Consolidated Strategy

Counterterrorism

(U//LES) Militia Extremists

(U//LES) Sovereign Citizen Extremists

(U//LES) White Supremacy Extremists

(U//LES) Black Identity Extremists

(U//LES) Anarchist Extremists
# Counterterrorism

- **(U//FOUO)** Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE)
- **(U)** The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) Global (includes Affiliates and Branches)
- **(U)** Racially Motivated Extremism
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- **(U)** Anti-Government/Anti-Authority Extremism
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- **(U)** Animal Rights/Environmental Extremism
- **(U)** Abortion Extremism
# Consolidated Strategy Guide

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Threat Issue Title

| III | HQ-CTD-92-III-18 | Black Identity Extremists |

Domestic Terrorism Fusion Cell (DTAU and DTOTU)

Threat Definition

| (U) | Black Identity Extremists (BIEs) use force or violence in violation of criminal law in response to perceived racism and injustice in American society; some do so in furtherance of establishing a separate black homeland or autonomous black social institutions, communities, or governing organizations within the U.S. A desire for physical or psychological separation is typically based on a religious or political belief system, which is sometimes formed around or includes a belief in racial superiority or supremacy. Retaliation and retribution for perceived wrongdoings against African Americans has become an organizing driver for BIEs. Some BIEs desire separation from perceived oppressive forces (law enforcement, USG personnel, and other oppressive forces who are viewed as participants in this perceived unjust institutionalized system). This type of targeting has become a more obtainable goal for BIEs. Some still advocate for a separate homeland, while some advocate for starting a race-war. |

Strategy Overview

What is the intended impact? (U)

(U) CTD will continue to focus on identifying national trends and federal crimes committed by BIEs to lower the intended threat impact by BIEs. The FBI expects field office work could mitigate and lower the national level extremist threat. Maintenance of state and local partnerships combined with source development could result in detection and prevention of BIE criminal activity. It is challenging to get sources into BIE groups, due to security measures these groups employ. The vetting process and time investment to gain access to leadership in BIE groups is very lengthy. The use of undercover employees and online covert employees in BIE investigations would provide valuable intelligence to assist in mitigating the threat.

What part of the threat is the FBI going to target? (U/FOUO)

(U/FOUO) The FBIHQ led Threat Mitigation Strategy IRON FIST was implemented to mitigate the potential threat posed by the BIE movement at the national level. IRON FIST will accomplish this by identifying actionable intelligence to directly support the intensification of FBI investigations and augment current efforts directed against BIEs. IRON FIST is designed to evolve and adapt to the ever-changing threat posed by BIEs, to proactively address this priority domestic terrorism target by focusing FBI operations via enhanced intelligence collection efforts. In addition, FBIHQ works to develop potential CHSs and conduct assessments on the current BIE CHS base. Many BIEs are convicted felons who are prohibited possessors, therefore the FBI will continue to use their prohibited possessor status as a tactic to assist in mitigating the threat for potential violence.

What information does the FBI need to know in order to mitigate the threat? (U/LES)

(U/LES) In order to mitigate the threat, the FBI must know who facilitates and recruits for BIE activity, what motivates BIEs to commit criminal activities in furtherance of their political/social goals and what tactics BIEs plan to use in the furtherance of their ideology. The FBI needs a better understanding of the hierarchy and structure of BIE groups, and how these groups train/work with one another, and criminal organizations. The FBI needs intelligence on individuals who BIE groups have removed, asked to leave, or who left voluntarily after expressing beliefs deemed too extreme for the established members of the BIE group since many recent lethal BIE incidents have been conducted by BIE lone offenders. To mitigate the threat emanating from BIEs, FBIHQ entities conduct an extensive review of the program's source base, which is published annually in the National Collection Posture and Plan (NCPP). As part of this review, the FBI assesses the national collection posture and capability of the BIE source base and makes a determination on the efficacy of the program's collection platform, including appropriate source utilization and areas in need of refocusing. In addition, the FBI highlights salient national collection gaps and provides recommendations for field offices to address those gaps. Finally, the NCPP emphasizes current trends within the threat stream that and discusses ways in which these trends may impact the collection efforts. The information taken from the NCPP is then used to inform Source Identification Guides, Source Directed Requirements, Source Identification Packages, and others, all to ensure the FBI's source base aligns effectively against the BIE threat.

What actions will the FBI take?

Field Office Actions

(U/FOUO) Field offices will focus on source development, awareness, and investigation of BIE criminal activity in their areas of responsibility.

(U/FOUO) Field offices will focus on recruitment, fundraising for illegal activities, and potential violent plots.

HQ Actions

(U/FOUO) FBIHQ will continue to identify and provide information on national threats and trends to FBI executives and field offices, as well as state and local law enforcement partners, and the rest of the intelligence community.

(U/FOUO) FBIHQ will proactively search open source material for...
Field offices will focus on the procurement of illegal weapons and explosives and the procurement of weapons and explosives by prohibited persons.

Field offices will evaluate their need for an open Type 3 assessment file in regards to BIE. An open assessment file allows for greater proactive collection techniques should the BIE threat emerge in the wake of a police-involved incident that sparks potential BIE activity.

Indicators of BIE activity, reporting relevant information to the field for possible predication or assessment of source potential.

FBIHQ will provide timely all-source analysis of BIE activities in order to inform FBI executives and field offices of threats and trends in tactics and targets.
— National Threat Overview

(U/FOUO)
(U) Disclaimer: Domestic extremists employ a number of indicators, some of which may be criminal and others which may constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the US Constitution. The FBI is prohibited from engaging in investigative activity for the sole purpose of monitoring the exercise of constitutional rights.

(U/FOUO) The FBI judges BIE perceptions of police brutality against African Americans have likely motivated acts of pre-mediated, retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement in 2016 and will continue to serve as justification for violent incidents. The FBI first observed this activity following the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the subsequent acquittal of police officers involved in that incident. While BIEs specifically target white law enforcement officers, all law enforcement officers are considered BIE targets for their participation in this perceived unjust system. BIEs often view African American police officers as race traitors. The BIE movement has also come to include many lone offenders and small cells, and individuals who are self-proclaimed members of multiple BIE groups.

(U/LES) The threat to law enforcement from BIE lone offenders and small cells is likely to remain elevated, and may continue to expand, driven in part by continued calls for violent action on social media and ongoing perceptions of racially-based injustices against African Americans. The FBI assesses racially charged events, coupled with the wide-spread media attention of these events, and the ready dissemination of violent online rhetoric by BIEs, are likely to remain contributing factors to the emergence of violent lone offenders within the BIE movement. Lone offenders will continue to benefit from operational security based on their independent activity, making it difficult for law enforcement to detect and prevent their violent plots.

— HQ TRP Impact and Mitigation Levels/Criteria

Impact Level 2
Continuing damage to U.S. economic and critical infrastructures
Loss of life and/or potential damage to public safety/wellbeing

Mitigation Level B
National efforts require a routine but active level of investigative activity to effectively mitigate the threat issue

— Key Intelligence Questions

Counterterrorism Division’s KIQs

— Key Domain Entities

(U/LES) Likely to target civilian and government entities that are perceived as oppressors, including, but not limited to, law enforcement officers, the US Government, members of rival BIE groups, and individuals based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion.

— Key Liaison Contacts

(U/LES) State and local law enforcement

— Key Threat Indicators

(U/LES) Attempts to identify and collect information such as names or vehicles of law enforcement officers.
(U/LES) Paramilitary training.
(U/LES) Attempts to acquire, sell, or maintain weapons illegally.
(U/LES) Wearing of uniforms, patches, or insignia of a black identity extremist group.
(U/LES) Violent or threatening rhetoric that may include threats against law enforcement and advocating of separate social, economic, or political systems for minorities.
(U/LES) Attempts to recruit individuals with criminal or military skill sets, including gang members or current or former military personnel.
(U/LES) Adhering to operational security procedures, such as attempts to locate recording devices, physical searches, removal of batteries from cellular phones, close examination of pocket items or clothing, and counter-surveillance.
(U/LES) Group membership for blacks or minorities only, with demonstrated hostility to the prospect of non-black membership.

— Link to Key Collection Requirements

USA-TERR-CTD-SR-0519-17 Black Separatist Extremists

— Case Classifications

UNCLASSIFIED//LES
UNCLASSIFIED//LES

FY18 CSG - Threat Guidance - CTD

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Related Links

- (U) 2015 National Intelligence Threat Study: Domestic Extremism Poses Medium-Level Threat
- (U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit (DTAU) SharePoint Site
- (U//LES) Comprehensive Domestic Terrorism Strategy from 2006
- DT Fusion Cell Intranet Site
Threat Issue Title

HQ-CTD-74-III-18 White Supremacy Extremists

Domestic Terrorism Fusion Cell (DTAU and DTOTU)

Threat Definition

(U//FOUO) White supremacy extremists (WSE) seek to further their social and political goals, wholly or in part through crimes of force or violence. Their beliefs are based in the superiority of the white race and a perception that the US Government is conspiring with Jews and other minority populations to bring about the race's demise. White supremacy extremism finds justification through a variety of religious beliefs (e.g., Christian Identity, non-theistic Creativity, and racist Odinism) and political and cultural ideologies (e.g., neo-Nazism and the racist skinhead movement). WSE beliefs sometimes appear in other domestic extremist movements, as has historically been the case with militia extremism.

Strategy Overview

What is the intended impact? (U//FOUO)
(U//FOUO) WSE threats and subjects are mostly identified by human source reporting, thus making identifying quality sources a priority for WSE investigators. By identifying sources with good access and vetting their information for possible inclusion of an FBI undercover, the FBI can learn how WSEs operate, mitigate specific operational plans by a group of WSEs or lone offenders, and make WSEs less effective and make it more challenging for WSE operations to take place.

What part of the threat is the FBI going to target? (U//FOUO)
(U//FOUO) The FBIHQ led Threat Mitigation Strategy SUPREME RENDITION was implemented to mitigate the potential threat posed by WSE movements at the national level and will accomplish this by identifying actionable intelligence to directly support the initiation of FBI investigations and augment current efforts directed against WSEs. SUPREME RENDITION is designed to evolve and adapt to the ever-changing threat posed by WSEs, to proactively address this priority domestic terrorism target by focusing FBI operations via enhanced intelligence collection efforts. In addition, FBIHQ works to develop potential CHSs and conduct assessments on the current WSE CHS base. Noting that many WSE subjects are convicted felons and are prohibited from legally possessing firearms, the FBI is exploiting the Dark Web or Dark Net to determine whether persons with a WSE ideology are using these non-indexed "hidden" websites and domains to procure firearms, explosives, murder-for-hire, or other illegal services in furtherance of their beliefs. Also, the FBI will use their prohibited possessor status as a tactic to assist in mitigating the threat for potential violence.

What information does the FBI need to know in order to mitigate the threat? (U//FOUO)
(U//FOUO) In addition to the information requested in the FBI’s Key Intelligence Questions and Collection Requirements for the WSE program, it would be of great benefit to understand the recruitment process for members of WSE organizations, the relationship with white prison gangs, how WSEs communicate, connections to overseas WSEs, and the radicalization process for those seeking membership in a WSE organization or for those wishing to act alone in an attack on WSE targets. The FBI needs intelligence on individuals who WSE groups had removed, asked to leave, or who left voluntarily after expressing beliefs deemed too extreme for the established members of the WSE group since many recent lethal WSE incidents have been conducted by WSE lone offenders. To mitigate the threat emanating from WSEs, FBIHQ entities conduct an extensive review of the program’s source base, which is published annually in the National Collection Posture and Plan (NCPP). As part of this review, the FBI assesses the national collection posture and capability of the WSE source base and makes a determination on the efficacy of the program’s collection platform, including appropriate source utilization and areas in need of refocusing. In addition, the FBI highlights salient national collection gaps and provides recommendations for field offices to address those gaps. Finally, the NCPP emphasizes current trends within the threat stream that and discusses ways in which these trends may impact the collection efforts. The information taken from the NCPP is then used to inform Source Identification Guides, Source Directed Requirements, Source Identification Packages, and others, all to ensure the FBI’s source base aligns effectively against the WSE threat.

What actions will the FBI take?

Field Office Actions
(U//FOUO) Field offices will focus on source development, awareness, and investigation of WSE criminal activity in their areas of responsibility.
(U//FOUO) Field offices will focus on changes in demographics in the AOR which might have an impact on WSE targeting (e.g. racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual identity minority populations).
(U//FOUO) Field offices will conduct social media analysis of WSE

HQ Actions
(U//FOUO) FBIHQ will provide strategic products to better inform field offices about emerging WSE threats from a national perspective.
(U//FOUO) FBIHQ will work with field offices to mitigate and lower the national level extremist threats/enterprise investigations.
(U//FOUO) FBIHQ will maintain liaison with state and local partners and
threats, as appropriate.

(U//FOUO) Field offices should liaise with their Criminal Division counterparts to determine if a hate crime contains an ideological component that necessitates dual captioning of an investigation.

will provide assistance with source development to result in detection and prevention of WSE criminal activity.
National Threat Overview

(U/LES)

(U) Disclaimer: Domestic extremists employ a number of indicators, some of which may be criminal and others which may constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the US Constitution. The FBI is prohibited from engaging in investigative activity for the sole purpose of monitoring the exercise of constitutional rights.

(U) WSE targets include racial, ethnic, sexual, and religious minorities and the cultural and social centers associated with them; the federal government for its perceived collusion with Jewish powers to harm the white race; and "race traitors" perceived to compromise the purity of the white race, such as sex offenders, drug abusers, the homeless, and those involved in interracial relationships.

(U) WSE crimes are frequently opportunistic in nature, though some have involved intricate planning. Traditional types of WSE criminal activity include threats, intimidation, physical assault, and murder using bladed weapons, firearms, and improvised explosive devices. WSEs have also engaged in the use and distribution of illegal narcotics, illegal weapons procurement, bank and armored car robberies, and counterfeiting in support of their ideological goals.

(U/FOUO) In recent years, perpetrators of WSE attacks have often been lone offenders or small cells acting without clear group affiliation or guidance. This differs from previous decades, when WSE attacks typically derived from extremist groups. Although the WSE movement continues to coalesce in opposition to racial and religious minorities or around various social issues, infighting and lack of leadership have made it difficult for groups to organize nationally and to sustain their memberships and influence. The Internet and the emergence of social media have also enabled individuals to engage the WSE movement without joining organized groups.

(U/LES) The FBI judges on the basis of previous analysis that WSE criminal activity will likely present a medium threat in 2018 and that lone offenders and small cells pose the greatest threat of violence, including lethal violence, likely involving assaults, various edged weapons, and firearms. The FBI judges some potential drivers of violence in 2018 may include foreign-inspired terrorist attacks whether committed within the United States or overseas, immigration, and social justice issues. The FBI further judges ongoing attrition of national organized white supremacy extremist groups will continue over the next year, yielding a white supremacy extremist movement primarily characterized by locally organized groups, small cells, and lone offenders.

HQ TRP Impact and Mitigation Levels/Criteria

Impact Level 2

Continuing damage to U.S. economic and critical infrastructures
Loss of life and/or potential damage to public safety/wellbeing

Mitigation Level 8

FBI has a partial understanding of the threat issue at the national level, presenting a serious barrier to mitigation

Key Intelligence Questions

Counterterrorism Division’s KIQs

Key Domain Entities

(U/LES) Likely to target racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, and the Federal Government.

Key Liaison Contacts

(U/LES) State and local law enforcement

Key Threat Indicators

(U/LES) Vandalism of religious buildings, government property, or other targets-based on race or religion, to include graffiti involving traditional WSE symbols or group names.

(U/LES) Presence of hate crimes (such as cross burnings)-based on race or religion.

(U/LES) Confidential human source (CHS) and other law enforcement reporting on encounters with WSEs.

(U/LES) Attempts to acquire, sell, or maintain weapons illegally.

(U/LES) WSE collaboration with violent motorcycle gangs.

(U/LES) Graffiti involving traditional white supremacy symbols or group names.
(U/LES) Threatening communications to traditional WSE targets, including racial, religious, and social minorities, and the federal government.

### Link to Key Collection Requirements

| USA-TERM-CTD-SR-0401-16 | White Supremacist Extremists |

### Case Classifications

- **100N**: (U) TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION-DT - WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM
- **266N**: (U) AOT-DT-WHT SUPRMST XTREMISTS
- **356N**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - PREDICATED INVESTIGATION OF A GROUP - WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM

### CPI Codes

- **D1AR**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - ARSON
- **D1AS**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - ASSAULT
- **D1BT**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM BOMB THREATS
- **D1FC**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - FINANCIAL CRIMES
- **D1FUG**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM FUGITIVES
- **D1JUD**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO JUDICIAL FIGURES
- **D1LE**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
- **D1PO**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS
- **D1SAB**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - SABOTAGE
- **D1SH**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - SHOOTING
- **D1VIO**: (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS OF VIOLENCE
- **D1G-023**: (U/FOUO) WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM - EVENT
- **D1G-024**: (U/FOUO) WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM - SUBJECT
- **SUB-FEL**: (U/FOUO) SUBJECT IS CONVICTED FELON
- **SUB-FMIL**: (U/FOUO) SUBJECT IS FORMER MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY
- **SUB-MIL**: (U/FOUO) SUBJECT IS MEMBER OF US MILITARY

### Related Links

- (U) 2015 National Intelligence Threat Study: Domestic Extremism Poses Medium-Level Threat
- (U/LES) Comprehensive Domestic Terrorism Strategy from 2006
- (U/LES) Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit (DTAU) SharePoint Site
- DT Fusion Cell Intranet Site
- White Supremacy National Strategy
Threat Issue Title

HQ-CTD-491-II-19 Racially Motivated Extremism

Domestic Terrorism Fusion Cell (DTAU and DTOTU)

Threat Definition

(U) The Racially Motivated Extremism threat encompasses threats involving the use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political or social agendas which are deemed to derive from race-related bias held by the actor against others, including a given population group. This threat generally includes White Racially Motivated Extremism, previously referred to as White Supremacy Extremism, and Black Racially Motivated Extremism, previously referred to as Black Identity Extremism.

National Threat Overview

(U/LES) (U) Disclaimer: Domestic extremists employ a number of indicators, some of which may be criminal and others which may constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the US Constitution. The FBI is prohibited from engaging in investigative activity for the sole purpose of monitoring the exercise of constitutional rights.

(U/FOOU) White Racially Motivated Extremists (WRMEs) seek to further their social and political goals, wholly or in, part through crimes of force or violence. Their beliefs are based in the superiority of the white race and a perception that the US Government is conspiring with Jews and other minority populations to bring about the race’s demise. WRMEs find justification through a variety of religious beliefs (e.g., Christian Identity, non-theistic Creativity, and racist Odinism) and political and cultural ideologies (e.g., neo-Nazism and the racist skinhead movement). WRME beliefs sometimes appear in other domestic extremist movements, as has historically been the case with militia extremism.

(U) WRME targets include racial, ethnic, sexual, and religious minorities and the cultural and social centers associated with them; the federal government for its perceived collusion with Jewish powers to harm the white race; and “race traitors” perceived to compromise the purity of the white race, such as sex offenders, drug abusers, the homeless, and those involved in interracial relationships.

(U) WRME crimes are frequently opportunistic in nature, though some have involved intricate planning. Traditional types of WRME criminal activity include threats, intimidation, physical assault, and murder using bladed weapons, firearms, and improvised explosive devices. WRMEs have also engaged in the use and distribution of illegal narcotics, illegal weapons procurement, and bank robberies in support of their ideological goals.

(U/FOOU) In recent years, perpetrators of WRME attacks have often been lone offenders or small cells acting without clear group affiliation or guidance. This differs from previous decades, when WRME attacks typically derived from extremist groups. Although the WRME movement continues to coalesce in opposition to racial and religious minorities or around various social issues, infighting and lack of leadership have made it difficult for groups to organize nationally and to sustain their memberships and influence. The Internet and the emergence of social media have also enabled individuals to engage the WRME movement without joining organized groups.

(U/LES) The FBI judges, on the basis of previous analysis, that WRME criminal activity will likely present a medium threat in 2018 and that lone offenders and small cells pose the greatest threat of violence, including lethal violence, likely involving physical assaults, various edged weapons, and firearms. The FBI judges some potential drivers of violence in 2018 may include foreign-inspired terrorist attacks whether committed within the United States or overseas, immigration, and social justice issues. The FBI further judges ongoing attrition of national organized WRME groups will continue over the next year, yielding a WRME movement primarily characterized by locally organized groups, small cells, and lone offenders.

(U) Black Racially Motivated Extremists (BRMEs) use force or violence in violation of criminal law in response to perceived racism and injustice in American society. Some BRMEs use intimidation and retribution for wrongdoings against African Americans, and they view them as oppressors, including the law enforcement of all races, whites, government personnel, and others they view as participants in an unjust institutionalized system. Some BRMEs do so in furtherance of establishing a separate black homeland or autonomous black social institutions, communities, or governing organizations within the United States. BRME desire for physical or psychological separation is typically based on a religious or political belief system, which is sometimes formed around or includes a belief in racial superiority or supremacy.

(U/FOOU) The FBI judges BRME perceptions of police brutality against African Americans have likely motivated acts of pre-mediated, retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement in 2016 and will continue to serve as justification for violent incidents. The FBI first observed this activity following the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the subsequent acquittal of police officers involved in that incident.
While BRMEs specifically target white law enforcement officers, all law enforcement officers are considered BRME targets for their participation in this perceived unjust system. BRMEs often view African American police officers as race traitors. The BRME movement has also come to include many lone offenders and small cells, as well as individuals who are self-proclaimed members of multiple BRME groups.

(U/LES) The threat to law enforcement from BRME lone offenders and small cells is likely to remain elevated, and may continue to expand, driven in part by continued calls for violent action on social media and ongoing perceptions of racially-based injustices against African Americans. If the FBI assesses racially charged events, coupled with the wide-spread media attention of these events, and the ready dissemination of violent online rhetoric continue to benefit from operational security based on their independent activity, making it difficult for law enforcement to detect and prevent their violent plots.

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Strategy Overview

**What is the intended impact? (U/FOUO)**

(U/FOUO) HQ will continue to focus on identifying national trends and federal crimes committed by Black Racially Motivated Extremists (BRMEs). Maintenance of state and local partnerships, combined with a particular focus on source development, could result in detection and prevention of BRME criminal activity. It is challenging to penetrate BRME groups with sources, due to security measures these groups employ. The vetting process and time investment to gain access to leadership in BRME groups is very lengthy. The use of undercover employees and online covert employees in BRME investigations could provide valuable intelligence to assist in mitigating the threat.

(U/FOUO) White Racially Motivated Extremists (WRME) threats and subjects are mostly identified by human source reporting, thus making identifying quality sources a priority for WRME investigators. By identifying sources with good access and vetting their information for possible inclusion of an FBI undercover, the FBI can learn how WRMEs operate, mitigate specific operational plans by a group of WRMEs or lone offenders, make WRMEs less effective, and conducting WRME operations more challenging.

**What part of the threat is the FBI going to target? (U/FOUO)**

The HQ led Threat Mitigation Strategy has been implemented to mitigate the potential threat posed by the BRME movement at the national level. The FBI will accomplish this by identifying actionable intelligence to directly support the initiation of FBI assessments and investigations and to augment current efforts directed against BRMEs. The FBI is designed to evolve and adapt to the ever-changing threat posed by BRMEs to proactively address this priority domestic terrorism target by focusing FBI operations via enhanced intelligence collection efforts. In addition, HQ works to develop potential CHIS, redirect existing FBI CHSs, and conduct assessments on the current BRME CHS base.

(U/FOUO) The HQ led Threat Mitigation Strategy Supreme Rendition was implemented to mitigate the potential threat posed by WRME movements at the national level and will accomplish this by identifying actionable intelligence to directly support the initiation of FBI assessments and investigations and to augment current efforts directed against WRMEs. Supreme Rendition is designed to evolve and adapt to the ever-changing threat posed by WRMEs, to proactively address this priority domestic terrorism target by focusing FBI operations via enhanced intelligence collection efforts. In addition, HQ works to develop potential CHISs and conduct assessments on the current WRME CHS base. Noting that many subjects are subjects are convicted felons and are prohibited from legally possessing firearms, the FBI is exploiting the Dark Web or Dark Net to determine whether persons with a WRME ideology are using these non-indexed "hidden" websites and domains to procure firearms, explosives, murder-for-hire, or other illegal services in furtherance of their beliefs. Also, the FBI will enhance collection efforts to increase the intelligence on potential foreign influence on the WRME movement.

**What information does the FBI need to know in order to mitigate the threat? (U/FOUO)**

In order to mitigate the threat, the FBI must know who facilitates and recruits for BRME activity, what motivates BRMEs to commit criminal activities in furtherance of their political/social goals, and what tactics BRMEs plan to use in the furtherance of their ideology. The FBI needs a better understanding of the hierarchy and structure of BRME groups and how these groups train/work with one another and criminal organizations. The FBI needs intelligence on individuals whose BRME groups have removed or asked to leave or who left voluntarily after expressing beliefs deemed too extreme for the established members of the BRME group. As many recent lethal BRME incidents have been conducted by BRME lone offenders. To mitigate the threat emanating from BRMEs, HQ entities conduct an extensive review of the program's source base, which is published semi-annually in the National Collection Posture and Plan (NCP). As part of this review, the FBI assesses the national collection posture and capability of the BRME source base and makes a determination on the efficacy of the program's collection platform, including appropriate source utilization and areas in need of refocusing. In addition, the FBI highlights salient national collection gaps and provides recommendations for field offices to address those gaps. Finally, the NCP emphasizes current trends within the threat stream and discusses ways in which these trends may impact the collection efforts. The information taken from the NCP is then used to inform Source Identification Guides, Request for Collection, and Source Identification Packages, all to ensure the FBI's source base aligns effectively against the BRME threat.

(U/FOUO) In addition to the information requested in the FBI's Key Intelligence Questions and Collection Requirements for the BRME program, it would be of great benefit to understand the recruitment process for members of WRME organizations, the relationship with white prison gangs, how WRMEs communicate, connections to overseas WRMEs, and the radicalization process for those seeking membership in a WRME organization or for those wishing to act alone in an attack on WRME targets. The FBI needs intelligence on individuals whom WRME groups had
removed or asked to leave or who left voluntarily after expressing beliefs deemed too extreme for the established members of the WRME group since many recent lethal WRME incidents have been conducted by WRME lone offenders. The FBI is also working to gather intelligence on Russian entities and US-based domestic terrorism collection priorities. To mitigate the threat emanating from WRMEs, FBHQ entities conduct, on an ad-hoc basis, an extensive review of the program’s source base, which is published in the National Collection Posture and Plan (NCPP). As part of this review, the FBI assesses the national collection posture and capability of the WRME source base. It makes a determination on the efficacy of the program’s collection platform, including appropriate source utilization and areas in need of refocusing. In addition, the FBI highlights salient national collection gaps and provides recommendations for field offices to address those gaps. Finally, the NCPP emphasizes current trends within the threat stream and discusses ways in which these trends may impact the collection efforts. The information taken from the NCPP is then used to inform Source Identification Guides, Request for Collection, and Source Identification Packages, all to ensure the FBI’s source base aligns effectively against the WRME threat.

**What actions will the FBI take?**

**Field Office Actions**

(U/FOUO) Field offices will focus on source development, awareness, and investigation of WRME or BRME criminal activity in their areas of responsibility.

(U/FOUO) Field offices will focus on recruitment, fundraising for illegal activities, and potential violent plots.

(U/FOUO) Field offices will focus on the procurement of illegal weapons and explosives and the procurement of weapons and explosives by prohibited persons.

(U/FOUO) Field offices will evaluate their need for an open Type 3 assessment file in regards to BRME or WRME. An open assessment file allows for greater proactive collection techniques should the BRME or WRME threat emerge in the wake of a police-involved incident that sparks potential BRME or WRME activity.

(U/FOUO) Field offices will focus on changes in demographics in the AOR which might have an impact on WRME targeting (e.g., racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual identity minority populations).

(U/FOUO) Field offices should liaise with their Criminal Division counterparts to determine if a hate crime contains an ideological component that necessitates dual captioning of an investigation.

(U/FOUO) Field offices will conduct social media analysis of BRME or WRME threats, as appropriate.

**HQ Actions**

(U/FOUO) HQ will continue to identify and provide information on national threats and trends to FBI executives and field offices, as well as state and local law enforcement partners and the rest of the USIC.

(U/FOUO) HQ will proactively search open source material for indicators of BRME activity, reporting relevant information to the field for possible predication or assessment of source potential.

(U/FOUO) HQ will provide timely all-source analysis of BRME activities in order to inform FBI executives and field offices of threats and trends in tactics and targets.

(U/FOUO) HQ will pass actionable threat information to the field offices through the initiation of Guardian leads or investigations.

(U/FOUO) HQ will work with field offices to mitigate and lower the national level extremist threats/enterprise investigations.

**What resources will HQ surge, for how long, and where are they coming from OR What new operational capabilities need to be developed to effectively mitigate the threat issue? (U/FOUO)**

FBHQ resource surging will be case or event driven and come from within FBHQ. FBHQ will focus on obtaining a better understanding of social media tools to enhance investigative capabilities. Through proactive research via FBI, USIC, state and local law enforcement proprietary sources and open source data, FBHQ hopes to identify information related to actual and potential racially motivated extremism, or related federal criminal activities.

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**HQ TRP Impact and Mitigation Levels/Criteria**

**Impact Level 2**

Loss of life and/or potential damage to public safety/wellbeing

**Mitigation Level A**

National efforts require a surge in investigative activity, or development of new operational capabilities, to effectively mitigate the threat issue

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**Key Intelligence Questions**

Counterterrorism Division's KIQs
--- Key Domain Entities ---

(U/LES) Likely to target civilian and government entities that are perceived as oppressors, including, but not limited to, law enforcement officers, the US Government, members of rival BIE groups, and individuals based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion.

--- Key Liaison Contacts ---

(U/LES) Foreign partners
(U/LES) State and local law enforcement

--- Key Threat Indicators ---

(U/LES) Confidential human source (CHS) and other law enforcement reporting on encounters with WRMEs or BRMEs.
(U/LES) Vandalism of religious buildings, government property, or other targets-based on race or religion, to include graffiti involving traditional WRME symbols or group names.
(U/LES) WRME collaboration with violent motorcycle gangs.
(U/LES) Wearing of uniforms, patches, or insignia of a BRME group.
(U/LES) Threatening communications to traditional WRME targets, including racial, religious, and social minorities, and the federal government.

--- Link to Key Collection Requirements ---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA-TERR-CTD-SR-0401-16</th>
<th>White Supremacist Extremists</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA-TERR-CTD-SR-0519-17</td>
<td>Black Separatist Extremists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- Case Classifications ---

| 100K | (U) TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION-DT - BLACK SEPARATIST EXTREMISM |
| 100N | (U) TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION-DT - WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM |
| 266K | (U) AOT-DT-BLK SEPR XTREMISTS |
| 266N | (U) AOT-DT-WHT SUPRMST XTREMISTS |
| 336K | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - PREDICATED INVESTIGATION OF A GROUP - BLACK SEPARATIST EXTREMISM |
| 336N | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - PREDICATED INVESTIGATION OF A GROUP - WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM |

--- CPI Codes ---

| DT-AR | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - ARSON |
| DT-AS | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - ASSAULT |
| DT-B | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM BOMBINGS |
| DT-BT | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM BOMB THREATS |
| DT-FC | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - FINANCIAL CRIMES |
| DT-FUG | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM FUGITIVES |
| DT-GOV | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO GOVERNMENT FACILITIES |
| DT-JUD | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO JUDICIAL FIGURES |
| DT-LE | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT |
| DT-PO | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS |
| DT-SAB | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - SABOTAGE |
| DT-SH | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - SHOOTING |
| DT-VIO | (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS OF VIOLENCE |
| DTG-013 | ([U//FOUO]) BLACK IDENTITY EXTREMISM - EVENT |
| DTG-014 | ([U//FOUO]) BLACK IDENTITY EXTREMISM - SUBJECT |
| DTG-023 | ([U//FOUO]) WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM - EVENT |
| DTG-024 | ([U//FOUO]) WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM - SUBJECT |
UNCLASSIFIED//LES

Related Links

(U) 2016 National Intelligence Threat Report: Domestic Extremism Poses Medium-Level Threat
(U) White Supremacy National Strategy
(U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit (DTAU) SharePoint Site
(U//FOUO) DT Fusion Cell Intranet Site
(U//LES) Comprehensive Domestic Terrorism Strategy from 2006
Threat Issue Title

(U) HQ-CTD-491-I-20 Racially Motivated Violent Extremism

(U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorism Fusion Cell (DTU and DTTU)

Threat Definition (U)

(U) Racially Motivated Violent Extremism encompasses threats involving the use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political or social agendas which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race, held by the actor against others, including a given population group.

(U//FOUO) Some RMVEs are driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race and a perception that the US Government is conspiring with Jews and other minority populations to bring about the race’s demise.

(U) Other RMVEs use force or violence in violation of criminal law in response to perceived racism and injustice in American society, or in an effort to establish a separate black homeland or autonomous black social institutions, communities, or governing organizations within the United States.

Threat Overview (U//FOUO)

(U) Disclaimer: Domestic violent extremists employ a number of indicators, some of which may be criminal and others which may constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the US Constitution. The FBI is prohibited from engaging in investigative activity for the sole purpose of monitoring the exercise of constitutional rights.

(U//FOUO) RMVEs seek to further their social and political goals, wholly or in part through crimes of force or violence. In recent years, perpetrators of lethal RMVE attacks have been lone offenders or small cells acting without clear group affiliation or guidance. The Internet and the emergence of social media have also enabled individuals to engage other RMVEs without joining organized groups. Lone offenders will likely continue to benefit from operational security based on their independent activity, making it difficult for law enforcement to detect and prevent their violent plots.

(U//FOUO) Some RMVEs driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race find justification through a variety of religious beliefs (e.g., Christian Identity, Creativity Movement, and racist Odinism) and political and cultural ideologies (e.g., neo-Nazism and the racist skinhead movement). Some RMVE targets include differing racial, ethnic, sexual, and religious minorities and the cultural and social centers associated with them; the federal government for its perceived collusion with Jewish powers to harm the white race; and “race traitors” perceived to compromise the purity of the white race, such as sex offenders, drug abusers, the homeless, and those involved in interracial relationships. The FBI judges other potential drivers of violence may include foreign-inspired terrorist attacks whether committed within the United States or overseas and immigration.

(U) RMVE crimes are frequently opportunistic in nature, though some have involved intricate planning. Traditional types of criminal activity can include lethal violence, threats, intimidation, physical assault, and murder using bladed weapons, firearms, and improvised explosive devices. Some RMVEs have also engaged in the use and distribution of illegal narcotics, illegal weapons procurement, and bank robberies in support of their ideological goals.
(U) RMVEs also encompass actors who use retaliation and retribution for wrongdoings against African Americans by those they view as oppressors, including law enforcement of all races, whites, government personnel, and others they view as participants in an unjust institutionalized system. Other RMVEs do so in furtherance of establishing a separate black homeland or autonomous black social institutions, communities, or governing organizations within the United States, while some RMVEs desire for physical or psychological separation is based on a religious or political belief system.

(U//FOUO) The FBI judges some RMVE perceptions of police brutality against African Americans served as justification for pre-meditated, retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement in 2016. The FBI first observed this activity following the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the subsequent acquittal of police officers involved in that incident. While some RMVEs specifically target white law enforcement officers, other RMVEs regard all law enforcement officers as race traitors and legitimate targets based on their participation in a perceived unjust system. The FBI assesses the threat to law enforcement from some RMVEs is likely to continue, driven in part by continued calls for violent action on social media. The FBI assesses racially charged events, coupled with the wide-spread media attention of these events, and the ready dissemination of violent online rhetoric by some RMVEs, are likely to remain contributing factors for potential violence.

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**Strategy Overview**

**What is the intended impact? (U//FOUO)**

FBIHQ will continue to focus on identifying national trends and federal crimes committed by RMVEs, as well as targeting for new subjects associated with the program. Maintenance of state and local partnerships, combined with a particular focus on social network analysis and source development, could result in detection and prevention of RMVE criminal activity. RMVE threats and subjects are mostly identified by human source reporting, thus making identifying quality sources a priority for RMVE investigators. By developing an understanding of subject networks and having sources with good access and vetting their information for possible inclusion of an FBI undercover, the FBI can determine unknown threat actors, learn how RMVEs operate, mitigate specific operational plans by a group of RMVEs or lone offenders, make RMVEs less effective, and conducting RMVE operations more challenging.

**What part of the threat is the FBI going to target? (U//FOUO)**

The FBIHQ led RMVE Threat Mitigation Strategy was implemented to mitigate the potential threat posed by the RMVEs at the national level. This Strategy will accomplish this by identifying actionable intelligence to directly support the initiation of FBI assessments and investigations and to augment current efforts directed against RMVEs. The Strategy is designed to evolve and adapt to the ever-changing threat posed by RMVEs, to proactively address this priority domestic terrorism target by focusing on subjects developing international connections and the threat posed by foreign influencers. Also, the FBI will enhance efforts aimed at gaining a greater understanding of the mobilization to violence.

**What information does the FBI need to know in order to mitigate the threat? (U//FOUO)**

In order to mitigate the threat, the FBI must know who facilitates and recruits for RMVE activity, what motivates RMVEs to commit criminal activities in furtherance of their political/social goals, and what tactics RMVEs plan to use in the furtherance of their ideology. The FBI needs a better understanding of the social networks of RMVE groups and/or radicalized individuals and how these groups and/or individuals train/work/communicate with one another and criminal organizations. The FBI needs intelligence on individuals whom RMVE groups had removed or asked to leave or who left voluntarily after expressing beliefs deemed too extreme for the established members of the RMVE group, as many recent lethal RMVE incidents have been conducted by RMVE lone offenders. In addition to the information requested in
the FBI’s Key Intelligence Questions and Collection Requirements, it would be of great benefit to understand the recruitment process for members of RMVE organizations, the relationship with prison gangs and other purely criminal entities, how RMVEs communicate, connections to overseas RMVEs, and the radicalization process for those seeking membership in a RMVE organizations or for those wishing to act alone in an attack on RMVE targets.

What resources will HQ surge, for how long, and where are they coming from OR What new operational capabilities need to be developed to effectively mitigate the threat issue? (U//FOUO)

FBIHQ is surging resources to address the fundamental lack of understanding of the growing RMVE threat presented by subjects developing international connections, the threat presented by foreign influencers, and the ease with which subject are transitioning from a proponent of and consumer of RMVE ideology and material to actions of violence. FBIHQ efforts will be directed to developing social networks to discover connections to domestic and foreign actors, the means of influencing and facilitating RMVE subjects, and to develop a better understanding of the mobilization to violence.

What actions will the FBI take?

HQ Actions
(U//FOUO) HQ will work with field offices to mitigate and lower the national level extremist threats/enterprise investigations.

(U//FOUO) HQ will continue to identify and provide information on national threats and trends to FBI executives and field offices, as well as state and local law enforcement partners and the rest of the USIC.

(U//FOUO) HQ will pass actionable threat information to the field offices through the initiation of Guardian leads or investigations.

(U//FOUO) HQ will provide timely all-source analysis of RMVE activities in order to inform FBI executives and field offices of threats and trends in tactics and targets.

(U//FOUO) HQ will proactively search open source material for indicators of RMVE activity, reporting relevant information to the field for possible predication or assessment of source potential.

(U) CTD will serve as a key component of the FBI’s new DT/Hate Crime Fusion Cell.

(U) CTD will commit to continued collaboration with CID on investigations or operations of mutual interest.

Field Office Actions
(U//FOUO) Field offices will focus on source development, awareness, and investigation of RMVE criminal activity in their areas of responsibility.

(U//FOUO) Field offices will focus on changes in demographics in the AOR which might have an impact on RMVE targeting.

(U//FOUO) Field offices should contact the new DT/Hate Crime Fusion Cell to see if an incident or threat necessitates dual captioning of an investigation.

(U//FOUO) Field offices will focus on recruitment, fundraising for illegal activities, and potential violent plots.

(U//FOUO) Field offices will evaluate their need for an open Type 3 assessment file in regards to RMVE. An open assessment file allows for greater proactive collection techniques should the RMVE threat emerge in the wake of a police-involved incident that sparks potential RMVE activity.

(U//FOUO) Field offices will conduct social media analysis of RMVE threats, as appropriate.
(U//FOUO) Field offices will focus on the procurement of illegal weapons and explosives and the procurement of weapons and explosives by prohibited persons.

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**HQ TRP Impact and Mitigation Levels/Criteria**

**Impact Level 1**

Considerable loss of life and/or widespread fear or psychological/physical trauma with collateral implications

**Impact Level Justification (U//FOUO)**

(U//FOUO) In October 2018, an RMVE attacked a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, killing 11 and injuring others, in the most lethal domestic violent extremist attack since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. On 15 March 2019, a lone offender attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, killing 51 and injuring many others. In April 2019, an RMVE attacked a synagogue in Poway, California, killing one and injuring others. The manifesto connected to the alleged shooter referenced the Pittsburgh and Christchurch attackers as inspiration. These incidents highlighted not only the capability of violence of RMVEs, but also the international influences and connectivity of individuals who espouse ideologies consistent with neo-Nazi and racist religious beliefs, etc.

**Mitigation Level A**

National efforts require a surge in investigative activity, or development of new operational capabilities, to effectively mitigate the threat issue

FBI has a fundamentally incomplete understanding of the threat issue at the national level, presenting a critical barrier to mitigation

**Mitigation Level Justification (U//FOUO)**

(U//FOUO) Of six lethal domestic terrorism attacks or incidents resulting in fatalities in the calendar year 2018, five were attributed to lone offender RMVEs. The FBI assesses lone offenders and small cells without direction from organized groups likely represent the primary threat of lethal violence. The FBI assesses lone offenders and small cell RMVEs will continue to pose a threat of mass casualty violence due to the operational security afforded to their isolated attack planning.

(U) RMVE crimes are frequently opportunistic in nature, though some have involved intricate planning. Traditional types of criminal activity can include lethal violence, threats, intimidation, physical assault, and murder using bladed weapons, firearms, and improvised explosive devices. National efforts require a surge in investigative activity or the development of new capabilities to try to mitigate the threat from RMVEs and disrupt and prevent future mass casualty attacks.

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**Key Entities of Interest**

(U//LES) Likely to target civilian and government entities that are perceived as oppressors, including, but not limited to, law enforcement officers, the US Government, members of rival RMVE groups, and individuals based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion.

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**Key Contacts**

(U//LES) State and local law enforcement.

(U//LES) Foreign liaison partners.
Key Threat Indicators

(U//LES) Vandalism of religious buildings, government property, or other targets-based on race or religion, to include graffiti involving traditional RMVE symbols or group names.

(U//LES) Wearing of uniforms, patches, or insignia of an RMVE group.

(U//LES) Threatening communications to traditional RMVE targets, including racial, religious, and social minorities, law enforcement, and the federal government.

(U//LES) Confidential human source (CHS) and other law enforcement reporting on encounters with RMVEs.

(U//LES) RMVE collaboration with violent motorcycle gangs.

FBI Requirements

USA-TERM-CTD-SR-0401-16 (U//FOUO) White Supremacist Extremists

USA-TERM-CTD-SR-0519-17 (U//FOUO) Black Separatist Extremists

Case Classifications

100K (U) TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION - RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (BLACK)

100N (U) TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION - RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (WHITE)

266K (U) RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (BLACK)

266N (U) RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (WHITE)

386K (U) PRELIMINARY TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION - RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (BLACK)

386N (U) PRELIMINARY TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION - RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (WHITE)
FY20 - Threat Guidance - CTD

--- CPI Codes ---

DT-AR - Activity - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - ARSON
DT-AS - Activity - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - ASSAULT
DT-B - Activity - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM BOMBINGS
DT-BT - Activity - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM BOMB THREATS
DT-FC - Activity - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - FINANCIAL CRIMES
DT-FUG - Activity - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM FUGITIVES
DTG-013 - Activity - (U//FOUO) BLACK IDENTITY EXTREMISM - EVENT
DTG-014 - Actor - (U//FOUO) BLACK IDENTITY EXTREMISM - SUBJECT
DTG-023 - Activity - (U//FOUO) WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM - EVENT
DTG-024 - Actor - (U//FOUO) WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM - SUBJECT
DT-GOV - Target Platforms - (U) THREATS TO GOVERNMENT FACILITIES
DT-JUD - Target Platforms - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO JUDICIAL FIGURES
DT-LE - Target Platforms - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
DT-PO - Target Platforms - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS
DT-SAB - Target Platforms - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - SABOTAGE
DT-SH - Target Platforms - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - SHOOTING
DT-VIO - Activity - (U) DOMESTIC TERRORISM - THREATS OF VIOLENCE
SUB-FEL - Actor - (U//FOUO) SUBJECT IS CONVICTED FELON
SUB-FMIL - Actor - (U//FOUO) SUBJECT IS FORMER MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY
SUB-MIL - Actor - (U//FOUO) SUBJECT IS MEMBER OF US MILITARY

--- Related Links ---

(U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorism Unit (DTU) SharePoint Site
(U//LES) Comprehensive Domestic Terrorism Strategy from 2006
(U) White Supremacy National Strategy
(U//FOUO) DT Fusion Cell Intranet Site