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Dear Readers!

I am honoured to greet you as Director General of the Security Police Board and present you our 12th Annual – sixth in series – that outlines the more relevant doings of the Security Police in 2003, but also makes an attempt to prognosticate the future developments. I believe that our Annual makes an interesting reading to those, who have observed our performances for years, as well as to those, who have not come across the fields of activities of the Security Police before.

On the one hand, the year 2003 meant anniversary to the Security Police Board – on June 18 we celebrated the 10th year of activity as an independent service – on the other hand; the year 2003 marked rather important changes in personnel: after the end of the second term of office Juri Pihl, who had been the head of the Security Police for 12 years, vacated the seat. History will give an impartial and objective assessment to his legacy. Nevertheless, one thing is already certain: established in the composition of the Police Board as a bureau in 1991 and having become an independent service on June 18, 1993, the Security Police has constantly developed and perfected since the moment of its creation. On the moment of accession to NATO and the European Union the Security Police has developed into the experienced special service with traditions, appropriate to guarantee security and comprehensive support of Estonian citizens. It would be the best, if every Estonian citizen would understand that the security of the state as well as of every citizen could be created collectively.

Accession to the European Union and NATO will be executed de jure only just in May 2004, but de facto the Security Police gave its full contribution into guaranteeing collective security already in 2003. It is a great responsibility to start to anticipate, besides attacks aimed against the Republic of Estonia, the attacks aimed against our partners’ interests. Experiences acquired by security officials during the previous 12 years and the will to act allow us to look into the future with optimism.
Staff And Training

The personnel of the Security Police Board is young and energetic. Nearly half (more precisely 45%) of the employees are under 30 years of age. At the moment 45 appears to be the most popular age among the officials working in our service. Although the percentage of female employees has not increased, it has stayed circa one fifth of the whole staff for several years already. At the end of the 10th year of activity the female employees formed 20.7% of our personnel. Ten years since the formation of the Independent Security Police Board filled on June 18, 2003, 45 employees may proudly regard themselves the veterans, who have stepped over this respectable threshold. Officials who have worked in our service 8 years form the greatest part of our employees. From year to year our staff has become more stable and more professional.

If we enquire for the reasons and motives, which attract people to work in the tense and stressful working conditions of the Security Police Board, we may receive very different answers. The most valued features are excellent working environment, young personnel with great development potential, contemporary technologies, possibility to realize oneself in an interesting and mysterious field of activity. The latter is especially characteristic of recently joined young police officers. Their need to prove themselves and accomplish something important is the greatest. That is why our personnel executives can choose only the best candidates already now. In order to apply for a job in the Security Police one has to participate in a multistage competition, but candidates already now. In order to apply for a job in the Security Police one has to participate in a multistage competition, but we have never been short of candidates.

On the other hand, the desire to serve as a security police official indicates that the work done with the staff has been consistent. Recently there has been more and more talking and writing about the employees being the greatest wealth of any institution or organisation. The more one values and motivates its employees the more the employees want and are able to apply their abilities and skills to achieve better results.

In order to achieve stable progress and effective results in the institution every security police official has to develop individually. It is necessary to work with rapidly changing laws – all this is essential in order to take right decisions in due time for the sake of security. One of the most important factors in this process is education and scholarship. 53% of the officials of the Security Police Board have higher education – 93% of our officials are in the middle of their studies, i.e. they are doing their MSc programmes. Therefore, we may say that education is a quality driven to strenuously and learning – often from beside very intensive and hard work – is considered respectable.

Not a single job-training institution, academy or institution of higher education is able to give education in such specific areas as counterintelligence, protection of state secret or combating terrorism – all vital for a security institution. Where academic education turns out to be insufficient, special in-service training helps. During past years the special services of several friendly countries have helped the Security Police Board by sharing their knowledge, skills and experience with our young officials. Our officials have participated in the courses specially organised for security service employees, but also in numerous cooperative trainings for the special services of Estonia and other countries. For instance, in January 2003, the USA Department of Defence and the USA Customs Board conducted a training that included practice, as well, on the subject "Prevention of the Distribution of Mass Destruction Weapons. Controllable Shipments." In very realistic conditions our officials together with Estonian customs officials performed the situation from detection of illegal substance at the border to detaining the "criminals." During the training contemporary interception equipment, cars and even a helicopter were used.

Due to enhanced danger of terrorism the Security Police constantly turns attention to improvement of various aspects and methods of combating terrorism. The year 2003 was no exception – our employees participated in a number of cooperative trainings and in various seminars and conferences dealing with trans-national cooperation in combating terrorism.

Naturally, supplementary training offered to security police officials does not consist of fascinating espionage games and participation at overseas trainings only. Keeping up with numerous legal acts that regulate (and often complement) our everyday work is extremely important. Therefore, on regular basis, the employees of the Security Police Board participate in such schoolings that deal with, for instance, exploring the principles of the draft bill of criminal procedure.

The above mentioned gave an impression that our officials only work, study and improve themselves. It should be said here that this is not the case. Even the most austere police official is an ordinary person in everyday life, enjoying his/her spare time differently. Our mostly cheerful and athletic active young employees are no exception. Here, at the Security Police Board, sporting has always been held in respect and not only because every employee of our institution must be in good shape and pass physical trials. Our officials fetched medals of every colour from the World Games of Policemen and Firemen. There are other athletic achievements, as well. Our officials have gained good results in orientating and cycle racing. Our team has always taken part in the ball games held among the employees of the institutions under administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During ten years several in-house sporting traditions have developed, as well. Every year a football competition is held between our departments and the winner gets the shiny trophy. The summer event is an impatiently longed-for event, where most of our employees come with their families. There are plenty of homes where children start to ask after Christmas, when and where the next event takes place. If the Security Police Board wants to appraise a young and vigorous family, where a father or a mother sometimes performs duties until late hours, we must let our employees to relax and invigorate themselves.

By choosing the best staff, by providing all our employees with opportunity to learn new things, by supporting the ones acquiring higher education and by creating excellent working conditions we can also require results from our employees that guarantee the security of Estonia. In ten years the Security Police Board has managed to build up an institution, where motivated employees want to apply all their skills and knowledge in protection of constitutional order and to anticipate and prevent intelligence activities aimed against Estonia.
The Security Police Board has a tradition to award every year on
the Police Day (November 12) two public officials, whose assis-
tance to the Security Police in some specific area has helped to
guarantee legal order and the security of citizens. With the decree
of the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Director General of the
Customs Board Aivar Rehe was awarded an inscribed firearm on
the Police Day in 2003. With the decree of the Director General of
the Security Police Board, the Managing Director of the Tallinn Airport
Illar Vaks was awarded the Plate of Merit of the Security Police.

Memorable moments from the year 2003.
Summer event at Lepanina, Pärnu County.
Winter celebration in the pub “Scotland Yard”, Tallinn.

Relations with Public

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Snapshots from the awarding ceremony of the best cooperation partners of the Security Police Board of 2003 with
attendance of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Estonia.
01. Handing over the inscribed firearm to the Director General of the Customs Board Aivar Rehe.
02. Presenting the Plate of Merit of the Security Police Board to Illar Vaks, the Managing Director of Tallinn Airport.
03. A horseshoe for good luck – from the Customs Board to the Security Police Board.
In our this year’s annual we would like to start the topic of counterintelligence with a serious quotation from the book “Russia and Moscow” with the subtitle “The geopolitical Dimension of Russia’s National Security”, published in Moscow in late autumn of 2003, written by Leonid Grigorjevitch Ivashov, a high-ranked military and a leading specialist of geopolitics, who plays an important role in forming Russia’s official (foreign-political) positions. Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, born in 1945, the graduate of the Military Academy called after M. V. Frunze, decorated with several awards of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, fulfilled the tasks of the Secretary of the Council of the Ministers of Defence of the CIS countries. At the same time he is a Doctor of History, professor, the Vice President of the Academy of Russia’s Geopolitical Sciences and the author of several books. The following quotation originates from the above-mentioned book, pages 170-171:

“...the vectors of Russia’s geopolitical development have been and still are the west (European direction), the east (Siberia, Central Asia, the Far East, the Pacific region of Asia), the south (Caucasia, the Near and Middle East); Russia's administration should actively concentrate the resources of the state nearly in these directions.” / / 

The cynically frank quotation cited above is not exceptional in contemporary Russia, especially in the last couple of years. The researches have observed the strengthening of the notation of super-ethnos in Russia during the last decade, but alteration in notations always presumers changes in actual politics. In studying the roots we should refer to historical neurosis that formed in 1991 after the great changes when Russia split into many different groups with antagonist interests. A great part of population sighed for the mighty Soviet Union, the status of the super-state, security, etc. Others looked towards western democracy and still others took advantage of economic chaos for fast enrichment. oligarchic economic system, vast differences in incomes and conflicts between Moscow and regions caused great tensions in public information fields and in addition to that the same oligarchic controlled part of media, as well. Immensely vast differences in the standpoints concerning the past, indistinctness of the future, but also the weakness of democratic forces brought along the situation where it became possible to restore the top-down managed system rooted in the consciousness of the masses.

During the history of many centuries the vectors of Russia’s geopolitical development have been and still are the west (European direction), the east (Siberia, Central Asia, the Far East, the Pacific region of Asia), the south (Caucasia, the Near and Middle East); Russia's administration should actively concentrate the resources of the state nearly in these directions. / / 

The decision determining for the future was made in Russia five years ago, when the President of that time, Boris Jeltsin, resigned from actual power and the rest has been the development of the then chosen trends. The myth of “democracy” collapsed and was replaced by the concept of a powerful country, the consciousness of the mass was directed to the idea of world power, customary from the times of the Soviet Union. The rehabilitation of the anthem of the Soviet Union as the anthem of Russia was supported by 70% of population, which, as a sign, gave distinct idea of the chosen way. Ever since, achieving consensus and setting national-patriotic goals that consolidate large groups has been the main task of Russia’s leaders. By 2004, the active restoration of hierarchical, controllable system, carried out since Vladimir Putin gained power, has been practically completed on the level of mass media. Control over Russia’s most influential media – television – is guaranteed and there is no actual opposition any more.

The last election campaign of the Duma clearly demonstrated the popularity of imperial ambitions, as proclamations in the style of Leonid Ivashov were constantly made in television. The great number of votes given to the liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovski proves that radical chauvinist views are intrinsic to great part of population. Strengthening of imperial spirit (“the sea-hawks”) in the consciousness of masses is obvious and is actively supported by media. As a part of democratically inclined intelligentsia and political elite has no considerable “voice” any more and has to adapt to dominant conditions.

Together with the changes in information field a tendency strengthens in Russia, which, similarly to Soviet times, gives priority to political decision over economical decisions and this complicates the actual economic cooperation. By now Russia has positioned itself as an active foreign-policy power that expresses itself in the direction of the neighbouring countries among which, by Russian terminology, Estonia belongs, as well.

The “Doctrine of Informative Security of Russia”, adopted in 2000, says among other things the following: “the national security of Russia largely depends on guaranteeing informative security and the importance of the latter starts to increase during technologic progress.” This standpoint gives notion of strategic tendencies and methods that will be employed in the coming years. The same doctrine tells us about the need “to preserve certain regulated restrictions in the distribution of information,” which actually has been put into practice already.

Questions concerning “our Baltic states” occasionally slip into controlled media, creating the background for diplomatic activity. It is distinctly predictable that the combat for the status of Russian-speaking population (“human rights” in propagandistic language) and protection of economic interests together with communicative destabilizers will characterise Russia’s politics in the neighbouring countries, among others in Estonia, in the nearest years.

In studying the roots we should refer to historical neurosis that formed in 1991 after the great changes when Russia split into many different groups with antagonist interests. A great part of population sighed for the mighty Soviet Union, the status of the super-state, security, etc. Others looked towards western democracy and still others took advantage of economic chaos for fast enrichment. Oligarchic economic system, vast differences in incomes and conflicts between Moscow and regions caused great tensions in public information fields and in addition to that the same oligarchic controlled part of media, as well. Immensely vast differences in the standpoints concerning the past, indistinctness of the future, but also the weakness of democratic forces brought along the situation where it became possible to restore the top-down managed system rooted in the consciousness of the masses. The decision determining for the future was made in Russia five years ago, when the President of that time, Boris Jeltsin, resigned from actual power and the rest has been the development of the then chosen trends. The myth of “democracy” collapsed and was replaced by the concept of a powerful country, the consciousness of the mass was directed to the idea of world power, customary from the times of the Soviet Union. The rehabilitation of the anthem of the Soviet Union as the anthem of Russia was supported by 70% of population, which, as a sign, gave distinct idea of the chosen way. Ever since, achieving consensus and setting national-patriotic goals that consolidate large groups has been the main task of Russia’s leaders. By 2004, the active restoration of hierarchical, controllable system, carried out since Vladimir Putin gained power, has been practically completed on the level of mass media. Control over Russia’s most influential media – television – is guaranteed and there is no actual opposition any more.

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In 2003 the Security Police Board continued to investigate and prevent the activity of the secret services of several foreign countries in Estonia. We had to pay concentrated attention to gathering counterintelligence information connected with Russia, but also to the activity of the special services’ officials of some threshold countries, who made several attempts to recruit Estonian government officials or other citizens.

Recently we have observed increasing performance of the Federal Security Bureau (FSB). Among other activities the FSB structural units in St. Petersburg and Moscow carried out a number of “demo-performances”. For the time being, it is difficult to assess the purposes and results of these demonstrations. However, one thing is certain: together with the reform of the special services of Russian Federation, initiated in 2003, the security system of Russia will gain in strength. For Estonia it might bring along various security threats. We can prognosticate continuous increase of FSB’s importance and consolidation of its positions in 2004. The activity of this organisation is more influential in border areas. Appropriate Estonian institutions must therefore pay more attention to everything associated with Estonian-Russian border, because in the nearest future we will not be dealing only with the interests and responsibility of Estonia, but of the eastern frontier of international organisations. In order to guarantee Estonia’s security it would be most important to implement an intense and reliable border control and efficient visa regime.

The experiences acquired in 2003 confirm that traditional intelligence services of Russia have become more active in information gathering and started to influence political parties, Russian-speaking inhabitants and international organisations represented in Estonia. Among the states, which extend intelligence activity towards Estonia, Russia has, besides its usual ambitions, been observed to pay increasing importance to the systematization of the “defence” of Russian-speaking diaspora. The so-called diaspora topic is becoming more and more important to Russian diplomats. Individually, the latter are of no interest to the Security Police, as their activity is usually separated from the illegal activity of intelligence services. Russia’s diplomats are becoming more independent, getting free from the grasp of Russia’s intelligence services. However, attention should always be kept on such events as, for instance, the Chief Consul of Russia getting involved in the performance of Estonian judiciary or the Ambassador of Russia publishing articles in Estonian press.

Counterintelligence
Influencing Russian Community in Estonia or “Protection of Compatriots”

During 2003 the Russian-speaking inhabitants continued to integrate into Estonian society in order to exert pressure upon Estonia, Russia made several statements in 2003, flavoured with the usual rhetoric of the great power, some of these aimed directly against Estonia, others directed to international organisations. However, these statements and campaigns with the features of propaganda war have not achieved desired result. Russia has tried in virtually every method to prevent the integration of Russian-speaking population into our society.

A part of Russia’s activity, aimed against Estonia, is the so-called compatriots’ politics, which the leaders of Russian Federation have repeatedly announced to be the priority of Russia’s foreign politics. One thing that indicates the ever more increasing contribution to compatriots’ politics is the fact that a new board, dealing with compatriots’ problems, was established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in 2005. The coordination of the activity of this board is an immediate task of the Vice Foreign Minister, at the moment Eleonora Mitrofanovna, known from previous times as a member of the chauvinistic Liberal Democratic Party, led by Vladimir Zhirinovski. A corresponding department was established under the Administration of the President of Russian Federation in the summer of 2002, already.

It should be said that in 2003 160 million roubles were appropriated from Russia’s government budget in support of the so-called compatriots’ organisations. These funds were mainly meant to support the compatriots in the neighbouring countries, among others Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The purposes are obvious: to guarantee the existence of loyal Russian-speaking compatriots in the neighbouring countries via whom Russia can keep these countries under its influence in the future. As for compatriots, both, direct and indirect policies of positive inclusion are used, striking Estonia at the same time with various political statements, e.g., requirement to increase the status of Russian language. In order to make the government propaganda influential, Russia funds the distribution of journals directed to local community (the best example is “Sootechestvennik”) and support the newspapers connected with the distribution of these publications.

Proceeding from Russia’s foreign politics, the representatives of state authority of Russian Federation (from the Administration of the President and the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the members of the boards of the so-called compatriots’ relief funds) have continued to guide the compatriots acting in Estonia. The Embassy of Russian Federation in Tallinn plays particularly active role in this process, appropriating funds to these organisations and guiding their activity. Not a single important or principal decision is made by the so-called “independent compatriots’ organisations” without the approval of Russian Embassy.

The activity of compatriots’ organisations is continually under the attention and influence of Russia’s special services. Concurrently with supporting compatriots, Russia has made several international attempts to influence Estonia, for instance, via international organisations, but also via the European Union, by making a number of “traditional” statements about persecution of local Russian community, a subject that has been exploited up to exceed long ago. Russia has also tried to exert pressure upon Estonian business elite and politicians in order to enforce economic or political decisions favourable for Russia. We should also note the recent statement of Russian Security Council on potential preventive armed actions in support of compatriots.

On October 18, 2002, the President of Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, adopted official conception on preparing national cadres of other countries in Russian educational institutions. The content of this conception is clearly connected with Russia’s so-called compatriots’ politics and form a part of the conception. It is stressed in the conception that its “main goal is the implementation of the geopolitical and economical interests of Russian Federation”. Another purpose of the conception is “preparation of national intellectual elite so that the long-term political and economical interests of Russian Federation in the regions of the world would be ensured”. The document also provides that the so-called foreign cadre educated in Russia should be used for developing political, commercial-economical and scientific-technological cooperation between Russia and other countries.

The conception provides the so-called extension of compatriots’ access to the educational institutions of the Russian Federation. On the one hand, it means ongoing Russia’s scholarships for the younger generation of Russian-speaking population of Estonia that enables them to study in the educational institutions of Russia. On the other hand, it declares support to the branches of Russia’s universities acting in other countries and to other educational institutions that work on the basis of the education programmes of the Russian Federation.

This means, practically, that Russia tries to influence the younger generation of Russian-speaking population living in Estonia, to acquire higher education in Estonia as well as in Russia (on the basis of educational programmes of the Russian Federation, of course) and via that bind these young people more with Russia than with Estonia.

The abovementioned conception and the activity of the Embassy of the Russian Federation and other state and local municipalities of Russia clearly indicate that Russia is clearly interested in influencing the young, educated generation, who starts its studies in universities and can still be affected, and who will later become the lobby-group of Russia in Estonian public institutions or private sector. The whole scheme is quite similar to the scheme developed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the State Security Committee of the USSR (KGB) meant to glamorise and advertise communism in the Western countries during the “cold war”.

On the one hand, the purpose of such activity is to influence the integration policy of the Republic of Estonia, to prevent the integration of the Russian-speaking population and to create Russia constant possibility to blame Estonia in the weakness of integration policy. On the other hand, the offer of the mentioned scholarships allows Russia to demonstrate itself as a sincere supporter of Russian-speaking population.

Russian Orthodox Church

During the entire re-independence period of Estonia Russia has taken advantage of several disputable issues (first of all of property) connected with Russian Orthodox Church in order to achieve its political ambitions against Estonia. It is no secret that the Russian Orthodox Church that has been tightly connected with Russia’s public authorities throughout history is an important means for carrying out the imperial interests of the Russian Federation nowadays, as well.
The year 2003 will be remembered as the year when the Patriarch of Moscow and the whole Russia, Alexius II, visited Estonia. The visit of the head of the church of Russia, who was born in Estonia, but also grew up, went to school and started his clerical career here, was extensively reflected in Estonian as well as in Russian media. One of the purposes of Russia’s foreign politics in connection with the so-called ecclesiastical issue is to demonstrate the discrimination of hundreds of thousands of religious members of Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia. Another goal is to keep Estonia in Russia’s sphere of influence in orthodox matters. However, the Patriarch’s visit to Estonia, met with modest activity of local members of the Orthodox Church was certainly a disappointment to the preachers of such politics. The amount of people who participated in the service carried out by the head of Russian Church was several times smaller than was expected and indicated on the fact that the active constituency of Moscow-inclined Orthodox Church is considerably smaller than it has been claimed to be. When in the processions organised by the Church in 1995 and 1996 the number of participants was almost 14,000, then the number of participants in the Patriarch’s service in 2003 was merely several hundred.

The abovementioned is a significant example of how consistent noisy upholding of disputes over clerical matters and other similar issues serve Russia’s imperial ambitions of foreign politics rather than religious or humanitarian purposes.

Extremist Movements

Due to previous active counteraction of the Security Police the well-known extremist movements proceeding from Russia (the National Bolshevik Party and the Russian National Unity) practically do not function in Estonia any more. Only some activists have remained here, whose relations with the head organisations in Russia have practically ceased to exist. The Security Police has observed the ambition of the abovementioned movements to extend their activity, above all to make contact with the persons sharing the same views in Europe and in the Baltic states, but it has not succeeded so far.

As Estonia’s accession to the European Union brings along free movement between the member states, the expansion of extremism from other countries to Estonia could be prognosticated. Above all, we can anticipate distribution of extremism and globalism proceeding from European countries to Estonia.

Certain security risks accompany the activity of extremists and their supporters, but they expose no threat to Estonia’s sovereignty and official policy. At the end of the 1990s we could prognosticate comparatively rapid progress of extremist phenomenon in Estonia. Due to effective counteraction of the Security Police Board, an inseparable part of which was prevention of extremism, we were able to suppress the activity of extremist organisations and their supporters. The leaders of the Estonian organisation of the Russian national Unity were brought to account and that reduced the participation of this organisation in social life into non-existent. In case of the Russia’s National Bolshevik Party we can speak about successful prevention of distribution of extremist ideology, which made it impossible even to form the groups of interested persons, not to mention the establishment of any sub-organisations. However, we should take into account that the socio-political situation in Russia is still complicated and, thus, the ground for expanding and activating the extremist organisations is sufficient. This means that the work in preventing the distribution of the extremist organisations proceeding from Russia still remains among the priorities of the Security Police Board.

Risks accompanying globalisation processes should be considered to be a threat source, as well. Together with Estonia’s accession to the European Union the borders will open and the ground for distribution of the ideologies of extremist movements in Estonia will become more advantageous. Russian extremists (the so-called barkashovians) of Estonia and Latvia are already trying to make permanent contacts with the nationalists of other European countries. The same tendencies are obvious in connection with the skinheads.

Implementation of measures by law enforcement structures is not sufficient for successful anticipation of extremism in Estonia: the whole society should understand the dangers of any extremism and condemn the illegal activity of extremist movements inclined towards violence (anti-globalists, neo-nazis, etc.). How important in contemporary Estonian society is the law-awareness and true comprehension of democracy of the citizens was well demonstrated by the manifestation against the war in Iraq, which took place in Kelmimanni Street, Tallinn, near the Embassy of the United States of America on March 30, 2003: mass disturbance of public order took place and the Embassy bore property damage. The protest demonstration, which was planned with good intention got out of hands and turned into a violent “declaration of will”, brought along criminal charge to 17 young people.
Prevention of International Terrorism

In 2003 two tendencies were characteristic in the world in connection with terrorism: combating terrorism was more efficient than ever before, but at the same time continuous attacks took place against the soldiers of the peace corps and international organisations in Iraq.

The terrorist attacks, which caused the most extensive response, took place in May in the capital of Saudi Arabia, Ar-Riyad, and four days later in an industrial town Casablanca in Morocco (five explosive devices were blown in the town at the same time): 75 people perished in these two attacks. In November the wave of terrorism reached very close to Europe: 60 people perished in the four attacks of the suicide terrorists in Istanbul. At the same time, in 2003 combating terrorism was much more efficient: several terrorist acts were prevented at an early stage. Arresting several leaders of Al-Qaida and the groups connected with it played an important role in countering the plans of terrorists. Here we should mention the seizure of Khalid Sheik Mohamed, who is claimed to be the third man in Al-Qaida hierarchy and one of the main planners of the operations. The tragic suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, are considered to be his “achievement”.

Equally important was the seizure of Nabiub, the leader of the South-East Asia terrorist organisation Jamaah Islamiah. The seizure of Mohamed and Nabiub probably stopped several planned attacks.

Although a number of terrorist acts have been prevented elsewhere in the world, the situation in Iraq became and is becoming more serious from month to month. The interception of Saddam Hussein has not brought along the desired results – the attacks continue without changes. The question about who really organises the attacks taking place in Iraq is still unanswered. If at first it was believed that the attacks represent chaotic activity of single fanatic supporters of Saddam Hussein, then the organised attacks with great numbers of victims that were carried out in the second half of the year indicate that these attacks are obviously planned and executed by well-organised groups.

The leading figures of various terrorist groups captured in 2003.

Terrorists have already purchased somewhat cheaper biological and chemical weapons, e.g. the anthrax letters sent in 2001 and ricin found in England in 2002. Ricin is a particularly poisonous substance contained in the seeds of the ricin oil plant, a poison to which no antidote has been found so far. One milligram of ricin is enough to kill one person and thus, this is an effective mass destructive weapon. Using “dirty bombs” – explosive devices with a supplement of radioactive materials, which increase their “efficiency” – is quite realistic, as well. At the same time, purchasing traditional tools of terrorism (explosives, weapons) is still much easier and cheaper than purchasing mass destructive weapons. As long as there will be suicidal volunteers, the now customary suicide attacks, which, in terrorists’ opinion, get enough media attention and sufficient quantity of victims, will not end.

There is still no danger of the use of mass destructive weapons in Estonia at the moment, but the probability that some forces will attempt to use Estonia as a transit country to transport mass destructive weapons or the parts of such weapons increases.

The Baltic States and most parts of Lithuania are still not interested in smuggling strategic goods or goods that could be used in two ways.

Complex Training on Crisis Management

Proceeding from the drastically increased threat of terrorism in the world during recent years the law enforcement agencies have channelled more resources than ever into being ready for top-priority operational performance in preventing and resolving terrorist acts. As mentioned before, the threat of terrorism in Estonia is minor at the moment, but in spite of that our responsible services should be ready to act in the crisis situations, e.g. hostage dramas, explosions with multitude victims, etc. In order to control whether the state is prepared to respond to terrorism, realistic crisis management training was carried out on February 1, 2003, where participated the Crisis Committee of the Government and the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Police Board, the Police Board, the Rescue Board, the Board of Border Guard, the Health Care Board and Estonian Defence League.

The purpose of the training was to control preparedness and readiness for cooperation of different public structures and services to perform the tasks of crisis management in case of the threat of terrorism. The training took place in the premises of the Public Service Academy. The scenario prescribed that terrorists take hostage the participants of an international conference held in the Public Service Academy. Surrendering and unarming the terrorists settled the hostage crisis.

All in all, the training was considered to have been successful: all purposes that had been set up were fulfilled and cooperation between different institutions was quite satisfactory. Unlike previous trainings, this time the assessment of the activity of various crisis management groups (headquarters, negotiators, special units, de-miners) was stressed in order to learn from deficiencies and identify problems that could occur in an actual crisis situation. The acquired experiences were analysed and summarized for future, in the real crisis situations that could occur.

Guaranteeing the Security of Important Persons or the so-called VIP-protection

Although the threat of terrorism in Estonia is low at the moment, it should not be considered nonexistent. Potential terrorist targets in Estonia could, above all, be the embassies of other countries (USA, Great Britain) or representative offices of international organisations, but also official guests visiting Estonia. Due to that Estonian security and police services are even more careful about guaranteeing the security of important persons on the
Risk assessments are carried out before every visit and optimum measures for guaranteeing security are applied. In connection with the events of 2003 – dispatching Estonian soldiers to Iraq, Euro-voting, murdering of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs – the protection of Estonia’s high officials was increased, as well.

Anticipation of Explosions and Disclosing the Guilty

For long, using explosives and organising explosions has been the most popular means among terrorists for achieving their purposes. Due to that anticipation of bomb explosions and preliminary investigation of explosions that have taken place, but also identifying and disclosing persons illegally manufacturing and handling explosives and explosive devices have for years been among the priorities of the Security Police in combating terrorism. The last mentioned is especially important in order to prevent potential explosions, which could be planned by international terrorist organisations to take place in the territory of Estonia, because terrorists often procure explosives necessary for carrying out explosion from local traders of illegal explosives or “bomb masters”.

In spite of the fact that not a single explosion qualified as terrorist act has been carried out in Estonia until now, we have to say with regret that the number of explosions, perished and injured in explosions, as well as bomb threats has increased in Estonia in 2003. If, according to the statistics of the Security Police Board, 14 bomb explosions, in which one person perished and two were injured, took place in Estonia in 2002, then in 2003 there were 16 bomb explosions, where 5 persons perished and 7 were injured. 98 bomb threats were made in 2003, 52 of them to schools.

If we analyse the increase in the number of bomb explosions, we see that one of the reasons might be the fact that the maximum and minimum punishments provided for illegal handling of explosives in the Penal Code, in effect since September 1, 2002, were substantially decreased. Article 207.3, sec. 2 of the Criminal Code (illegal manufacturing, possessing, storing, delivering, transporting, selling and sending of explosives forbidden for civil use) provided 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment, whereas Article 414 of the Penal Code (illegal handling of explosives) provides either pecuniary penalty or imprisonment up to 6 years. Punishment provided for illegal handling of explosive device or some important part of such device has also been decreased in the Penal Code. Punishment for such activity is either pecuniary penalty or imprisonment up to 10 years.

As an example we could introduce a criminal case investigated by the Security Police concerning an explosion in a garage belonging to cooperative society “Kadri”, at 17 Looga Street, Kohila-Järve, on October 4, 2003 at about 02.00 p.m., where Nikolai Sidorenkov, born in 1957, was killed. A rifle with optical hindsight, 15 dischargers, one detonator and 38 cartridges of various calibres were found and taken away in the course of examining the scene. According to the information gathered during criminal proceeding Sidorenkov dealt with ruinous fishing and poaching, and procured explosives with the purpose to catch fish with the help of self-made explosive device.

Another example was an explosion that took place at the waste ground in Sillamäe on October 3, 2003 at about 03.30 a.m., where Nikita L. Sidorov, born in 1977, was killed. A rifle with optical hindsight, 15 dischargers, one detonator and 38 cartridges of various calibres were found and taken away in the course of examining the scene. According to the information gathered during criminal proceeding Sidorov dealt with ruinous fishing and poaching, and procured explosives with the purpose to catch fish with the help of self-made explosive device.

Small quantities of explosives in wrong hands might bring along much sorrow and serious destruction.
Explosive devices seized

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<td>624</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>347</td>
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<td>Explosives</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>77/12*</td>
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<td>Bomb threats</td>
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<td>221</td>
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<td>184</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Of them: at schools</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>91</td>
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<td>Bomb scavenges</td>
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<td>Bomb technical checking</td>
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<td>4 046</td>
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<td>1 347</td>
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<td>2 875</td>
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<td>Detonators seized by the Security Police</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammunition seized by the Security Police (kg)</td>
<td>1 10</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1 600</td>
<td>1 100</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
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* Explosions of explosive substances

Toptsin, Aleksandr Fofarow and Artur Moor. The youngsters, who beforehand had consumed alcohol and drugs, decided to test a self-made explosive device made of ammuntion, electric detonator and fuse.

The third such explosion, which affirms that people have started to use explosive devices much more daringly, took place in the former “Männiku” military base in Saku parish, Lääne-Viru County on October 18, 2003 at about 12.45 p.m. in the course of investigation it was ascertained that the explosion had been organised by Eno Vaigurand, born in 1977, who said that with the help of explosive device, made of TNT, electric detonator and fuse, he wanted to obtain iron rails from the underground shelter situated beneath the former missile base of Soviet occupation army and take the rails to the EMK buying-up in Rakvere. All three abovementioned criminal cases expressively characterise the need to make the punishments for handling illegal explosives more severe. Otherwise it is impossible to conclude that the number of explosions, which bring along extensive public response or victims, will increase in the future.

Especially important in anticipating terrorism is the control over the movement, the mediators and exploiters of illegal explosives. The fact that the number of explosions decreases together with the diminishing of the quantity of illegal explosives needs no proof. As explosive materials with which most of the explosions at the beginning of the 1990s were carried out, the ones left behind by the Soviet occupation army, are nearly finished by now the new potential sources of illegal explosives would be, besides the mines in Virumaa and the battlefields of the World War II, Estonian Defence League and Estonian Defence Forces. Here it should be said that, regrettably, the servicemen, whether due to negligence or due to self-interest, help criminals to acquire illegal explosives.

For instance, on March 14, 2003, the Security Police initiated a criminal case on the officials of the Peace Operations Centre (Juri Tänav, Armin Tullus and Edmund Tänavott) and the head of the weapons’ store Jaan Kärsin, who dealt with illegal intermediary of fire-arms’ ammunition and explosives. In the course of procedure 2004-2005 carriages of various calibres, 16-calibre hunting-guns (.38-26) and a kilometers of explosive (ammunition) were confiscated from the mentioned persons. To Tallinn City Court on February 10, 2004.

Some amount of explosives might get into circulation from the enterprises dealing with blasting. For instance, on July 3, 2003, 69 detonators fell on the road from the truck belonging to Voglers Eesti Ltd., which deals with blasting. Despite the happy end (all the detonators were found and took to a safe place) such breaches are inadmissible from the standpoint of public security. On November 24, 2003, Jäva County Court punished the guilty with pecuniary penalty in the amount of 10 000 krons.

In comparison with the year 2002, the number of bomb threats increased on account of repetitive threats made by single persons. Thus, from February 15 to March 3, 2003, a 14 year-old Reika Pashchenko, who lives in Ambja, made by phone five bomb threats to different schools and shops in Järva County. On April 29, 2003, the Järva County Court punished Reika Pashchenko with two years imprisonment. This was the first case in the history of Estonia, when the judge was declared guilty in connection with his professional activity – in so serious professional frauds.

Another continuous priority among the activities of the Security Police is revealing corruption in police system, because public security means overall human values cherished by all citizens of the state. In anticipation and prevention of crimes and in investigating the already committed crimes the police has extensive credentials. Due to comprehensible reasons corruptive misuse of such extensive credentials or making use of authority in the interests of certain people is unjustifiable. In 2003 the Security Police turned much attention to revealing the cases of bribery in the police system.

For instance, in May 2003, after prolonged pursuit, the Security Police officials detained the chief inspector of the criminal office of the Southern Police Department of Tallinn Police Prefecture, Andrei O., who, together with a civilian Viktor K., is accused of requesting bribe. According to accusation Andrei O. and Viktor K. required bribe from a person, who was under preliminary investigation, on October 3-5, 2003, Reika Pashchenko made another five bomb threats to Stockmann Department Store and the cinema “Coca-Cola Gola Plaza”, both situated in Tallinn. Besides Pashchenko there were other such teenagers, who made repetitive bomb threats. Thus, the number of the makers of bomb threats did not in principle increase in 2003.

Occurrence of corruption in the courts directly affect the impartiality of jurisdiction and thus the credibility of Estonian legal system on internal as well as on international level. Due to the abovementioned reasons revealing corruption is undoubtedly one of the most important activities. Although the greatest corruption risks are connected with the activity of administrative courts, more and more attention should be paid on criminal courts, where the most corruption risky areas are still releasing from detention, passing exculpatory court decisions and application of too lenient punishment. For instance, at the beginning of 2003 the Security Police took to court the judge of Tallinn City Court, Ain Truu, who took bribe for conditional prescheduled release and among other matters he was accused of illegal deprivation of liberty. The Court declared Ain Truu guilty and punished him with two years imprisonment. This was the first case in the history of Estonia, when the judge was declared guilty in connection with his professional activity – in so serious professional frauds.

Revealing Corruption in Law Enforcement Institutions

In 2003 the main trend in combating corruption was revealing corruption in law enforcement agencies. Main attention was turned to corruption in court system and in the police, but also to corruptive activity of administrative receivers.

In order to ascertain possible corruptive activity of administrative receivers the Security Police started systematic information gathering in 2002 and by now we can be satisfied with the work done in this area. Corruption risks in the activity of administrative receivers are mainly connected with illegal utilisation of official position or misappropriation of bankruptcy assets. We have

Combating Corruption

Strikingly, one more dangerous tendency characteristic of police corruption appears in the described case. Several former police officials and active police officials have actively started business activity, giving jurisdictional consultations or tendering bank collections. Such persons make use of their police-work knowledge, as well as former colleagues among police officials. In the given case a business association, which among other things dealt with bank collections, was registered on the name of Andrei O.’s wife. In the course of preliminary investigation it was ascertained that Andrei O. and Viktor K. used the initiating of criminal procedure as a leverage to call in dubious or hopeless debts of the clients of this business association. The latter was just a disguise to cover illegal activity of police officials and make it look legal.

Thus, the case under discussion was not a one-time or occasional bribe taking, but systematic criminal activity – requiring money from both, the creditor and the debtor. The creditor paid for initiating of criminal procedure and examining application on crime, the debtor paid for terminating the criminal case initiated on him/her. Besides assisting to bribery Viktor K. is accused of illegal acquisition and storing of explosives, firearm, ammunition and silencer. The Security Police has taken to court both, Andrei O. and Viktor K.

In order to ascertain possible corruptive activity of administrative receivers the Security Police started systematic information gathering in 2002 and by now we can be satisfied with the work done in this area. Corruption risks in the activity of administrative receivers are mainly connected with illegal utilisation of official position or misappropriation of bankruptcy assets. We have
will not treat any individual cases here. We cover only one case.

In 2003, as a result of pursuit, the Security Police detained three inspectors of the mobile control group of South-Eastern Customs Inspectorate’s Parnio customs station, Kersti Karits, Villem Kastamm and Stanislav Liitus. These customs officials blackmailed bribe from the head of a transportation company. In the fuel tank of one of their trucks the officials discovered fuel with special marking, which is forbidden for such vehicles. The court found the officials guilty and punished them all with two years' conditional imprisonment with three years' probation period.

In order to prevent smuggling at customs stations and revealing corrupt public officials the Security Police, parallel to customs officers and border guards act together in one criminal group. In Border Guard units the main corruption risks are connected with taking bribe for not controlling certain persons, also covering up or not fixing breaches.

In June 2003 the Security Police officials detained in connection with the proceeded criminal case the physician of Ida-Viru Border Guard District, Lieutenant Vladimir D., suspected in smuggling together with the residents of Narva, Kalev K., Andrei S., Eduard K., Aliksi M. and Genadii M. Vladimir D. was detained in Ida-Viru County, on the territory of Vasknarva Border Guard Station. In the course of arrest police confiscated 1.300 litres of bootleg, which was poured into jerricans. The contraband was brought from Russia to Estonia in inflatable motorboat. The spirit was to be transported to Narva, where it would have been sold to the producers of illegal alcohol. During preliminary investigation it was ascertained that in two months this criminal group had managed to bring contraband from Russia to Estonia twice. Especially interesting for the Security Police is the fact that the group used the services of Vladimir D., who among other things informed the smugglers about border guard regime. By offering bribe, Vladimir D. tried to recruit servicemen from amongst the staff of Vasknarva Border Guard Station, so they would enable him and his group illegal border crossing and smuggling.

The above-described case is not exceptional, because similar examples could be given from other border guard units, as well. At the beginning of 2003 the Security Police took to court Sven Mäe, the border guard official of Luhamaa Border Guard Station in South-East Border Guard District, who according to previous agreement took bribe for not checking a car at border and by that assisted in smuggling. The court found Sven Mäe guilty in bribery and punished him with partially actual imprisonment. From two years imprisonment he had to stay in prison for two months and the rest of the punishment will be conditional. If he will not commit another crime during three years.
Combating Crimes Connected with Excise Goods
– Illegal Fuel Trade

In 2003 one of the priorities of the Security Police Board in the matter of excise goods was combating illegal fuel trade. This is a crime type, which, first of all, endangers economic stability of Estonia and due to that the security of the whole state. Due to fuel trade tax frauds the state treasury does not receive hundreds of millions of kroons of taxes and at the same time a vast amount of the so-called dirty money goes into circulation via criminal structures. Taking into consideration the fact that corrupt officials from different public institutions are often connected with such fraud schemes, the Security Police has paid a lot of attention to restrain illegal fuel trade.

In connection with illegal fuel trade the most problematic area is still the so-called fuel laundering or illegal removal of additives from specially marked liquid fuel. The statistics that characterizes the import and consumption of diesel fuel and specially marked liquid fuel indicate that thanks to joint efforts of different services the situation as a whole has become considerably better, but it can not be considered satisfactory yet. Besides fuel laundering fuel smuggling plays quite an important role in illegal fuel trade. Due to that the state does not receive tens of millions of kroons of excise tax. At the same time, compared with fuel laundering, fuel smuggling is a second rate problem, because control over the movement of goods has become more efficient during recent years. The Security Police has paid main attention in this area to revealing sea-borne fuel smuggling.

For instance, in May 2003, after three years of thorough preliminary investigation, the Security Police took to court a group of fuel smugglers. Members of this group were Eduard B., Juri R. and Vladimir K. During the years 2000 and 2001, this criminal group smuggled into Estonia 6,644 tons of petrol with octane value 95 via Roomassaare Port in Saaremaa, and due to that the state did not receive all in all 49,500,000 kroons of VAT and excise tax. This was probably the most large-scaled revealed smuggling scheme in the history of Estonian Police. Here the fact that the former head of Kuressaare Customs Station Mart K., who directly helped the group in the breach of law, was also took to court accused of misuse of official position. Nevertheless, such large-scaled fuel smuggling cases, when thousands of tons of fuel are brought into the state, are quite unexceptional.

If on the second half of 2002 the Security Police mainly focused on disclosing criminal structures, which deal with fuel laundering, then on the first half of 2003 the main attention was turned to illegal activity of fuel laboratories dealing with fuel certification. Namely, certificates with indices, which do not correspond to reality and are thus deceitful, have been found in several retail, wholesale- and importing companies in the course of control-raids.

There have been cases of imported or marketable fuel, which, according to certificate, should correspond to fixed requirements, but tests give entirely different results. In such cases we are usually dealing with fuel, which has been either taken in the course of transit or from which special markings have been illegally removed.

In June 2003 the illegal activity of Aleksei V., the chairman and owner of B.E.I. Survey Ltd., which deals with certificating fuel, was proved guilty in the matter of taking bribe for issuing a fictitious fuel certificate. B.E.I. Survey Ltd. was one of the five companies, accredited by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and Estonian Accreditation Centre, authorised to certify fuel. In the course of crime imitation Aleksei V. took bribe in the amount of 7,000 kroons for issuing a fictitious conformity certificate to diesel fuel not corresponding to quality requirements, whereas he was well aware of the fact that the fuel does not correspond to fixed requirements. On the certificate Aleksei V. wrote a file number of a fictive sample, also his own signature and the signature of Aleksandri O., an expert of B.E.I. Survey Ltd., and by that he confirmed that the substandard fuel corresponds to requirements fixed for diesel fuel. Proceeding from the above-mentioned the Security Police brought charge against Aleksei V. on bribery and official forgery and took the case to court. The certificating accreditation issued to B.E.I. Survey Ltd. was annulled. This case expressively indicates that official control over the fuel certificating companies should be more efficient and more frequent.

Disclosing Corruption in Ministries and Central Subsidiary Units

In case of corruption in ministries and their subsidiaries the greatest problem, without doubt, are officials, who take bribe for performing their regular tasks or not performing some of their tasks. Having continually paid great attention to these particular problems the Security Police disclosed several such bribery cases. For instance, the Security Police took to court the case of the head of the Labour Market Board Anneli Sild, who issued a forged service record for bribe. She also ordered to pay unemployment insurance to her acquaintance with no statutory ground. The court punished Anneli Sild for taking bribe and misuse of official position to her acquaintance with no statutory ground. The court punished Anneli Sild for taking bribe and misuse of official position to her acquaintance with no statutory ground. The court punished Anneli Sild for taking bribe and misuse of official position.

A noteworthy circumstance here is that in the framework of the same criminal case the head of the Employer Servicing Department of the Labour Market Board Mati Karu and his acquaintance Peeter Krimpe were also taken to court for forging documents on the basis of which one acausal person received the labour market benefit meant for unemployed. After the benefit had came in this person’s bank account, Mati Karu and Peeter Krimpe drew...
Preliminary Investigation of Crimes without Limitation Period

Several investigations initiated by the Security Police in the matter of crimes against humanity reached to court decisions in 2003. Two criminal cases concluded with condemnatory decisions.

On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court did not give proceeding permission to the appeal of Juri Karpov, who was declared guilty by Tallinn District Court on December 19, 2002, in the matter of the March Deportation, a criminal case that was treated more thoroughly in the previous Annual.

Valga District Court found a security officer, the former head of Elva District Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of USSR Vladimir Penart guilty according to § 61, section 1 of the Criminal Code, and with its decision from April 9, 2003, the Court punished him with 8 years imprisonment. On the basis of § 75, section 1 of the Penal Code the Court ordered suspension of the sentence on probation, if Penart does not commit a new criminal offence within the period of probation. With the same court decision according to § 136a of the Criminal Code of the Russian FSFSR (sic!), Vladimir Penart’s former agent Rudolf Tuvi was convicted and punished with 8 years imprisonment. On the basis of § 5, section 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the punishment was not applied due to expired limitation period.

According to the accusation of the Security Police Board Vladimir Penart was responsible for murdering three forest brothers. Rudolf Tuvi assisted him as an agent in two cases and in one of these cases Tuvi was the executor of the murder or the so-called agent-murderer (agent-bojevik).

Vladimir Penart, as well as the prosecutor appealed the decision of the first instance. The latter did it because Valga District Court considered only one murder in Penart’s accusation to be reliable proved and re-qualified the perpetration of Rudolf Tuvi to be murder with the purpose of personal gain, not a crime against humanity.

On September 2, 2003, Tartu District Court annulled the above-mentioned decision and admitted the accusation to be fully proved. Both accused were found guilty in crimes against humanity according to § 61, section 1 of the Criminal Code and the District Court punished them with 8 years imprisonment, but according to § 73, section 1 of the Penal Code suspended the 3 years sentence on probation, unless Penart or Tuvi intentionally commit a new criminal offence within the period of probation.

Tallinn District Court did not satisfy the appeals registered by their defender on January 22, 2004.

On October 10, 2003, Saare County Court convicted Pjotr Kishlyi and August Kolk of a crime against humanity according to § 61, section 1 of the Criminal Code. Their defender disputed the court decision in the district court. These are the first accused, whose files the court separated from the vast volume of materials concerning the enormous criminal case of the 1949 March Deportation at Saaremaa. Three more security officers were brought to trial in the course of the last case.

Qualifying the March Deportation as Genocide

On September 29, 2003, the Security Police Board started the preliminary investigation of the Hiiumaa episode of the 1949 March Deportation. Materials that were the basis of the procedure were separated from the voluminous criminal case dealing with the deportation in Estonia, which the Security Police investigates since 1995.

On March 25, 1949, the occupation power of the Soviet Union deported more than 20,000 people from Estonia to Siberia, among them 84 families or 261 people from Hiiumaa. Like in other Estonian counties the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Estonia and the Ministry of State Security (the predecessor of the State Security Committee – KGB) supervised deportation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Border Guard forces participated, as well. By force and with weapons the local “Party and Soviet activists” and “reliable collective farmers” were involved in deporting people.

The preliminary investigation of the deportation from Hiiumaa resembles previous proceedings that were held in other counties, e.g. the abovementioned criminal case of Saaremaa deportation.

However, one feature makes the criminal case of the Hiiumaa March Deportation entirely new. The previous preliminary investigations and court decisions have proceeded from the Criminal Code, which lost effect on September 1, 2002. The regulation of the Penal Code applied to crimes against humanity and war crimes is remarkably different and requires precise qualifying.

In qualifying deportation as a crime according to § 61, section 1 of the Criminal Code, Estonian law enforcement agencies had, until now, no obligation to draw a strict line between genocide and crime against humanity in a broader sense, as the mentioned article and section involve both crimes. According to the Code the Supreme Court attempted to define them in the adjudication of Karl Leonard Paušu, but the problem has not been raised in connection with deportation cases, so far.
According to the valid Penal Code genocide should be distinctly distinguished from crimes against humanity while qualifying the crime. Genocide is the most serious one among possible deportation qualifications. Thus, the matter is relevant and also interesting from judicial aspect.

Placing a certain racial or social group (if we regard national, ethnic and religious groups as social groups, as well) into the living conditions that bring along partial or total danger of perishing of such group is sufficiently objective aspect of genocide crime. Article 2 of the 1948 Convention on Prevention And Repression of Genocide acknowledges such group to be only national, ethnic, racial or religious group. The most important feature that distinguishes genocide crime from the crimes against humanity is the purpose of such crime – to wipe out such group entirely or partially.

If we analyse the long systematic activity of the governing institutions of the Soviet Union and the results of this activity on Estonian population, we can draw a conclusion that in further perspective the purpose of the occupying power was to destroy Estonians as an ethnos. Pertinent argumentation would need the volume of a separate article, but, and this is much more important, as the intent to destroy Estonians – the most important subjective aspect of a genocide crime – might be ascertained only in connection with very few top communists or top chekists and on the basis of available archive documents it would be practically impossible to prove it in court. The defenders can use as a counterargument the fact that amid highest local communist and security organs’ ranks were Estonians, who did not deny their nationality.

As a posterior international tendency, several states have completed the list of potential genocide victims with political groups. Since 1995 Estonian law considers any activity aimed at destroying any social group to be genocide; a group resisting occupation regime has been referred to separately. However, nobody has ever explained the exact meaning of this. In the adjudication of Karl-Leonard Paulov the Supreme Court explained to public that a group of forest brothers, for instance, who share a bunker or forest brothers who act together in a gang, can not be considered a group containing people on the basis of objective features that cannot be transformed by somebody’s judgement. Next we try to explain whether the deportees of the 1949 March Deportation formed a social group (or a complex of such groups) that resisted occupation.

Deportees As a Social Group Resisting Occupation Regime
The pure fact that the whole families were deported indicates that the purpose of deportation was to eliminate the whole groups of population, not individuals who have been found guilty in something or considered dangerous. The deported families were specified by group features.

Regulation No. 300-138ss of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (see Appendix), the orders, plans and summaries concerning the preparation and execution of operation “Priboi” organised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Security (MGB) that formed the basis for deportation, also the records of the families to be deported manifest that the top officials of the Soviet Union and MGB specified persons to be deported by social group features, not by their individual activity. Such features were:
1. Belonging into a social group which the occupation power specified as “kulaks”. As has been mentioned before, the lists of “kulak” households were compiled already in 1927-48 in order to apply special higher taxation on more wealthy households. Thus, belonging to the group was defined by financial situation only and that is a social feature.
2. Belonging to the family where at least one member was:
   a. a judicially repressed forest brother;
   b. a killed forest brother;
   c. a free forest brother;
   d. “legalised”, meaning not repressed forest brother;
   e. a supporter of repressed forest brothers;
   f. “nationalist” – according to the MGB definition – were persons who had been judicially repressed for “counter-revolutionary crimes” and emigrants (escape abroad was qualified as “treason of homeland” and this was considered to be another “counter-revolutionary crime”). Actually, all “counter-revolutionary crimes” were expressions of political inclination that the occupation power had criminalized in its own criminal interests.

In chekists’ phraseology the term “nationalist” included all family members of categories 2a-2f and discriminated from “kulaks”.

Estonian Museum of Occupations opened the doors on June 27, 2003. The doors of the prison cells dating from the time of Estonian SSR.
The listed categories, or special contingent in MGB terminology, were outwardly quite different – on the one hand wealthy farmers (at least once they had been wealthy) and, on the other hand, mostly fatherless families, which the occupation power had deprived of means of living already in 1944-45. In 1949 the latter were often among the poorest families. However, there was one group feature common to all of them – their political inclination towards occupation power was or could have been adverse due to their family relations, i.e., due to their social origin. Thus, the group of deported persons can be considered to have been a social group that resisted (first of all passively) occupation power. “Priboi” operation “Pharaoh” might have been total or partial destruction of this group.

Activity Aimed at Destruction of the Group

Above we substantiated why the deportees formed a social group resisting the occupation regime. Next we explain how did MGB’s intention to destroy the mentioned group totally or partially reveal itself and how was this group placed into the living conditions that brought along the danger of partial or total destruction:

1. Clause 2, Regulation No. 390-138ss of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (see Appendix) from January 29, 1949, provided that the deportation in restricted meaning (i.e., transporting people to the faraway places of the occupying country) will be followed by lifetime exile in various regions and districts of Siberia. Thus, the deported Estonians were scattered and isolated from their habitual social and economic environment – there was no mother-tongue education, no church, no press and insufficient possibilities to communicate. Even if the high death rate, caused by difficult living conditions and insufficient medical aid imposed upon deportees, would not have destroyed them physically, it is obvious that the deportees could not have existed in Siberia as a separate social or national group for more than one generation.

2. The then official or otherwise widespread rhetoric of bolsheviks was not ashamed of phrasing the purpose of the repressions of the occupying powers. There was talk about “eliminating kulaks as a class,” etc.

3. Partial destruction of the group was actually completed. Together with collective farms, imposed upon by the occupation power (which was successful due to deportation and in fear of new deportation), deportation eliminated the social group of farmers in occupied Estonia.

4. Deportation itself was expensive for occupying power and an undertaking jeopardizing general stability. Influence on general stability was actual – for instance, after deportation the activity of forest brothers became much more active, in quantity (many, who had escaped from deportation, also those, who feared new wave of deportation, went into the forests), as well as in activity (those forest brothers, whose family members had been deported, took revenge). Sure enough, deportation was not economically efficient. From Soviet Union’s point of view the only rational reason for deporting 87,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians must have been social elimination of a group of persons who resided or might have resisted occupation power.

(The Already Traditional Column: Russia’s Response

Punishment for crime against humanity has, first of all, preventive purpose that should not be regarded barely in the context of local (internal) community. In punishing for crimes against humanity international general prevention should be taken into consideration. This obligation is placed upon us by the 1968 Convention on non-application the period of limitation in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity (OJ 1991, 35, 428; OJ II 1994, 16/7, 30, 27, 143) that provides requirement to apply criminal liability with regard to persons who have committed crimes against humanity. It is emphasized in the Preamble of the Convention that according to international law war crimes and crimes against humanity belong amongst the most serious crimes. It is also said that effective punishment for war crimes and crimes against humanity is an important factor that helps to prevent such crimes, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, enhance international confidence and stimulate cooperation, but also guarantee international peace and security.

Therefore, sanctions applied towards criminals who have committed crimes against humanity have great importance from the aspect of criminology. Even more important is the fact that society together with international public would decidedly condemn such crimes and the representatives of extremist views (whether individuals, organisations or the whole countries) would give up their sympathy towards any kind of criminals.)
As in the Annual of 2002 we cannot and may not look past regrettable reaction of the legal successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, about the execution of justice in the subject under discussion in the neighbouring countries. Russia’s official politics and the pronouncements of Russia’s politicians/diplomats brought no surprises in 2003, regrettably no positive developments, as well. Russia’s official foreign politics continued to deny the existence of consistent Republic of Estonia and the fact of its violent occupation, and continued to justify the criminals with antifascist demagogy.

It, likewise, did not surprise the Security Police Board that either through oversight or through impertinence Moscow’s official politics discarded the mask of “compatriots’ legal aid” from the invasion attempt to Estonian courts.

Aleksandr Kustov, who calls himself a lawyer and has until now defended Russia’s citizens, by the order of the Embassy of Russian Federation began to “defend” Arnold Meri, an Estonian and a citizen of the Republic of Estonia, who is suspected of taking part in deportation. It cannot, at least in case of Arnold Meri, be called a real defence, because already after the first procedural step Kustov decided to harness his “client” to the propaganda carriage of Kreml. That is why attesting an Estonian citizen to be a suspect by Estonian law enforcement bodies became public via Russian National (!) news agency RIA Novosti. The person who had leaked the information was mentioned, as well – the Head of the Baltic Representation of Russia’s Union of Lawyers Aleksandr Kustov, who was not discreet in his comments. Let us quote the news agency:

“In the lawyer’s opinion the ordinance filed by Kapo about attesting Arnold Meri to be a suspect in committing “several serious crimes” is nothing more, than “the desire of Estonian authorities to portray him as a person, who must bear responsibility for everything that “Soviet regime” commenced on Estonian territory in 1949.”

“Regrettably – Kustov added last but not least – the processes connected with the 1949 Deportation of the residents of Hiiumaa and Saaremaa continue in Estonia, and at the same time the processes held on the former employees of law enforcement agencies, who in 1944-1956 participated in the eliminating of the so-called “forest brothers.”

Recurrent reproach in the statements of Russia’s politicians and diplomats is the using of the term occupation in Estonian official documents. (See for instance: the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from July 17, 2003). Although the democratic public of the whole world recognizes consistent Estonian Republic and by that the Soviet Union’s illegal occupation that took place in 1940-1941 and 1944-1994, Russia’s administration seems to be unable to reconcile with it. This was the Kreml’s position that Aleksandr Kustov defended at the process at Saare County Court in 2003, questioning the consistency of the Republic of Estonia and the occurrence of occupation.

Unlike last year, in 2003 the Informaion and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made no formal statements that directly concerned the investigation of crimes against humanity in Estonia. But, on October 13, 2003, the speaker of Russian Duma Gennadi Selezniov made a harsh statement, claiming that the investigation of Arnold Meri’s activity during the 1949 Deportation is a persecution of the veteran of the Great Patriotic War. Although Meri has so far been declared a suspect, Selezniov believes that the charges pressed against Arnold Meri have political background. The speaker threatened that such activity may seriously exacerbate the relations between Russia and Estonia, and warned “Estonian authorities” to be cautious.
The decision of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union of January 29, 1949: “Deporting from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia kulaks and their families; the families of bandits and nationalists who are illegal, who were killed in the course of armed conflicts or who have been convicted, legalized bandits, who continue resistance, and their families; also the families of the supporters of repressed bandits.”

MOSCOW, KREMLIN, JANUARY 29, 1949
Council of Ministers of USSR Top secret
DECISION no. 390-138
Deporting from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia kulaks and their families; the families of bandits and nationalists who are illegal, who were killed in the course of armed conflicts or who have been convicted, legalized bandits, who continue resistance, and their families; also the families of the supporters of repressed bandits.

January 29, 1949, Moscow, Kremlin

The council of Ministers of USSR Decides:

1. To accede the proposals of the Councils of Ministers of Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR and Estonian SSR, and the Central Committees of the Communist (bolshevist) Parties of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to deport kulaks and their families; the families of bandits and nationalists who are illegal, who were killed in the course of armed conflicts or who have been convicted, legalized bandits, who continue resistance, and their families; also the families of the supporters of repressed bandits.

Deport altogether 29000 families consisting of 87000 persons, of these 8500 families, 25000 persons from Lithuania; 13000 families, 39000 persons from Latvia; 7500 families, 22500 persons from Estonia.

2. To deport the persons belonging to the abovementioned categories permanently to Yakut ASSR, the territories of Krasnojarsk and Habarovsk, the regions of Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk, and to apply the Decree of the Supreme Council of USSR of November 26, 1948: “Bringing to criminal account the persons who have been deported to the further districts of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, but who have escaped from the sites of compulsory exile.”

3. To oblige the Ministry of State Security of USSR (comrade Abakumov) to execute the deportation of the persons named in point 1 of this Decision from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia during the period of March 20-25, 1949.

To deport kulaks and their families on the basis of the lists confirmed by the Councils of the Ministries of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR; the families of bandits and nationalists who are illegal, who were killed in the course of armed conflicts or who have been convicted, legalized bandits, who continue resistance, and their families; also the families of the supporters of repressed bandits according to the decision of the Special Consultation by the Ministry of State Security of USSR.

4. To oblige the Ministry of Internal Affairs of USSR (comrade Kruglov) to guarantee the convey and transportation of the deportees from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by means of railway and water carriage up to the sites of their exile; carefully guard the deportees on the way; to guarantee administrative surveillance of the deportees at exile sites and keep proper account over deportees – to apply a regime that prevents any escapes; to guarantee work for deportees in agriculture (in collective and state farms, in timber industry and gold-mine industry).

To organize special commandant’s offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at exile sites.

5. To allow the deportees to take along valuables, homestead (clothes, tableware, farming implements and domestic inventories) and food, altogether up to 150 kilograms per one family. The rest of the property and livestock of the exiles should be confiscated.

The confiscated property of the exiles must be used to cover the government debt, the property that remains after covering the government debt (houses, auxiliary buildings, enterprises, farming and working inventory and fixed) must be given to collective farms free of charge and put it into indivisible funds. The rest of the property must be transferred to finance bodies for realization. Food cereals, fodder and industrial crops must be transferred to the state.

6. To oblige the Ministry of Finance of USSR (comrade Zverev) to assign in 1949 additional finances from all-Union budget to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for special commandant’s offices, and also finances for feeding and medical care of deportees during transportation, calculating 5 rubles and 60 kopeks per one person per day.

Appendix

An appeal of Soviet occupation powers for political clearing of accounts, published in a newspaper after re-occupying Estonia in 1944: “Let us welcome everywhere political alertness that helps to reveal agents and spies left behind by Germans, to arrest fritzes hiding in the forests. Political alertness is the pledge of ultimate victory and prosperity of our country and people!”
7. To oblige the Ministry of Transportation (Communication) of USSR (Comrade Bestsev) to seclude to the Ministry of Internal Affairs the necessary amount of railway carriages for transporting deportees; also, to take care that the deportees’ echelons would run up to the target sites in the rights of army echelons.

Transportation reports of deportees are submitted in the form of the tariffs of transporting prisoners.

8. To oblige the Ministry of Economy of USSR (Comrade Zhavoronkov) to take care of the excluding of warm meals to the deportees’ echelons and to pay for the meals with finances secluded to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the basis of point 6 of this Decision.

9. To oblige the Ministry of Health of USSR (Comrade Smirnov) to seclude for each deportees’ echelon a doctor and two nurses together with necessary amount of medicaments and bandages, in order to ensure medical aid during transportation.

10. To oblige the Council of Ministries of Yakut ASSR and the Executive Committees of the Councils of the Deputies of the Working People of the territories of Krasnogorsk and Habarovsk, and the regions of Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk to render assistance in settling the exiles and to organize their households and living environment; also, in case of necessity, to found invalids’ and old people’s homes to accommodate lonely invalids and elderly persons who arrive among the exiles and to appropriate funds for founding and keeping such institutions.

Chairman of the Council of Ministries of USSR J. STALIN
Secretary of the Council of Ministries of USSR J. TSHADAEV