors’ Office refused to render us legal assistance. The activity of the Republic of Estonia and its internal security structures was strictly legal, yet decisive and strong.

The 2007 April events and Russia’s aggressive response to legal decisions made by independent democratic country in accordance with the principles of international law made a lot of people in and out of Estonia to think and act. At that, it was good to feel the support of all democratic countries and international organizations. Although influencing activities in the adjoining countries (especially in Estonia) are continuously among Russia’s priorities, Estonia and our allies forwarded a clear message to Russia: in connection with the April events: the democratic world is united and activity against independent states deserves deserved reaction. Four persons have been indicted in organizing mass riots. As is characteristic to the state based on the rule of law, their activity is evaluated in court.

Russia’s attempts to influence the Russian-speaking population in Estonia by circulating false information and anti-Estonia propaganda did not achieve expected result. Despite every possible support from Moscow, the extremist-disposed Constitutional Party, led by Andrei Zarenkov, could not gather even 1% of voices, necessary to get state financing. External influencing activity strived towards giving negative background to the events in Estonia. The main purpose of internal manipulations in Russia was (and is) to give Russian public negative and hostile image of Estonia. Besieging Estonian Embassy in Moscow, shooting the windows of the Embassy buildings of Estonia in Moscow and Pskov, and physically attacking Estonia’s Ambassador in an editorial office of a Russian newspaper demonstrated to the world that in undemocratic societies the state-supported youth organizations might use methods characteristic to terrorists, if they sense impunity.

Information-societies are sensitive to cyber-attacks and vulnerability of public information systems has become an important issue of state security. In April and May 2007, Estonia discerned large-scale attacks coming from Russia. Various forces might organize such attacks: extremists, terrorists, representatives of organized crime and groups influenced by political propaganda. To make information security more efficient internally and, first of all, internationally, is certainly a challenge that will involve more and more various partners and resources.

Different from Western Europe the terrorist threat in still minor in Estonia and we are one of the least threatened regions in the European Union. Despite that we can and may not pay less attention to combating terrorism. Preventive measures of combating terrorism and readiness to act in risky situations are among the priorities of the Security Police Board for a long period. As cooperation partners to many, we must consider terrorist threats together with other countries, and plan mutual activities to prevent terrorism, track terrorists and protect population and infrastructures. Terrorists still exploit bomb explosions as the most common attacking method. Illegal explosives, illegally handled explosives and chemical substances for making explosives are a great threat and our preventive work in this field continues.

The Security Police Board’s field of activity in restricting corruption has extended. The Government of the Republic decided to give the proceeding of the investigation of high-rank officials of six municipalities to the Security Police. The first suspicions in the 2007 corruption case in one county government and one local government have been submitted already.

In terms of national security the most important aspect is safeguarding law and order. We all know our fundamental rights. The Republic of Estonia must guarantee possibilities to every person to exercise his/her fundamental rights. In exercising his or her rights, every person must consider the rights of others and due to that, certain restrictions. Rights act in combination with duties. The right to the protection of the state and law means, first of all, that every person must be law-abiding. The state has the right to restrict persons’ rights by law and, if necessary, coercion to protect the state’s security and ensure public order, and offenders must inevitably take this into consideration. We all wish to live in a safe country and everyone can contribute to this.

In the name of the Security Police Board I wish to thank every person and cooperation partner who has helped to guarantee the security of our state and safety of its residents.

Wishing you an interesting reading and pleasant cooperation,

Aldis Aulis
Kaitsepolitseidirektor

The Security Police Board’s international cooperation and information exchange with security and law enforcement authorities, and also with Europol, has continued. In 2007 Estonia joined with the Schengen area and this gives law enforcement authorities’ additional possibilities to guarantee internal security of the country. Information exchange within the European Union and increasing efficiency constantly helps to anticipate and prevent terrorism and other serious crimes, and coordinate mutual counter-activities of the European Union member states.

The Security Police Board’s internal cooperation with the State Security Service, the State Migration Service, and the Ministry of Justice is oriented at preventing terrorism, illegal migration, illegal stay, and terrorism and illegal migration-related crimes.
The activities of the Security Police Board were treated objectively and neutrally in 2007. We are glad to recognize that there were no cases of journalists misusing the comments or explanations of the Security Police. Information has been used responsibly from the position of state security.

Delivering information to public remained (as in 2006) directed to certain target groups and took place via various working groups, where the security police officials participated, or was aimed to certain institutions, organizations and persons, whose support the Security Police needs to execute its legal tasks. The Security Police Board has a lot of public communication, including various meetings, conferences, seminars and gatherings.

In 2007 journalists and a great part of public began to realize systematic information attacks against Estonia, proceeding from Russia. This sets even higher responsibility and public expectation towards the Security Police Board in fighting and preventing such attacks. As a positive moment, we should mention improvement of inter-service cooperation in this field, but in order to deal with these attacks successfully, we need to train various public officials and transfer the notifying activity from ad hoc to proactively planned activity. The Security Police Board contributed to this area with analytical reports concerning
Honoring the best cooperation partners of the Security Police Board in 2007, with participation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Chancellor.

The inscribed firearm to the Head of the Põhja Police Prefecture Tarmo Miilits.

The Plate of Merit of the Security Police Board to the Head of Information Department of the Board of Border Guard Indrek Jõgi.

Throughout years, journalists have maintained constant interest in criminal proceedings carried out in the Security Police Board. In 2007 international press was most interested in the criminal case on Arnold Meri that was taken to court with accusation in genocide and in connection with that several previous, already enforced judicial decisions in crimes against humanity committed in Estonia. Although the right to comment criminal cases has been transferred from investigative bodies to the Prosecutor’s Office, the Security Police has not disappeared from media in connection with threats to security. On the contrary – the proportion of media reflections even increased in 2007 compared with the previous year. The reason being, of course, the regretful events in April: in connection with prevention of mass riots all law enforcement agencies had considerably more intense communication with the public.

Due to mass riots and displacing the Red Army Monument from Tõnismägi, the 2006 Annual of the Security Police Board, especially the topics concerning protection of constitutional order and combating extremism, deserved significantly more reflection in Estonia and abroad. Public and media feedback affirmed that oral and written the Security Police Board information in security matters is continually considered reliable, professional and competent.

According to traditions, two public officials, who personally contributed in mutual and successful support of law and order in the state, were remembered with complimentary words and mementos at the 2007 Police Day ceremony of the Security Police Board. On November 12, 2007, with the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Tarmo Milits, the Police Director of the North Police Prefecture, was awarded an inscribed firearm. (He is the police director of the Traffic Supervision and Maintenance of Law and Order of the Police Board since November 15, 2007) With the order of the Director General of the Security Police Board, the head of information department of the Board of Border Guard Indrek Jõgi was awarded the Plate of Merit of the Security Police Board.

Taking into consideration the eventful year, filled with various problems, the choice was far from random. Due to Tarmo Miilits and the professional, brave and good work of his officials the crisis arising from the April mass riots in Tallinn was solved within a few days. Good cooperation and timely exchange of information with the Border Guard ensured that active attempts of the members of Russian extremist youth organization “Nashi” to infiltrate into Estonia across the border and sow national hatred here failed totally.
The purpose of counterintelligence has been, is and will be detection, anticipation and prevention of foreign counter-activity aimed against independence and security of the Republic of Estonia. Although, in accordance with its resources, the Security Police Board monitors hostile special services attempting to operate undercover in Estonia, our main attention in recent years has been turned on three large well-equipped and ambitious Russian special services that, besides gathering information, deal with other tasks, e.g. extensive manipulating.

It is no secret that special services, in greater or smaller extent, attend in generating of decisions that proceed from Russia’s foreign policy ambitions, using comparoms or economic levers as “tools”. Thus, the developments in the field of counterintelligence in 2007 could not be regarded separate from intense social and political processes and the events in April 2007. “Projects” that Russian special services have, so-to-say, put on standby – the claiming official bilingualism in Estonia, the zero-level citizenship, the so-called equal rights (that basically means the right to work on any position and in any public in institution). These claims have, in one form or another, been made already earlier, most recently at the meetings in Narva during the April events, but not with full force.

As already mentioned in the Annual of 2006, the main purpose of political intelligence manipulations of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in 2007 was to ensure representation in the parliament (Rigikogu) of the Constitutional Party, supported and controlled from Russia. “Unfortunately” the puppet party could not fulfill the hopes of the SVR – the party gathered only 3464, or 0.9 % voices (all in all 390,213 people gave their vote). Even the issue of the “Bronze Soldier” exploited throughout the year 2006 did not help to pass the required threshold at elections. According to the Security Police the Constitutional Party totally discredited itself in the eyes of Estonian Russian electorate by March 2007.

No doubt, the purpose of the SVR in forming a new party was not to form a center for instigating hatred. The purpose was to get good positions in the Rigikogu in order to influence political and economic processes in Estonia more efficiently and from inside. Currently Russian intelligence has already taken another course, the parliamentary elections in 2011. They probably assume that the situation for concentrating Russia-inclined forces is much more favorable after the April 2007 events.

According to the Security Police the special services and power structures of Russia were behind the instigation of the over-emotional reflection in Russian media in connection with encounter over the “Bronze Soldier” (one of the reasons why the events escalated into mass riots) and opposed several high-ranking Russian public officials, who agreed under various considerations with civilized relocation of the monument.

As for the April riots we can say that despite preceding visits of several Russian intelligence officers into Estonia the role of Russian special services (both, the FSB and the SVR) during April 26-27, was to observe the course of events. The Security Police did not ascertain directing the violent events from the side of Russain special services. Secret meetings between Russian diplomats and local extremists (including the meeting in Tallinn Botanical Garden that was covered by the press) could not initiate the hysterical outbreak. However, the SVR’s good position in the circle of Russian journalists, whose participation in instigating hostility was outstanding, should be taken into account.

The meetings of Russian diplomats and extremists in the Botanical Garden were inefficient due to the fact that the so-called clean diplomats were used, who have no special preparation in manipulations. Using personnel diplomats in typically special-service-specific spheres indicates that Russian special services have not been able to create functioning framework of residents in Estonia.

After the April events Russian intelligence mainly dealt with influencing (in order to encourage and agitate local Russian associations) and supporting active measures. For instance, on April 10 to May 1, 2007, a delegation of the Duma of the Russian Federation made a visit to Estonia. One member of the delegation was the former FSB director (the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, from July 1996 to July 1998), the retired General Colonel Nikolai Kovalyov, who was the actual leader of this group of six persons. Noteworthy in connection with this visit was the fact that the former head of the FSB Kovalyov had with him materials received from Moscow that contained detailed plans/schemes of the territory of Tõnismägi with the locations of police units and their moving directions. The delegation was thoroughly informed of the situation prior to arriving in Estonia and due to that the Cluma delegates had no need for information from the Tallinn Embassy. Such behavior exasperated the Ambassador Nikolai Uspenski who found that the Embassy had been bypassed. The diplomats of the Tallinn Embassy were also offended by the fact that the materials forwarded to the delegates from Moscow were tendentious and gave a wrong picture of the situation. It had been claimed to the members of the
Duma in Moscow that the Police trapped the crowd intentionally, to ram distraught people down, thereupon. As the on-site situation occurred to be quite different, the delegates decided to commemorate the dead in the new location of the “Bronze Soldier”, at the cemetery. The activeness of the SVR’s political intelligence among Estonian Russian population that had been slow since the summer of 2006 (even in April 2007 the FSB dealt more actively with the members of Russian-speaking community) livened right after June 1, 2007, when the visa agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Union simplified. Article 11 of the mentioned agreement ensures for the owners of diplomatic passport visa-free entering and staying in the country for 90 days during a half-year. The SVR officers of political intelligence, having acquired greater freedom of movement, immediately participated in several compatriots’ events. For instance, at Russia’s compatriots conference held in hotel “Ecoland”, Tallinn, in June 2007, the official of the SVR Political Intelligence Central Administrative Board, Vladimir Pozdorovkin participated in the conference as a patron and introduced to participants the compatriots program “Russki Mir” (Russian World). At the second half of the year two other SVR political intelligence officers participated in compatriots events. Thus, the SVR tries to take active part in processes that take place in Russian community, to exploit concluded contacts in the interests of Russia’s foreign policy in the future.

The mere fact that the SVR demonstrated its interest in compatriots subject and sent such a high-ranking intelligence officer to Estonia on the very first day of visa-free traveling made Pozdorovkin’s visit interesting. Several representatives of various Russian special services, among them some intelligence officers known in the world, have paid short visits to Estonia with diplomatic passports. The Security Police Board is informed about their activities, even if they come for one-two days only. Active exploitation of visa-free traveling in the interests of the SVR could be anticipated in the future, as well.
In the context of protection of constitutional order the tightly attached keywords “Bronze Soldier” and “mass riots” with the threatening shadow of hostile Russia glancing through, go into the history of the Security Police Board, as well as of the whole country. The popular term “bronze soldier”, marking the burial site monument that stood in the center of Tallinn, at Tõnismägi during 1947-2007, is doubtlessly a stylistically incorrect term, but quotable and widely spread in public, thus used in the Annual of the Security Police Board as a synonym for the Tõnismägi monument in the interests of shortness.

In last four years the Security Police Board has repeatedly emphasized in various reviews and analysis that during Vladimir Putin’s reign the results of the II World War and with that the meaning of Soviet symbols have been revived in Russia anew. Besides pressure from Russia, relocation of the Tõnismägi monument was influenced by internal events in Estonia, e.g. “the memorials’ conflict.”

The described developments and did impact compatriots in the Baltic States. Estonian-Russian community and its leaders were directed and supported directly from Moscow and via the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Estonia. As a result of propaganda Russian community started to celebrate former Soviet red-letter days more actively and provocingly since 2005. This pompous collective action culminated on the Red Square in Moscow on May 9, 2005. The purpose of this propagandistic activity was to restore Russia’s economic and military position and influence in the world as an empire by leaning on the patriotism of people.

Preventive work done by the Security Police Board in connection with occurred events was many-sided - the main spheres were gathering information, anticipating and prevention of the extremists’ activities, inter-services cooperation and informing the Government of potential threat. In organizing information gathering and executing preventive activities conceptions on history and different sources of daily information. The deeper reasons for conflict hide in the complicated historical events of the middle of the 20th century, still not cleared. As the views and positions of the representatives of both sides were extreme and had no wider public support, it was practically impossible to have dialog with them or search solutions, or apply any preventive measures.

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of charges forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office by autumn. The hearing started in Tallinn City Court on January 14, 2008.

Assessing the events afterwards allows us to say that services responsible for safety and security did everything dependent on them to guarantee law and order in April 2007. It was the most serious challenge to law enforcement agencies after re-independence of Estonia. Despite the fact that the Police had had little experience in acting in such situations, public order was restored quickly. The Police activity was organized adequately and conformed in general with given threat assessments.

**Russian Media as a Tool in Information War against Estonia**

Estonia has been the target of Russia’s propaganda attack for several years already. As an example of the extent of muzzling the Russian press could be brought from the winter-spring period of 2007, when several journalists from Russia were forced to notify Estonian Russian organizations that from then on the only communication for them will be with Andrei Zarenkov and his followers, known for their leftist views. The Russian Embassy in Tallinn introduced various leftists as contact persons to the journalists who came from Russia or wanted to do stories about Estonia, avoiding moderate opinions. Russian press did not bother to find out alternative positions. More and more Estonian residents interviewed by Russian journalists have been forced to recognize that their attempts to have a dialog or to explain have ended in tendentious montage or downright lie.

Especially eager in disseminating lies and propaganda were the journalists of the Russian TV-channel RTR and the journalist of the Moscow newspaper “Komsomolskaya Pravda” Galina Sapozhnikova. The problem is not so much the journalist activity or tendentious position, but attempts to influence the events directly, in order to construct the story. For instance, the journalist of the RTR Jekaterina Zorina let the members of “Nashchi Dozor” to stage demonstrations at Tõnismägi in order to get more “powerful” shots for Russian national television. Local leftists of Russian-speaking community were the only ones who could express their views on the RTR. The attempt of the RTR journalists to agitate a spontaneous demonstration in Ruskvee at the funeral of Dmitri Ganin was a disgrace, which indicated clearly that neither the “Bronze Soldier” nor general human values have any importance for them — they were only interested in necessary shots ordered from Moscow. The journalist of “Komsomolskaya Pravda” Galina Sapozhnikova, who called herself an undercover member of “Nashchi Dozor” and participated repeatedly in their meetings, was also active in the role of a director.

The latter was especially outstanding at the international conference “Russian Information Area in the Baltics”, funded by the Embassy of Russia, where she sharply attacked those Russian newspapers published in Estonia that do not instigate hatred, and she called such newspapers “supporters of the power”. Russian-language “Postimes” earned her special displeasure (“… as does the Russian-language “Postimees”…”), and does it absolutely hateful, being the champion in violation of media ethics… “). But nearly every moderate publication in Estonia was attacked for various reasons. The news portal novosti.ee was announced “inflame portal with highly negative attitude towards Russian-language”. The situation in Latvia is apparently much better. According to Galina Sapozhnikova the development of the press in Estonia is directly connected with the education reform of Russian schools. A Latvian correspondent of the RTR TV-channel Jekaterina Zorina participated in the conference actively, as well.

The articles of Galina Sapozhnikova are extremely emotional and with demagogic undertone, and prevalently tendentious about the Government of Estonia or discrediting on authorities. The journalist manipulates with facts torn out of their context and misleads the reader (first of all Russian-language reader). For instance, in the article “The Police and the Army in War with Nazis”, published in internet portal novosti.ee on November 8, 2007, the author compared the events in Georgia and the April events in Estonia. The author stated that the difference between Georgia and Estonia was that in Georgia the Police and the Army confronted their own nation, but in Estonia the Police beat and tortured foreign nation (Sapozhnikova: “This is how Russians are called in Estonia”).

According to the Security Police Board the Moscow compresses of Russias extremely youth movement “Nashi”, who tried to organize a massive propagandistic protest campaign “Memory Watch” aimed against the relocation of the monument at the now empty former monument square at Tõnismägi, coordinated their activities with the RTR journalists Jekaterina Zorina and
Artjoms Jakoblevs in spring and summer of 2007. Before the travel into Estonia, the Russian youngsters were instructed how to behave in Estonia, so they would not be revealed before the action, and how to behave after arresting. The youngsters participating in the actions knew that a TV-journalists’ filming group would join them at the moment they start their watch at Tõnismägi.

Russia’s Manipulations with Compatriots

Estonia has always observed attentively and with interest political events and developments: taking place in Russia. As in 2007, when in connection with approaching elections Russia’s foreign policy became increasingly more emotional and propaganda more exclusive. Estonian-Russian relations are increasingly more overshadowed by uncontrollable corruption, the impacts of which extend to Russia’s foreign, compatriots and economic policy, and due to that deserve increasing attention of the Security Police Board. Due to decreasing role of legislative powers and smothering of public dialog (absence of free press and dissidents), an actual threat is forming that power struggle in Russia could spread to the streets. And this is the direct reason for the source of instability in the neighboring country.

An expressive example about the abovementioned in the context of Estonia is everything connected with funding compatriots. It does not matter, how this concept is defined and how it is “explained” attempt to sell to ordinary Russians and the outside world (initially funding compatriots, then Russki Mir), the content has always been the same – corruption of public officials in cooperation with “tame” money-applying compatriots. During years the sums have increased and so has the desire of local marginal Russian political cons to prove increased their needs to distribution of funds. Due to the latter they accuse Estonia in Nazism, genocide, police violence, etc. with increasing emotion and power.

In the situation, where the state’s pressure on society increases in Russia continuously, personal power to decide and role in compatriots policy of Russian compatriots living abroad has gradually vanished. In 2007 constant intervention of Russia’s diplomats in processes connected with compatriots policy could be observed. Favored candidates, approved in Moscow, are overly promoted to leading positions in local Russian organizations and parties. Alternative candidates and opinions are excluded by using bureaucratic tricks similar to the ones from the Soviet era. The real decisions concerning compatriots (especially funding agreements) are made somewhere in the sauna, in a pleasant atmosphere behind glass of beer. It is understandable that alternative candidates emerging from outside the circle of friends are direct threat to secret agreements concluded previously between the diplomats.

A spectacle of eastern democratic process is performed in the democratic Republic of Estonia, where conference speeches, opinions, comments, etc. expressing the “free will” of Russian compatriots, are previously coordinated with the foreign policy representatives of Russia. Particularly noteworthy are the cases, when the same officials, who applaud to the ideas deriving from such free will, basically dictate the great ideas of the Baltic States’ “leading compatriots” for developing compatriots programs. Several Russian compatriots are experiencing a dejà vu – it has all happened before. The fact that at the Conference of the Baltic States’ Russian Compatriots held in Tallinn on August 28, 2007, every sixth participant had a Russian diplomatic passport or service passport, meaning they were official representatives of Russia, and the lobby for maintaining the right candidate proceeded till the first minutes of the Conference. The Security Police has always identified several political intelligence officers of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) at such conferences.

The activity of the Compatriots Coordination Council of Russian Federation has brought along a situation in Estonia, where official representatives of Russia do not any more wish to meet publicly with the leading figures of the Coordination Council who have discredited themselves. Andrei Zarenkov, who exhibited himself as the best friend of Modest Kolerov, was among the first to declare Kolerov’s worst enemy, as soon as the employer’s position among Russia’s authorities weakened.

It can only be wondered how Moscow continues with dumb consistency to hype uneducated, hypocritical, ambiguous and greedy persons to leading positions in Estonia, persons, who discredit and split local Russian community. However, they appeal Russia in one point – they share the ideas of Russia’s current elite, inclined towards chauvinism. The diplomats of the Russian Embassy did not consider it too much trouble to meet with the leftist extremists of the Constitutional Party and “Notschnoi Dozor” secretly in Tallinn Botanika Garden and in a shashlik-bar right before the April riots, and not in vain.

Russia continuously uses the non-profit association Information Center of Human Rights to carry out its propagandistic scientific researches.” An interesting thing here is that every time the Security Police publishes a disclosing article about Russia’s financing, the finances change. At first the Information Center of Human Rights received funds directly from the Talinn Embassy of Russian Federation. After this fact was disclosed in the Annual of the Security Police Board, the remittances from the Embassy were practically quitled. The Center started to receive finances from Moscow via the international support fund “Eurolipressa Llvonia”, acting under direct control of the Presidential Administration of Russian Federation. When this connection was disclosed, either, the Foundation “Eurolipressa Llvonia” was established with participation of the leaders of the non-profit association Information Center of Human Rights, via which funding from Moscow continued. In 2007 the new course of action for the Information Center of Human Rights became publicity for the protectors of the “Bronze Soldier”.

Several examples of the master-servant relation between the Embassy of the Russian Federation and the Russian Federation Compatriots Coordination Council could be given. We would confine to one most characteristic example: in summer 2007 the Kremlin intended to organize several prominent events with a lot of participants via local Embassy in September 2007, and one of the events was supposed to fall on September 1. The last date was not chosen randomly – the Embassy wanted the local leader (assigned from Moscow) Zarenkov to organize an event that would be connected with the reform in Russian language schools.

Zarenkov and Manaşev planned to organize a big open-air concert on September 1, the initial heading of which was supposed to be “Rock against Fascism”. However, no anti-education-reform demonstrations took place. Two things could be brought out as the main reasons: lack of support and fear to fail (even the yearly concert “Vivat Rossia!” had been transferred from Tallinn to Riga). Probably some official in Moscow had an idea to defy the local Russian youth to come out against the education reform.
The first edition of compatriots journal "Baltiiski Mir" was published in July 2007 – the publisher being the non-profit association Integration Media Group with the members of the board Andrei Zaremov and Valeri Ilchenko. The chief editor of the journal is the former correspondent of Regnum in Estonia and Zaremov’s relative Dmitri Kondrashov who, according to the Security Police, has contacts with the special services of Russia. The journal that is delivered to the readers or free is printed in Riga (the print-run is 3,000 copies – of the first number 1,000 was distributed in Estonia, 1,000 in Latvia and 500 in Lithuania). The compatriots journal is a part of regional project that besides the Baltic States includes the Caucasian states and the so-called distant foreign countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia finances the publishing and the journal is distributed via Russian compatriots organizations.

Although the editorial of the first number claimed that the journal focuses on recent events in Estonia, the April events had minimum coverage. The published overview found that the protectors of the “Bronze Soldier” had nothing to do with the vandalizing and plundering, it was a job of asocial element without the nearest future. Aleksandri Gaponenko, who wrote about Latvia, expressed fear for spreading extremism among the youth and pronounced an opinion that in case of mass riots, Russia could bring armed forces in East-Latvia and Riga to protect Russians.

The first edition also emphasized occurrence of nazism and russophobia in the Baltic States, and expressed disparaging attitude towards intertwining of Russian and local culture, language immersion classes, and the representatives of Russian-speaking population who look positively on local culture, politics and integration.

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An incident took place in the camp, when the representative of the Russian Embassy in Moscow, Andrei Kalugin, who was introduced as a hero (was in “memory watch” on May 22, 2007) made a speech at the opening of the camp. The other speaker was the person who tore down the flag of the Republic of Estonia from Estonian Embassy in Moscow. An uninterrupted mandatory “Memory Watch” was held at Seliger, as well.

There were three levels in “Nashi” hierarchy in 2007: an applicant, a member and a commissar. In addition to that there is the so-called Management College (Vyschaya Shkola Upravleniya), where commissars and particularly talented and diligent common members were sent. After graduating they became federal (national) commissars. Federal commissars were promoted into managements of youth organizations by various local governments. The purpose of the Kremlin policy was to replace the old nomenclature of local governments with loyal and easily operated cadre as new leaders. As there were a lot of disturbances at Seliger compare with the earlier years it was decided in 2007 that in the future the number of participants in “Nashi” camps will not be as numerous. According to the plans of 2007 the activity of “Nashi” had to be very active until the presidential elections of 2008. The next active period was scheduled on the years 2010-2012.

Economic Security

The year 2007 indicated expressively, how Russia takes advantage of economic levers increasingly publically and more powerfully, to achieve its foreign policy goals. The fact that the victims of economic manipulations and sanctions are frequently Russia’s own businessmen (and Estonian businessmen connected with the latter) is of no relevance to the suppurers of “strong hand”. The pressure of Russian power circles has made Russian businessmen quite obedient to the wishes of Russian politicians despite direct economic losses, because, as Russian businessmen themselves say: “The ability to listen is good for health.”

Due to that we hear from time to time loud statements about no business with Estonia, about directing the flow of goods around Estonia, etc.

In economy it could be seen that behind Russia’s attempts to put pressure on Estonian businessmen and through them Russian businessmen was a corrupt wish to redistribute the markets, while the competitors of Estonian businessmen successfully took advantage of their administrative resources or “cover” in Russian special services, local governments and supervisory offices. In essence, every successful Estonian enterprise became attractive to administrative measures of Russia’s institutions with possibility to redistribute the existing. Despite the favorable attitude of Russian business partners, investments of Estonian businessmen was inhibited, Russian surveillance agencies started to check the persons Estonian investors were forced to leave Russia by personal invitations to Estonian citizens for “making visas”, etc. There have also been cases of direct money extortions. Several Estonian investors were forced to leave Russia from market. The scale of the administrative–special-service influencing could be considered a separate sector of economy in Russia. As this does not concern only Estonia, it would be wise, if doing business with Russia, to secure oneself against this tributary of profit, between officials and their companions, hoping easy profit.

Rightist Extremism

Even redirecting transit around Estonia has followed the financial interests of Russia’s political circles and their families, not economical logic of enterprises – the well-being of politicians and their families is directly gained on the profit of Russian enterprises. The pipeline Nord Stream that received extensive reflection in Estonian society became a project where the influencing was attempted via trustworthy European partners, avoiding possible direct contacts with Russia. At the same time it was attempted to take advantage of businessmen dependent on Russian capital and their influence on political circles. According to the Security Police Board, the main course of action in Nord Stream influencing activities are other European countries, tried to include them in the project positively in order to increase trust in this project.

Risto Mikaël Tenonen who introduces himself as an Estonian nationalist. Young people who have gathered around him do not ask from themselves, why a person who has given up the citizenship of his birth country, ready to go to another state the moment any trouble arises, teaches National Socialism. They also do not ask, why does a person from Finland publish and disseminate in Estonia books containing clearly provocative pictures (Estonian decoration and armband with swastika) that Russian propaganda uses at once in its interests as a proof of Estonia’s affection towards Nazism. What connects Estonian nationalism with the National Socialist ideology of Germany that occupied Estonia? Nothing, but a provocative forefather, behaving as an influencing medium. Nothing else than a foreign instigator who behaves as an influencing medium.
On January 25, 2007, the Riigikogu adopted new State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Act that took effect on January 1, 2008. The Security Police Board as the main institution that guarantees protection of state secrets in the Republic of Estonia participated in developing this new Act and legislation enacted pursuant to this Act. The purpose of this Act is to ensure the security and international communication of the Republic of Estonia by protecting state secrets and classified information of foreign states from disclosure or from being accessible to persons who have not been granted access to such information. Due to the fact that the regulation of the previous valid law was obsolete in comparison with regulations of protection of classified information of other countries and international organizations, it was necessary to develop this Act. The previous Act was partly also too inflexible about the type, their classification classes and terms of information declared state secret. The new Act makes assignment of information declared state secret more flexible - legislator gives exhaustive list of the state secret types, the highest possible class of classification and maximum term, and gives to the Government authorization rules for enforcing specific classification levels and terms by sub-classes. Unlike previous rules that listed state secrets exhaustively in laws and was classified by classes of state secret, the relevant reference for classification should be searched from Regulation No.262 State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Protection Procedure from December 20, 2007 that took effect on January 1, 2008.

According to the new Act, division of state secrets by sub-classes is the following:

- State secrets on foreign relations;
- State secrets on national defense;
- State secrets on maintenance of law and order;
- State secrets on security authorities;
- State secrets on protection of infrastructure and information.

Declassification of Information Processed as a State Secret and Changing the Level, Basis and Term of Classification of Information

Classified as State Secret are regulated more thoroughly and made significantly simpler than in the previous Act. The circle of persons who can execute these procedures has been enlarged. Recording requirements of classified data medium have been specified, as well.

Compared with the previous regulation, procedures for applicants have been simplified and more comprehensible. In developing these regulations the practices of NATO, the EU and their member states were taken into consideration. Thus, for instance, processing requirements of data medium containing confidential level classified information was harmonized with corresponding requirements in effect in NATO and the EU and due to that processing of the copies of data media containing Confidential level information is more like processing Restricted level information. An important change is extension of the bases for refusal to issue clearance, the most important of them being evaluation of applicant's loyalty. Security Clearance shall not be issued to persons who have, either by word or deed, expressed dishonesty, disloyalty, untrustworthiness or indication that may refer to the person's untrustworthiness to protect a state secret.

In 2008 the Security Police Board plans to carry out several trainings due to the new Act that has taken effect and necessity to introduce all possessors of state secrets to changes made in processing it. As there are quite a few changes in the work organization of possessors of classified information, the year 2008 would be a kind of transitional year from old to new. A possessor of classified information is required to review the classified media within one year as of the enforcement of this Act. If information contained by a medium is not classified information for the purposes of this Act, such information is declassified and the medium is marked, as provided by this Act. If information contained by a medium is classified at a different level, legal grounds for different for the purposes of this Act, the classification marking of a medium, marking concerning the grounds of classification, or term of classification shall be respectively changed. The Security Police Board tries to give its best to help possessors of information in harmonizing the organization of state secret with the new Act.

Parallel with developing the new Act and legislation based on it, but also with making preparations for application of the new Act the Security Police Board dealt in the sphere of state secret with its everyday routine activities.

- In 2007 the first legal persons extending the validity term of access certificate reached to the procedure of security clearance. Legal persons also show increasing interest towards acquiring the right to process state secrets. From January 1, 2008 natural persons in possession of classified information, the year 2008 would be a kind of transitional year from old to new. A possessor of classified information is required to review the classified media within one year as of the enforcement of this Act. If information contained by a medium is not classified information for the purposes of this Act, such information is declassified and the medium is marked, as provided by this Act. If information contained by a medium is classified at a different level, legal grounds for different for the purposes of this Act, the classification marking of a medium, marking concerning the grounds of classification, or term of classification shall be respectively changed. The Security Police Board tries to give its best to help possessors of information in harmonizing the organization of state secret with the new Act.

Disappearance of the classified data media became possible due to the fact that Reet Kuntus did not follow the requirements provided in clauses 76, 81, 83 and 841 of the Procedure for Protection of State Secrets: Reet Kuntus did not store classified media in her possession in a security container, although the employer had created adequate conditions;

- Did not keep classified media under continuous supervision after removal from security container;
- Did not record classified media in a security container, nor lock the entrances upon leaving the room during working hours;
- Did not ask for permission of the head of the agency and did not pack classified media according to requirements in order to remove it from a security area.

Thus, Reet Kuntus committed a misdemeanor provided in the Act sec 312 1 of the State Secrets Act. As there were no requirements of the misdemeanors of the State Secrets Act, no legal consequences of the misdemeanors of the State Secrets Act were established. The decision of Tartu County Court in its turn agreed with the decision made by the Security Police Board as the body conducting extra-judicial proceedings on the same misdemeanor matter on September 18, 2006.

The decision of the Security Police Board indicated that Reet Kuntus, the accountant of the National Defence League Jõgeva Unit, received against signature a CD that contained information declared state secret on confidential level, i.e. the wartime structure of Estonian Defense Forces and the National Defense League. When receiving this data media Reet Kuntus committed to protect classified data media in her possession from disclosure and access of unauthorized personas, and to process it according to the requirements provided in the Government of the Republic Regulation No. 216 of 7 July 1999 Procedure for Protection of State Secrets (hereinafter Procedure for Protection of State Secrets): Reet Kuntus did not store classified media in her possession in a security container, although the employer had created adequate conditions;
Prevention of Dissemination of Radical Islam

In 2007 the fundamental Islam organization Jamaat Tabligh showed interest towards Estonia, what became obvious in two visits of missionaries groups. There is a well-grounded reason to believe that a member of one group was a citizen of one EU Member State who is connected with supporting terrorism. In connection with this organization an anti-terrorist operation executed in Spain in January 2008 should be mentioned, when 14 persons were arrested under suspicion of planning terrorist acts in Barcelona. According to initial information several of the arrested persons are the members of Jamaat Tabligh. This case proves once again that although the missionaries of Jamaat Tabligh do not propagate terrorism directly, several of its members are connected with terrorist groups.

Besides the interest towards Estonian Islam community from outside the country the members of our Muslim community themselves are interested in keeping and establishing contacts with Islam organizations of other countries. In summer 2007 the members of Estonian Muslim community participated in the activities of a religious camp in Poland, organized yearly by the Islam organization WAMY (World Association of Muslim Youth). WAMY is an organization funded by the Government of Saudi Arabia that has been connected with supporting terrorism and propagating radical views in several countries.

The matter that radical views might spread among Estonian Muslims is illustrated by the case of an active member of Estonian Muslim community, who was detained in a border town Termez, Uzbekistan, from where he intended to proceed to the conflict region of Afghanistan to support Taliban. During detention this person acted aggressively and Uzbekistan law enforcement authorities held him under custody for a month. The mentioned person is a so-called convert, who has received Islam religion, but who is psychologically unstable. He has had close contacts with the members of Islam organization Jamaat Tabligh during their visits to Estonia. This indicates that although the representatives of radical or Fundamental organizations
do not directly deal with recruitment and do not call for jihad in Estonia, their slogans are still inspiring, above all among psychologically unstable persons.

An increasing number of Muslim immigrants have come to Estonia from North Africa, Middle East and Asia during last years. They use various methods to come here - by visa or work permit, by entering some Estonian university or by marrying an Estonian citizen. Immigrants without knowledge of local language, sufficient education and little working experience have trouble integrating into Estonian society. This has caused Muslim immigrants' greater interest in following Islam more strictly and becoming more drawn to local praying centers, where they meet people with similar background. Thus, some immigrants have separated from society and that brings along the risk that radical views and opposition to the state's constitutional order are easily spread among these persons.

Prevention of Financing Terrorism

An important part of combating terrorism is prevention of financing terrorism. Although no persons or organizations have been identified in Estonia that finance terrorism knowingly, Estonian financial structures might be used for such purposes. In the course of executing a letter rogatory, submitted to the Security Police Board from Great Britain, it occurred that financial means for planning and preparing terrorist acts in Great Britain have been moved via Estonian financial structures. Various routing systems, credit institutions, gift vouchers and bank accounts sold to undercover agents have been used.

The “dummy” account owners did not know the real purpose of this money or its connection with terrorism. Thus, the criminal case was passed to the Central Criminal Police for checking possible facts of money laundering and computer fraud. As a result of this criminal case and another case, already in proceeding in the Central Criminal Court the Harju County Court convicted two persons on June 12, 2007. Maksim Panamanenko was convicted in money laundering and was punished with 2 years and 8 months conditional imprisonment with probation period of 18 months; Iija Kotkov was convicted in money laundering and computer fraud, and was punished with 5 years conditional imprisonment with probation period of 3 years. On July 5, 2007, the Court in Great Britain convicted three citizens of Great Britain of terrorism for assistance in terrorism, imposing actual imprisonment from 6.5 to 10 years.

In summer 2007, Estonian Muslim community received financial support for organizing religious camps from persons connected with Islamic organization Al-Isam. This Islamic organization Al-Isam and connected with supporting terrorism, and that confirms the fact that funds interesting from the position of international anti-terrorism combat might move via Estonia.

Prevention of Smuggling Weapons of Mass Destruction and Strategic or Dual-use Goods

In the framework of combating terrorism, anticipation and prevention of strategic and dual-use goods and weapons of mass destruction is a continuously important state. Due to Estonia's geographic position and the fact that it lies on the outer border of the European Union, efficient preventive work and inter-agency information exchange are vital, because it is very easy to deliver strategic materials smuggled into Estonia within the EU. Thus, restrictions on transporting strategic goods are not new development. The wider purpose of this has always been to guarantee peace and stability, and anticipate any escalation of crisis. Nowadays we must pay attention to the fact that the parts of weapons of mass destruction and other strategic goods (e.g. radioactive materials), preserved in Russia from the Soviet times, are attractive selling items among smugglers and the Baltic States might be used to transport such materials into the Western countries or to conclude sales transactions.

The work of the Security Police Board in the field of anticipating and preventing dissemination of strategic and dual-use goods and weapons of mass destruction could be viewed on two levels. Firstly, the Security Police Board and Al-Isam which had been the most active organization in this area, stopped working in Estonia. Secondly, the Security Police Board, in cooperation with the Estonian Ministry of Defence, has increased the number of unlicensed foreign military vehicles delivered into Estonia by private persons in 2007. Maybe the abovementioned punishments help the trading companies to understand that in the case the law is violated, admitting ones guilt and regretting is not enough – one has to bear financial consequences.

Transiting strategic or illicit goods via Estonia has been attractive for smugglers throughout centuries due to our state's geographic position. A good example here is limitations on trade and violations of these limitations that were valid in the Middle Ages.

On September 7, 2006, a criminal case was initiated in the Security Police Board on the features of § 392, subsection 2, clause 3 of the Penal Code (illicit import and export of prohibited goods or goods requiring a special permit by a group) on the basis of previously received information, according to which Aleksandri Kaldma, connected with international smuggling and drug business, together with a group of persons is planning illegal export of a large quantity of military weapons from the Republic of Estonia to the Republic of Lithuania. On March 7, 2007, the Security Police officials in cooperation with the Central Criminal Police and K-Commando detained Aleksandri Kaldma and Sergei

Missionsaries of fundamental Islam organisation Jamaa Tabligh in security check at the airport.
Lod in Tallinn, on the territory of a garage association at Pallasti Str. 32. The latter were preparing a large quantity of illegal firearms and ammunition for the moment of detention. The weapon-smugglers, who were loading the cargo into a Lithuanian furniture truck, had provided themselves with small arms for unexpected visitors, but seeing the obvious supremacy of special police forces they gave up armed resistance and dropped the Makarov pistol at the last moment. Both men have been previously punished for crimes – true, under different names (Aleksei Kalidma and Sergei Lodii as Sergei Gussen).

From possession of the abovementioned persons and pointed out about events with their weapon business were taken the following items:

- 103 complete PPS-43 type submachine guns;
- 8 pistols;
- 1 rifle with scope;
- 4,117 cartridges of different caliber and function;
- 4,134 kg of various explosives;
- 19 electric detonators;
- 4 silencers for firearms;
- 2 night observation devices.

The submachine gun PPS-43, a fully automatic firearm made by Russian weapon constructor Aleksei Sudayev in 1942, with a magazine containing 35 cartridges, shooting speed of 700 shots per minute and effective range of fire up to 200 meters. For ammunition it uses 7.62x25 mm cartridges (the same cartridge as the TT-Pistol). As this cartridge has a steal-core bullet, it can penetrate various bullet-proof vests used in the police structures nowadays. Thus, we are dealing with a weapon with more force than the favorite of criminals over the years in Estonia – the TT-Pistol. Already during the II World War the number of manufactured PPS-43 submachine guns reached 500,000, the majority of which was stored for preserving in the warehouses of strategic funds.

The thinking of the members of this criminal group is best illustrated by the following fact. When the preliminary investigations arrived at one group member’s place of residence for search after the end of official working hours (after 6 p.m.), the weapon-smuggler answered the door in underpants, holding a loaded Makarov pistol with a silencer in his hand. The firearms, of course, was illegal. The man was genuinely surprised to finding police officials at his doorstep and mumbled that had they come during regular working hours, he wouldn’t have been caught so stupidly with a weapon.

It was ascertainment in the course of the criminal case that the criminal group handled illegally over 700 kg of narcotics (mainly hashish, but also acrometha, ephedra and cocaine) and over 1000 liters of parent compound for making phenylacetone or BMK. The international group of the smugglers was composed of the fact that narcotics were trafficked from Netherlands, smuggled into Estonia and forwarded to Russia, while part of narcotics was marketed in Estonia, as well. The parent compound for producing drugs – BMK – was smuggled from Jekaterinburg, Russia, to Estonia and from here to West Europe. For clarity’s sake, it should be added that the street price of 1 gram of hashish is 150-200 kroons (10-14 euros) and 1 liter of BMK costs about 7000 kroons (450 euros). This enables to get the picture of the financial dimensions of drug business.

Interesting is the fact that detention of a greater part of the group on March 7, 2007, had no affect on the rest of the group, who continued drug business and smuggling in their greed for super-profit. For example, a drug-courier was detained in Tallinn transporting 4 kg of hashish (with a street value of ca 6 million kroons) that was to arrive in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Anticipation of International Terrorism

One of the leaders of international group of smugglers Aleksandr Kalidma (up left).

An outwardly ordinary furniture truck with Lithuanian registration plates hid 95 military weapons PPS-43, intended to smuggle out to Estonia illegally.

The illegal pistol Makarov that the weapon smuggler Sergei Lodii tossed away at detention. The pistol was loaded.

The “magic sandals” (contained diamond-cords for sawing bars) with the help of which the weapon smuggler Sergei Lodii intended to escape from prison. The sandals were probably meant for breaking “metal obstacles” that isolated Sergei Lodii from freedom.

The described criminal case indicates, on the one hand, how large quantities of explosives could be brought out from these mines illegally. On the other hand, the fact of illegal owning and storing of devices.

One of the “co-fighters” of the suspect Sergei Lodii, Aleksandr Kaldma trafficked narcotics from Netherlands via the Baltic States to Russia, and BMK and large quantities of cigarettes from Russia to the Scandinavian countries.

To conclude this topic, it should be mentioned that compared with previous years the Security Police Board, in anticipating terrorism, pays much more attention to international level smugglers, because besides drugs and excise goods trafficking the high-ranking smugglers, who are oriented to enormous profits, are ready to deliver, for instance, goods necessary for organizing terrorist acts, including weapons, explosives, but also weapons of mass destruction or their components. Joint operations of the law enforcement agencies of different countries help to consolidate international anti-terrorist cooperation.

Elimination of Illegal Explosives from Circulation

One of the most important tasks of combating terrorism, first of all to avoid organizing bombing explosions, is to identify and detain persons who are connected with illegal handling of explosives, but also those, who produce and own explosive devices. In 2007 the Security Police officials detected and eliminated in all 89.2 kg of various explosives, 152 mines originating from the WWII, 17 hand-grenades, 5 self-made explosive devices and other items. Compared with the year 2006, when 33.3 kg of various explosives, 5 self-made explosive-devices and 27 various grenades were eliminated from circulation, the amount of confiscated explosives occurred significantly larger.

On the one hand, it was due to the fact that several criminal cases, the information of which dated from previous years, were initiated in 2007. For one, the above described criminal case of weapon smuggling. On the other hand the increase was due to the fact that the mines in the northeast Estonia have again started to become increasingly more important source of explosives in recent years. Although the Security Police Board has repeatedly pointed out that mines should toughen surveillance after explosives, it has not been done so far. Criminals can still acquire illegally large quantities of explosives from the mines in a short time.

To confirm this statement we can bring an example of a criminal case initiated by the Security Police Board on February 1, 2007, when 19.7 kg of ammonite, an explosive material originating from the mine, and a self-made explosive device were confiscated from a resident of Kohila Jarve Roman Apt. The device consisted of 100 grams of ammonite and 1 electric detonator, also of the kind used in mines. Another example is a criminal case initiated in the Security Police Board on July 4, 2007. Several episodes of staging criminal offense resulted in getting hold of 45 kg of ammonite and 0.6 kg of nitrile from an employee of Põlevkivi Kaevardamise AS Oja Uhla Mining Plant. During preliminary investigation it was ascertainment that the confiscated explosives originated from the territory of Põlevkivi Kaevardamise AS mine Estonia, from where it was smuggled out and handed over to Eduard Barovoo by two employees of this mine.

He had previously also stored explosives for “bad times”.

Trotyle (TNT) found at Sergei Lodii’s home.
A shipment of illegal weapons – 103 machine guns PPS-43 – confiscated in one of the largest operations of the Security Police in recent years.
such large quantities indicates clearly that it had been acquired for selling. It can be imagined what security risk hides behind the fact that persons with criminal inclination can acquire from one illegal source ca 20-50 kg of explosives in a short time, and which would be the consequences of using such quantity of explosives could bring to other people's life and health, and also to their property.

Another, increasingly important source of illegal explosives besides mines are persons, who visit the battle-places of the WWII in northeast Estonia, to dig out wartime 

who searched for wartime explosives from the wood and died, because the primer of a wartime projectile exploded. The fact that Maksim Voronin was a 'black archaeologist' found confirmation with finding of 57 wartime mines and 1.1 kg of troyte smelted from projectiles.

Unfortunately the latter is no exception. For example, on December 9, 2007, at 9 p.m. the Security Police officials in cooperation with the officials of the North-Prefecture Strike Division detained the member of a war history association "Viora" Jürgens Fili in Tallinn, on the 11th

day with excavating explosives at battle sites for some time usually know each other and are quite well aware of the accidents that have happened. Despite that and beyond all reason they continue to search and dig out munitions of war, including extremely dangerous explosives, at battlefields.

Investigation of explosions

Another task besides identifying and prosecuting persons interested in illegal handling of explosives, the Security Police Board must identify and detain persons who are connected with organizing explosions at the territory of the Republic of Estonia. According to statistics, 10 explosions of explosives took place in Estonia, in which died one person, the abovementioned Maksim Voronin, and injured seven. Compared to the year 2006 with 4 explosions (one dead and 2 slightly injured), the number of explosions has increased. The main reason is incompetent handling of explosives, which, at the same time, is the main reason for explosions. Here it should be mentioned that interest in explosives among average citizens increased. While ordinary citizens have usually no knowledge and skills in handling explosives, the number of explosions and the injured persons has increased, as well. Explosions, where a person died and all explosions resulting in injuries were caused by foolishness and incompetence.

in seven cases out of ten the explosion took place due to incorrect handling of explosive materials.

On May 10, 2007, at 12.53 p.m., there was an explosion in Konsu village, Iluva rural municipality, Ida-Viru county: An employee of Tootsi Turvas Ltd tried to cut electric detonator with cutting pincers, which resulted in bodily injuries.

On June 23, 2007, at 13.27 p.m., self-made detonating mixture exploded at 25-167 Suuricate Street, Tallinn, resulting in one seriously and one slightly injured person. The Security Police Board initiated a criminal case on this criminal fact and it was ascertained that Aleksandr Dzyobik, Addis Dzhab and Vitali Orehhov had decided in the latter's home to make a bomb of domestic chemicals in order to explode it in the wood at Midsummer Day night. They used aluminum powder and red lead found at Orehhov's apartment, and the mixture exploded, when Orehhov lighted a cigarette. As a result of the explosion Orehhov's and Scharimov's clothes caught fire. Orehhov's skin got burnt in extent of 60% and Scharimov's in the extent of 26%.

On August 2, 2007, at 2:40 a.m., there was an explosion at 4-9 Otu Street, Otu village, Nose rural municipality, Harju county, where a 24-year-old man tried to cut electric detonator with scissors. As a result he lost a thumb and the tips of the next two fingers.

The abovementioned criminal cases indicate expressively how serious can the results of incorrect handling of explosives, also attempts to produce explosives of domestic chemicals. Despite that at least 2-3 persons try to produce detonating mixtures of handy domestic chemicals, mainly out of interest toward explosive materials. Descriptions of detonating mixtures self-made of domestic chemicals, freely available on Internet, definitely contribute to emergence of new generation of pyromaniacs.

The rest three explosions executed in 2007 were organized, above all, with hooligan motives. They did not result in deaths or injuries, but indicate vividly that people do not comprehend, what they are doing. The best example about that was the explosion organized on the roadway in front of a building at 53 Pelguranna Street, Tallinn, that took place on January 5, 2007, at 2:30 a.m. This explosion damaged two cars - a Renault Megane and a Volkswagen Golf. Initiated criminal procedure ascertained that the explosion was executed with hooligan intentions by drunken Andrei Sepp, punished previously several times for property and drug offences, who wanted to check the "working condition" of a grenade RG-42 and general-purpose UZ-96M striker-releasing fuse. In the course of criminal procedure it was ascertained that Andrei Sepp had received the grenade and the detonator in January 2007 from Sergei Danilenko, who was detained by the Security Police officials on March 28, 2007. At the moment of detention the latter was in the wanted list of Harju County Court in connection with refraining from serving a sentence. On September 11, 2007, Harju County Court punished Ander Sepp for owning an explosive device and inadequate serving of a sentence. On September 11, 2007, Harju County Court punished Ander Sepp for owning an explosive device and inadequate serving of a sentence. On September 11, 2007, Harju County Court punished Ander Sepp for owning an explosive device and inadequate serving of a sentence. On September 11, 2007, Harju County Court punished Ander Sepp for owning an explosive device and inadequate serving of a sentence.

Crisis Regulation

In 2007 the Security Police Board participated in international training "Smart Raven 2007", incorporating the special services of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the USA. According to the scenario the training was for practicing joint activity on forced landing of an all-terrain vehicle suspected of transporting strategic goods. The Security police also participated in the training "Eastern Shield 2007" in the role of observer. The main stage was Ukraine, but relevant power structures of Poland, Georgia, Hungary and Romania participated actively, as well. For internal Estonian trainings, the renegade aircraft situation training RESI-2007 could be mentioned.

Events of nationwide importance also require more contributing. The 10th Youth Song and Dance Festival took place in summer 2007. This could be considered a main rehearsal of the 25th National Song Festival and 18th National Dance Festival that will take place in 2009. Competitions of Estonian national football team at home grounds, on Al Bluu Arena stadium, should be mentioned, among these the competition between Estonian and Russian national teams, when the strictest security measures were applied.

Cooperation between the services (Personal Protection Service, the Police, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Disposal Centre, Emergency Medical Care) securing state visits and nationwide events has improved from year to year. All visits and large-scale events in 2007 passed peacefully.

The weapons of the II World War are dangerous even 60 years later. Every such shell or mine that is unearthed could be lethal to 'black archaeologists'. On the photo: an arsenal dug out by the persecuted Maksim Voronin.
Combating corruption in 2007 was no different from previous years and the volume of work in this area did not decrease. The fact that corruption has not decreased in Estonia was confirmed by a research published by Transparency International in 2007, according to which perception of corruption in Estonia has, quite contrary, increased.

The cases proceeded by the Security Police Board in 2007 are, in a way, a reflection of processes taking place in the society. Some year back the emphasis was on offences committed by the officials in IT-sector, connected with rapid development in this area. Recently several criminal cases are connected with real estate and construction, probably subject to ‘real estate boom’.

The majority of criminal cases dealt with by the Security Police Board have been initiated due to the Board’s continuous and active work on mapping corruption risks and gathering information on corruption.

The fact that combating corruption in Estonia is not yet possible without active information gathering is confirmed by the corruption-hint phone statistics that receives increasingly less hints month by month. A fact that occurred from the research of the Ministry of Justice that only 1% of persons, who had experienced corruption, notified the law enforcement authorities about it, should be mentioned here. This is a regrettably tendency because according to the same research 2/3 of population thinks that corruption is a problem in Estonia and greater activity in notifying such cases could be assumed.

The Security Police Board wants to thank honest citizens who have helped and will help to combat with corruption. The Security Police Board has focused on investigating large-scale and more complicated cases. Since summer 2007 the legislation provided that the task of the Security Police Board is to investigate the corruption cases, where officials receive direct financial profit from transactions. Such cases are more concealed by nature, as both parties of corrupt relation are profiting from transaction and they lack motivation to reveal their activity. The Security Police Board was also tasked to investigate crimes committed by the heads of local municipalities by budget and number of inhabitants — Tallinn, Tartu, Parnawa, Narva and Kohila-Jaärve towns, and Jõhvi rural municipality.

Several corruption cases the Security Police investigated in 2007 could not be discussed publicly, as the Court has not made decisions, yet.

An important part in combating corruption is prevention of corruption in law enforcement agencies. One of the most conspicuous cases in 2007 was the case of a chief superintendent of the Criminal Police. The chief superintendent, in return for receiving free of charge diesel fuel from a previously punished person, he enabled to take forbidden items to the bribers into the house of detention. He also helped the bribers to stay at home instead of the house of detention during the sentence period. Besides that it turned out that the same official had misappropriated cigarettes, confiscated by the police, owned illegal ammunition and gave information from the police database to his acquaintance, concerning a woman of interest. This case points out the risks hiding in the work of the criminal police — is in the grey area between the right and wrong, that keeps ordinary citizens in the limits of law-abiding behavior, could be lost.

Police corruption is dangerous due to the fact that the main task of the police is to guarantee legal order and in the eyes of citizens a police official remains a police law-abiding behavior, could be lost. The Security Police Board is to investigate the corruption cases, where officials receive direct financial profit from transactions. Such cases are more concealed by nature, as both parties of corrupt relation are profiting from transaction and they lack motivation to reveal their activity. The Security Police Board has focused on investigating large-scale and more complicated cases. Since summer 2007 the legislation provided that the task of the Security Police Board is to investigate the corruption cases, where officials receive direct financial profit from transactions. Such cases are more concealed by nature, as both parties of corrupt relation are profiting from transaction and they lack motivation to reveal their activity. The Security Police Board was also tasked to investigate crimes committed by the heads of local municipalities by budget and number of inhabitants — Tallinn, Tartu, Parnawa, Narva and Kohila-Jaärve towns, and Jõhvi rural municipality.

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Police corruption is dangerous due to the fact that the main task of the police is to guarantee legal order and in the eyes of citizens a police official remains a police law-abiding behavior, could be lost. The Security Police Board is to investigate the corruption cases, where officials receive direct financial profit from transactions. Such cases are more concealed by nature, as both parties of corrupt relation are profiting from transaction and they lack motivation to reveal their activity. The Security Police Board has focused on investigating large-scale and more complicated cases. Since summer 2007 the legislation provided that the task of the Security Police Board is to investigate the corruption cases, where officials receive direct financial profit from transactions. Such cases are more concealed by nature, as both parties of corrupt relation are profiting from transaction and they lack motivation to reveal their activity. The Security Police Board was also tasked to investigate crimes committed by the heads of local municipalities by budget and number of inhabitants — Tallinn, Tartu, Parnawa, Narva and Kohila-Jaärve towns, and Jõhvi rural municipality.

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As part of corruption in law enforcement, the Security Police Board has dealt with corruption in tax and customs sphere.

The bribe cases of customs officials of the northeast and southeast Estonia customs stations reached to decision in 2007. The court prevalently punished the guilty officials with conditional imprisonments. As an example from 2007 we can mention the criminal case of a high official and senior official of the Tax and Customs Board. The officials rendered unofficial accountancy service to an enterprise under their supervision as officials, and received “under-table” fee. Among other things, the officials submitted tax returns in their name, instead of the enterprise, and left out the taxes that should have been paid on “under-table” fees.

The majority of criminal cases dealt with by the Security Police Board have been initiated due to the Board’s continuous and active work on mapping corruption risks and gathering information on corruption.

The fact that combating corruption in Estonia is not yet possible without active information gathering is confirmed by the corruption-hint phone statistics that receives increasingly less hints month by month. A fact that occurred from the research of the Ministry of Justice that only 1% of persons, who had experienced corruption, notified the law enforcement authorities about it, should be mentioned here. This is a regrettably tendency because according to the same research 2/3 of population thinks that corruption is a problem in Estonia and greater activity in notifying such cases could be assumed.

Here the Security Police Board wants to thank honest citizens who have helped and will help to combat with corruption.

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An important part in combating corruption is prevention of corruption in law enforcement agencies.
Each and every one of us can help to combat corruption by acting correctly and justly.

Corruption connected with government departments could be considered yet another sphere of combating corruption. In 2007 the cases in this sphere were more or less connected with public procurements. The motives for officials to break law have prevalently been the prospect to receive corrupt income. At the same time, there have been cases, where officials want to facilitate their work or prefer their acquaintances as bidders. In 2007 the Security Police Board forwarded to the prosecuting office the criminal case on the previous head of department of the Labor Market Board. This official was responsible for executing projects co-financed with the European Social Fund. To facilitate the job on the one hand, and to prefer acquaintances, on the other hand, the official coordinated the terms of invitation to public procurement tender, carried out in the framework of these projects, with an acquaintance. The official asked the acquaintance to compile the invitation to tender, in order to guarantee the contract to the latter, who, of course, won the tender under prescribed terms. The official was aware that in case the requirements of public procurement are violated, the Labor Market Board must pay the support back to the European Social Fund, so the Labor Market Board is might face the claim of refund the 2.8 million kroons support.

The third case in this sphere can be the case of a high official of one rural municipality. This official received hundreds of thousands of kroons of bribe from a company that participated in public procurements, in order to look after their benefit. The official did not only stand for the interests of this company in public procurements by favoring it unfoundedly to others, but also directed the state’s financial support into this company.

Of the cases, where interference of the Security Police prevented the occurrence of loss to the state, we could mention the criminal case of Ants Mangulis, the Põlva-Võru-Valga Region Director of the State Nature Conservation Center. At the beginning of 2007 the court found Ants Mangulis guilty of receiving bribe in the amount of 60,000 kroons for coordinating the detailed plan. For the bribe of 1 million kroons he had to guarantee that the state would purchase from a private person a registered immovable with value in terms of nature conservation for unreasonable price, several times higher than the actual price. Due to interference of the Security Police Board the plan of Ants Mangulis and the convicted businessman failed.

Active information procurement takes place in the sphere of corruption in local governments and hopefully we can speak of work done in our next annual already. As an example from the year 2007, we could point out the case of the Mayor of Kiviõli Voldemar Trumm, who required bribe from the manager of a foundation. The Mayor refused to coordinate the joint project of the foundation and local government before he receives 700,000 kroons. Voldemar Trumm promised though, that for the bribe he will see that the foundation will receive support from the local government in the future, as well. Thanks to the decisive behavior of the foundation manager the illegal activity of the Mayor found proof and he was taken to court.
The year 2007 spotlighted that not just Estonians and Russians living in Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa comprehend the history of Estonia and what's going on in the state now; different values are much more general. As mentioned above in connection with the Tõnismägi monument, the deepest reasons of this controversy conceal, first of all, in the unexplained historical events in the middle of the 20th century. Different Estonian and Russian approaches to history and different information sources from where Estonians and Russians get their everyday knowledge only exacerbate the situation. Wherever there is confusion and conflict, uneducated and ambiguous “heralds of truth” appear, who crave for publicity and media attention. And, whenever there is mutual misunderstanding between Estonians and Russians, the Kremlin-inclined puppeteers and connivers appear sooner or later, whether with heavy wallet, “delicatessen” of propaganda or pretense to protect compatriots. This was expressively demonstrated by the course of events at Tõnismägi during several years, and this happened also in the small village at Vara Rural municipality, Kirepi, Tartu County in summer 2007.

Kirepi village, populated by Russians, is joined with Metsakivi village according to current administrative division and shares the name with the latter. Historically this is a village founded in the beginning of the 19th century by Old Believers who emigrated from Russian villages near Lake Peipsi due to wish to deal with agriculture. Currently there are about 20 households in Kirepi, all of them Russians and predominantly elderly people.

In October 2005 local inhabitant Aleksandr Shirokov, openly hostile towards the Republic of Estonia, gathered 42 signatures from the villagers of Kirepi and their relatives, and submitted to Vara Rural Municipality Government a request to set up a war memorial in Kirepi village. The argument noted: “The war memorial is meant to commemorate villagers who perished in the II World War and whose names we intend to sculpt on the memorial”. With its Decision No 12 of May 30, 2006, Vara Rural Municipality Government applied for receiving into municipal ownership the “War Memorial” land unit (area 252 m²) in Metsakivi village, Vara rural municipality, Tartu County. On November 22, 2006, the Vara Rural Municipality mayor Andres Kärp sent relevant application to Tartu County Government. The reason stated: “Land applied for municipal property is necessary to perpetuate cultural and historic memories of local people. Inhabitants of Metsküla village and their relatives turned to Vara Rural Municipality with an application to set up a war memorial. The memorial is meant to be a place to commemorate the villagers perished and missing in the World War, whose burial places are unknown. Families could go and commemorate the perished there. There will be no political symbols on the war memorial. It will bear the names of the perished. The dimensions would be about 1x1 meters and the height up to 2 meters. There are a few big trees on this land unit. The villagers wish to set the memorial up between the trees. It would be in the center of the village and would improve the look of the village, as well”.

On November 22, 2006, the Vara Rural Municipality mayor Andres Kärp sent written permission to set up a small construction work (or memorial) in Metsküla village. Immediately after that construction started in Kirepi village to be ready for festive opening of the memorial on August 2, 2007, with participation of the Russian Ambassador. The initiators of establishing the war memorial were the famous activists from the town of Kallaste, Aleksandr Shirokov, his brother Oleg Shirokov and Leonti Kromonov (a member of the Constitutional Party, the former deputy of Kallaste Council), who supported the participants of the April mass riots. In April 2007, Aleksandr Shirokov was active in doing anti-Estonia propaganda among Russian population in the area and made an unsuccessful attempt to organize a bus to bring additional rioting forces to Tallinn. Interesting is also the fact that in the middle of July the Ambassador of Russia Nikolai Uspenski, accompanied by
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Leonti Kromonov and Aleksandr Shirokov, made a three-day visit to Soviet-time communist memorial located by Lake Peipsi. He met with the leaders of Vara and Alatskivi rural municipalities and Kallaste city government.

On July 13, 2007, Nikolai Uspenski was in Kears at the location of memorial construction. By that time the original text had already changed significantly: the sentence “In memory of the villagers perished in the II World War” had been replaced with the sentence “To the villagers of Kears, perished due to fascist terror during 1941–1945” Aleksandr Shirokov bragged in private conversations that he would have wanted the text on memorial to be “In memory of villages of Kears murdered by Estonian nationalists and extremists”.

There were 14 Russian names on the memorial, among them several who, according to recollection of local Estonian population, were active henchmen of occupying powers and belonged in destruction battalions that might have participated in killing and deporting local civil population in 1941. More precise were the memories of the murder committed by local members of destruction battalion at Kalevi farm, the ruins of which are only 200 meters from the location of the planned memorial.

The Security Police Board ascertained that two persons whose names were on the memorial – Aleksandr Kostin and Lavrenti Kostin – belonged into destruction battalion. According to witnesses, Aleksandr Kostin belonged into a destruction battalion that in Soviet times caught local men hiding in the woods and took them to the basement of Koosa dairy that was used as a custodial place. During convoying an Estonian detainee one Red Army soldier mistakenly shot Aleksandr Kostin into the spine. The latter died of wounds and was buried in Kasepää graveyard. Aleksandr Kostin’s time of death on the planned memorial was July 7, 1941, on the gravestone it is July 8, 1941, and the German Army arrived in Kavastu rural municipality only on July 24, 1941. In the application from 1946 about declaring Lavrenti Kostin to be dead, it is stated that before he declared missing in 1941, he served in a destruction battalion. The birth date of Lavrenti Kostin on the memorial is August 23, 1916, but in family register it is August 23, 1902. It is interesting that although Lavrenti Kostin was the grandfather of the initiator of the monument Aleksandr Shirokov, the latter did not know the birth year of his grandfather.

In 1941 Viktor Kuznetsov was the deputy chairman of Kavastu Rural Municipality Executive Committee, located at Koosa (a bigger settlement near Kears village), thus he was the highest representative of the Soviet power in the district. He was killed in the town of Kallaste at the beginning of August 1941, when he tried to escape from German Army to Russia. He is buried in Kallaste.


From the archive documents it was ascertained that the personal data of 7 out of 14 persons cut into memorial stone were not killed, but died of natural causes – Vassili Solovyov of old age in 1944 and Nikolai Shirokov of typhus in 1943. Two “victims of fascism” on the memorial stone were not killed, but died of natural causes – Vassili Solovyov of old age in 1944 and Nikolai Shirokov of typhus in 1943. Three persons on the memorial – Nikolai Dyakov, Pimen Ilyin and Larion Kusnetsov – were entered in the 1941 victims of communism record already in 1996 (Mart Laar and Jaan Toor “Red Terror”). The soldier of destruction battalion Aleksandr Kostin was accidentally killed by his comrades several weeks prior arrival of the German Army in Kavastu rural municipality.

On December 18, 2007, the organizer of the memorial Aleksandr Shirokov took the notorious and history-fabricating stone away from the village himself.

Ethically it remains incomprehensible, why the names of three Estonian inhabitants from the same Kears village who were brutally killed by the soldiers of the retreating Red Army on July 30, 1941, were left out from the memorial list of the war victims. By distinguishing between nationalities the persons to commemorate only caused unnecessary tensions on national grounds in the neighborhood. The memorial and extreme incompetence of its creators painfully tore open the old wounds. The grasp of history varies, but facts can be neither disproved nor ignored.

On July 24, 2007, the Security Police Board in conformity with the Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal procedure on the basis of a citizen’s application and according to § 89 of the Penal Code in the criminal case No 07913000066 (under the leadership of the occupying powers of the Soviet Union, civilians were killed in mass in Tartu County, Kavastu rural municipality in June, July and August 1941).

In the course of investigation it was ascertained that 24 local civilians (3 of them in the abovementioned Kears village – 87-year-old Kaarel Kalev, 65-year-old Liisa Kalev and 3-year-old Lembit Kalev) were killed by retreat soldiers of the Red Army and destruction battalions in Tartu County, Kavastu rural municipality in summer 1941. Unfortunately the investigation could not identify the persons who committed crimes against humanity, because of the passed time is so long and the majority of potential witnesses are dead. With the permission of the Prosecutor’s Office the criminal procedure was closed on November 27, 2007.
On August 9, 2007, based on the information of preliminary investigation carried out by the Security Police, the Western Circuit Prosecutor’s Office brought charges against Arnold Meri, who led the deportation in Hiiumaa in March 1949, in genocide (§ 97 of the Penal Code) and attack against civilians (§ 97 of the Penal Code). Initially the court hearing had to take place in Kärdla in January 2008, but the defense council of the accused chose the tactics to delay the time of the court session by submitting applications impeaching the jurisdiction of Estonian courts.

Namely, the attorney at law Sven Sillar submitted an application that the court hearing on the first genocide accusation in Estonia would be held in international court or even in Russia. According to the attorney of law Sillar the crime of the 1949 March deportation was committed in Russia, Siberia, to where the deported persons were expatriated. According to the opinion of the defense council Estonian courts are not competent to hear criminal cases on deportation, as according to “The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” persons charged with genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed.

Estonian courts could not agree with such claim and rejected all relevant applications made by the defense. Genocide is a crime that, as a rule, presumes co-execution due to its scale. As for the 1949 deportation, there were thousands of executioners and participants (at least as many as the victims by estimation) in the territory of Estonia as well as in Russia. Deportation as genocide consisted in placing members of a certain social group into living conditions that resulted in the risk of partial or total holocaust. Carrying out this crime presumes execution of multiple different acts by many persons in various places, including imprisonment and transporting them to a region where they are deprived of normal living conditions. While according to § 11 sec. 1 p. 1 of the Penal Code an act is deemed to be committed at the place where the person acted, in case of deportation, the place where an act is committed is considered the to be any place where a criminal commits an act, whether it is in Hiiumaa or in Siberia.

Here it is probably unnecessary to remind that not a single criminal case on communism crimes has been tried in Russia until now. Taking into consideration the steadily increasing heroizing of the communism era in Russia is does not seem realistic in the nearest future. The defense counsel himself had to admit that the hearing of Arnold Meri’s accusation in Russian courts is not realistic. But despite that the attorney at law Sven Sillar demonstrated mistrusts towards Estonian court system and applied for formation of special international criminal court to hear the case of Arnold Meri, claiming that according to his knowledge such is international practice in proceeding the crimes of genocide.

This claim, however, is incompetent, as formation of ad hoc courts in international practice occurs only in case internal courts are not capable to hear complicated criminal cases due to important reasons (e.g. Rwanda and Yugoslavia). The conditions in the Republic of Estonia, the Member State of the EU, and the competence, credibility and independence of its courts to hear criminal cases are undoubtedly incomparable with the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that had undergone national catastrophe in the 1990s. The State Court confirmed this with its decision No. 3-1-1-95-07, by saying that there is no reason to consider changing the jurisdiction in the criminal case of Arnold Meri, because there are rules of criminal procedure in Estonia for objective proceeding of genocide by a competent court.