### Largest towns in Estonia (by road, km)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>01.01.2005</th>
<th>Distance from Tallinn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>396 010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartu</td>
<td>101 483</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva</td>
<td>69 410</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohtla-Järve</td>
<td>46 032</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu</td>
<td>44 396</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viljandi</td>
<td>20 354</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ethnic composition of citizens of Estonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationalities</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dear Reader,

I am glad to present you the next – eighth in line – Annual of the Security Police Board. Continuing the tradition initiated in 1998, the following pages present a summary of the work done by the Security Police Board in 2005 and some observations made in connection with our spheres of activity.

15 years since the recreation of the Security Police fills this year. I am convinced that during this time, short on the one hand, but comparatively long on the other, the Security Police has become an efficient service, which plays an important role in guaranteeing security in Estonia, as well as in the European Union and NATO.

Recalling the year 2005 we cannot avoid mentioning the terrorist attack with the great number of victims that took place in London on June 7. This once more confirmed that radically inclined supporters of Islam are ready and also capable of committing terrorist attacks in Europe. Most alarming is the fact that this terrorist act was carried out by Moslems, who have lived in Great Britain for several generations already. The fact that an increasing number of the European Union citizens belong among the supporters of Islam has raised the level of terrorist threat in the whole Europe. The citizens of the Member States can move freely within the borders of the European Union and this complicates the situation for law enforcement agencies in preventing the activity of persons connected with terrorists. Thus, for guaranteeing security, close cooperation and swift information exchange with other countries and international organisations is essential. Integration of Europe and globalisation makes trust between security services and residents of the state more vital. I mean that we can be successful in guaranteeing security only by means of cooperation. Combating terrorism cannot and should not be organised as a campaign – combating this phenomenon must be continuous, in Estonia and Europe, as well as in the whole world.

In brief we must state regretfully that terrorist attacks, as the worldwide tendency indicates, approach Estonia geographically year by year.

Speaking of the last year we cannot avoid an alarming occurrence of aggressive activities of Russia aimed towards Estonia. During the period preceding the election of local governments in 2005, the Security Police ascertained the aspirations of Russian Federation to ensure the breakthrough of Russian-speaking political parties of Estonia into local governments. Numerous administrative agencies and organisations of Russia worked for this, including the Russian Embassy in Estonia. Especially active were intelligence officers hiding behind diplomatic disguise. We cannot ignore the processes taking place in Estonia, shaping with the assistance of Russian Federation, which cannot be called otherwise than interfering into internal affairs of the Republic of Estonia. The purpose of such activity is transparent – Russian Federation needs to have its own people inside to influence decision processes, both in major local governments as well as in the Riigikogu. Here the interests of Russian Federation, not the interests of Russian-speaking residents of Estonia, come first.

In 2005, we continued active anti-corruption combat, as well. We tracked down several large-scaled and complicated cases of criminal official misconduct. A group of 19 officials was taken to court and a case of a public official taking bribe that amounted over half a million of kroons was detected. A number of official misconducts connected with public procurements of information technology will remind of the year 2005. Shortage of ethics dominating in some fields gives rise to fear: we cannot described otherwise the situation, where acknowledged managers of information technology companies discussing a court decision in media express an opinion that giving bribe is an infringement equal to, for instance, exceeding speed limit. This brings out two aspects: first – the shifted values of a certain part of the society and second – the necessity and importance of combating corruption.

In speaking of the achievements of the Security Police in 2005, we must also mention the significant breakthrough in investigating the explosions that have taken place in the Lasnamäe district, Tallinn for several years.

In the name of the Security Police Board, I want to thank all people and cooperation partners, who collectively helped to secure the safety of the state and our citizens last year.

Wishing you interesting reading and pleasant cooperation,

Aldis Alus
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE SECURITY POLICE BOARD
In the 15th year of its activity the Security Police Board can be proud of its stable, experienced and professional personnel, still recurrent in optimum scale. All this has guaranteed and will guarantee consistent development of the Board. In 2005 the average age of the employees reached 33.8 years, the average length of service 7 years and 6 months. Rapidly progressing environment in which we work lays on us additional responsibilities and demands continuously better knowledge. Recurrent demands should be particularly taken into consideration in planning and organising the trainings – the number of trainings has increased annually. Due to ever growing risk of terrorism in the world the Security Police lays increasingly greater emphasis on anti-terrorism combat trainings. At the same time various short-term in-service trainings are organised to keep the knowledge and skills of our employees constantly on the necessary level. In 2005 active participation in various seminars and conferences in Estonia and abroad continued.

One of the measures of the skills and professional achievements of the employees of the Security Police Board were state awards given on February 24, on the Independence Day of Estonia: in 2005 one 4th class Order of the Cross of the Eagle and four 5th class Order of the Cross of the Eagle decorations and several letters of appreciation and certificates of honour of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Police Board. It should be acknowledged that if years ago our employees quite often turned to partner services for expert opinions in case of complicated matters, today we consult our partners more often. Such progress has been achieved, first of all, due to successful searching, training and motivating of employees.
Sports and entertainment have not been forgotten, either. In 2005 our officials participated in various inter-institutional competitions (volleyball and basketball) and in-house sports events. The nice tradition of the Board's summer and winter events continued, as well. If winter joys tend to be enjoyed by a limited number of winter sports fans, then the summer event has been a genuine family event for years. Excellent weather doubtlessly contributed to the success of the summer event of the 2005 at Kääriku. The year ended, as usual, with the high-spirited Christmas party.
Every year on the Police Day (November 12) the Security Police Board traditionally awards two public officials, whose assistance to the Security Police in some specific area has helped jointly and successfully to guarantee legal order and security of the citizens. On the Police Day in 2005 the Head of the Rescue Board’s Centre of Mine Clearing Margus Kurvits, according to the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, was awarded the weapon registered on his name. With the order of the Director General of the Security Police Board the chief of logistics of the Border Guard Administration’s Valga Border Guard District, Major Meelis Kivi was awarded the Plate of Merit of the Security Police.

The Security Police Board thanks from the heart all persons, organisations, institutions and enterprises that have helped the Security Police to improve the security of Estonia in 2005.
The Minister of Internal Affairs Kalle Laanet attending the awarding ceremony of the best cooperation partners of the Security Police Board in 2005.

The Plate of Merit to major Meelis Kivi

The inscribed firearm to Margus Kurvits
In 2005 all special services of Russian Federation (GRU, SVR and FSB) increased their activeness in Estonia noticeably. According to the information of the Security Police Estonian military and diplomats, who have permanent assignment abroad, have been approached. FSB also tried vigorously to recruit persons, who have contacts in public institutions and political circles. FSB continued its traditional gathering of economic information in Estonian-Russian border region and observation of mutual relations between the local governments of Estonia and Russia.

The spheres of interest of the Security Service of Russian Federation (FSB) are extensive, but lately the interest in Estonian power structures and Estonia’s politics has become predominant. FSB is continuously connected with influencing the activity of Russian community in Estonia. Since 2004 the Security Police has observed FSB’s operations in the European Union, in the framework of which it tries to make use of persons from the Baltic States, working in the structures of the EU. One such operation worth of mentioning was doubtlessly the formation of European Russian Alliance at the European Parliament. The scenario for this was prepared in St. Petersburg and reported directly to the Director General of FSB as a triumph.

In 2005, as in previous years, FSB continued to search and create an enemy figure. Several showy FSB campaigns for “catching Estonian spies,” starring FSB agents, were carried out in 2005. These productions have several aims: to disseminate fear in Russia’s citizens, to glorify their own professionalism and watchfulness and, after capturing the “spy,” demonstrate Estonia in media campaigns as a state hostile and dangerous to Russia. One of the stage directors of this staging is the FSB Centre official Aleksandr Harlamov. As Harlamov has participated in many recruiting attempts of Estonian citizens, we ask the residents of Estonia, whom the person depicted on the photo has troubled, to inform the Security Police Board of this on the phone 6 121 455.

According to the opinion of the Security Police Board the active and insolent activity of FSB in Russia (recruiting Estonian citizens who visit Russia, influencing businessmen via issuing visa and via business
interests) is especially dangerous from the security aspect of the state, because operations that Russian special services carry out on the territory of Estonia are easier to detect. In order to emphasize and bring to notice the seriousness of danger the Security Police considers important to warn all Estonian citizens travelling to Russia of approach attempts of Russian special services.

In 2005 all intelligence officers working in the Embassy of Russian Federation under diplomatic cover tried to perform special missions given to them. As an interesting tendency, proceeding from visa restrictions established in 2004, the Embassy increased the number of diplomats by way of inviting diplomats and administrative-technical personnel to short-term official travels (not assignments) into Estonia. The length of such official travels ranges from 5 to 130 days. In the first half of 2005 applications on 90-days official travels dominated, but by the end of 2005 already 22 persons had submitted visa applications. There are grounds to suspect several of these applicants in connections with Russian intelligence services.

Attempts are made to execute anti-Estonia intelligence and acts of influence "by the book" – thoroughly and systematically. Persons of interest to Russian Intelligence are "treated" according to the list, previously compiled on the basis of information obtained by various means from the leaders of Russian community and state officials of Estonia.

In 2005 the most important task of local intelligence residency was undoubtedly an attempt to consolidate different political forces of Russian community for elections of local governments in 2005. The activeness of a resident of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Anatoli Dyshkant acting under cover of an adviser in the Embassy should be noted separately. He met and talked with the local leaders of Russian parties and recommended to participate at local elections together.

The role of Russian special services in executing Russia’s foreign and economic policy is constantly growing, much due to the fact that high-ranking intelligence officials transfer to state offices and political parties. An alarming case from 2005 was a cooperation meeting, where five of the six members of Russia’s delegation were officials, ranking as generals of intelligence!
Increasing the consciousness of both, state officials and citizens, supported doubtlessly by the guide introducing protection of state secrets compiled by the Security Police Board, but also by 22 trainings organised for public institutions and business enterprises with over 500 participants should be considered the most important achievement in the sphere of protection of state secrets in 2005. For various reasons media covered the issue of state secrets repeatedly, as well. Regrettably the press does not always enable to explain the nature of problems, thus on the one hand state secrets are mystified and on the other hand, an impression is created, as if state secret is information classified according to officials’ pleasure and by that diminished into formality.

It is essential from the position of the Security Police Board that persons coming across state secrets would not treat classification of information into state secret as formality. Several allied states of NATO and the EU define damage caused by disclosure of a state secret as potential loss in personnel. Consequently, the sphere of state secret should not be considered a formality anywhere. Restrictions are imposed on information classified as state secret or having other restrictions applied to it restricted in order to guarantee protection to preservation of such information.

The principle of trust applies to states as well as persons. This means that in accepting information, the state agrees to protect this information in the way the sender of the information has considered necessary. This principle should be strictly followed in everyday processing of state secrets. The behaviour, where a person accepts information as classified, but does not handle it accordingly, presuming incorrectly that the information contained in the data medium is not classified, cannot be considered proper.

In 2005 we discovered several shortages in treating the state secrets of the Republic of Estonia. Media covered more extensively the unsatisfactory arrangement of protection of data mediums in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The legal proceeding did not ascertain removal of data mediums from security area, but classified data mediums were destroyed without proper registering. All in all, it could be said that disclosure of state secrets did not occur, but protection of state secrets in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in general did not meet the requirements. Another case achieving extensive attention was a lawsuit on the former Minister of Defence Margus Hanson, from whose home a briefcase containing secret data media was stolen. Infringement consisted in the fact that data media were taken out of security area and left unsupervised. These events have forced several state institutions to re-inspect the measures for protecting state secrets.

In case of measures applied in protection of state secrets it should be observed that protected information would not be disclosed, i.e. a person without access certificate must not come across secret documents. Besides direct danger also indirect risks, meaning above all illegal access to facilities, means of communication and information processing systems, where secrets are processed, should be prevented.

Three state authorities organise protection of state secrets in the Republic of Estonia: the Security Police Board, the Information Board and the Headquarters of the Defence Forces. While the Information Board and the Headquarters of the Defence Forces deal mainly with protection of state secrets and executing security clearance prior to issuing the access permit in-house, the Security Police Board carries out the same tasks for the whole civil sphere. The Information Board carries out security clearances within the Board and the Headquarters of the Defence Forces carries out the same function in the defence forces and in the National Defence League. Despite the division of the protection of state secrets between different agencies, the Security Police Board is the only agency authorised to conduct extra-judicial proceedings and pre-trial procedures connected with violation of state secret. Thus, the main role in organising protection of state secrets in Estonia rests on the Security Police Board.
The State Secrets Act and the State Secrets Protection Procedure places upon persons, but also public departments or business enterprises possessing access permit, obligation to notify. Obligation to notify can be divided into three:

- notifying about changes in personal data;
- notifying about violation of handling requirements of classified information;
- notifying about an attempt to gain illegal access to state secrets.

Notifying about changes in personal data is important for two reasons: 1) that every possessor of access permit might prove his/her right for access any moment, and 2) that the validity of every access permit would be controllable any moment. In case of change of name the access permit to state secrets must be replaced just as all other identity documents.

Assault against state secret means indirect assault to the security of the state. Timely notification of all violations of handling requirements and illegal access attempts to any information classified as state secret helps to:

1. have constant knowledge, which part of classified information might be at risk;
2. ascertain all assaults against information in need of protection;
3. avoid any damage that due to disclosure of classified information might endanger the security of the population or the state.

The number of spheres regulated by state secrets has steadily increased in Estonia in the course of time. The main reason for this in last years has been increased proportion of classified information originating from international organisations. Access by virtue of office to information classified as "Restricted" notably increased the quantity of increase. Here it is important to emphasize and realize that although state secrets marked as "Restricted" is on the lowest level of the hierarchy, it is still state secret.
In most countries the security services, besides guaranteeing the security of the state, guarantee economic security of the state, as well. One of the components of protection is industrial security or the state’s activity in protecting industrial sector. An integral part of industrial security is processing of state secrets by legal persons. Access permit to information classified as state secret, issued to a legal person by the Security Police Board, enables the enterprise to participate in classified procurements organised by NATO, the European Union or their Member States. Obtaining voluminous procurements by Estonian enterprises creates new jobs and supports economic growth in Estonia as a whole.

Enterprises all over the world consider information leakage and knowledge theft much more dangerous than, for instance, fires. In case of fire information will be destroyed, in case of theft the company acquires a well-informed competitor, whose development expenses are much lower due to stolen information, thus enabling the company to manufacture cheaper and acquire competition advantage in the market. Today we can talk about national industrial espionage and industrial espionage in the enterprises. In case of the first the interest is chiefly directed to intensification of technologic development and saving on development expenses in order to accomplish military, technologic, political and economic programmes. In case of enterprises the interest is directed to growing the profit by means of saving on development expenses.

To close the subject we present an extract from an explanatory letter of a state official – a negative example not to be followed: “... I knew that these documents should not be thrown into the dustbin, so I put them beside it.” No comments here.

Increasingly faster developing economy in Estonia, increasing modernisation and globalisation – these require more attention from the state, enterprises and citizens in guaranteeing economic security. Advances in developing and applying new technologies cause increasing interest in the other states’ special services, their purpose being acquirement of information about scientific achievements, new technologies, various studies, etc. Industrial espionage can have serious consequences on the target enterprise – from economic loss to decay and liquidation.

Estonia’s rather liberal economic climate and favourable taxation climate contribute, first of all, to inflow of capital from Russia and that also increases security risks. It is important to emphasize the statement of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin from December 20, 2005, that information security, protection of domestic business in foreign markets and “guaranteeing equal and safe competition environment there” will become more vital. According to Putin, Russian special services, including powerful technologic and intellectual potential of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) should be more actively involved in fulfilling these tasks.

In 2005 the Security Police observed increasing activeness of SVR officers working in Estonia under diplomatic cover. The Federal Security Service (FSB) that has actively supported expansion of Russian capital to the neighbouring countries was active in this field. FSB has, under pretence of combating terrorism, infiltrated into various economic structures and spheres. Although in the competition conditions of free market economy every enterprise has to deal with the risk management of business itself, the dialogue between entrepreneurs and the Security Police is expedient and necessary for preventing foreign intelligence.

Economic security does not include only national counterintelligence: it is important that public decision mechanisms are independent of influential activity of persons connected with foreign capital. It is often difficult to ascertain, whether the lobbying is in the interests of the company or the state, or both. Taking into consideration the relatively modest dimensions of Estonian economy more attention should be paid to consolidation tendencies of business branches, especially in connection with capital originating from outside the European Union. The recent gas conflict between Ukraine and Russia clearly indicated that entrepreneurs must manage also political risks. Estonian entrepreneurs should attentively observe the (political) tendencies in Russia, where private entrepreneurs’ great dependence on public structures and increasing nationisation could be seen. Today’s foreign business partner, who achieves too great role in some sector important to the state, might after some years begin to influence domestic and foreign policy of the country.

In recent years the tandem Gennadi Timchenko and Severstaltrans have actively expanded their economic scope in transit sector in Estonia, trying to increase their percentage in transit chain, and lobby in Estonian public institutions and political circles through contact persons, connected to them by business interests. In order to exclude the possibility that other interests besides economic ones, whether personal or public, would be realised, competitive parity should be guaranteed. We have observed that local Russian compatriots organisations, being constantly short of money (finances are often used for personal benefits) have started to try to make reprisals to Estonian entrepreneurs in the form “if you don’t sponsor us, you can’t do business.”

In 2005 the Security Police again observed increasing tendency in the political circles of Russia to use economic pressure to influence Estonia politically. Particularly busy in making threats at various economic forums was the head of the Presidential Department for Inter-regional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries Modest Kolerov, whose activity proves that in his opinion relations between Estonia and Russia is not a partnership based on mutual benefit, but unilateral relationship of subordination.
In 2005, the Russian Federation continued active application of "compatriots issue" to achieve its foreign policy aim. The so-called protection of compatriots' interests still lies in obtaining trumps for foreign policy rhetoric via influencing compatriots. Russia undoubtedly uses protection of compatriots as propagandistic leverage to influence their own population. Since Estonia’s accession to the European Union a new tendency has appeared – Russia’s desire to use local compatriots organisations and Russian parties in the interest of Russia’s foreign policy in European Parliament and elsewhere and via these organisations influence domestic policy situation in Estonia.

The main institutions carrying out Russia’s foreign policy are the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Duma. Although changes in the Presidential Executive Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided for in the administrative reform, took place also in 2005, they did not involve changes in relations with Estonia. Russia’s foreign policy as a whole became more flexible in 2005, especially towards the neighbouring countries (the CIS and Baltic states). Expressive examples of inflexible policy, aimed against Estonia, were abrogation of border agreement signatures and refusal to grant visa to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia. Economic pressure and threatening with power, accompanied with intensive anti-Estonian propaganda in Russia’s foreign policy could be clearly distinguished.

The weakened control of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation over compatriots issue in 2004 strengthened again in 2005. Confirmation of this is the establishment of the Department for Inter-regional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (VRKAV) on February 22, 2005, headed by the specialist of political techniques and propaganda Modest Kolerov, who is subject to the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Sobyanin. The main reason for establishing this department was Moscow’s political failure in connection with upheavals in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. VRKAV’s official tasks include intensification of contacts with compatriots living abroad, its actual purpose, however, should be considered consolidation of Russian diaspora in the neighbouring countries in the interests of Moscow and informative-political work upon the residents of the countries of location – especially after liberal revolutions that have taken place in several CIS countries. Proceeding from the role of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation Russia’s Government reports on situaton of relations with the Baltic States to the Office once in a calendar quarter.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, as well as the Embassy of RF in Tallinn became significantly more active in the issue of compatriots in 2005, whereas the role of both became more directly aimed than before. The Embassy, for instance, gave several direct tasks and orders to various compatriots’ organisations. Both, the Ministry and the Embassy used money as an effective leverage.

Russia’s Embassy in Tallinn guides directly or indirectly major compatriots’ organisations in Estonia, e.g. the Union of Russia’s Compatriots Associations together with its sub-organisations, also Information Centre of Human Rights, which depend directly on the financing of the Embassy. The leaders of these organisations have almost daily contacts with Russian Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, receiving guidelines and instructions on further activities and financial support for carrying out their actions. From their part these organisations constantly deliver to the Embassy information about their own activity and events on the political landscape of Estonia, also compile surveys and analyses used for planning Russia’s foreign policy onward.

The activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (in connection with the Baltic States) in 2005 is characterised by general propaganda aimed against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and “protection of the rights” of Russian-speaking population there. Estonia is constantly pointed at as a problematic state, Estonia’s “destructive behaviour” is referred to on all levels of contacts, in Russia’s foreign representations as well as international organisations. In relations with NATO and the EU officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia emphasize that the problems in the Baltic States with Russian-speaking population discredit these organisations, too.

On April 27, 2005, a conference addressed to Russia’s compatriots – “Change of Elite and Elections in the CIS and Baltic States” – was held in Moscow, in the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The conference was organised by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Institute of Contemporary Diaspora, main topic being the development of the CIS and Baltic states and processes taking place among their political elite. According to the concept of organisers these states are in the middle of a critical period just now, connected with renewal of political elite and change of generations, but also with political and economic reasons. According to the organisers the nature of these changes depends on the role of Russia as a key state. In this context forms and methods of CIS’s foreign policy in relation to the CIS and Baltic states were discussed on the conference. Experts, representatives of public and non-profit structures and journalists from the CIS and Baltic states were involved in discussions and debates.

The conference held in Moscow and the issues raised there once more confirm the fact that Russia continually attempts to gain authority over the former USSR states, including Estonia, intervening with its compatriots’ policy the internal affairs of these states. First of all, attempts are made to employ Russian communities living in these countries in the interests of Russia via political and informative, but also via vigorous cultural action. Due to West-orientated political changes that have taken place in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, the Kremlin has feverishly began to revalue the efficiency of former methods. One indicator of this process is the establishment of a new structural department headed by Modest Kolerov.

As a part of differentiated foreign policy addressed towards the Baltic States approach to history, particularly to the II WW is emphasized. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia has initiated the idea to establish a working group by the Security Council of the Russian Federation that would draw up countermeasures to misconceptions of history. Such working group has already been established in the Ministry of Defence of Russia. In order to discredit the Baltic States in abovementioned issues it has been considered important to intensify cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Russia’s and international Jewish organisations.
As mentioned above, on February 22, 2005, a new structural unit – the Department for Inter-regional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (VRKAV) – was established by the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation and the former editor-in-chief of the information agency Regnum Modest Kolerov was appointed its head. During his short time in this office Modest Kolerov has frequently made negative or hostile statements about Estonia. In order to achieve his purposes he has often used Russia’s information agency Regnum (www.regnum.ru). According to the Security Police Regnum is not an ordinary information agency, but a structure controlled by the power elite and special services of Russia via which they try to affect internal political situation in the neighbouring countries in the direction favourable for Russia.

The activity of Modest Kolerov might well be behind the fact that funds allocated to compatriots are not made as direct contributions, but in 2006, 500 million roubles from the state budget are planned for financing Russian non-profit associations. Allocation of money will take place via the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation. VRKAV’s attempts to intervene into domestic policy of Estonia could be observed in 2005 in connection with local government elections with the purpose to unite Russian-speaking political powers in Estonia. In 2005 Modest Kolerov threatened in his speeches to use economic leverages against the Baltic States, as well. Kolerov’s management has attentively observed the issue of Fenno-Ugrians (Mariland) and pointed that this is a retaliation of Fenno-Ugrian nation states.

Modest Kolerov wanted to visit Estonia on October 3-4, 2005, with the purpose to participate in the electoral action of the list of candidates Citizens Initiative – Elections of 2005 formed on the basis of the United Peoples Party of Estonia and consolidate Russian community around this party. Due to various reasons Modest Kolerov could not visit Estonia and his intentions to manipulate local Russian community before local government elections failed. On October 26-27, 2005 Modest Kolerov participated at the conference “Baltic Transit and Economic Security” held in St. Petersburg by the fund “Euroregion Livonia,” where he accused the Baltic States and other neighbours of Russia in applying double standards in economic security and tied the solution of economic issues with the solution of political issues.

After the forum in St. Petersburg Modest Kolerov visited Latvia on November 7-10, 2005. He started his visit in Latvia dashingly, making offensive statements about Latvia to the press at the airport already. Later his tone relented a bit. However, Modest Kolerov did not tire to emphasize two things during his visit:

1. Russia’s compatriots’ policy is indisputable;
2. Russia will not excuse before Latvia (Baltic States) for issues connected with history.

Actions Organised by ‘the Anti-Fascist Committee’

In 2005 a non-profit organisation with a propagandistic name – Non-profit Organisation Against Neo-Fascism and National Hostility (colloquially the Anti-Fascist Committee) – continued its anti-Estonia activity by organising tendentious history lectures in the schools in Maardu, orientated to the youth of Russian community, justifying the Soviet occupation regime. On March 18, 2005 a lecture “Spring 1945” organised by the Anti-Fascist Committee took place in Kallavere Secondary School, the main organisers being the ideologists of the Anti-Fascist Committee Andrei Zarenkov and the Mayor of Maardu Georgi Bystrov. Lecturers at this event were the members of the Anti-Fascist Committee’s board Arnold Meri and Uno Laht, the first of them a suspect in crime against humanity (the March deportation of 1949 in Hiiumaa) and the latter is a former security official of the Soviet Union, who hunted forest brothers.

The author and main financer of the series of lectures was the correspondent of the information agency Regnum Dmitri Kondrashov, residing in Russia. The chairman of Maardu sub-organisation of the Union of the Veterans Organisations Vladimir Zaitsev was also involved in this action. Arnold Meri has lectured in Maardu Gymnasium on the same topic earlier. The message of this lecture was that Russia did not occupy Estonia as Estonian history books and public generally claim. Estonia joined the USSR voluntarily. The financer of the lecture Dmitri Kondrashov published in the opinion column of Russian-language Delfi web page a subjective historical approach full of Soviet-era rhetoric in the name
of the United Peoples Party of Estonia. It is noteworthy that he did not inform anyone of this, not even the then chairman of the party Jevgeni Tomberg.

An interesting fact worth of mentioning is that Dmitri Kondrashov has earlier worked as an adviser of the United Peoples Party of Estonia and as a subordinate of Modest Kolerov in Regnum. Before that he was the ideologist and establisher of a by now liquidated youth organisation Front. As we described in one of our previous annuals, in March 2003 the members of Front protested in front of the Embassy of the United States, which overgrew into illegal demonstration.

On September 22, 2005 the veterans of the Red Army, mainly Russians by nationality, celebrated the so-called anniversary of the liberation of Tallinn of fascist forces (this day will always remind Estonians the violent liquidation of Otto Tief's legal government and reoccupation of our capital city by the Red Army). The initiator of this event was the Union of the Veterans Organisations and the Union of Armed Forces and War Veterans, assembling the veterans of Tallinn. Like in previous years a festive ceremony where speeches were made, took place.

Besides the memorial ceremony carried out under the leadership of the veterans section, the Non-profit Organisation Against Neo-Fascism and National Hostility organised a separate action in cooperation with the "Citizens Initiative – Elections of 2005" formed on the basis of the United Peoples Party of Estonia. The organisers from Estonia were the activists of the United Peoples Party of Estonia Andrei Zarenkov (also the leader of the Anti-Fascist Committee) and Georgi Bystrov, who wanted, with a torch made in St. Petersburg, to bring to Estonia the flame lighted from the eternal fire of Piskaryov memorial and light a commemorative candle at the Tõnismägi memorial.

The idea of propagandistic action came from Russia from the former correspondent in Estonia of Russian information agency Regnum Dmitri Kondrashov, who at the moment lives in St. Petersburg. The curator and main financer of the candle-lighting action was the head of the Department for Inter-regional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation Modest Kolerov, via whom the party in power in Russia, "United Russia," was also involved in this 'project'. The secretary of regional political council of "United Russia" Vadim Tyulpanov lighted the torch meant for Tallinn under media attention at the Piskaryov memorial on September 21, 2005.

On September 21, 2005 at 3 p.m. in Jaanilinn the torch and the candle were handed over to Andrei Zarenkov, Georgi Bystrov and the representative of Narva Veterans Section, who returned by foot along Narva road-bridge to Estonian border at 4 p.m. The Border Guard of the Russian Federation ordered to put out the torch, meant specially for transporting the fire, in the frontier zone. In the evening of September 22, 2005 the information portal Regnum.ru began to circulate Zarnekov’s comment that talk in Estonian media about Russian Border Guard putting out the torch is disinformation and was actually done by Estonian Border Guard. On arrival to Estonia a picture was taken of the abovementioned persons at Narva border checkpoint and the company proceeded to the meeting of Narva Russian Citizens’ Association to represent the torch. Andrei Zarenkov made a speech covering the origin of the torch, historic events and commemorative day.

On September 22, 2005 at 9 a.m. the Non-profit Organisation Against Neo-Fascism and National Hostility headed by Andrei Zarenkov, Georgi Bystrov, Arnold Meri, Uno Laht and Vladimir Velman gathered at the
Tõnismägi monument, where they lighted the commemorative candle brought from St. Petersburg. As the torch was put out at the border, Andrei Zarenkov lighted it with a cigarette lighter. Representatives of Estonian- and Russian-language media and shooting groups from Pervyi Baltiiski Kanal and STV were invited to intermediate the event. Andrei Zarenkov remained at Tõnismägi until 1 p.m., gave interviews and presented flowers to veterans, promoting in principal the electoral coalition “Citizens Initiative – Elections of 2005”.

Information portal Regnum.ru, hostile towards Estonia and well known for propagating slander, circulated information about events at Tõnismägi to Russia’s news media. The portal continued broadcasting during the event and made summaries even the next day, in the course of reflecting the events connections between Estonia and fascism were indirectly set forth repeatedly. For instance, Andrei Zarenkov’s quote was circulated, according to which “the candle lighted on this event will help to keep fascism out of Estonia forever.” Zarenkov repeatedly implied in his speeches to “several forces in Estonia obstructing” the activities of Anti-Fascist Committee.

Attempts to Establish European Russian Party

In 2005 the Russian Federation continued its attempts to establish the Russian Party of the European Union – the purpose being extension and strengthening of influence in Europe. As we already mentioned in our previous Annual the purpose of this pretentiously-named party is to establish a party on ethnic basis that would ignore the principles of the European Union, to unite all Russians living in the Member States of the EU and to “protect their interests”.

A noteworthy event in compatriots policy was the conference “Russian-speaking population of the European Union: formation of civil society” held in Brussels on June 17-18, 2005, where two associations were established for pan-European Russian community – the Federation of Russian Parties in the EU and the European Russian Alliance. This was a sequent meeting of the initiative group formed in Prague on June 4, 2004, for establishing the Russian Party of the EU.

The conference was organised by the delegate of the European Parliament, the leader of Latvian Russian-speaking political group “For Human Rights in a United Latvia” and one spokesperson of Latvian radical National Bolshevik Party Tatjana Zhdanok in cooperation with the fractions of the Greens of the European Parliament and the European Free Alliance. Nearly 40 people from influential organisations of Russian communities from various EU Member States and from Russia participated in this conference. Representatives from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, England, Portugal, Austria, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Cyprus, Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and Russia were present. The representative from Estonia was the vice-chairman of Russian Party in Estonia Gennadi Afanasyev, who was banned to enter the Republic of Latvia in 2005.

According to the statutes the Federation of Russian Parties of the EU is a legal person according to the Association Law of France from 1901. The members of this Federation are parties protecting the interests of Russian-speaking population. The tasks of this organisation are coordination of their activities and pooling of experience. The purposes of the organisation coincide with the ones envisaged in their political platform and they are to be achieved at conferences and information campaigns, by organising lobby and direct actions (действия прямого действия). The Federation of Russian Parties of the EU coordinates help to its members in pre-electoral contest in the Member States of the EU.

The European Russian Alliance and the Federation of Russian Parties of the EU have similar aims, but unlike the latter, which deals with Russian-speaking parties, the activity of the European Russian Alliance is aimed at Russian-speaking population as a whole and besides the EU it acts in European business environment (€ўропейская экономическая среда – Russia is probably considered to belong into this environment). Every person of at least 18 years of age, capable of legal act, who submits written application and recommendations of at least three members living in different states, can join the European Russian Alliance. The decision about receiving a new member is made by the board of the Alliance. The highest governing body of the organisation is the European Russian Assembly (€ўропейский Русский Собор), called together once a year and all members are allowed to participate. The Assembly elects the board, its head and auditor.
The further foreign policy priorities of Russia in connection with the European Russian Alliance and the Federation of Russian Parties of the EU is to use compatriots organisations and Russian parties in the foreign policy interests of Russia in relations with the European Union, accompanied with an attempt to affect domestic policy of Estonia.

In connection with Estonia should be noted the initiative of the representative of Russian extremists living in Latvia Tatyana Zhdanok to organise the conference of Russian movements in Europe in Narva right before local government elections in Estonia, with the purpose to increase and propagate the popularity of the representatives of Russian parties running for elections. Zhdanok tried to use an old-fashioned method to bring into Estonia leaflets propagating her radical views.

Reforming the issue of compatriots and compatriots’ policy could be prognosticated in Russia in 2006. Primal will be not direct financial support, but support via various advantages. On foreign policy level continues emphasizing the compatriots issue from the aspect of so-called human rights, with prime emphasis on activity in international organisations (EU, NATO, OSCE, UN) and influencing Estonia via these organisations.

Talking about political extremism and its export to Estonia we cannot avoid the events in the Republic of Latvia. On February 25, 2005 Latvian national bolshevists managed, despite the protests of law enforcement authorities, to legalise their activity in Latvian record of enterprises under the name of the non-profit association NBP. NBP’s associate – Latvian AKM, practically a sub-organisation of all-Russian movement “Vanguard of Red Youth” (Авангард красной молодежи) – registred itself likewise.

On March 12, 2005 elections of local governments took place in Latvia. One political force on which Russia’s official institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Moscow City Government) and non-profit organisations (e.g. Juri Dolgoruky Fund in Moscow) made contribution to was the association “For Human Rights in United Latvia.” The latter secretly cooperated with extremists – chauvinistic Latvian National Bolshevik Party headed by Jevgeni Ossipov (barkashovians) and National Bolshevik Party (limonovians) that has had several problems with law. There were cases, when “For Human Rights in United Latvia” openly began to defend extremists, whose activity the law enforcement authorities tried to prevent. “For Human Rights in United Latvia” used national bolsheviks and their associates from non-profit association AKM in carrying out their action against education reform. Barkashovians, limonovians and red avant-guardists also participated in unauthorised actions organised against the parade of Latvian Legionaries that took place in Liepaya on March 16, 2005.

Proceeding from the abovementioned, more active cooperation between “For Human Rights in United Latvia” led by Tatyana Zhdanok and
organisations representing the Russian-speaking population of Estonia should be considered dangerous from the aspect of Estonia’s security. In this context the coordinated activity of the former member of the Russian Party in Estonia Dmitri Linter and the activist of “For Human Rights in United Latvia” Juris Sokolovski should be mentioned. In early 2005 the management of the Russian Party in Estonia adopted the decision to start carrying out joint actions with Latvian leftists (“For Human Rights in United Latvia” and the anti-education-reform movement Headquarters of Protection of Russian Schools). The situation became attractive to the activist of Russian Party in Estonia Gennadi Afanasyev, Dmitri Linter and their followers, because organising various actions and perceptible public interest in them gives an opportunity to make propaganda before elections of local governments.

The activity of Linter-Afanasyev was built up similarly to the pre-election tactics of “For Human Rights in United Latvia” – to create a lot of public response by means of public actions and by that increase the number of the voters for the party. The leading method was to cause sensation and take advantage of the large-scaled public dispute accompanying domestic policy events. On the Second Congress of the Headquarters of Protection of Russian Schools held in Riga on April 17, 2005, Dmitri Linter said that Estonia’s situation resembles the situation in Latvia, because here, as well, Russians are forced to become Estonians. He admitted that Estonia does it more delicately, but the final goal would be to keep Russians away from power. Linter agitated Russian diaspora in the Baltic States to jointly step up for discriminating politics.

As local elections were not successful the Linter-Afanasyev tandem soon began to use mean methods and direct provocations in order to discredit the activity of Estonian authorities in the eyes of the public (also international public). Schoolchildren were once again dragged into dirty political adventures of extremists – this time from Latvia.

Dmitri Linter in cooperation with his Latvian curators planned sensational demonstration on April 23, 2005. The main force on this event were to be the members of the extremist movement “Vanguard of Red Youth” always participating in the actions of “For Human Rights in United Latvia.” They were to travel to Estonia under the pretext of “the schoolchildren excursion” and conduct a sudden action in Tallinn, unexpected for authorities, with the purpose to find response in international press and draw attention to the “problem.” This was a direct provocation, because Linter had chosen for the action the open house day of the Riigikogu and the place was to be at Estonia’s parliament building. Among “sightseers” was the activist of Latvian National Bolshevist Party Levs Vasilyevs, in relation to whom prohibition on entry to Estonia was effected already several years ago in connection with activity instigating hostility. Estonian law enforcement authorities prevented the planned demonstration and prohibition on entry to the Republic of Estonia will be applied to 12 more Latvian extremists in the future.

The demonstration of Latvian national bolsheviks on May 6, 2005 and a provocative meeting on May 8, 2005, planned to take place in front of the Embassy of Latvia in Tallinn were prevented, as well – both planned according to the instructions of Dmitri Linter. The demonstration was to be the first stepping out of the future Tallinn organisation of Russian National Bolshevist Party. Linter, due to his irresponsible and senseless activity discredited himself among Russian youngsters supporting national bolshevism and they gave up the idea to organise the demonstration.

The main source of danger in the future proceeding from Latvian National Bolshevist Party could be considered the potential establishment of an organisation in Estonia, based on national bolshevist ideology. As an example of an attempt to organise an act of protest, the former activist of Russian Party in Estonia Dmitri Linter (left from the party by now), in the framework of the electoral campaign “Klenski list,” carried out a demonstration in front of the parliament building in Tallinn on October 13, 2005, in defiance of Russian-language education. Linter hoped that this demonstration will initiate the process similar to the movement against education reform in Latvia, but the amount of his supporters had decreased to 7-8 persons by the end of 2005.
The Rightist Movements in Estonia

One of the priorities of information gathering done by the Security Police Board is ascertaining persons and groups instigating social hostility and endangering constitutional order, also preventing their criminal activity. The rightist, so-called skinheads movement is under attention. The activity of skinheads is not as advanced in Estonia as in many other European countries (including Finland and Sweden), but despite that there are several dangerous tendencies that could bring along the strengthening of this extremist movement in Estonia.

International cooperation of rightist extremists is a dangerous phenomenon. As for Estonia, contacts in foreign countries have influenced it and can bring along the spreading of skinhead ideology. Events uniting the rightists, mainly organising various concerts, contributes to this tendency. The idea and tradition to organise rightist extremist concerts has spread into Estonia from West European countries, where concerts and other events take place more often and with regularity. Since 2000 the main event for Estonian skinheads is the concert dedicated to the Independence Day of Estonia. In previous years there have been visitors, primarily from Finland, among both, performers and audience. Participation of local skinheads in concerts abroad, mainly in Finland and Germany, help to advance contacts with European skinheads.

One of the threats to constitutional order connected with skinheads is an attempt to involve rightist-minded persons in politics, because it could bring along the rightists’ getting politically legally organised. Such dangerous example should not be searched from far. It happened in the Republic of Latvia, where on the basis of Latvian extremist sub-organisation National Unity of Russia Latvian National Democratic Party was established. So far attempts to involve Estonian extremists in politics have been ascertained in connection with elections. Estonian Independence Party has been connected with such activity, as well – its summer event in 2005 practically developed into a convention of Estonian rightists.

Despite the lack of organisation the attitude of Estonian skinheads is aggressive and intolerant towards other races and sexual minorities. Fortunately the few cases with the elements of social hostility, which have taken place so far, have been mostly restricted to verbal insults, not physical violence and committed by individuals, not by groups. Until now the crimes (causing of bodily injuries) and misdemeanours (breach of public order) the skinheads have committed have not been numerous, but their victims have been foreign experts on assignments in Estonia, foreign students and tourists. Hostile attitude towards foreigners influences negatively Estonia’s reputation as a tourism country.

Skinheads’ negative attitude towards homosexuals is particularly striking. The parades of homosexuals brought along ardent public dispute in 2004 and 2005. The majority of bystanders tried to express their negative attitude towards the participants of the parade. Skinheads expressed their anger with insulting calls at first, but eventually there were cases, where police had to intervene to avoid violence. In the interests of impartiality it should be mentioned that some of the participants provoked the audience themselves. More aggressive are younger skinheads, especially minors, who are often young persons, left aside from socialization process, and might commit unreasoned and cruel acts (crimes) to prove their identity.
In 2005 it became increasingly obvious that local Moslems, whose ancestors have lived in Europe for several generations, are truly willing to carry out terrorist acts there. The suicide terrorist attack in London on July 7, 2005 (at least 52 deceased and over 700 injured) and an unsuccessful retry on July 21, confirmed this.

The fact that in both cases the involved persons were Pakistanis, born in Great Britain, shows an alarming tendency that an increasing number of EU citizens belong among the supporters of radical Islam and Islamic terrorism. Due to that identification of radically inclined persons becomes considerably more difficult. Recently the Moslem communities in Europe show signs of radicalisation, as Moslems, who have been in Europe for several generations, but also Europeans-converts join different fundamentalist and extremist groups.

Besides the so-called bomb-terrorism, the danger of terrorists making use of chemical and biological weapons is becoming increasingly realistic. Al-Qaida has threatened to release smallpox, botulism, Ebola-type virus or plague epidemic in some metropolis. Internet pages, connected with terrorists, indicate to the plan to organise biological terrorism-attack as soon as they are capable of it. To prevent such dangers the public health and rescue institutions’ system should be ready to deal with it. Terrorists’ latest tactics to attack preferably “soft targets,” where the power structures are usually not present, should be taken into consideration. Places filled with masses of civilians, such as public transport (metro, planes, trains, buses), health care institutions, schools, skyscrapers, etc. are most endangered.

Terrorism and Estonia

As one of the basic principles of the European Union is the free movement of persons, Estonia is already today confronted with the threat that potential terrorists may freely cross the borders of our country. Due to that it is considerably more complicated for security services and law enforcement authorities to ensure internal security and requires application of additional resources. We should also bear in mind that Estonia, geographically lying between Scandinavia and the Baltic States, logistically situates in a good place for the supporters of terrorism. As soon as complex strengthening of security measures in the older Member States of the European Union forces terrorists and their supporters and financiers into constant moving, terrorists might start to consider Estonia as one potential retreat. More frequent visits of fundamentalist religious organisations to Estonia and Estonia’s neighbouring countries during last years confirm this tendency.

Islamic organisation Jamaat Tabligh’s interest in the activity of Estonian Moslem community has been particularly insistent. This is a fundamentalist organisation of religion advertisers that has spread all over the world and regards distributing Islam its most important obligation. Jamaat Tabligh is not considered a terrorist organisation, but it is known that several of its members have joined terrorist organisations. Jamaat Tabligh’s purpose in Estonia is to get a picture of local Islamic community and to revert Moslems to so-called true Islam. Fortunately the ideas of this radical group have not found support in Estonian Islamic community, so far. However, in every social or religious group there are persons, who share extremist views and with great probability this is the case among local Moslems, as well.

Arresting of persons, suspected of preparation of terrorist acts in West Europe has moved geographically closer to Estonia year by year. Although the danger of terrorist attack has remained relatively modest in Estonia, so far, Estonia’s active participation in international anti-terrorist combat paradoxically increases the risk of terrorism here. It should be mentioned that the basis for victory lies in constant cooperation of all institutions. And even that does not exclude the possibility of terrorist attack completely.
Increased security measures: the Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair and the President of Israel Moshe Katzav in Tallinn in 2005.
Such punishment might help the owners of commercial organisations to understand more clearly that in case of crime one will not get away by acknowledging guilt and regretting it, but there is extensive financial loss accompanying it, as well.

The Security Police continues to gather information about persons and enterprises, which might be interested in illicit traffic or transit goods that belong to the abovementioned sector via the territory of Estonia. Attempts are made to identify persons involved in illegal activities, but also to ascertain what kind of strategic goods are involved and which are potential schemes for crossing Estonian-Russian border. The Security Police checks the background of these enterprises, which apply for permit to export strategic goods and the goods requiring special permit.

State Visits and Public Events

The growing global threat of terrorism makes potential attacks aimed at high-ranking representatives of foreign states visiting Estonia more probable. Increasingly stricter security measures should also be applied to ensure the safety of public events taking place in Estonia.

At the beginning of December 2005 the Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair paid a visit to Estonia to discuss with the Prime Ministers of the Baltic States the draft budget of the European Union for the next period. This was one of the most notable state visits made to Estonia lately. Guaranteeing the security of this important guest took place on the basis of the risk prognosis compiled by the Security Police Board. Besides Personal Protection Service and the Police, the whole personnel of the Security Police Board was in increased readiness during the short visit of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in order to prevent any potential terrorist attack. All in all, Tony Blair’s visit passed without incidents, demonstrating to the rest of the world that Estonia is a safe country.

Another state visit of high security risk occurred in September 2005, when the President of Israel Moshe Katsav paid a visit to Estonia. The Security Police Board made a great effort to secure the safety of this high-ranking guest, evaluating threats and minimizing the possibility of attack against the President of Israel. Moshe Katsav’s visit went successfully.

The Estonia-Russia World Championship match of football in Tallinn on March 30, 2005, had doubtlessly extensive public interest. Although a fair portion of political colouring dating from Soviet times (especially from the part of Russian football fans) accompanies athletic competitions of such level, any performances of persons with extremist inclination were prevented this time.

Illicit Traffic of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Strategic or Dual-Use Goods

The Security Police Board constantly tracks information about illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, firearms, explosives, strategic or dual-use goods, ammunition and military technology – the main purpose is to prevent the falling of such goods into the hands of some terrorist groups. At the same time information is gathered about criminal structures that gain income from illicit trafficking of illegal goods and/or goods requiring special permit across the borders of the Republic of Estonia, part of which is the external border of the European Union.

Several enterprises, which tried to bring into Estonia military or dual-use goods without permit were revealed in 2005. Among these enterprises was regrettably a well-known company Enimex Ltd., which brought an aircraft engine D-36 (used on planes AN-72, AN-74 and JAK-42) by plane from Ukraine to Estonia. Violation of law was proved in connection with OGMA-V Ltd. and Uralest Ltd., as well – both enterprises delivered to Estonia spare parts for helicopter MI-8, without having permit. During criminal proceedings, commenced to investigate all three cases, the mentioned facts were fully proved. Although criminal proceedings were terminated due to lack of public interest, compensation levies in favour of the state were claimed from all mentioned companies (correspondingly 100,000, 160,000 and 150,000 EEK).

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Detection of Explosions and Elimination of Illegal Explosives from Circulation

According to the statistics of the Security Police Board 6 explosions, in which 2 persons perished and 13 were injured, took place on the territory of the Republic of Estonia in 2005. Compared with the year 2004, when 7 explosions (5 deceased and 4 injured) were carried out, the total of explosions remained on the same level. Due to longstanding common efforts of the Security Police Board and other law enforcement authorities the total of explosions has probably reached its minimum. Every effort must be made that this number would not increase in the future. We should emphasize, as a positive tendency, the fact that beside the stability of the total of explosions the number of deceased has decreased from year to year.

Analysing the backgrounds of organising bomb explosions it can be claimed on the basis of the evidence gathered in the framework of criminal matters in the Security Police Board’s legislative proceeding that the percentage of explosions connected with the struggle for power between criminal groups has steadily decreased. The majority of explosions are carried out either to solve personal conflicts or due to incompetence in handling explosives.

Arrest in November 2005 of Märt Ringmaa, who is suspected of carrying out several explosions in the quarter of Pae Street in Lasnamäe district, Tallinn, got the greatest public attention. The person, called the “bomb maniac of Pae Street” by people, had terrified the neighbourhood for years, because it seemed that the explosions occurred with no comprehensible motivation. Several innocent outsiders, who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, perished or were injured in the explosions that took place in the neighbourhood of Pae Street and Punane Street.

To avoid organising explosions of explosive materials on the territory of the Republic of Estonia the Security Police Board’s priority besides investigation of explosions, has for years been identification and disclosure of persons, who manufacture and handle explosives and explosive devices illegally. In 2005 the officials of the Security Police Board discovered and removed all in all 77.8 kg of different explosives, 365 detonators of different purpose, 33 hand grenades, 6 gun grenades, 166 fuse heads of different purpose, 26 mines of different purpose, 1 shell and 4 meters of fuse. Besides that the whole arsenal of firearms was eliminated from civil circulation: 8 hunting guns, 5 pistols, 3 revolvers, 3 sawn-off rifles made of hunting guns, 7 silencers and 4220 cartridges of different calibre and purpose.

Compared with 2004, the amount of discovered and confiscated explosives grew twice. On the one hand, the growth of the amount of confiscated explosives is due to the fact that the Security Police Board has applied increasing number of resources to eliminate illegal explosives from civil circulation. Thus, previously gathered information was used in 2005, too. On the other hand, the increase of the amounts of confiscated explosives clearly indicates the decrease of law compliance.
the amendment of the Penal Code by diminishing the Criminal Code’s strict punishments has made criminals relatively active in handling illegal explosives.

Due to shortcomings in legislation the so-called “black archaeology” shows rising tendency. According to available information several people have searched and dug out a lot of war-time explosives, weapons and ammunition at the battlegrounds of the II WW and keep these items at their homes or residences. On December 13, 2005, the officials of the Security Police detained Maksim Voronin and discovered and confiscated from his residence 25 landmines of different calibre, 62 mine fuses, 22 hand grenades of different type, 6 gun grenades, 1 tank grenade RPG-40, 8 discharge sets of different calibre, 35 mine fuses, 46 hand grenade fuses, 4 blasting caps, 1 sawn-off gun made of a rifle, 582 cartridges of different calibre and purpose and 6.32 kg gunpowder of military origin.

The Security Police Board has pointed out the fact that one source of illegal explosives besides Estonian Defence Forces, the National Defence League and mines are persons, who dig out extremely dangerous explosive materials at old battlefields.

Especially brutal explosive device (ammonite sticks with nails) found from Loksa pub: external view and an X-ray photo

The suspect Märt Ringmaa

Airplain engine D-36 illegally brought into Estonia
in case of corruption it should be kept in mind that we are dealing with a typical form of concealed crime. It means that all participants in the line of corruptive transactions gain profit from committing a crime and they are all interested in continuing and concealing such crime. Only a few cases are known, where persons, who have been asked to participate or were already involved in corruptive activity, turned to some law enforcement structure, including the Security Police, for help. In such cases the activity involved is either bribe or bribe blackmailing, or the initiator of corruptive activity is particularly cynical and greedy in persuading others to crime.

On the basis of the abovementioned it is clear that disclosure of corruption and ascertainment of parties involved in corruptive transactions, also combating their activity requires resources and time. In the process of gathering evidence it is inevitable to use surveillance, including operations, which require court authorisation. Special feature in last years' proceedings is the fact that the shaped-out roles of the participants have become static or in other words – newcomers are not allowed into "the club." However, money and other items of value that change owners during corruptive activity have drastically increased. Corrupt officials avoid conspicuously luxurious lifestyle, although in the course of more thorough control the contrast between official income and actual expenses is clearly distinguishable. The tendency to "launder" the money received by corruptive activity, i.e. attempt to transform it into legal values, is increasing.

The Security Police plans to turn more attention to property acquired by corrupt means, or charge and convert it to public revenues in the future. At the same time it is evident that if society's attention to corruption is considerable, the attitude of the members of society towards corruption is favourable and if it is attempted to equalize corrupt act with minor traffic infringements, then we are dealing with general moral and ethical decline. If such tendencies deepen it takes us, firstly, to proliferation of unhealthy competition and growth of various deceptions, also combating their activity requires resources and time. In the future. At the same time it is evident that if society's attention to corruption is considerable, the attitude of the members of society towards corruption is favourable and if it is attempted to equalize corrupt act with minor traffic infringements, then we are dealing with general moral and ethical decline. If such tendencies deepen it takes us, firstly, to proliferation of unhealthy competition and growth of various deceptions, also combating their activity requires resources and time. In the future.

Corruption in the Police

2005 was doubtlessly a decisive year in combating corruption in police. As a result of long-time surveillance the Security Police presented evidence on suspicion in bribe, misuse of official position, execution of illegal surveillance and committing a drug crime on the chief superintendent of the Central Criminal Police Vallo Jäärats, who himself was responsible for prevention and disclosure of drug crimes.

As can be seen in the files of this criminal case, in 2002 the chief superintendent informed his acquaintance of Estonian nationality about the fact that the Finnish law enforcement authorities plan international police operation to detain his Finnish acquaintances, who were connected with drug trafficking. The chief superintendent's acquaintance, also connected with international drug trafficking, passed the received information on. Due to information leak the international police operation planned by the Finnish law enforcement authorities failed.

The chief superintendent is additionally accused of giving to the same acquaintance cocaine twice in 2003, altogether over 200 grams, with the purpose to take it to Finland and sell it there for the total price of 120.000 EEK. The chief superintendent received the cocaine from a friend, also connected with drug trafficking. The chief superintendent paid to his friend 100.000 EEK for the cocaine. According to the materials of this criminal case both quantities of this cocaine were later allegedly seized in Finland.

During the proceeding of this criminal case it was additionally ascertained that in the end of 2004 the chief superintendent Vallo Jäärats helped his friend, who was connected with drug trafficking, to discover concealed surveillance carried out by the Security Police and informed him that the law enforcement authorities might be interested in him. The chief superintendent's friend informed persons, who sold narcotics under his subordination in Pärnu and told them to narrow the sales. As a result of this warning the mentioned persons destroyed most of the narcotics in their possession. Despite that the Security Police executed these men, suspected of handling large quantity of narcotics.

This was not the only case when the chief superintendent delivered official information. It appears from the materials of the criminal case that in 2003-2004 he had repeatedly carried out illegal surveillance activities, ascertaining personal data and home addresses of phone subscribers and their calling lists. He also delivered to his friend specific
official information from police databases about different persons. This is an expressive example of a case, where a high-ranking police official practically covered up for the smugglers and distributors of narcotics and gained by that. Harju County Court convicted chief superintendent Vallo Jäärats of misuse of official position, conducting illegal surveillance and illegal handling of large amount of narcotics, and punished him with 4 years imprisonment. The Court acquitted Vallo Jäärats of taking bribe. The chief superintendent will probably appeal the above-mentioned decision to the Circuit Court.

As for junior and senior police officials we should mention the criminal proceedings initiated in 2005 on two officials of the Ida-Harju Police Department of the North Police Prefecture, who are suspected of taking bribe. According to the materials of the criminal case the police officials stopped a truck transporting illegal fuel and asked from the owner a bribe for not initiating official procedure. It is notable that the sum asked in the course of staging a criminal offence amounted to 80,000 EEK, undoubtedly the highest request among police officials lately. In this particular case the police officials’ cynicism was also surprising; they did not just require bribe, they blackmailed it. Preliminary investigation of this criminal case is completed and materials delivered to the Prosecutor’s Office.

The effective and active work of the internal control of the Police has indicated lately that they have decisively started to clean the lines of the Police of corrupt officials. It is known that the internal control unit of the Police has preferred charges on taking bribe to nearly 30 patrol unit police officials of the North Police Prefecture. This fact proves on the one hand that the Police regards corruption problem seriously and actively, but on the other hand it indicates to the depressing extent of corruption in police patrol units. Potential punishment for criminal official misconduct in the valid Penal Code provides from pecuniary punishment to five years of imprisonment. The court practice of last years shows that imprisonment as an actual punishment for criminal official misconduct has been applied only in individual cases, and even then it has often been less than one year.

The Bribe Case of a High-Ranking Official of the Tax and Customs Board

Just as before, in case of tax corruption the main risks are connected with conducting tax audits and official surveys. In 2005 the Security Police preferred charges on taking bribe to the head of the Survey Department of the Tax and Customs Board Ahti Lill. According to the materials of the criminal case Ahti Lill, in the course of staging a criminal offence, asked from a board member a bribe in the amount of 300,000 EEK to terminate the criminal case initiated for surveying the activity of the company. In the practice of the Security Police it is undoubtedly an exceptional case, because Ahti Lill as the head of the Survey Department knew very precisely the tactics of surveillance and technical means for recording conversations and meetings. Ahti Lill was a very cautious criminal, who followed every rule of conspiracy, trying to make disclosure as improbable as possible. On his first meeting with the board member he checked, for instance, whether the other party is wearing a microphone or a recording device under clothes and used other precautions.
To exclude the possibility that some of his colleagues would see him meeting the board member, Ahti Lill sent his girlfriend Evelin Vihtol to more important meetings. Ahti Lill himself met the board member only a couple of times, preferring then either to keep silent or not talk about the issue very thoroughly. Thus, Ahti Lill tried to keep a distance from the whole issue from the very beginning. As for the meetings between Evelin Vihtol and the board member, a probable legend was prepared at once. If somebody had began to ask about their meetings, it was to be said that Evelin Vihtol is a mediator of business contacts to foreign countries. An extraordinary method for delivering the bribe money should be noted, as well. The delivery of cash was not to happen from hand to hand, but by the private messenger service. It was agreed that half of the sum – 150,000 EEK – will be hidden in the bottom of a chocolate box and the courier will deliver it to Evelin Vihtol together with the flowers. The problem here was to find a chocolate box, big enough to place 150,000 EEK. The private messenger company did deliver the hidden money and the flowers to Evelin Vihtol to a cafeteria in one hypermarket, but this candy box did not make the receiver any happier, because the criminals were detained soon. The court found Ahti Lill and Evelin Vihtol guilty and punished Ahti Lill with partly actual imprisonment and Evelin Vihtol with conditional imprisonment.

Customs and Border Corruption

During last years the Security Police has treated customs and border corruption together, gathering information concerning corrupt customs officials and border guards simultaneously. In the last couple of years the combat with customs and border corruption has become more systematic. To achieve more comprehensive effect, the surveillance information about illegal activities of customs and border guard officials is fixed during longer period and afterwards the cases are realized concurrently.

At the end of 2004 the Security Police eliminated illicit trafficking at the customs frontier in Northeast Estonia. Charges on taking bribe were preferred to four inspectors of Narva Road Customs Point of the Customs Inspectorate of Northeast Estonia and two non-commissioned officers of Ida-Viru Border Guard Region. According to suspicions the mentioned officials systematically took bribe for not checking illegal goods trafficked from Russia to Estonia and for leaking operative information entered to databases. As a result of illegal activity the mentioned officials received not less than 300 EEK off every cargo of spirit and up to 5,000 EEK off every cargo of cigarettes that was illegally brought to Estonia. By now the court has convicted 2 customs officials and punished them with conditional imprisonments. Preliminary investigation on the rest officials has also been concluded and the prosecutor has delivered the materials of this criminal case to the court for proceeding.
As a result of systematic surveillance the Security Police liquidated at the Northeast Estonian customs frontier the risk-free illicit trafficking channel, “fed in” by the smugglers, via which the smugglers, with the help of officials, were able to bring from Russia to Estonia various goods without the fear of being caught. All in all the Security Police preferred charges on misuse of official position and taking bribe to 18 inspectors and one former inspector of Luhamaa Customs Point of the Customs Inspectorate of Southeast Estonia. In this criminal case it found proof that the officials, during a 7-month period, received systematic bribe in the amount of over 296,000 EEK for not checking contraband loads brought in from Russia to Estonia. The court convicted all the mentioned persons and punished them according to the seriousness of their activity with either conditional or partially actual imprisonment. Here we might mention the fact that the hearing was quite curious, as all accused persons could not fit in to the prisoner’s bench simultaneously.

In 2005, in addition to the abovementioned, the Security Police preferred charges on misuse of official position and taking bribe to 17 customs officials of Koidula Border Customs Point of the Southeast Customs Inspectorate. These customs officials are also accused of systematic bribe taking for not checking illegal goods brought to Estonia. The sum paid to officials amounted from 100 USD or 1,300 EEK to 40,000 EEK for a cargo, depending on the value of the cargo. During the 15 months treated in the framework of the criminal case the customs officials received at least 1.5 million EEK bribe, but this sum may increase, as the preliminary investigation of the case is still open.

As can be seen from the abovementioned, there are unfortunately rather a lot of such cases, where a corrupt official, on criminals request and for a bribe, allows illegal goods across the state border without checking or helps criminals to conceal tax evasion. The described crimes also make up good grounds for more serious crimes. Corrupt officials could be used to bring illegally to the country goods that require special permit, including firearms, explosives, but also prohibited goods, e.g. narcotics. Internationally wanted criminals, including terrorists or illegal immigrants, might use for crossing the border the assistance of officials, who misuse their position. Such activity is the most direct threat to the security of the whole state.
Bribe Case in the Veterinary and Food Board

In assessing corruption risks in the ministries and state administrative agencies the highest risk, undoubtedly, lies in bribe-taking officials. The Security Police has paid much attention to these problems and tried to ascertain the bribe cases in public institutions. For instance, in 2005, after a long surveillance period, charges were preferred to the deputy director general of the Veterinary and Food Board on repeated bribe taking. According to the materials of the criminal case this high-ranking state official, during six months in question, systematically and repeatedly took bribe from 10 companies handling fish and exporting frozen fish. At the end of criminal proceeding charges on giving and intermediating bribe were preferred to 15 persons. In criminal episodes treated during the preliminary investigation the bribe sum amounted to about $23,300 USD or 307,000 EEK. Preliminary investigation of this criminal case is terminated and the materials are sent to the Prosecutor’s Office.

Corruption Connected with Information Technology Procurements

In the last couple of years the Security Police Board has detected four corruption cases, which were directly connected with public procurements of information technology and illegal activity – taking bribe – of information technology managers in public institutions. All proceeded cases indicate to the shortcomings in the arrangement and supervisory system of public procurements of information technology.

In 2005 the court, on the basis of the criminal case investigated by the Security Police, convicted for systematically requesting and taking bribe and for money laundering the information technology manager of the Ministry of Social Affairs Henry Timmermann and punished him with partly actual imprisonment. According to preferred charges Henry Timmermann, having worked less than a year on this post, took over 330,000 EEK bribe from six different companies producing information technology services.

The court also convicted on the basis of the criminal case investigated by the Security Police in 2004 the Informatics Department manager and latter consultant of the Labour Market Board Ülo-Karla Kask for misuse of official position and punished him with conditional imprisonment. According to the accusation Ülo-Karla Kask channelled an over 3 million EEK worth international information technology procurement financed by Phare 2000 programme to the consortium, where his son was a shareholder, and arranged that several information technology contracts of the Labour Market Board were concluded with the company managed by his son – altogether in the amount of 1.2 million EEK. As in the first case Ülo-Karla Kask violated the rules of performing international procurements, Estonia had to return the mentioned 3 million EEK to the financers of the project.
In 2005, in connection with information technology procurements, the Security Police preferred charges for taking bribe to the deputy director of the Social Insurance Board and on misuse of official position and taking bribe to the manager of the System Technology Department of the same institution. In the framework of the same criminal procedure charges have been brought to Director General of Tartu Pension Board and to his wife, who works as a chief specialist of information technology. These high-ranking public officials are accused of preferring one Estonian public limited company to work out, develop and maintain the Social Insurance Board’s information system SKAIS, also procurements on personnel training, violating the rules provided for carrying out public procurement. According to the materials gathered in this criminal case it seems that procurements were not arranged according to actual needs and to find out the best offer, but to use up the information technology budget assigned to public institution. In case of need the legal procurement procedures were bypassed and everything was done to ensure that the above-mentioned company would win the procurement.

According to the materials of the criminal case, since 1997 the company has made continuous remittances to the bank accounts of high-ranking officials and delivered cash in the amount of about 1.52 million EEK. Here it should be said that the Social Insurance Board has had contractual relationship with the mentioned company precisely since 1997 and during all that time the work connected with information system has cost for the state over 65 million EEK.

The manager of the System Technology Department of the Social Insurance Board is additionally suspected of violation of the rules of international procurements. Namely, in 2004 he participated in the work of the Procurement Inspection Panel established for procurement of software for the Social Insurance Board information system SKAIS by the Ministry of Finance and financed by Phare 2000 programme. This was an international procurement with total cost over 4.5 million EEK. Before participation in the work of the Procurement Inspection Panel the manager of the Department of the Social Insurance Board signed the declaration of independence and confidentiality required in case of international procurements.
With violations connected with foreign financings one of the greatest accompanying risks is that in case the misuse of funds becomes known the international organisation that has financed the project would probably claim from the state compensation for loss and repayment of paid sums. Thus, if the violation committed by the manager of the Department of the Social Insurance Board will find affirmation in court, the mentioned 4.5 million EEK must probably be repaid to the financers of the project. The materials of the criminal case have been delivered to the Prosecutor’s Office.

In 2005, in connection with information technology procurements, the Security Police preferred charges for taking bribe to the manager of the Information Technology Division of the State Chancellery Kristjan Mälk, who is suspected of taking bribe from the board members of three private limited companies and one owner of a private limited company, Kalmar Kumar. The latter is a person, who some years ago worked in the Information Technology Division of the Chancellery of the Riigikogu. The materials of the criminal case indicate that the companies of Kalmar Kumar constantly provided information technology services to the State Chancellery and participated in the State Chancellery’s procurements, for which Kristjan Mälk was responsible.

Since 2003 Kalmar Kumar’s companies received over 1.8 million EEK for executing various procurements of the State Chancellery. In return, one of the companies – OÜ Makato Eesti – leased to the state official on favourable terms a passenger car Mazda 6, costing nearly 310,000 EEK, and partly covered its lease payments and various minor expenses. The court convicted Kristjan Mälk and OÜ Makato Eesti and punished Kristjan Mälk with conditional imprisonment and OÜ Makato Eesti with pecuniary punishment. In addition the court decided to confiscate from Kristjan Mälk the sum received as an illegal favour.

The abovementioned cases expressively confirm the corruption risks in the field of information technology, also the fact that in this sector bribe as a method of “business promotion” has become sooner a rule than an exception. In all these cases the sophistication of planning corrupt schemes by the bribe givers is amazing. However, the bribe bidder should take into consideration the fact that there might always be a competitor, who offers more.
Corruption Connected with Construction Procurements of Tallinn University

In 2005, in the course of revealing corruption cases in the ministries and public institutions, the Security Police initiated criminal proceedings to investigate the activity of the construction specialist of Tallinn University, who is suspected of repeated bribe-taking and counterfeit of official documents. According to suspicion, during the staging of criminal offence the construction specialist asked for a bribe in the amount of 500,000 EEK from the members of the board of the private limited company that participated with 1.18 million EEK bidding in the state procurement organised for acquiring translating technology for the new building. In return he promised to ensure that this company would be declared the winner of the tendering procedure. This is the largest revealed bribe-sum known, which was intended to hand over. The asked sum forms nearly 50% of the total cost of the procurement.

This crime is especially cynical due to the fact that the construction specialist proposed to the members of the board to increase subsequently their bidding by half a million or by the asked bribe sum. Thus, after awarding the contract and as a result of illegal agreements the University paid to the private limited company for translation technology 1.68 million EEK or 500,000 EEK more than envisaged in the original bidding.

As appears from the materials of the criminal case the abovementioned bribe case was not the first and only one for the construction specialist of Tallinn University. He is suspected of taking bribe from another private limited company that performed the construction and installation works and delivery of audiovisual system into the new building of Tallinn University. The construction specialist made a proposal to the project manager of the company that he will ensure the ordering and accepting of potential additional jobs for the company, if the company, in return, will supply him with various technical home appliances and installs cables in his home at no cost. As a result of this illegal agreement Tallinn University paid to the company 20,000 EEK more than envisaged in the original bidding. In return the company installed cables in the construction specialist’s home at no cost and supplied him with various technical home appliances with the market value of nearly 40,000 EEK.

Curious in this case is also the fact that when the construction specialist applied for the job in Tallinn University, he submitted to the competition committee a faked university diploma. Actually he finished his education in Viljandi Juvenile Prison in 1987, where he, being a prisoner, managed to finish the 10th grade. Preliminary investigation in this criminal case has been completed and materials delivered to the Prosecutor’s Office.
By now the Security Police Board has investigated war crimes and crimes against humanity for more than ten years already. Most of these crimes were committed in Estonia during the II WW or during the decades following the war. Investigation of crimes committed under the circumstances of both, German and Soviet occupation has been considered equally important in Estonia. While a lot of countries have investigated the crimes committed by the persons who fought for Nazi Germany, investigation of crimes against humanity and war and genocide crimes committed under the Soviet regime and under cover of combating fascism has been considered important only by some East European (small) countries. Here it is important to note that the efforts of Estonia have not been without result and beside nazi crimes the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes have found condemning, as well.

Crimes of communism were condemned in Estonia already on June 18, 2002, with the statement of the Riigikogu “On the Crimes of the Occupation Regime in Estonia.” The Parliament’s document was preceded a year earlier, June 14, 2001, by the statement of the President of the Republic of Estonia Lennart Meri in which he declared the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the State Security Committee (KGB) and other numerous repressive institutions to be criminal organisations, to which totalitarian power gave authority to pass death sentences and other punishments out of court.

Flagrant violations of human rights committed by totalitarian communist regimes have by now found condemning on international level, too. On January 25, 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted with large majority of votes the resolution condemning the crimes of communism. This was the first time, when a position concerning the crimes of communist regime was taken in such extensive international level. The resolution, which got 99 votes in favour and 42 votes against, while 12 delegates of PACE remained undecided, called the communist or post-communist parties of PACE Member States to reassess the history of communism and their own past.

The resolution adopted by PACE is declarative and does not refer directly to any country or political party. Not all functioning communist parties and movements are automatically considered criminal, only totalitarian communist regimes under which crimes against humanity have been committed. Despite that several deputy groups of PACE tried to prevent the adoption of this resolution. The socialists’ group of PACE made an attempt to pass the resolution before voting back to political council. Among the loudest opponents of the resolution were the representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation headed by Gennadi Zuganov. It was no surprise for Estonia that practically all members of PACE’s Russian delegation voted against the resolution. The only member of Russian delegation, who voted in favour, was the leader of Russian liberal democrats Vladimir Zhirinovski. Due to that the member of the communists’ fraction of Russian Duma Viktor Iliuin accused Vladimir Zhirinovski in treason and demanded seizure of the latter’s property. There is no reason to believe that Vladimir Zhirinovski, who ordinarily casts hostile remarks towards Estonia, has actually began to fight for those, who have suffered by the communist regime. Zhirinovski, who has the reputation of a brawler, probably took this step to get the attention of media. The statement of Viktor Iliuin, in its turn, expressively illustrates the situation of freedom of speech in Russia.

The activity of the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council of Russia Mihhail Margelov expressively demonstrated Russia’s actual reluctance to the resolution. PACE intended to discuss concurreny the report on condemning the crimes of communism and another condemning re-expansion of nazi ideology. Mihhail Margelov, who is responsible for presenting a report reflecting the situation of neo-nazi movement expanding in Russia, preferred to observe the elections in Palestine as PACE’s Middle-East reporter and by that set the discussion of both reports in PACE under doubt. In his official statements made before the election of local authorities in Palestine Mihhail Margelov emphasized the need to give Palestinians as extensive right to vote as possible. On the same day with the election of local authorities in Palestine, won by the Islamic group Hamas that is entered in a list of terrorist organisations in USA as well as in the European Union, PACE adopted the resolution condemning the crimes of communist regimes. Russia, that has always considered itself among the winners or “the great,” demonstrated once again its irresponsibility towards its historical injustice as well as its cynical attitude towards democratic values.

Information communicated to internal auditorium of Russia in connection with PACE’s resolution on condemning crimes of communism has been reassuring. The head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Duma Konstantin Kossatchov invited his fellow-countrymen to be calm about this resolution and not overreact, because the resolution is only advisory. The director of Russia’s Institute of Politics Sergei Makarov represents predominant attitude and does not agree with Konstantin Kossatchov, seeing this resolution as a direct offensive against Russia. Sergei Makarov says: “PACE’s purpose is transparent. Russia is the legal successor of the communist Soviet Union. The resolution sets ideological basis to raise claims to Russia.” A good example about overreacting is the anti-campaign of the Communist Party of Russian Federation: its solution resembles the caricature competition on holocaust theme initiated by the President of Iran. Namely, Russian communists have busily started to compile a list of the crimes of capitalism.

It is regrettable that Russia has not, until now, been able to distance itself clearly enough from the crimes committed by the totalitarian communist regime of the Soviet Union. Lack of adequate criticism and seeking justifications to these crimes can be seen increasingly often. There is not a single example of some investigative body having prosecuted someone, who has worked in some Soviet repressive body or was on a leading position in the Communist Party, being accused of a crime against humanity or a war crime. Russian historians, who examine the crimes of the communist regime from historical aspect, have no moral or financial support from the state and attempts are made to make them look as persons, who undermine the bases of the state. Narrow attitude and lack of adequate information in the past, regrettably also today, can certainly not contribute to consolidation of democratic values in the world. Under the conditions of limited freedom of opinion, thought and speech, also low self-esteem, we can never be sure that serious crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in the past will not be repeated in the nearest future.
Before the II WW there was no state secrets law or even the legal term "state secret" in Estonia. However, such phrase was used in spoken language and part of information concerning the security of the state was protected from "disclosure" by law.

Punishments and types of protected information were entered into penal codes. Developing Estonia’s own legislation was an activity demanding time and care, and in the beginning this field was regulated with the tsarist Punishment Law (1885), the new Punishment Law (1909) and since February 1, 1935 with the Criminal Code (CrC.). The easiest punishment in old laws for disclosing a document marked "secret," was removing from office or imprisonment up to 8 months, for disclosing official documents or information, which "was known to be kept in secret" the CrC. provided imprisonment up to 6 months. If a document concerned the security of the state the punishment for it until 1935 was imprisonment up to 2 years 8 months, and since then up to 8 years. The penal rates increased, if the person was acting in the interests of a foreign state or during wartime, and the highest penal rate for the activity qualified as espionage, was death sentence.

Information protected with these laws was comprised quite shortly and indefinitely in Article 84 of the CrC., according to which it was forbidden to disclose:

1. messages or things that concern external security or military forces or buildings for national defence of the Republic of Estonia, which were to be kept in secret;

2. a plan, drawing or other description or image of a fortified spot, of a region or esplanade appointed for such spot, of warship or other building of the Republic of Estonia, appointed for military defence of the state, or a document concerning mobilisation or preparation arrangements for war.*

Although the military regulations provided that a soldier might not spread service information, it was not accurately written down, what concerned security and what has to be kept in secret. In case of doubt, one had to turn to military intelligence for expert opinion. According to declared opinion, entirely public information might have been secret, if it had been gathered during a long period and analysed.

Marking secret documents was quite chaotic, especially in the first years of independence (e.g. there were such markings on the documents as “most secret” and “extra secret”). Later the three levels mainly used were “completely secret,” “secret” and “not for publicity.” Their application was not precisely regulated and probably the compiler of the document decided the marking based on its importance. The marking “secret” figured most, used widely in the Army, the Political Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
It was quite often that the marking was not on the cover. It also happened that it appeared only in the text of a document (and not even on the first page) that the document should be considered completely secret or that a “completely secret” annex was found from a document consisting of several hundred pages, wearing no marking whatsoever. The situation was curious in the early 1920s, when a “completely secret” note, concerning officers assigned to the reserve, was sent to police commissars, into whose district they moved to live, but at the same time the budget was published line by line in the “State Gazette” so that everybody could learn how much money the Security Police and the Military Intelligence spend on their informants. During years this situation improved and became more rational.

Publishing in press certain information concerning the Army was forbidden already during Estonian War of Independence. In peacetime, in 1923, the Government of the Republic obtained the right with the Publishing Law to “ban the publication in periodicals of information about the forces of the Defence League and their movement and means of national defence, as well as mobilisation.” In January 1924 the Government adopted the regulation listing the information prohibited to publish. Besides the Army structure and means and personnel in its disposal this list included such points as the spirits and discipline of the Army, plans concerning mobilisation and military industry, also secret agreements concluded and planned to conclude with foreign countries. Restrictions did not apply to information meant by the military institutions for publishing. Initially the Regulation was in effect only for one year, but it was repeatedly elongated and was actually in effect until 1940. Executive editor, who broke this Regulation, could be punished with a fine or detention up to 6 months.

For following the Regulation and for preventive work the responsibility lied upon (structural changes and exchange of name are not reflected here):

- the Political Police (Polpol) – dealt with counterintelligence in the whole country and investigated crimes specified in Articles 74-121 of the CrC., besides the catalogue of the institution gave good possibilities for background control of persons;
- the Second Department of the Headquarters of the Army – dealt with counterintelligence in the Army;
- the Administrative Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – controlled that the press would not publish prohibited materials.
The first two had close cooperation with each other and with the Border Guard – the latter was not directly responsible for protection of secrets, but often the couriers caught at the border took to the spies in public institutions. As a result of counterintelligence tens of spies were caught and convicted by courts, usually the information gathered by them was of little value or of no value at all. The most dangerous persons leaking the secrets were caught in 1921 and in 1938.

In 1921, in cooperation between the Military Counterintelligence and the Security Police, several agents were caught and tried, who had been acting under the leadership of the member of the Riigikogu Martin Bleimann. The draughtsman of the inspector of the Engineering Force of the Ministry of War Johannes Alender was punished with the death sentence by shooting, the other three were punished with hard labour and one person was acquitted. The Intelligence of Soviet Russia acquired the maps of the fortifications of Narva district and of the fort railways on the isles of Aegna and Naissaar, more than a hundred orders of the day and other documents. Especially active was agent Peeter Lempo, who had sold the same documents simultaneously to Martin Bleimann and the Embassy of Soviet Russia, thus receiving double payment. The member of the Riigikogu Martin Bleimann, who had organised the whole activity, managed to escape to Russia, where in 1938 he was executed in the framework of political mass repressions initiated by Jossif Stalin.

Disclosure of this case pointed out several shortcomings in the system of protecting secrets. Only a week after the first arrests the secret circular of the Minister of War specified the rules for handling secret documents and emphasized the necessity of following the rules in effect.

1938 brought along the arrest of the officer of the Pioneer Battalion in Narva Nikolai Trankmann, who had sold to Soviet intelligence the drawings of battery positions, frontier fortifications and bunkers, the planned projects etc. in Narva defence district. Together with Trankmann was prosecuted his brother-in-law and assistant Adolf Polisinski, who was sentenced to hard labour for 14 years. Nikolai Trankmann was punished with 20 years of hard labour, but was actually released in June 1940 during the “coup” of the Soviet occupation army and died in 1990.

Besides catching spies an important and quite extensive job was keeping suspicious persons away from secret materials. The Secret Police and Military Intelligence performed particularly close cooperation in examining the background of persons, who were appointed to positions, where they came across secrets. Before hiring a person the corresponding military institution had to deliver the person’s personal data to the Second Department of the Army Headquarters, which submitted inquiry on the person’s background to the Political Police. The Police controlled the catalogue that by 1940 consisted about 160,000 cards already.

Although such cooperation took place in 1920s already, complete data about it has regrettably preserved only about a short period – from June 13, 1939, to November 21, 1939. During the mentioned period more than 1,700 persons’ backgrounds were examined, most of them persons employed to various jobs at the war plant “Arsenal” or at sea forts, also entrants to military school and those employed to military institutions. Only a few inquiries were connected with the operative interests of military intelligence. In such cases it was requested from the Political Police to make on-the-spot inquiries in addition to data found in the catalogue. During the mentioned period the Political Police controlled the data of 12 persons per day. Answers were given in ten days on an average. Usually the answer was received in a few days, but inquiries, which the commissars of the Political Police had to make outside Tallinn, naturally took more time. Compromising data was discovered about 3.75% of controlled persons, the more frequent “sins” being criminal and/or communist past and excessive consumption of alcohol.